RUFINA VDA. DE TANGUB, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE (CAR) RTC, BRANCH 4, ILIGAN CITY, AND SPOUSES DOMINGO EUGENIA MARTIL, RESPONDENTS.

The jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court, acting as a special agrarian court, in the light of
Executive Orders Numbered 129-A and 229 and Republic Act No. 6657, is what is
at issue in the proceeding at bar.

Rufina Tangub and her
husband, Andres, now deceased, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del
Norte in March, 1988, “an agrarian case for damages by reason of the(ir)
unlawful dispossession * * as tenants from the landholding” owned by the
Spouses Domingo and Eugenia Martil.^[1] Several persons were also impleaded as
defendants, including the Philippine National Bank, it being alleged by the
plaintiff spouses that said bank, holder of a mortgage on the land involved,
had caused foreclosure thereof, resulting in the acquisition of the property by
the bank as the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, and in the sale by the latter, some time later, of
portions of the land to the other persons named as its co-defendants (all
employees of the National Steel Corporation), and it being prayed that that
mortgage and the transactions thereafter made in relation thereto be annulled
and voided.^[2]

In an Order rendered on August
24, 1988, respondent
Judge Felipe G. Javier, Jr. dismissed the complaint.^[3] He opined that by virtue of Executive Order
No. 229 — “providing the mechanisms for the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program at approved on July 24, 1987” — and
Executive No. 129-A, approved on July 26, 1987, as well as the Rules of the
Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian Reform, jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court over agrarian cases had been transferred to the Department
of Agrarian Reform.

The Tangub Spouses filed
a petition for certiorari with this Court, docketed as UDK-8867, assigned to the Second
Division.  Discerning however no special
and important reason for taking cognizance of the action, this Court referred
the same to the Court of Appeals, that tribunal having concurrent jurisdiction
to act thereon.

The Court of Appeals, by
Decision promulgated on October 23, 1989,^[4] dismissed the petition, finding that the
jurisdictional question had been correctly resolved by the Trial Court.  The Court of Appeals,
adverted to a case earlier decided by it, on August 30, 1989, Estanislao
Casinillo v. Hon. Felipe G. Javier, Jr., et al., in which it was
“emphatically ruled that agrarian cases no longer fall under the
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts but rather under the jurisdiction of the
DAR Adjudication Board.”^[5] The ruling was grounded on the provisions of
Executive Orders Numbered 229, approved on July 22, 1987, and 129-A, issued on
July 26, 1987, in relation to Republic Act No. 6657, effective on June 15,
1988.  Said executive orders, it was
pointed out, were issued by President
Corazon C. Aquino undoubtedly in the exercise of her revolutionary powers in
accordance with Section 6, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1986
Constitution providing that the “incumbent President shall continue to
exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.”

The petitioner
Rufina Vda. de Tangub, now widowed, is once again before this Court,
contending that the Trial Court’s “order of dismissal of August
26, 1988, and the
decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals affirming it, are patently illegal
and unconstitutional” because they deprive “a poor tenant access to
courts and directly violate R.A. 6657, PD 946, and Batas Bilang 129.”

The petition is without
merit.

Section
1 of Executive Order No. 229 sets out the scope of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP).  It states that the program –

” * * shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produce, all public and private agricultural land as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 dated July 22, 1987, including whenever applicable in
accordance with law, other lands of the public domain suitable to
agriculture.”

Section 17 thereof

1) vested the Department of Agrarian Reform with
“quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters,” and

2) granted it “jurisdiction over all matters involving
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of Agriculture (DA), as
well as “powers to punish for contempt and to issue subpoena, subpoena
duces tecum and writs to enforce its orders or decisions.”

Section 4 of Executive
Order No. 129-A made the Department of Agrarian Reform “responsible for
implementing the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and, for such
purpose,” authorized it, among others, to –

“(g)
Provide free legal services to agrarian reform beneficiaries and resolve
agrarian conflicts and land tenure problems; * * (and)

***

(j)  Approve or disapprove the conversion,
restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural
uses:  * * .”

