MARIANO DINGLASAN AND FELICIDAD DINGLASAN, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. MARIA ALICIA M. AUSTRIA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 159, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG, METRO MANILA, NATIONAL …

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a restraining order seeking the annulment of the
November 17, 1988 and February 20, 1989 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, presided over by herein respondent Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria, in
Civil Case No. 15363, ordering the issuance of a writ of execution and denying
the motion for reconsideration, respectively.

Spouses Mariano Dinglasan and Felicidad Dinglasan, herein
petitioners, on June 2, 1961, mortgaged their real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 88001 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal (a residential lot at
268 Haig St., Mandaluyong, Rizal, consisting of 1,088 square meters more or
less; and a residential building
constructed thereon) to respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
to secure a loan of P30,000.00, payable within ten (10) years in monthly
installment of P452.86. Respondent
GSIS, in its letter of September 5, 1966, petitioners being 56 months in
arrears in the payment of their loan, gave them fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof within which to update their account. When they failed, respondent
GSIS, on January 3, 1967, filed an application for the extra-judicial
foreclosure of the mortgage with the Office of the Sheriff in Pasig,
Rizal. The auction sale was originally scheduled on February 14, 1967 but was transferred to March 14, 1967
because of the proposal of petitioner Mariano Dinglasan as to how he will liquidate his account, to which, respondent GSIS agreed subject to the
condition that “if he fails then go through with the foreclosure.”
(Exh. 15-A, p. 118, Record). On
February 8, 1967, petitioner Mariano paid respondent GSIS the amount of
P5,000.00 and accordingly, an agreement to postpone was prepared, transferring
the auction sale from February 14, 1967 to March 14, 1967. Petitioner did not
pay the amount of P500.00 during
the first two (2) weeks of March and as such, the auction sale proceeded on
March 14, 1967, and respondent GSIS, being
the highest bidder, offering the amount of P52,731.00, was awarded the
sale. Petitioners having failed to
redeem the property, the same was sold to herein private respondent Concepcion
T. Tinio, the highest bidder in the sealed public bidding.

On October 30, 1971, petitioners filed with the then Court of
First Instance of Pasig a Complaint for declaration of nullity of the
extra-judicial sale with preliminary injunction, docketed therein as Civil Case
No. 15363. In the same, petitioners claimed that respondent GSIS unlawfully
caused the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property without
complying with the requirements of posting and publication of the notices and
in buying for itself the said property at an inadequate price. Petitioners asked for the nullification of
the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property.

The then Court of First Instance of Rizal, presided over by Judge
Celso L. Magsino, after trial, in a
Decision dated July 29, 1976 (Rollo, pp. 19-34), dismissed the complaint

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court dismisses complaint, with
costs against the plaintiffs.

“The writ of preliminary injunction is hereby lifted and set
aside.

“The counterclaim is likewise dismissed.”

Petitioners filed an appeal, CA-G.R. No. 60654-R, and the Court
of Appeals, in a Decision promulgated on July
27, 1979 (Ibid., pp. 35-49), reversed and set aside the appealed decision –

“WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is reversed and set aside, and another is hereby rendered (a)
declaring null and void the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the property in
question held on March 14, 1967, the certificate of title issued in the name of
the defendant Government Service and Insurance System and all proceedings
relative thereto, and (b) enjoining permanently the defendants and all persons
acting in their behalf from dispossessing, or ejecting the plaintiffs from the
subject property. No pronouncement as
to costs.”

Respondent GSIS filed a petition for certiorari in this
Court, G.R. No. 52180, and the Second Division of this Court issued Resolution
dated December 8, 1980 (Ibid., p. 50),
which reads:

“‘G.R. No. 52180
(Government Service Insurance System vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.). –
Considering the pleadings filed in this case, the Court Resolved to require
petitioner to IMPLEAD Mrs. Concepcion I. Tinio and for the latter party to
COMMENT within ten (10) days from service of the amended petition, of which
service this Court must be notified by petitioner, why private respondents may
not be allowed, as a matter of equity at least, to pay all their outstanding
arrearages to the petitioner
within ninety (90) days from the time they receive her comment and the comment
of petitioner, on the condition that upon another failure of private
respondents to comply, the sale to Mrs. Tinio shall be deemed final and the
right to redeem of respondents finally
lost.’”

Respondent GSIS, in compliance, filed an amended petition
impleading respondent Tinio; and the Second Division of this Court issued a
Resolution dated January 27, 1982
(Ibid., p. 51), which reads:

“G.R. No. 52180 (Government Service Insurance System vs. Court
of Appeals, et al.) – Acting on
the (GSIS) amended petition herein, the Court resolved to DENY the same,
without prejudice to the parties including Concepcion I. Tinio being bound by the terms of the
resolution of December 8, 1980, whereby the rights of respondent Tinio would
immediately be effective upon failure of the Dinglasans to comply with said resolution.”

