G.R. No. 86360. July 28, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FLORO DEL PILAR, ALIAS “SONNY,” ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellant impugns and would have this Court reverse the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Sur, Branch XXIV, in
Criminal Case No. 1014-K[1]
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II
of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1675 and sentencing him “to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua (life
imprisonment) with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, to pay a
fine of P20,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to pay the costs.”[2]
The information filed against appellant alleges that on or about
November 3, 1985, in Cabugao, Ilocos
Sur, the said appellant, without having been
authorized by law, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously delivered and sold Indian hemp, otherwise known as
“marijuana,” a kind of plant from which a prohibited drug may be
manufactured.[3]
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. During the trial, the prosecution tried to
establish the guilt of appellant through the testimonies of Patrolman Alexander
Y. Casela, Station Commander Sgt. Angelino S. Savella, Robert Arthur, Miguel Solatre,
Captain Valentino A. Gaerlan, Judge Efren S. Ubungen and Sebastian
Castillo. The defense presented the
appellant himself, his wife, Teresita Del Pilar, and his sister, Corazon Ramos.
The prosecution’s evidence, upon which the trial court based its
finding of guilt, sustains the following factual findings of said court:
“In the late afternoon of November 3, 1985, between the hours of five and six o’clock,
P/Sgt. Angelino S. Savella, Pfc. Sebastian P.
Castillo, Pat. Nestor S. Savellano, Pat. Stephen E. Sabio
and Pat. Alexander Y. Casela, all of the Cabugao, Police Station, Cabugao,
Ilocos Sur, laid out a plan
to entrap the accused who was reported to be dealing
in dried marijuana leaves. The
information was relayed to the police by Robert Arthur and Miguel or Bonifacio Solatre, both of Brgy. Rizal, Cabugao,
Ilocos Sur.
“With Arthur and Solatre assigned as
decoys, the police team motored to Brgy. Pug-os, Cabugao,
Ilocos Sur, where accused
maintains a store. Arthur was
provided by P/Sgt. Savella with a twenty-peso bill
bearing the initial(s) ‘AYC’ which stands for Alexander Yabes
Casela, a member of the team, with which to buy
marijuana from the accused. Upon arrival in Brgy. Pug-os, the members of the police team deployed themselves at a
place south of the store of the accused, while Arthur and Solatre
went inside to buy the prohibited stuff.
After Arthur had bought the marijuana from the accused and had given the
agreed signal by coughing, P/Sgt. Savella and his men
surrounded the house of Del Pilar. P/Sgt. Savella went
inside the house and talked to the wife of the accused, Teresita,
and demanded the production of the marked twenty-peso bill. Mrs. del Pilar denied having received the same. The accused was no longer inside the store
because he had already left, but Pfc. Castillo and Pat. Casela
who went after the accused met him on the way.
When pressed by P/Sgt. Savella to produce the
marked money used by Arthur in buying the marijuana, the accused and his wife
retrieved it from the receptacle containing their daily sales proceeds and
handed the same to P/Sgt. Savella.
“The accused, Floro Del Pilar @ Sonny, was brought to Police Headquarters where he identified
the prohibited stuff bought by and taken from Robert Arthur. He and his wife did not make any complaint about any wrongdoing committed by the
arresting officers.
“Robert Arthur and Miguel or Bonifacio
Solatre gave their individual written statements
detailing the incident on the following day, i.e., November 4, 1985 (Exhs. ‘D-5′ & ‘D’, respectively). However, during the trial, both tried to
prove that their sworn statements were the handiwork of the police
investigators who allegedly prepared everything for their signature. They disowned the important role played by
them in the entrapment of the accused.
In view of this development, the prosecution had to present on the
witness stand Judge Efren S. Ubungen
before whom Arthur and Solatre swore to the truth of
their statements after the same were read and explained to each of them.