And
Section 5 of the same Executive Order No. 129-A specified the powers and
functions of the Department of Agrarian Reform, including the following:

“(b) Implement all agrarian laws,
and for this purpose, punish for contempt and issue subpoena, subpoena duces
tecum, writ of execution of its decision, and other legal processes to ensure
successful and expeditious program implementation; the decisions of the
Department may in proper cases, be appealed to the Regional Trial Courts but
shall be immediately executory notwithstanding such appeal;

***

(h)  
Provide free legal service to
agrarian reform beneficiaries and resolve agrarian conflicts and land tenure
related problems as may be provided for by laws;

(i)     
Have exclusive authority to
approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for residential,
commercial, industrial, and other land uses as may be provided * * *.”

The jurisdiction thus conferred on the Department of Agrarian Reform, i.e.:

(a)  
adjudication of all matters
involving implementation of agrarian reform;

(b)   resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and

(c)   approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or
readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial,
and other non-agricultural uses,

is
evidently quite as extensive as that theretofore vested in the Regional Trial
Court by Presidential Decree No. 946, which extended to the rights and
obligations of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land, and
other matters affecting tenant-farmers, agricultural lessees, settlers,
owner-cultivators, farms’ cooperatives or organizations under laws,
Presidential Decrees, Orders, instructions, Rules and Regulations in relation
to the agrarian reform program.^[6] Clearly, the latter must be deemed to have
been eliminated by its being subsumed in the broad jurisdiction conferred on
the Department of Agrarian Reform.  The
intention evidently was to transfer original jurisdiction to the Department of
Agrarian Reform, a proposition stressed by the rules formulated and promulgated
by the Department for the implementation of the executive orders just quoted.^[7] The rules included the creation of the
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board designed to exercise the adjudicatory
functions of the Department, and the allocation to it of –

” * * original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
subject matter vested upon it by law, and all cases, disputes, controversies
and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program under Executive Order No. 229, Executive Order No.
129-A, Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6289, Presidential
Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.”

The
implementing rules also declare that “(s)pecifically, such jurisdiction
shall extend over but not be limited to * * (that theretofore vested in the
Regional Trial Courts, i.e.) (c)ases involving the rights and obligations of
persons engaged in the cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other agrarian laws **.”

The matter has since been further and definitively clarified by
Republic Act No. 6657, which was signed into law by President Aquino on June 10, 1988 and became effective
immediately after its “publication in two (2) national newspapers of
general circulation” on June 15,
1988.  The Act makes
references to and explicitly recognizes
the effectivity and applicability of Presidential Decree No. 229.^[8] More particularly, the Act echoes the
provisions of Section 17 of Presidential Decree No. 229, supra,
investing the Department of Agrarian Reform with original jurisdiction,
generally, over all cases involving agrarian laws, although, as shall shortly
be pointed out, it restores to the Regional Trial Court, limited jurisdiction
over two groups of cases.  Section 50
reads as follows:

“SEC. 50.  Quasi-Judicial
Powers of the DAR.–The DAR is
hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).

It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence
but shall proceed to hear and decide all cases, disputes or controversies in a
most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts
of every case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the
case.  Toward this end, it shall adopt a
uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination
of every action or proceeding before it.

It shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take
testimony, require submission of reports, compel the
production of books and documents and answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena, and subpoena duces tecum and to enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly
deputized officers.  It shall likewise
have the power to punish direct and indirect contempts in the same manner and
subject to the same penalties as provided in the Rules of Court.

*****

Notwithstanding an appeal to the court of appeals, the decision of
the DAR shall be immediately executory.”^[9]

The Regional Trial Courts
have not, however, been completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian
reform matters.  Section 56 of RA 6657,
on the other hand, confers “special jurisdiction” on “Special
Agrarian Courts,” which are Regional Trial Courts designated by the
Supreme Court — at least one (1) branch within each province — to act as
such.  These Regional Trial Courts qua
Special Agrarian Courts have, according to Section 57 of the same law, original
and exclusive jurisdiction over:

1) “all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to land-owners,” and

2) “the prosecution of all criminal offenses under ** (the) Act.”

In
these cases, “(t)he Rules of Court shall apply **
unless modified by ** (the) Act.”

