THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ODON SURIGAWAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Accused-appellant Odon Surigawan, together with Herminiano Aperdo,
Daniel Bahaynon and Alejandro Uayan, were charged with the crime of Robbery
with Homicide under the following Information:

“That on or about the 4th day of March 1985, in the evening,
in the residence of the victim, at Palaopao, barangay Maluko, municipality of
Manolo Fortich, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, by means of treachery, with
evident premeditation, with the use of a gun, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally attack, assault and beat TEODORO DONIA, inflicting
several wounds on his body, which cause the death of TEODORO DONIA thereafter.

And that in the occasion of said murder upon Teodoro Donia and
pursuant to the same conspiracy, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation take, rob and carry away from Teodoro Donia money the amount of
THREE THOUSAND (P3,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to his damage and
prejudice.

The crime was committed in the dwelling of
the victim.

Contrary to and in violation of Article 294 in relation with
Section 14, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code.”

Upon arraignment on May 24, 1985, the four (4) accused pleaded
not guilty.

Their trial proceeded. The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses: Pat. Ruben Enguio, a policeman of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon;
Adelina Serrana, daughter of the victim Teodoro Donia; Judge Angel Baula,
municipal judge of Manolo Fortich-Libona, Bukidnon; and Federico Abunda, a
neighbor of the victim. After these
witnesses testified, accused Aperdo, Buhaynon and Uayon, assisted by counsel,
changed their plea from not guilty to guilty. They were accordingly meted their sentence.^[1] Accused-appellant Odon Surigawan, however,
continued to maintain his innocence and proceeded with his defense. He himself testified. His mother, Laureana Surigawan, buttressed
his defense.

The facts as deduced from the evidence are hardly dubitable. The victim of the crime was Teodoro
Donia. He was a widower, 69 years old
and lived alone in his house at Palcopao, Maluko, Manolo Fortich,
Bukidnon. His married daughter, Adelina
Serrana, lived some 24 meters away from his house.

In the evening of March 4, 1985, Adelina and her husband Pablito
and their children, heard the victim shouting for help. They ran to their neighbors and asked for
help. None offered any assistance. They could only look through their window to
see what was happening in the house of the victim. Below the victim’s house, they saw two (2) persons wearing white
shirts. Seized by fear, they did not
come near the victim’s house until 6 o’clock the next morning. They were greeted by the dead body of the
victim in blood. His chest had a
wound. His left arm was swollen. One of his legs was broken. His P3,000.00 was gone. That was the money he earned selling corn
and bamboo.

The crime was reported to the local police authorities. Patrolman Ruben Enguio conducted the
investigation.^[2] The investigators found that the wall at the
back of the house of the victim was destroyed by the culprits. But what broke the case was a strange pair
of slippers of different colors left by the culprits at the scene of the crime. The slipper for the right foot was red while
the slipper for the left foot was yellow. A child^[3]
informed Pat. Enguio that he has seen accused Uayan wear this pair of slippers
in the market.

The police looked for accused Uayan. They could not locate him for several days. They asked his mother and elder brother to
surrender him. On March 9, 1985, the
accused Uayan gave himself up. Pat.
Enguio took his statement.^[4] After he was apprised of his constitutional
rights, he admitted his participation in the crime without the assistance of
counsel. He also implicated his
co-accused. He was then brought before
Judge Angel Baula of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Manolo
Fortich-Libona, Bukidnon where he swore to his statement.

With Uayon’s confession, Pat. Enguio then filed a complaint
against the four (4) accused in the municipal court. Judge Baula conducted the preliminary investigation. Accused Uayon reiterated his statement and
the police picked up the three (3) other accused. The three (3) initially denied any involvement in the crime. They had a change of attitude and agreed to
give their statements when they learned that accused Uayon had already spilled
the beans on them. They were then
informed of their constitutional rights and they waived their right to
counsel. They admitted guilt in their
respective statements. The statement of
accused Aperdo^[5]
had as witnesses, his wife Nelia and Lourdes Surigawan.^[6] The statement of accused Daniel Buhaynon^[7]
had as witness, his father, Marcelo. The statement of accused-appellant Odon Surigawan^[8] had
as witnesses his wife, Lourdes, father, Martin, and mother, Laureana.

In his defense, accused-appellant Surigawan declared that the
statement he signed admitting his guilt was already prepared by the
police. He said the police did not read
the same to him before he signed it. He
also averred that he signed the statement without the assistance of a lawyer
due to the promise of the police that he would be released upon its signing. He was also threatened that something would
happen to him if he refused to sign the statement. He advanced alibi to exculpate himself. He said that on the date and time in question, he was sleeping in
his house with his wife and children.

The trial court^[9] convicted the accused-appellant Surigawan in
a Decision dated February 5, 1988.^[10] It premised the conviction on two (2)
grounds: (1) accused-appellant’s extra
judicial statement (Exh. “H”) admitting his guilt, and (2)
accused-appellant’s implication to the crime made in the extra-judicial statements of his co-accused (Exhibits
“B”, “F” and “J”).

