PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DOMINGO DE MESA Y PANTALEON AND MARIO DE MESA, ACCUSED, DOMINGO DE MESA Y PANTALEON, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal brought before this Court by appellant, Domingo
de Mesa y Pantaleon, from a Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104 (Special
Criminal Court),^[1]
dated 1 February 1989, which adjudged him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the victim in
the sum of one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos representing actual,
compensatory and moral damages; and to pay the costs.

The prosecution presented as a witness; Crisostomo
Mapalad, a helper in .Yolly’s
Canteen, situated at 1081 Quirino Hi-way, Barangay Kaligayahan, Quezon City, where the crime
occurred.  In his testimony (Rollo, pp. 15-16, TSN, pp. 20-22, October 18, 1989) he
narrated that on 19 January 1988, at about 3:45 in the afternoon, the
appellant, together with his co-accused Mario de Mesa, who is his cousin, and
another man, arrived at Yolly’s Canteen.  They ordered beer and started drinking.  The victim, Sgt. Renato
Santos, a member of the Malabon Police. Station and
owner of the canteen, also entered the premises and after asking for coffee,
sat on a long bench inside the canteen. 
The appellant approached Sgt. Santos and asked him whom he had voted
for.  When the latter replied that he had
voted for “Oreta“, appellant’s cousin,
Mario de Mesa, addressed these remarks to Sgt. Santos, “Gago ka pala.  Si Planas ang ibinoto
ko.” Sgt. Santos said that he voted in Malabon.  Mario de
Mesa, however, said, “Baka akala
mo, komo sarhento ka ay natatakot ako sa
iyo.” Sgt. Santos asked Mario de Mesa, “Bakit, inaano ba
kita?” As Sgt. Santos started to stand up, Mario
de Mesa pushed him on the shoulder as appellant Domingo de Mesa simultaneously
stabbed him on his left chest below the shoulder.  Mapalad witnessed
the incident as he was only about one arm’s length from the three.  The witness knew the appellant as the latter
drank and ate at the canteen quite often.

After the stabbing of Sgt. Santos, Mario and Domingo de Mesa ran
away.  The victim drew his gun and fired
three times but he was not able to hit them (Rollo,
p. 15).  Sgt. Santos was taken to the MCU
Hospital where he expired.

On 20 January 1988, appellant was apprehended at the BLTB bus
terminal in Pasay City. He was arraigned while his
cousin, Mario de Mesa, remained at large. In the course of the trial, the
prosecution Corrected the name of the appellant appearing in the Information
from Dominador de Mesa y Pantaleon
to Domingo de Mesa y Pantaleon (Rollo,
p. 15) .

The prosecution also presented Beatrice Alpanoso
Perez.  Her testimony (Rollo, p. 16, TSN, pp. 3-6, October 5, 1989) dovetailed
with that of Mapalad on all material points.  She stated that she went to Yolly’s Canteen to borrow some lotion from her
sister-in-law, Yolly Santos, owner of the canteen and
the second wife of the victim.  She
observed that the appellant and the latter were having an argument.  It turned out that the appellant was trying
to get from Yolly Santos the clothes of a certain Marivic, but Yolly refused
because Marivic is indebted to her in the amount of
P300.00.  After that, the appellant
approached Sgt. Santos, and the subsequent exchange of words between them
leading to the stabbing incident, occurred.

The defense presented only one witness, the appellant, 25 years,
single, a deep-well driller, who categorically denied that he had stabbed the
victim.  He implicated his cousin and
co-accused, Mario de Mesa, as the perpetrator of the crime.  He narrated that at 3:45 in the afternoon of
19 January 1988, he was inside Yolly’s Canteen with
his cousin, Mario de Mesa and another man named Nick De Vera.  While inside the canteen, he witnessed an
argument among Sgt. Santos, the victim, Mario de Mesa (accused-at-large) and Yolly” Santos.  According to him, the argument started when
he asked Renato Santos whom he voted for.  When Santos answered “Oreta“, Mario de Mesa said, “Tarantado
ka pala, Quezon City ito.  Bakit si Oreta
ang ibinoto mo.” The
victim reportedly answered, “Tarantado ka rin.” The appellant said that he transferred to
another bench when an altercation ensued between the two.  After several moments, appellant claimed that
Mario de Mesa told him to run.  When he
asked Mario why, appellant alleged that Mario told him that he stabbed a man,
which he assumed to be Sgt. Santos.  He
knew that Mario, a butcher, was carrying a knife when they entered the
canteen.  As they were fleeing the place,
he heard three successive gun shots (TSN, pp. 45-49, 14 December 1988).

When asked if he knew of any reason why Crisostomo
Mapalad would testify against him, he told the Court
that he had a previous quarrel with the latter (TSN, p. 50, 14 December
1988).  The accused admitted that Crisostomo used to be his gangmate
and knew him for about three years.

On cross-examination, the appellant said that he used to talk to
the victim about the elections whenever they saw each other, and that he did
not get angry when he was told by the victim that he voted for Oreta since he knew that he was from Malabon
(TSN, p. 54-55, 14 December 1988).

As aforestated, the Trial Court
convicted the appellant of the crime charged, holding that his denial of
participation in the crime cannot overcome the positive identification made by
the witnesses.  The Court also noted the
presence of treachery in the execution of the crime (Rollo,
p. 19).  Hence, this appeal wherein the
appellant interposes the following Assignments of Error:

I

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RELYING
SOLELY ON THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION’S WITNESSES AND IN REJECTING THE
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE.

II

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING
‘USED DOMINGO DE MESA OF MURDER
-INSTEAD OF HOMICIDE GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT HE IS GUILTY.

This appeal lacks merit.  A
thorough law of the records of the case indicates that the guilt of the
appellant has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt.