It is relevant to mention in this connection that –

(1)  
appeals from decisions of the
Special Agrarian Courts “may be taken by filing a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt or notice of the
decision, **”^[10]
and

(2)  
appeals from any “decision,
order, award or ruling of the DAR on any agrarian dispute or on any matter
pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation
of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform may be brought to the
Court of Appeals by certiorari^[11]
except as otherwise provided ** within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
copy thereof,” the “findings of fact of the DAR ** (being) final and
conclusive if based on substantial evidence.”^[12]

The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City was therefore correct in dismissing Agrarian
Case No. 1094.  It being a case
concerning the rights of the plaintiffs as tenants on agricultural land, not
involving the “special jurisdiction” of said Trial Court acting as a
Special Agrarian Court, it clearly came within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform, or more particularly, the
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, established precisely to wield the
adjudicatory powers of the Department, supra.

The petitioner has not
bothered to substantiate her contention that she has been denied access to the courts, which is just as
well.  The contention is on its face
utterly without merit.  It may profit
her and her counsel to realize that apart from granting all concerned parties
access to a quasi-judicial forum (the Adjudication Board of the Department of
Agrarian Reform), the law strives to make resolution of controversies therein
more expeditious and inexpensive, by providing not only that the Board
“shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence,” supra,
but also that, as explicitly stated by the penultimate paragraph of Section 50
of the Act:

“Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent
themselves, their fellow farmers, or their organizations in any proceedings
before the DAR:  Provided, however, That when
there are two or more representatives for any individual or group, the
representatives should choose only one among themselves to represent such party
or group before any DAR proceedings.”

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is
DISMISSED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 16725
dated October 23, 1989, AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and
Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
The case was docketed as Agrarian Case No. 1094, assigned to Branch 4 of the
RTC at Iligan City,
Lanao del Norte, presided over by Hon. Felipe G.
Javier, Jr.

^[2] Rollo,
pp. 9-16

^[3] Id.,
pp. 24-28

^[4]
In CA-G.R. SP. No. 16725, assigned to the Fifth Division, the ponente being Francisco, J., with whom
concurred Martinez and Elbinias, JJ.

^[5] Rollo,
p. 38

^[6]
The “original and exclusive jurisdiction” of the CAR under SEC. 12,
PD 946 extended to cases or questions involving rights and obligations in the
cultivation and use of agricultural land or arising from laws, Presidential
Decrees, Orders, instructions, Rules and Regulations in relation to the
agrarian reform program; the collection of amortizations on payments for farm
equipment, irrigation systems or water right grants, or rentals affecting
tenant-farmers, agricultural lessees, settlers, owner-cultivators, farms’
cooperatives or organizations; the annulment or rescission of lease contracts
and sales pertaining to agricultural lands; boundary disputes; membership in
the Samahang Nayon, etc.

^[7]
Rules of the DAR Adjudication Board, which took effect on March 8, 1988

^[8]
SEC. 4 states that the CARP covers, all agricultural lands, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced as provided in Proclamation No. 131
and Executive Order No. 229.  SEC. 14
accords effect to the registration of landowners made pursuant to said EO 229.  SEC. 47 enumerates the functions of the BARC
(Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee) which shall be in addition to those
provided in EO 229.  SEC. 63 provides
that the initial funding for the implementation of the Act shall be taken from
the Agrarian Reform Fund created under Secs. 20 and 21 of EO 229.  SEC. 75 declares that EO 229, together with
RA 3844 as amended, PD Nos. 27 and 266 as amended, and EO 228 and other laws
not inconsistent with the Act, “shall have suppletory effect.”

^[9]
“Agrarian reform,” according to SEC. 3 of RA 6657, “means redistribution
of lands, regardless of crops or fruits produced, to farmers and regular
farmworkers who are landless, irrespective of tenurial arrangement, to include
the totality of factors and support services designed to lift the economic
status of the beneficiaries and all other arrangements alternative to physical
redistribution of lands, such as production or profit-sharing, labor
administration, and the distribution of shares of stock, which will allow
beneficiaries to receive a just share of the fruits of the lands they
work.” “Agrarian dispute,” in the context of the DAR’s power to
“hear and decide all cases, disputes or controversies” set out in the
second paragraph of SEC. 50, “refers,” according to the same SEC. 3, “to
any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers’ associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining changing or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of such tenurial arrangements.,” including “any
controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under ** (the) Act and
other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farm-workers tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.”

^[10]
Sec. 60

^[11]
This mode of appeal is sui generis.  It is the only instance when an appeal
by certiorari may be
taken to the Court of Appeals. 
Heretofore, appeals by certiorari were authorized only when taken
to the Supreme Court.

^[12]
Sec. 54