DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, RESPONDENTS.

The Development Bank of the Philippines imported IBM computer
equipment from the United States, and in connection therewith paid to the
Bureau of Customs duties, compensating taxes and import processing fees in the
aggregate sum of P5,562,926.00.  It thereafter
asked for a refund of the amount paid, invoking Section 4 (c) of Executive
Order No. 1087 (eff., Jan. 20, 1986).  The
Customs Commissioner refused to grant the refund, maintaining that the customs
duties, taxes and fees had been correctly imposed and collected.1

The DBP appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals, which on July 31,
1987 adjudicated the controversy in its favor, ordering the Commissioner of
Customs “to refund to ** (it [the DBP]) the amount of P5,562,926.00
it paid to the Bureau of Customs ** (which) shall be applied and credited to
the payment of the subscribed capital stock of the Government in the
Bank.”1

The Commissioner in turn came up to this Court on an appeal by certiorari, his appeal being docketed as G.R.
No. 79635.  By Resolution of the Court en banc dated September 15,
1987, however, the appeal was referred to the Court of Appeals for
the reason that “(s)uch
cases emanating from the Court of Tax Appeals now fall within the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.”

In the Court of Appeals the case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 12887.  And in due course, the Ninth Division of the
Court of Appeals rendered judgment under date of October 3, 1988,2 annulling
and setting aside that of the Court of Tax Appeals.  The Court of Appeals sustained the position
of the Customs Commissioner that it was grave error for the Court of Tax
Appeals to have taken cognizance of the case in view of the explicit provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 242,3
pertinently providing that:

SECTION 1. 
Provisions of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, all disputes, claims and controversies solely between
or among the departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of
the National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
but excluding constitutional offices or agencies, arising from the
interpretation and application of statutes, contracts or agreements, shall
henceforth be administratively settled or adjudicated as provided
hereinafter:  Provided, That this shall
not apply to cases already pending in court at the time of the effectivity of this decree.”

The
Appellate Tribunal thus held that the controversy between the DBP and the
Commissioner of Customs was not within the jurisdiction of the CTA and should
have been decided in accordance with the mode of settlement and adjudication
set forth in Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. No. 242, viz.:

SEC. 2. 
In all cases involving only questions of law, the same shall be
submitted to and settled or adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice, as
Attorney General and ex officio legal adviser of all government-owned
or controlled corporations and entities, in consonance with section 83 of the
Revised Administrative Code.  His ruling
or determination of the question in each case shall be conclusive and binding
upon all the parties concerned.

SEC. 3. 
Cases involving mixed questions of law and of fact or only factual
issues shall be submitted to and settled or adjudicated by:

(a) The Solicitor General, with respect to disputes or claims or
controversies between or among the departments, bureaus, offices and other
agencies of the National Government;

(b) The Government Corporate Counsel, with respect to disputes or
claims or controversies between or among the government-owned or controlled
corporations or entities being served by the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel; and

(c) The Secretary of Justice, with respect to all other disputes or
claims or controversies which do not fall under the categories mentioned in
paragraphs (a) and (b).

The Appellate Court ruled that Section 7 (2) of Republic Act No.
1125 — pursuant to which the Court of Tax Appeals had theretofore been
exercising exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Commissioner
of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money
charges, inter alia — had been superseded by said P.D.
No. 242, it being “a settled rule of statutory construction that where
there is irreconcilable repugnancy between two statutes anent the same subject
matter — as there is between P.D. No. 242 and Sec. 7 (2) of R.A. No. 1125 in
regard to the manner of settlement of disputes involving customs duties, etc.
between government offices, agencies and corporations — the one of later
enactment, being the latest expression of the legislative will, should prevail
over the other which is of earlier enactment.”1

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied on January 10,
1989,2 the
DBP has filed a petition for review on certiorari with this
Court, praying for reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals on the
ground that:

1) said Court had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the
Court of Tax Appeals, this pertaining exclusively to the Supreme Court; and

2) said Court had erred in applying P.D.
No. 242 in resolution of the controversy.3

The petition is without merit.

The Court reaffirms its earlier resolution that it is the Court
of Appeals which is now vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the Court of Tax Appeals and other
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions.

It is true that originally, appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals
could be taken only to the Supreme Court. 
This was so stated in Section 181 and
Section 192 of
Republic Act No. 1125 (eff., June 16, 1954). 
There were then, as explained by this
Court,3

* * two ways of
elevating ** (the) case to the Supreme Court, i.e., first, by filing in
the Court a quo a notice of appeal and with this
Court a petition for review * * (Sec. 18, Rep. Act 1125), and second, by causing such ruling, order or decision of the Court of Tax
Appeals likewise reviewed by Us upon a writ of certiorari in proper cases.  Premised on these provisions, it may be
alleged that when a case is taken up to this Court by petition for review, We
could go over the evidence on record and pass upon the questions of fact; but
that in cases of review upon petition for a writ of certiorari, this
Court could only pass upon issues involving questions of law.  In answer to these possible argument We may
say that when the interest of justice so demands, We may interchangeably
consider petitions for review as petitions for a writ of certiorari and
vice-versa, and if We have the power to consider the evidence to determine the
facts in cases of review, We find no plausible reason for depriving this Court
of such power in petitions for certiorari specially if We consider that
in the latter cases the petitioner oftenly charges
the respondent court with the commission of grave abuse of discretion the
determination of which usually depends on the facts and circumstances of the
points in controversy.  * *.