The first error assigned by the appellant revolves around the credibility
of the prosecution witnesses as against his own testimony.  On this point, the established rule is that
the Appellate Courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the
Trial Court, as the latter is in n better position to decide the same, having
heard the witnesses themselves and having observed their deportment and manner
of testifying during the trial (People v. Olalia, No.
50669, March 12, 1984, 128 SCRA 139).  In
the case at bar, the testimonies of the witnesses against the appellant were
straightforward, categorical and convincing. 
Their declarations were unimpaired by material discrepancies even when
subjected to cross-examination.  Against
this backdrop, the veracity of their testimonies must be accepted.

The prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellant as
the one who stabbed the victim.  Beatrice
A. Perez testified:

Q.   When Domingo de Mesa sat
beside Sgt. Santos, what happened next, if any?

A.    Domeng
asked Sgt. Santos whom he voted.

Q.   What was the answer of
Sgt. Santos, if any, to the question asked by Domeng?

A.    Sgt. Santos answered, he
voted for Oreta.

Q.   What happened next after
Sgt. Santos answered it was Oreta whom he voted?

A.    Mario de Mesa, cousin of
Domeng said “gago ka pala.”

xxx                xxx                   xxx

Q.   What did Sgt. Santos do,
if any, when Mario de Mesa uttered such words to him?

A.    None, he stood up.

Q.   When Sgt. Santos stood
up, what happened next, if any?

A.    Mario tapped him on
the right shoulder and simultaneously Domeng stabbed
him on the left side of his shoulder (TSN, pp. 5-6, October 5, 1988,
underscoring supplied).

Crisostomo Mapalad
also told the Court:

Q.   And what happened next
after Dominador de Mesa approached Sgt. Santos?

A.    He asked him who he
voted for and Sgt. Santos answered Oreta.

Q.   And what was the reaction
of Doming de Mesa,

xxx    xxx       xxx

A.    His cousin bat (sic) in
and said” “Gago ka pala.  Si Planas ang ibinoto
ko.”

xxx                xxx                   xxx

Q.   Then, what happened next,
if any?

A.    After that, Mario said
that: “Baka akala mo, komo Sarhento ka ay natatakot ako sa
iyo.”

Q.   And what happened next,
after that?

A.    And Sgt. Santos said:
“Bakit, inaano ba kita?”, and he attempted
to stand up, but Mario pushed him on the shoulder and simultaneously, Doming
stabbed him (TSN, pp. 21-22, October 18, 1988, underscoring supplied).

Thus, there can be no doubt regarding the positive identification
of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.  It is well-settled that greater weight is
given to the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution
witnesses than to the accused’s denial and
explanation concerning the commission of the crime (People v. Canada, No.
63728, September 15, 1986, 144 SCRA 121; People v. Mostoles,
Jr., L-38644, September 30, 1983, 124 SCRA 906).  Against such positive identification, appellant’s
negative assertion that he did not kill the victim cannot prevail (People v. Sabado, No. 76952, December 22, 1988, 168 SCRA 681).  Further, it has been ruled that the early
identification of an accused by prosecution bespeaks of their spontaneity and
veracity v. Chavez, L-38603, September 30, 1982,117 SCRA 221)

In an effort to discredit the positive identification made by
prosecution witnesses, the appellant emphasized that Crisostomo
Mapalad was the victim’s canteen helper for more than
two years, hence, his loyalty to his employer cannot be discounted.  And, in respect of Beacrice
A. Perez, he avers that being the sister-in-law of the victim, she had a strong
motive to testify falsely (Rollo, p. 38).  Mere relationship to the victim, however,
need not automatically tarnish the testimony of witnesses. “When there is
no showing of improper motive on the part of witnesses for testifying against
the accused.  The fact that they are
related to the victim does not render their clear and positive testimony less
worthy of full faith and credit.  On the
contrary, their natural interest in securing the conviction of the guilty would
delve them from implicating persons other than the culprits, for otherwise, the
latter would thereby gain immunity” (People v. Radomes,
No. 68421, March 20, 1986, 141 SCRA 548; People v. Canada, supra).  The appellant failed to point any specific
reason that motivated the witnesses to testify falsely against him other than
their relationship to the victim.  As
regards Mapalad, the appellant told the Court that he
had a previous quarrel with him over gambling. 
Suffice it to state that this is not a strong enough reason to discredit
Mapalad’s testimony specially in the light of its
obvious credibility.

Appellant’s attempt to shift culpability to Mario de Mesa, who is
still at large, is a convenient device which cannot succeed in the face of
positive evidence against him.

With respect to the second assigned error, the Trial Court,
correctly appreciated the presence of treachery in the commission of the
crime.  As the records disclose, the
victim was suddenly stabbed by the appellant without any warning.  Although he was armed with a gun, he was
never given an opportunity to ward off the assault due to its suddenness.  The defense cannot justifiably argue that the
heated discussion had placed the victim or his guard.  After all, only a trivial matter was
involved.  As the evidence discloses, the
victim was complete unprepared for the attack, was unable to offer any
resistance, nor make any move whatsoever in his defense.  The attack was, therefore, carried out in a
manner that precluded any risk or retaliation to the appellant that could have
come from the victim.  Treachery was
unquestionably present.

Pursuant to the majority opinion in People v.
Muñoz and Millora
(L-38969-70, February 9, 1989, 170 SCRA 107), the imposable penalty for Murder,
in the absence of any circumstance, is reclusion perpetua.^[2]

WHEREFORE, the
judgment is AFFIRMED, except that the indemnity awarded the heirs of the
deceased is reduced to P30,000.00, consistent with prevailing
jurisprudence.  Costs against
accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento,
and Regalado, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, presiding.

^[2]  Subject to the undersigned’s own dissenting
opinion