“The accused denied
having sold the prohibited stuff wrapped in a cigarette tin foil (Exh. ‘B’) to Arthur. He also denied having received the marked
twenty-peso bill (Exh. ‘A’) from
Arthur in payment of the marijuana.
He claimed that he was the innocent victim of a frame-up.
“The wife of the accused, Teresita,
and his sister, Corazon Ramos, testified that Arthur and Solatre
went to buy cigarettes, not marijuana, from the store and paid a five-peso bill
for the cigarettes. It so happened that
there was a wrapped object of the size of a face towel which was left behind by
a certain Sammy who played basketball a few days before, and it was this
wrapped object which the two asked from the accused. It turned out that the policemen capitalized
on the presence of this wrapped object to allege that it contained dried
marijuana leaves. Mrs. Del Pilar further claimed that the marked money was planted by
one of the policemen after having failed to locate it at the first instance.
“In a final bid, the accused tried to impute an evil motive on
the part of the arresting officers by claiming that one of them was attracted
to his wife, Teresita, and that may be the reason why
they want him to be incarcerated.”[4]
According to appellant, the testimonies of Arthur and Solatre, who were the prosecution’s so-called decoys in the
“buy-bust” operation, are at variance on material points with their
previous sworn statements taken before the police authorities and, therefore,
this renders said testimonies unreliable.
He argues that the prosecution should be bound by the declarations of
its own witnesses and if their testimonies tend to absolve him, he is entitled
to an acquittal.[5]
He opines that entrapment, as a device for the apprehension,
prosecution and conviction of
the offender, is illegal and violative of human
rights because there is no administrative order or regulation which authorizes
and regulates the same.[6]
He claims that he was a victim of
“a possible desire of the police to frame-up and extort” from him
“which is a usual objective of raids of this nature.” He submits the
observations that the courts in Cabugao were not
informed of the plan to entrap him; the display of unnecessary and
disproportionate police power consisting of five (5) policemen, led by the station
commander himself, with the assistance of two (2) decoys; Sgt. Savella and some policemen went inside his house demanding
the production of the P20.00 bill; the use of personal money of Station
Commander Angelino Savella to buy marijuana leaves: and the suspicion that the marijuana leaves
were planted since Arthur and Solatre did not buy
them.[7]
Furthermore, he bewails the fact that he was made to identify the
marijuana leaves allegedly sold by him without the benefit of counsel. He also capitalizes on the failure of the
police operatives to issue him a receipt which would prove the seizure of the
marijuana leaves and the recovery of the marked P20.00 bill.[8]
Penultimately, appellant claims that it
is unthinkable, if not unbelievable, for his wife to voluntarily return the
alleged marked money used in the “buy-bust” operation.[9] He contends that
when the raiding team arrived in his house, he was not there: that it was his wife who was encountered by
the police operatives; and
that the evidence thus tends to indicate the strong possibility that it was his
wife who was the drug pusher.[10]
Lastly, appellant points out alleged conflicting statements of
the prosecution witnesses in that, according to the station commander, Sgt.
Angelino Savella, he gave the P20.00 for the purchase of marijuana to Robert Arthur at
the municipal hall[11] and Pat. Alexander
Y. Casela,
marked the P20.00 bill also at the municipal hall.[12] However,
according to Pat. Casela, he initialed the
P20.00 bill at the waiting shed in Brgy. Pug-os and Sgt. Savella delivered the
marked money to Arthur also in the same waiting shed.[13] Appellant
further notes that Pat. Casela testified on
direct examination that accused Del Pilar turned over
the retrieved marked money to Sgt. Savella,[14] but on
cross-examination, Pat. Casela stated that Mrs. Del Pilar delivered the seized marked money to Station Commander Savella.[15]
The appeal is devoid of merit.
A painstaking review of this case shows that what actually transpired was an entrapment and not a frame-up. The records show that the law enforcement
team never planted evidence to incriminate appellant nor did they induce him to
perform any prohibited act which he would never have done but for such inducement.
