LILIA LIWAG, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND HEIRS OF THE SPOUSES VICENTE S. CRUZ AND JUANA EUSTAQUIO, AS REPRESENTED BY ADELA CRUZ CAYETANO, NONITA CRUZ AND JOVITA CRUZ, R…

Petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolutions of respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 12101, entitled “The Heirs of Vicente
S. Cruz, et al. vs. Hon. Rafael de la Cruz, et al.,” dated March 17, 1988^[1]
and December 7, 1988,^[2]
respectively.

As the factual backdrop of this case, the records tell us that
the late Vicente S. Cruz filed a petition for the reconstitution of his lost
original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42408 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal in Branch 21 (now Branch 160) of the
then Court of First Instance of Pasig docketed as LRC
(Reconstitution) Case No. 80, entitled “In Re:  Petition for Reconstitution of the Original
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42408-Rizal Registry, Vicente Cruz, Petitioner.”
The property covered by said certificate of title is located at Barrio Bayan-Bayanan (now Concepcion), Marikina, Rizal,
consisting of two (2) lots with an aggregate area of 1,307,755 square meters,
more or less.  It appears that said
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42408 was derived from the sales patent
issued to Sisenando Cruz, father of Vicente
Cruz.  On June 5, 1978, the land registration court rendered a
decision in said Reconstitution Case No. 80 directing the Register of Deeds of Rizal to reconstitute the lost original of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 42408 pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.
26.^[3]
Consequently, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. N-96819 and N-96820 were
issued in the name of Vicente S. Cruz.^[4]

After said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42408 was
reconstituted, the late Vicente S. Cruz ostensibly sold the lots covered
thereby to petitioner pursuant to a deed of sale executed on May 18, 1984.^[5]
Curiously, it likewise appears that after said sale, the Cruz spouses executed
a special power of attorney on September
21, 1984 appointing petitioner as their attorney-in-fact with the
power to manage and administer the subject property.^[6]

On February 4, 1986, herein petitioner filed an omnibus motion^[7]
in the same Reconstitution Case No. 80, now in Branch 160 of the Regional Trial
Court at Pasig, Metro Manila, alleging that the
subject two (2) parcels of land were sold to her by Vicente S. Cruz in a deed
of sale executed on May 18, 1984 but the certificates of title and deed of sale
therefor were allegedly lost, hence she prayed for a
declaration of the nullity of the owner’s duplicate copies of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. N-96819 and N-96820. 
The court below granted the petition and ordered the cancellation of the
aforementioned certificates of title on February
10, 1986,^[8]
as a consequence of which Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. N-115722^[9]
and N-115723^[10]
were issued in the name of petitioner Liwag.  On March
25, 1986, petitioner executed a deed of sale of the said two (2)
parcels of land in favor of Teresita L. Paz in
consideration of the stated sum of P4,000,000.00.^[11]

On April 29, 1986, private respondents, as heirs of Vicente S.
Cruz and Juana Eustaquio, filed Civil Case No. 53389
in Branch 162 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasig,
Metro Manila against Lilia Liwag, Teresita
Liwag Paz and the Register of Deeds for Marikina Branch for the nullification of the aforesaid deed
of sale allegedly executed by their deceased parents in favor of petitioner Liwag and the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. N-115722 and N-115723.^[12]
Private respondents further prayed for the declaration of the nullity of the
subsequent deed of sale executed between petitioner and Teresita
Paz on March 25, 1986, on
the ground that the aforesaid two (2) deeds of sale were absolutely
simulated.  Additionally, private
respondents also sought to have said Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
N-115722 and N-115723 declared null and void for having been illegally
reconstituted by a court totally devoid of jurisdiction in violation of Section
109 of the Property Registration Decree, Presidential Decree No. 1529, in
relation to Section 113 of Act No. 496. 
Petitioner Liwag filed her answer on July 21, 1986.^[13]

In the course of the proceedings before Branch 162, private
respondents, as plaintiffs, and Teresita Paz, as
defendant, entered into a compromise agreement dated September 25, 1986,^[14]
which was approved by the court on December
8, 1986.^[15]
Pursuant thereto, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. N-115722 and N-115723
were ordered cancelled and respectively replaced with Transfer Certificate of
Title No. N-127021^[16]
issued in the name of private respondents, as owners of 496,938 square meters
and Teresita Paz as the owner of 100,000 square
meters, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-127022^[17]
which was issued in the name of private respondents.

