ALEJANDRO KATIGBAK, AND MERCEDES K. KATIGBAK, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, EPIFANIO VILLEGAS, ARTURO XAVIER, PONCIANO FERNANDO, ROSEN­DO DOMINGO AND LEONARD…

These cases were certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals
for resolution on appeal,1 since the
central issue involved is the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1379, “An
Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State of Any Property Found To Have
Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for
the Proceedings Therefor.”1 As posed
by the referral resolution,2 the
question is whether or not said statute —

” * * en cuanto
autoriza la confiscacion en
favor del Estado de las propiedades ilegalmente adquiridas por un funcionario o empleado del Gobierno antes de la aprobacion
de la Ley ** es nula y anticonstitucional porque:

(a) es una Ley ex-post facto que autoriza la confiscacion de una propiedad privada
adquirida antes de la aprobacion
de la ley y obliga el funcionario o empleado publico a explicar como adquirio sus
propiedades privadas, compeliendo de esta forma a incriminarse a si mismo, y en cierto modo autoriza la confiscacion de dicha propiedad sin debido proceso de la ley; y

(b) porque autoriza la confiscacion de inmuebles previamente hipotecados de buena fe a una persona.”

The proceedings at bar originated from two (2) actions filed with
the Court of First Instance of Manila.

The first was Civil Case No. 30823, instituted by the Spouses
Alejandro Katigbak and Mercedes Katigbak.  In their complaint they prayed that:  (1) the Solicitor General be enjoined from
filing a complaint against them for forfeiture of property under the above
mentioned R.A. No. 1379; (2) said statute be declared unconstitutional in so
far as it authorizes forfeiture of properties acquired before its approval,
or, alternatively, a new preliminary investigation of the complaint filed
against Alejandro Katigbak by NBI officers be
ordered; (3) properties acquired by Alejandro Katigbak
when he was out of the government service be excluded from forfeiture
proceedings; and (4) the NBI officers and the Investigating Prosecutor
(Leonardo Lucena) be sentenced to pay damages.

The second action was Civil Case No. 31080, commenced by petition3 filed by the Republic of the Philippines
against Alejandro Katigbak, his wife, Mercedes, and
his son, Benedicto, seeking the forfeiture in favor
of the State of the properties of Alejandro Katigbak
allegedly gotten by him illegally, in accordance with R.A. No. 1379.  Said properties were allegedly acquired while
Katigbak was holding various positions in the
government, the last being that of an examiner of the Bureau of Customs; and
title to some of the properties were supposedly recorded in the names of his
wife and/or son.

The cases were jointly tried. 
The judgment thereafter rendered4 (1) dismissed the complaint and the
counterclaim in Civil Case No. 30823, the first action; and (2) as regards
Civil Case No. 31080, ordered “that from the properties (of Katigbak) enumerated in this decision as acquired in 1953,
1954 and 1955, shall be enforced a lien in favor of the Government in the sum
of P100,000.00.”1 The
judgment also declared that the “impatience of the Investigating
Prosecutor” during the preliminary inquiry into the charges filed against Katigbak for violation of R.A. No. 1379 did not amount to
such arbitrariness as would justify annulment of the proceedings since, after all, Katigbak
was able to fully ventilate his side of the case in the trial court;2 that R.A. No. 1379 is not penal in nature, its
objective not being the enforcement of a penal liability but the recovery of
property held under an implied trust;3 that with respect to things acquired
through delicts, prescription does not run in favor
of the offender;4 that Alejandro Katigbak may not be deemed to have been compelled to
testify against his will since he took the witness stand voluntarily.5 The Katigbaks moved for
reconsideration and/or new trial.  The
Trial Court refused to grant a new trial but modified its decision by reducing
the amount of “P100,000.00 in the dispositive portion ** to P80,000.00.”6

Appeal was taken from this verdict to the Court of Appeals by the
Katigbaks which appeal, as earlier stated, was
certified to this Court.