On the contrary, the sale of the marijuana leaves was made by him of his
own volition and the team merely devised a means to obtain evidence thereof.
In People vs. De la Cruz, et
al.,[16]
we made this observation:
“We are not unmindful of the fact that the common modus
operandi of narcotic agents in utilizing poseur-buyers does not always
commend itself as the most reliable way to go after violators of the Dangerous
Drugs Act as it is susceptible of mistakes as well as harassment, extortion and
abuse. By the very nature of this
anti-narcotics operation, the possibility of abuse is great.”
but we also
declared that –
“We are not, however, inclined to shackle the hands of
narcotic agents whose task, as it is, is already formidable and attended with
great risk, lest their dedicated efforts for the apprehension and successful
prosecution of prohibited drug violators be unduly hampered. The proliferation of drug addiction and
trafficking has already reached an alarming level and has spawned a network of incorrigible, cunning and dangerous
operators. Our experience has proven
entrapment to be an effective means of apprehending drug peddlers as
exemplified by this case.”
We again reiterate that a “buy-bust” operation, as what
happened in this case, is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to
trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante
delicto.
It is an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the
commission of the offense. Entrapment,
therefore, has received judicial sanction as long as it is carried out with
constitutional and legal circumspection.
The appellant asks the Court to set aside the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Robert Arthur and Miguel Solatre
for being unreliable. They were supposed
to have acted as poseur buyers or decoys as the trial court called them. Both witnesses, however, denied having bought
any marijuana from appellant. In effect,
they disowned any participation in the “buy-bust” operation. They, however, admitted having signed their
respective extrajudicial statements[17]
before Judge Efren S. Ubungen
of the Municipal Trial Court of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, particularly narrating their participation in the
“buy-bust” operation[18] although they
tried to gloss over the same and denied having knowledge of the contents thereof.
We are not persuaded by the supposed retractions of Robert Arthur
and Miguel Solatre.
Firmly entrenched is the rule that recantations of extrajudicial
statements formally made before an investigating officer are looked upon with disfavor by the courts.[19] The retracted statement must be subject to
scrupulous examination. The previous
statement and the subsequent one must be carefully compared and the
circumstances under which each was
given
and the reasons and motives for the change carefully scrutinized. The veracity of each statement must be tested
by the credibility of the witness which, as a general proposition, is left for
the trial judge to ascertain.
A comparative examination of the testimony of Robert Arthur
during the trial and his sworn written statement bares no substantial variation
or contradiction as would affect the trial court’s conclusion that appellant
was entrapped in the “buy-bust”
operation. His testimony that he never
agreed with the police operatives to entrap the appellant does not bear the
imprint of truth.
The records show that on November
3, 1985, he was accompanied by Miguel Solatre
to the house of appellant at Brgy. Pug-os, Cabugao, Ilocos
Sur and that he had received from Station Commander
Angelino Savella the money with which to buy
marijuana;[20]
that he knew
appellant to be the source of marijuana;[21] and that he
inquired from appellant whether he has marijuana for sale.[22] The foregoing
testimony given by him during the trial substantially interweaves with his
extrajudicial written statement where he stated that the police gave him money
to buy marijuana: that he was sent by
the police operatives to buy marijuana at Brgy. Pug-os, Cabugao, Ilocos
Sur; that he went to that place on November 3, 1985 together with
Miguel Solatre; and that he knows that the purpose of
the police operatives was to apprehend appellant.
An analysis and the combination of all these circumstances would
lead to no other conclusion than that the entrapment of appellant did take
place as contended by the prosecution.