On February 27, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for relief^[18]
in said case from the aforesaid judgment on compromise, alleging that her
exclusion from the compromise agreement without her consent and knowledge is
unlawful by reason of the fact that Teresita Paz had reconveyed the parcels of land to her in a deed of sale
executed on August 27, 1986,^[19]
prior to the execution of the compromise agreement.

Said petition for relief was denied, prompting herein petitioner
to file a petition for the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
N-127021 and N-127022, pursuant to Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
this time before Branch 160 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
in the same Reconstitution Case No. 80.^[20]
After notice, private respondents filed a motion for inhibition^[21]
on the ground of partiality on the part of the presiding judge therein, with an
opposition^[22]
and a supplemental opposition^[23]
to the petition.  On May 5, 1987, the presiding judge of Branch 160,
Judge Rafael de la Cruz, issued an order denying the motion for
inhibition.  A subsequent order was
issued on May 14, 1987
granting the petition, directing the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. N-127021 and N-127022 and ordering the issuance of new titles in the
name of petitioner Liwag.^[24]

Private respondents elevated these orders of May 5, 1987 and May 14, 1987, for having been issued without jurisdiction,
to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari docketed therein as
CA-G.R. SP No. 12101.^[25]
The petition was initially denied due course by respondent court in its
decision of October 30, 1987,^[26]
but said judgment was subsequently reconsidered and the relief prayed for by
private respondents was eventually granted in a resolution dated March 17, 1988.^[27]
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on December 7, 1988,^[28]
hence this petition.

As capsulized from the errors assigned
in petitioner’s memorandum, respondent court is faulted as having gravely erred
in:

(1) Giving due course to the petition for certiorari of
respondent heirs in case CA-G.R. SP No. 112101, said petition being definitely
insufficient in form and substance;

(2) Giving due course to respondent heirs’ motion for
reconsideration of the original decision in case CA-G.R. SP No. 112101 which
dismissed their petition;

(3) Declaring null and void the order of Judge Rafael de la Cruz in
Reconstitution Case No. 80 for the cancellation of respondent heirs’ TCT Nos.
N-127021 and N-127022, on the ground that said order was in effect a review of
the decision of Judge Manuel Padolina (Branch 162) in
Civil Case No. 53389 as, in fact, the respondent judge annulled the judgment in
said civil case;

(4) Refusing and/or failing to declare that the decision of Branch
162 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in Civil
Case No. 53389, approving the compromise agreement submitted therein, is null
and void; and

(5) Holding that in the case at bar, there is a serious controversy
on the ownership of the parcels of land covered by the transfer certificates of
title.

We find for private respondents.

The basic issue for resolution is whether Branch 160 of the
aforesaid regional trial court, sitting as a land registration court, has
jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation of titles filed by petitioner Liwag in Reconstitution Case No. 80.

While the petition for cancellation was supposedly filed pursuant
to Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property Registration
Decree, for the reconstitution of an allegedly lost title, the material
allegations therein readily disclose that such was not the real intendment of
petitioner.  An examination of said
petition reveals that, for all intents and purposes, it actually seeks a
reversal or setting aside of the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 53389 by
Branch 162 of the same court by attacking the legality and validity of the
stipulations contained in the compromise agreement submitted by the parties
therein which was approved by said branch in its judgment upon compromise.

It bears repeating that in her petition filed in Reconstitution
Case No. 80 in Branch 160, petitioner asked the court therein to declare null
and void the cancellation of her titles by the register of deeds as a result of
the approval of what she alleged were unlawful provisions in the compromise
agreement in Civil Case No. 53389 in Branch 162.  Private respondents, however, vehemently
objected to the contentions of petitioner alleging that the assailed stipulations
are valid and binding.  It is thus
evident that the issue involved in the instant case is not a simple
reconstitution of a lost title but is actually a challenge to the legality and
enforceability of the judgment upon compromise rendered in Civil Case No.
53389.