No less than 18 errors have been attributed by the Katigbaks to the Court a quo.7 They
concern mainly the character of R.A. No. 1379 as an ex post facto law,
principally because it imposes the penalty of forfeiture
on a public officer or employee acquiring properties allegedly in violation of
said R.A. No. 1379 at a time when that law had not yet been enacted.8

Whatever persuasiveness might have been carried by the ruling on
the issue of the learned Trial Judge in 1961, the fact is that the nature of
R.A. No. 1379 as penal was in 1962 clearly and categorically pronounced by this
Court in Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr.9 Citing
voluminous authorities, the Court in that case declared that “forfeiture
to the State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly
out of proportion to his salary as such ** and his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property ** has been held ** to partake of
the nature of a penalty”; and that “proceedings for forfeiture of
property (although technically civil in form) are deemed criminal or penal,
and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal cases from the obligation
to be witnesses against themselves is applicable thereto.”10 The doctrine was reaffirmed and reiterated in 1971
in Republic v. Agoncillo.1 And
germane is the 1977 ruling of the Court in de la Cruz v. Better Living, Inc.2 — involving among others the issue of the validity
and enforceability of a written agreement alleged to be in violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act — to the effect that “the provisions of said law cannot be given
retroactive effect.”

The forfeiture of property provided for in Republic Act No. 1379
being in the nature of a penalty; and it being axiomatic that a law is ex
post facto which inter alia “makes
criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when
done, and punishes such an act,” or, “assuming to regulate civil
rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right
for something which when done was lawful,” it follows that that penalty of
forfeiture prescribed by R.A. No. 1379 cannot be applied to acquisitions made
prior to its passage without running afoul of the Constitutional provision
condemning ex post facto laws or bills of attainder.3 But this is precisely what has been done in the
case of the Katigbaks.  The Trial Court declared certain of their
acquisitions in 1953, 1954 and 1955 to be illegal under R.A. No. 1379 although
made prior to the enactment of the law, and imposed a lien thereon “in
favor of the Government in the sum of P100,000.00.”
Such a disposition is, quite obviously, constitutionally impermissible.

As to the issue of whether or not the Prosecuting Fiscal,
Leonardo Lucena, should be made answerable for
damages because the filing of the forfeiture proceedings, Civil Case No. 31080,
resulted from a preliminary investigation which was allegedly conducted by
Fiscal Lucena in an arbitrary and highhanded manner,
suffice it to state that the trial court found no proof of any intention to
persecute or other ill motive underlying the institution of Civil Case No.
31080.  The trial court further found
that during the preliminary investigation by Fiscal Lucena
on September 13, 19, 24, 25 and 26, 1956, Alejandro Katigbak
was assisted by reputable and competent counsel, Atty. Estanislao
A. Fernandez and Atty. Antonio Carag.  The mere fact that the preliminary
investigation was terminated against the objection of Katigbak’s
counsel, does not necessarily signify that he was
denied the right to such an investigation. 
What is more, the Trial Court’s factual conclusion that no malice or bad
faith attended the acts of public respondents complained of, and consequently
no award of damages is proper, cannot under established rule be reviewed by
this Court absent any showing of the existence of some recognized exception thereto.

The foregoing pronouncements make unnecessary the determination
of the other issues.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court a quo, in so
far as it pronounces the acquisitions of property by the appellants illegal in
accordance with Republic Act No. 1379 and imposes a lien thereon in favor of
the Government in the sum of P80,000.00 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, but
is AFFIRMED in all other respects.  No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino,
and Medialdea,
JJ., concur.

1
Sec. 3, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court of
1940 (Sec. 3, Rule 50, [present] Rules of 1964)

1 Eff. June 18, 1955

2 Promulgated on Nov. 20, 1961 by the Special Third Division of the Court of
Appeals:  Hernandez, Rodriguez, and Villamor, JJ

3 Later amended

4 Under date of April 11, 1960, by Hon. Magno S. Gatmaitan (later,
Associate Justice and then, Presiding Justice, of the Court of Appeals)

1 Record on Appeal, pp. 336-381

2 Id.,
p. 375

3 Id.,
p. 376

4 Id.,
p. 377

5 Id.,
pp. 379-380

6 Id.,
pp. 494-505

7
Rollo, pp. 117 et seq

8 Errors Numbered I to V

9 6 SCRA 1059

10 At pp. 1063-1064, and 1066; parenthetical insertion and emphasis,
supplied.  Occasion was had, at p. 1067,
to distinguish the ruling from that in Almeda v.
Perez, L?18428, Aug. 30, 1962, which had reference “to the
purely procedural aspect of said proceeding, and ** (had) no bearing on the
substantial rights of the respondents therein, particularly their
constitutional right against self-incrimination.”

1 40 SCRA 579, 584

2 78 SCRA 274, 287

3 Sec. 11, Rule III, 1935
Constitution, then in force