It is noteworthy that Republic Act No.
5440 (eff., September 9, 1968) amended Section 17 of
Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, by
explicitly including the Court of Tax Appeals — together with the Commission
on Elections and such quasi-judicial agencies as the Court of Industrial
Relations, the Public Service Commission and the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission — as among the entities whose final judgments and decrees were
subject to review by the Supreme Court “on certiorari as the law or rules of court may
provide.”

These provisions no longer control, in view of the comprehensive
provisions of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129
granting to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now the Court of Appeals)
“(e)xclusive appellate jurisdiction over all
final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial
Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the  Constitution,
the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraphs and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948.” The fact that, as the DBP argues, the Court of Tax Appeals is not
among the agencies reorganized by said Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129,1 is of no
moment.  What is essential, and
indisputable, is that that law did not, as the DBP imagines, deal only with
“changes in the rules on procedures;” and that not only was the Court
of Appeals reorganized, but its jurisdiction and powers were also broadened by Section 9 of the Batas.  Its original
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, and habeas corpus, which theretofore could be
exercised only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, was expanded by (1) extending
it so as to include the writ of quo warranto, and
also (2) empowering it to issue all said extraordinary writs “whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.” Its appellate jurisdiction
was also extended to cover not only final judgments of Regional Trial Courts,
but also “all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards
of ** quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except
those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of
the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17
of the Judiciary Act of 1948,” it being noteworthy in this connection that
the text of the law is broad and comprehensive, and the explicitly stated
exceptions have no reference whatever to the Court of Tax Appeals.  Indeed, the intention to expand the original
and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, is further stressed by the
last paragraph of Section 9 which excludes from its provisions, only the
“decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines
and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.”

Since final judgments or
decrees of the Court of Tax Appeals are now within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, and since appeals by certiorari may properly be taken only to this
Court, it follows that the mode of appeal from the Court of Tax Appeals to the
Court of Appeals should be by notice of appeal cum petition for
review, consistently with the mode of appeal from other quasi-judicial bodies
and agencies prescribed by Republic Act No. 5434 (eff.,
September 9, 1968),2 and that formerly provided for by Republic
Act No. 1125, supra.  It
is on this basis that the interim or transitional rules adopted in this Court’s
en banc Resolution of January 11, 1983 on the subject prescribe that
” ** appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court from quasi-judicial
bodies shall continue to
be governed by the provisions of
Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the same is not inconsistent with the
provisions of B.P. Blg. 129.”1

The Court also rejects the DBP’s second
argument, and expresses its entire agreement with the conclusion of the Court
of Appeals — and the basic premises thereof — that there is an
“irreconcilable repugnancy * * between Section 7 (2) of R.A. No. 1125 and
P.D. No. 242,” and hence, that the later enactment (P.D. No. 242), being
the latest expression of the legislative will, should prevail over the earlier.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolved to DENY the
petition for lack of merit, and AFFIRM the challenged Decision of the Court of
Appeals.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

1
Rollo, p. 8

1 Id.,
p. 9

2 Id.,
pp. 21-25.  The opinion was written for
the Division by Lombos-de la Fuente,
J., and concurred in by Martinez
and Pe, JJ.

3 Entitled “(An Act)
Prescribing the Procedure for Administrative Settlement or Adjudication of
Disputes, Claims and Controversies Between or Among Government Offices,
Agencies and Instrumentalities, including Government-Owned or Controlled
Corporations, and for Other Purposes.” The avowed purpose of the decree was “to avoid litigations
in court where government lawyers appear for ** (government offices, agencies
and instrumentalities) to espouse and protect their respective interests altho, in the ultimate analysis, there is but one real
party in interest — the Government itself — in such litigations;” and to
avoid, too, “needlessly
contributing to the clogged dockets of the courts ** (and) dissipating or
wasting the time and energies not only of the courts but also of the government
lawyers and the considerable expenses incurred in the filing and prosecution of
judicial actions.”

1 Rollo, p. 24

2 Id.,
p. 28

3 Id.,
p. 10

1 Providing in part as follows: 
“Any party adversely affected by any ruling, order or decision of
the Court of Tax Appeals may appeal therefrom to the
Supreme Court by filing with the said Court a notice of appeal and with the
Supreme Court a petition for review, within thirty days from the date he
receives notice of said ruling, order or decision.  * *.”

2 * *.  Any
ruling, order or decision of the Court of Tax Appeals may likewise be reviewed
by the Supreme Court upon a writ of certiorari in proper cases.  Proceedings in
the Supreme Court upon a writ of
certiorari or a petition for review,
as the case may be, shall be in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court or such rules as the
Supreme Court may prescribe.

3 Collector of Internal Revenue v. Aznar,
et al., 102 Phil. 979, 985-986 (Jan.
31, 1958)

1 The courts reorganized were the Intermediate Appellate Court (now the
Court of Appeals, of course), the Courts of First Instance (now the Regional
Trial Courts), and the City, Municipal and Municipal Circuit Courts (now the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts), said courts, together with the Supreme Court forming what is
known as the “Integrated Judicial System” in this jurisdiction, as
distinguished from other courts and quasi-judicial agencies.

2 The Act deals with appeals from the Court of Agrarian Relations; the
Secretary of Labor under Section 7 of RA 602; the Department of Labor under
Sec. 23, RA 875; the Land Registration Commission, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Patent Office, the Agricultural
Inventions Board.

1 Par. 22 (c)