This controverted point per se
is beyond the jurisdiction of the land registration court acting on a petition
filed under Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the proceedings
wherein are summary in nature and are allowed only when a scrutiny of the
allegations discloses that the issues are patently insubstantial as not to be
genuine issues.^[29]
Furthermore, the relief provided for under Section 108 requires that there be
unanimity of parties, that is, that there be no adverse claim or serious
objection on the part of any party in interest.^[30]
Considering the serious and weighty objections raised by private respondents,
petitioner cannot legally invoke or avail herself of Section 108 in support of
the relief she aspires for.  The land registration
court should have dismissed the petition without prejudice to the right of
petitioner to file the appropriate action in the proper court.

Likewise, as a co-equal and coordinate branch of the same
regional trial court, Branch 160 obviously has no authority to entertain the
petition for cancellation which, as hereinbefore stated, is actually one for
annulment of the judgment of Branch 162 of said regional trial court.^[31]
Cases of such nature fall exclusively within the original jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals pursuant to Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.  However,
the Court of Appeals could not likewise rule on the validity of the judgment
upon compromise in the petition for certiorari as formulated and filed
before it in CA-G.R. SP No. 12101, as petitioner Liwag
would have it.  Aside from the adjective
nature of that case and the issues which would have to be joined and
substantiated therein, such a relief would require the presentation of evidence
to prove the basic antecedental facts and the alleged
fraud committed on petitioner by herein private respondents, and not merely
“incidental” facts not touched upon or fully heard by the trial
court.  It would necessarily require a
full-blown trial on the merits of the main factual issue which properly
pertains to a trial court.^[32]

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolutions of respondent court
are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the right of petitioner to institute
the appropriate remedy in the proper forum for such reliefs
as she believes she is entitled to.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Penned by Justice Jorge R. Coquia and concurred in by
Justices Josue N. Bellosillo
and Venancio D. Aldecoa,
Jr.; Rollo, 55.

^[2]
Justice Venancio D. Aldecoa,
Jr., ponente, with the concurrence of Justices
Josue N. Bellosillo and Emeterio C. Cui; Rollo,
60.

^[3] Rollo, 224-250.

^[4]
Comment of Private Respondents, 2.

^[5] Ibid.,
Annex B.

^[6] Rollo, 251.

^[7] Ibid.,
254.

^[8] Ibid.,
126.

^[9] Ibid.,
84.

^[10] Ibid.,
89.

^[11] Ibid.,
93-94.

^[12] Ibid.,
95.

^[13] Ibid.,
99.

^[14] Ibid.,
109.

^[15] Ibid.,
113.

^[16] Ibid.,
120.

^[17] Ibid.,
123.

^[18] Ibid.,
140.

^[19] Ibid.,
105.

^[20]
Said petition was entitled “In Re: 
Petition for Cancellation of TCT Nos. N-127021 and N-127022, pursuant to
Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 (formerly Section 112 of Act No. 496).  Lilia L. Liwag,
Petitioner, vs. The Heirs of the Spouses Vicente S. Cruz and Juana Eustaquio, et al., Respondents.”; Rollo,
72-83.

^[21] Rollo, 128.

^[22] Ibid.,
133.

^[23] Ibid.,
150.

^[24] Ibid.,
175.

^[25] Ibid.,
62.

^[26] Ibid.,
50.

^[27] Ibid.,
55.

^[28] Ibid.,
60.

^[29] Sangalang Sr. vs. Caingat,
25 SCRA 180 (1968).

^[30]
Castillo vs. Ramos, 78 Phil. 809 (1947).

^[31] Cabigao, et al. vs. Del Rosario, et al., 44 Phil.
182 (1922); Mas vs. Dumara-og,
et al., 12 SCRA 34 (1964).

^[32] Lingner & Fisher GMBH vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al., 125 SCRA 522 (1983).