Where the events
constitute a compact mass of circumstantial evidence, the existence of every
bit of which was satisfactorily proved
and the proof of each is confirmed by the proof of the other, and all without exception leading by mutual support to but one conclusion, the circumstantial evidence
is sufficient to establish the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.[23]
Furthermore, it appears that the extrajudicial written statement
executed by Robert Arthur and Miguel Solatre were
subscribed and sworn to before Judge Efren S. Ubungen who himself testified that he had the occasion to
explain to them the contents thereof and their voluntary execution of the
same. The appellant failed to show why
Judge Ubungen would be actuated by any improper motive in testifying as he
did. There is nothing in the records to suggest that the good judge was motivated by any
reason other than his desire to perform his solemn task in having the affiants
voluntarily and intelligently swear to the truth of their statements. Consequently, we are convinced that we should
accord full credence to the aforesaid extrajudiciaI
written statements of Robert Arthur and Miguel Solatre.
The defense of frame-up can undoubtedly be fabricated with
facility. It must, therefore, be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. Like alibi, it is a weak
defense that is easy to concoct and is difficult
to prove.[24] Understandably, appellant seeks to bolster
his contrived defense by imputing evil motives on the part of the police
officers to the extent of claiming, inter alia, that one of them was attracted to his wife and that may be the reason
why he is being prosecuted. These lame insinuations do not impress us as
sensible arguments. The narration of the
incident by the police operatives, who enjoy the legal presumption that their
official duty was by then regularly performed, is worthy of credit.
Appellant, as earlier noted, also tries to exploit the alleged
inconsistencies of the prosecution witnesses regarding the P20.00 marked
bill. It is obvious, however, that the apparently conflicting statements are mere unwitting
lapses on insignificant details and do not bear such weight as would affect the
credibility of these witnesses and their testimonies. In fact, even the absence of the marked money
would not create a hiatus in the prosecution’s evidence as long as the
marijuana subject of the prohibited transaction was presented before the lower court.[25]
In People vs. Macuto,[26]
we stressed that the commission of the offense of illegal sale of marijuana
requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction. How the marked money was recovered is of no
great significance in establishing the guilt of the appellant. What is important is
the fact that the poseur buyer received the marijuana from the appellant and
the contents were presented as evidence in court.
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, provides
for the penalty of life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00. The dispositive
part of the trial court’s decision is not entirely accurate since it imposed
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Reclusion perpetua,
as understood in the Revised Penal Code, has its own legal connotation, effects
and accessory penalties which are not applicable to life imprisonment provided
for by the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 which is a special law.
The penalty imposed on appellant should have been indicated as, and it
is hereby declared to be, life imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, with the above modification, the judgment of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED in all other
respects.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
[1]
Per Judge Florencio A. Ruiz, Jr.
[2]
Original Record, 173.
[3]
Ibid., 1.
[4]
Ibid., 168-171.
[5]
Rollo, 56-57.
[6]
Ibid., 62.
[7]
Ibid., 59-60.
[8]
Ibid., 65.
[9]
Ibid., id.
[10]
Ibid., 61.
[11]
TSN, July 15, 1986, 5.
[12]
Ibid., id., 7.
[13]
Ibid., March 21, 1986,
4.
[14]
Ibid., February 24, 1986, 25.
[15]
Ibid., March 21, 1986,
8.
[16]
G.R. No. 83260, April 18, 1990,
citing People vs. Fernando, 145 SCRA 151 (1986); People vs. Ale,
145 SCRA 50 (1986).
[17]
Original Record, 132-135.
[18]
TSN, May 22, 1987, 78, 85.
[19]
People vs. Aldeguer, G.R.
No. L-47991, April 3, 1990;
People vs. Navasca, 76 SCRA 70 (1977).
[20]
TSN, May 22, 1987, 76.
[21]
Ibid., id., 80.
[22]
Ibid., id., 78.
[23]
People vs. Aldeguer, ante,
Footnote 19.
[24]
People vs. Estevan, G.R. No. 69676, June 4,
1990; People vs. Nabunat, G.R. No. 84392,
February 7, 1990; People vs. Agapito, 154 SCRA
694 (1987).
[25]
People vs. Marcos, G.R. No. 83325, May 8, 1990; People vs. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, February 21, 1989.
[26]
G.R. No. 80112, August 25, 1989.