After the records of this case were remanded to the trial court,
Judge Celso L. Magsino issued an Order dated May 31, 1985 (Ibid., pp. 52-53)
the dispositive portion of which, reads:

“In implementation of the decision of the Supreme Court which
has become final and executory, the Court gives the plaintiffs sixty (60) days
from notice hereof within which to vacate the subject premises and deliver the same to Concepcion I. Tinio who is ordered to pay the balance of
her outstanding account in connection
with the sale of the subject premises to her
by the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) within a period of sixty (60) days from notice hereof,
and upon said payment, the GSIS is ordered to execute the corresponding deed of
sale.”

On June 7, 1985, petitioners filed with this Court an Omnibus
Motion (Ibid., pp. 82-84), praying that respondent GSIS be required to inform
them of their exact arrearages and to accept payment of the same or in the
alternative that they be allowed to deposit the same in a reputable bank in
trust for respondent GSIS, and that the court a quo be restrained
from issuing a writ of possession in favor of respondent Tinio. This was
followed by a Supplemental Motion on June 27, 1985, reiterating the prayer for
a restraining order. However, this
Court, in a Resolution dated October 11, 1988 (Ibid., p. 54), stated –

“Entry of judgment having been made on February 22, 1982, this
case was CLOSED and TERMINATED in this Court as of that date. Accordingly, all incidents transpiring
thereafter are REFERRED to the trial court,
which is DIRECTED to resolve the same within thirty days from notice hereof.”

Thereafter, the trial court,
now presided over by respondent judge, issued the questioned Order of November
17, 1988 (Ibid., pp. 89-90), wherein it is ordered that “[U]pon submission
to this Court of the deed of
sale executed by defendant GSIS,
let writ of execution issue requiring the plaintiffs to vacate the subject premises and deliver the same to said
Concepcion I. Tinio.”

Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said order, arguing that if there is any judgment to be executed at all, it
is the decision of the Court of Appeals which set aside the foreclosure sale
and the sale to respondent Tinio, and which permanently enjoined respondent
GSIS from disturbing the possession of petitioners. However, in an Order dated February 20, 1989 (Ibid., pp. 91-92), the motion was denied by respondent
judge –

“In view thereof, the present Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby denied for lack of merit.

“Considering the report of counsel for Concepcion T. Tinio
that she had actually paid the GSIS the amount due, the latter is hereby
ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of said Concepcion
Tinio, within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof; otherwise, the Court will
order the Clerk of Court of this Court to execute the corresponding Deed of
Sale in favor of Concepcion Tinio in order that the final decision of this
Court may be finally enforced and executed.”

Hence, the instant petition.

The Second Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated March
29, 1989 (Ibid., p. 62), resolved to require the respondents to comment; and after the parties had submitted the
required pleadings, in a Resolution dated August 2, 1989 (Ibid., p. 115), gave
due course to the petition.

Petitioners raised two (2) issues, to wit:

I

CAN RESPONDENT TRIAL JUDGE EXECUTE A JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF RIZAL IN CASE NO. 15363, WHICH WAS REVERSED EN TOTO BY THE
COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. NO. 60654-R AND WHICH REVERSAL WAS AFFIRMED BY THE
SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 52180?

II

DID THE RESOLUTIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT DATED DECEMBER 8, 1980
AND JANUARY 27, 1982. (ANNEXES
“C” AND “D”, RESPECTIVELY, OF PETITION) IN G.R. NO. 52180, SET ASIDE
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. NO. 60654-R AND IN EFFECT
MERELY GAVE PETITIONERS A GRACE PERIOD OF 90 DAYS TO REDEEM THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION; OTHERWISE, THEY LOST THEIR
EQUITABLE RIGHT TO REDEEM?

The instant petition is devoid of merit.

The second issue raised by petitioners is the main and crucial
issue in this case since if the same is answered in the affirmative, the sale
to respondent Concepcion T.
Tinio will be deemed final and the right to redeem of petitioners finally lost.

It is the contention of petitioners that the December 8, 1980
resolution of the Court did not give them any right of redemption nor did it
impose the penalty of the loss of
the right to redeem upon failure
of petitioners to exercise said right within ninety (90) days. They further alleged that the said
resolution only asked respondent Tinio to comment on the proposal of giving
petitioners time to exercise the right of redemption, subject to the penalty of
loss of the right by petitioners, in case of their failure.

Petitioners’ contention is untenable. The said resolution laid down a term for petitioners to pay all
the arrearages within ninety (90) days from the time they receive the comments
of respondents Tinio and GSIS, on the condition that upon another failure of
petitioners to comply, the sale to respondent Tinio shall be deemed final and
the right to redeem of petitioners finally lost. If the Court, as claimed by petitioners, merely required
respondent Tinio to comment on the possibility of granting petitioners a last opportunity to
redeem, then there would have been no need to impose the definite period to
redeem the property. Besides,
petitioners themselves, in their Omnibus Motion, contrary to their claim now,
is of the same interpretation or
construction of said resolution of December 8, 1980. Paragraph 3 of their said motion, reads:

“3.  That only recently movants discovered of the
Resolution of this Honorable Court dated December 8, 1980, allowing them to pay
all their outstanding arrearages to the GSIS within ninety (90) days from the
time they receive Comment and the Comment of petitioner;” (p. 82, Rollo)

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.