Accused-appellant^[11] now assails the Decision of the trial court
with the following:

“ASSIGNMENT
OF ERRORS

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN
ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF THE ACCUSED;

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN
RELYING ON THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF THE ACCUSED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT;

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN
NOT FINDING FOR THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND ACQUITTING HIM OF THE CHARGE AGAINST
HIM”;

In his Manifestation and Motion dated
March 16, 1993, the Solicitor General^[12]
recommended the reversal of the conviction of accused-appellant Surigawan.

We find merit in the appeal as well as the recommendation of the
Solicitor General.

The guilt of the accused-appellant was not established by any
competent and credible evidence. The
prosecution did not present any witness identifying the accused-appellant as
among the perpetrators of the crime at bar. Adelina Serrana, the daughter of the victim, could only state that she
saw two (2) persons under the house of the victim when the crime was
committed. Unfortunately, however, she
failed to recognize the identities of these persons.

Be that as it may, the trial court still convicted the accused-appellant
based on his extra-judicial statement (Exh. “H”) given to the police sans counsel. The admission
and use of this uncounselled confession is prohibited by no less than the
Constitution, sec. 12 (1) and (3), Article III of which provide:

“(1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford
the service of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

x x x

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.”

In a litany of cases,^[13]
we have ruled that uncounselled confession cannot convict. This shopworn ruling was reiterated in
People v. Gonzales^[14], viz:

“It is now too well-settled to require extensive citation of
authority that the right to remain silent and to refrain from giving an
extrajudicial confession and to have competent and independent counsel, cannot
be waived save in the presence of counsel and that an extrajudicial confession
obtained under such circumstances is not admissible in evidence. We cannot, therefore, take account of the
extrajudicial confession of appellant Gonzales. The judgment of conviction must stand or fail on the basis of
other evidence of record.”

It is not difficult to understand why
unlawfully, obtained evidence has to be excluded. To paraphrase Mr. Justice Tom Clark in Mapp vs. Ohio^[15]
“to hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its
privilege and enjoyment.”

The error of the trial court is compounded by the use of similar
uncounselled confessions^[16] made
by the other accused to convict accused-appellant Surigawan. Cited by the trial court to bolster its
ruling is section 30 of Rule 130 which provides:

“The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the
co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.”

Again, the inapplicability of this
provision is plain to the eye. For this
provision to apply, the following requisites^[17] must
be satisfied:

“a. that the
conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself;

b. that the admission
relates to the common objects; and

c. that it has been
made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.”

In the case at bar, the alleged
conspiracy among the accused was not priorly established by separate and
independent evidence. Nor was it shown
that the extra?judicial confessions of the other accused (Exhibits
“B”, “F” ????? “J”) were made while they were engaged in
carrying out the conspiracy. In truth,
the confessions were made after the conspiracy has ended and after the
consummation of the crime. These
confessions cannot be used against the accused-appellant without doing violence
against his constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against
him and to cross examine them.^[18]

Without the uncounselled confession of the accused-appellant and
the extra-judicial confessions of the other accused, no shred of evidence
remains to establish the guilt of accused-appellant Surigawan beyond reasonable
doubt.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Bukidnon, 10th Judicial Region, Br. XI, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon in Crim.
Case No. 318 is reversed and set aside and the accused-appellant Odon Surigawan
is acquitted from the charge of Robbery with Homicide. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, and Nocon, JJ., concur.

^[1]
They were sentenced to suffer imprisonment from 8 years, 1 day of prision mayor
as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, to
indemnify the heirs of Donia in the amount of P33,000.00, to suffer the other
accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the cost of the
proceedings.

^[2]
He was assisted by Pfc. Lozada and Pat. Elnar.

^[3]
Pat. Enguio failed to give the name of the child.

^[4]
Exh. “B”.

^[5]
Exh. “F”.

^[6]
Wife of accused-appellant Odon Surigawan.

^[7]
Exh. “J”.

^[8]
Exh. “H”.

^[9]
The RTC of Bukidnon, 19th Judicial
Region, Br, XI, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon presided by the Hon. Garison Mabelin. The case was docketed as Crim. Case No. 318
for Robbery with Homicide.

^[10]
It appreciated the aggravating
circumstances of superior strength and dwelling and sentenced the
accused-appellant to reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Teodoro Donia the
sum of P30,000.00 and to pay the costs of the proceedings.

^[11]
He was ably assisted by Atty. Augusto
Jose Y. Arreza, as counsel de oficio.

^[12]
Solicitor General Raul Goco, assisted by ASGs Ramon A. Barcelona and Pio C.
Guerrero and Associate Solicitor Armand Mejia.

^[13]
People vs. Lacap, 171 SCRA 147 [1989]; Aballe vs. People, 183
SCRA 196 [1990]; People vs. Capinpon, 204 SCRA 116 [1991]. People vs. Jimenez, 204 SCRA 719
[1991].

^[14]
189 SCRA 343 [1990].

^[15]
367 US 643 [1961].

^[16]
Exhibits “B”, “F” and “J”.

^[17]
Apostol, Essentials of Evidence, 1986 ed., p, 163; Francisco, The Revised Rules
of Court in the Philippines, Vol. VII, part I, 1990 ed., pp. 349-356.

^[18]
People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil.
718, 725; People vs. Ferry 66 Phil. 310.