ELISEO CARO, CARLOS CARO, BENITO CARO, CARMEN CARO BATAYOLA AND LORENZO CARO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SERAFIN V. RONZALES, JOSE RONZALES, JR. AND GEMME RONZALES,…

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. CV No. 01016 entitled, “Epifanio Caro,
Plaintiff-Appellant v. Serafin V. Ronsales,
et al., Defendants-Appellees,” dated January 28,
1986 affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Iloilo; and its resolution dated September 11, 1986 denying the
motion for reconsideration.

The subject matter of the present controversy is a 260 square
meter parcel of land which, according to petitioners, is included in the parcel
of land purchased by their predecessor, Epifanio Caro, from Simeon Gallego; but
contradicted by the private respondents by claiming it as their own evidenced
by a certificate of title issued in their favor.  We gathered from the records that the
questioned land is the eastern portion allegedly included in the parcel of land
purchased from Simeon Gallego.  The trial court ruled in favor of the private respondents on the grounds of estoppel,
absence of fraud in the registration of the questioned land and
prescription.  This ruling was affirmed
by the respondent court.  Likewise, We affirm, based on the first two grounds but not on the
ground of prescription.

The antecedent facts are
as follows:

It appears that on May
14, 1946, Simeon Gallego bought a parcel of land from
Loreto Martinez, Presentacion Jereza,
Hermenigildo Jereza, Maria
Luz Nele Jereza and Maria
Elena Jereza, situated within the poblacion
of Jordan, Sub-Province of Guimaras with an area of
5,031 square meters and bounded on the North by Jordan River, Joaquin Galve and Custodia Jalandoni; on the East by Roman Catholic Church and the
Municipality of Jordan; on the South by Graciana
Martinez; and on the West by Jordan River. 
The above-described parcel of land was then declared for taxation
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 6437. 
This land was later on sold by Simeon Gallego
to Epifanio Caro in
1948.  On May 15, 1962, Trinidad Castem, Rolando Iranaya and Eriberto Iranaya sold a parcel of
land which they inherited from Custodia Jalandoni, situated in the poblacion
of Jordan, Sub-Province of Guimaras, with an area of
1,011 square meters and bounded on the North by Jordan River; on the East by
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Jaro; on the South by
Rafael Gaylan; and on the West by Jordan River, to Epifanio Caro.  The land was then declared for taxation
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 4135. 
In the same year, Epifanio Caro
bought another parcel of land from the heirs of Rafael Gaylan,
situated in the poblacion of Jordan, Sub-Province of Guimaras, with an area of 1,750 square meters and bounded
on the North and East by the heirs of Custodia Jalandoni; on the South by Simeon Gallego;
and on the West by Jordan River, and declared for taxation purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 3638.

In 1963, Epifanio Caro had
those three (3) parcels of land surveyed and were then designated as Lot No.
54.  When Blas Gonzales conducted the survey, he
prepared a plan.  Epifanio
Caro was
given a copy of the plan and he just kept it.  During that survey, Epifanio
Caro pointed the boundaries of his parcels of land to the survey team.  These parcels of land were relocated in 1968
by the Sirilan Surveying Company and Plan Psu-­207820
was prepared.  The parcels of land
of Epifanio Caro
were denominated as Lot No. 54 and the land claimed by the private respondents Serafin V. Ronzales, Jose Ronzales, Jr. and Gemme Ronzales as Lot No. 55. 
Epifanio Caro had
the three lots consolidated after the survey into one lot, and Tax Declaration
No. 7688 was issued.  During the
cadastral proceeding, Epifanio Caro
filed an answer for Lot 54.  There is no showing whether or not a title
was issued to him.

On the other hand, the private respondents claim that the
questioned land was formerly owned by Pascuala Lacson and was declared
in her name under Tax Declaration No.
4234.  Pascuala
Lacson was married to Domingo Ronzales.  Long before World War II, private respondents
and their predecessors-in-interest had been living on the questioned land.  When Epifanio Caro bought a parcel
of land from Simeon Gallego, Jose Ronzales,
Sr., his brother Serafin Ronzales and sister Gemme Ronzales,
children of Domingo Ronzales and Pascuala
Lacson, were already living in a house of semi-strong
materials on the questioned land.

Sometime in 1964, another
survey was conducted.  The parcels of land claimed by Epifanio Caro were denominated at Lot No. 54 and the land
claimed by the private respondents was denominated as Lot No. 55.  Epifanio Caro filed an answer for
Lot No. 54 and Purificacion Ronzales, mother
of private respondent Jose Ronzales, Jr. filed an
answer for Lot No. 55.  No other person
or persons filed an answer for Lot No. 55. 
Consequently, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-6836 was issued in the
names of the private respondents, in equal
shares of 1/3 portion each
on September 17, 1970.

In June, 1973, the spouses Epifanio Caro and Paz Caro filed an ejectment case
against Augusto Chavez, Naciso
Galila, Timoteo Parreno, Ramon Aranduque and
Rafael Galotera, involving Lot Nos. 56, 59 and
60.  In 1974, the spouses filed an ejectment and
illegal detainer case against Ramon Aranduque, Timoteo Parreno and Augusto Chavez,
involving Lot No. 54.

On June 4,
1975, Epifanio Caro filed a complaint
before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (Civil Case No. 10235) for
cancellation of Certificate of Title No. 0-6836, reconveyance,
recovery of possession and damages on the ground of fraud.  During the pendency
of the case, Epifanio Caro died, so he was substituted by his heirs, namely, Eliseo
Caro, Carlos Caro, Benito Caro, Carmen Caro Batayola and Lorenzo Caro.

On November
22, 1982, the trial
court dismissed the complaint.  On
appeal, the dismissal was affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals.  The motion for reconsideration was
denied.  Hence, the present petition for
review on certiorari.

The issues may be limited
to the following:

1) Whether or not the action in Civil Case No. 10235 has
prescribed;

2) Whether or not fraud attended the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-6836; and

3) Whether or not the plaintiff in said civil case  was in estoppel.

Petitioners contend that
since private respondents do not own the questioned land, they are mere
trustees and this being the case, prescription does
not lie in an action for reconveyance.

In this regard, the trial court held (p. 413, Records):

“An action for reconveyance on the
ground of fraud prescribes in four (4) years from the time of the decree of
registration, for the reason that the registration of the decree constitutes
constructive notice to the whole world (Gerona v. de Guzman, G.R. No. 19060,
May 29, 1964, citing the cases of J.M. Tuazon and Co.
vs. Magdangal, G.R. No. 15539, June 30, 1962; Abdon v. Abella, C.A. G.R. No.
29846-R, August 31, 1964).”

Affirming, the respondent court said (p.
29, Rollo):

“x x x,
even if a trust relationship had existed, the right to seek reconveyance
prescribed ten (10) years after 1948 when Epifanio Caro was informed by the wife of Jose Ronsales
that she inherited the land from her grandmother (de la Cerna
vs. de la Cerna, 72 SCRA 515; Alzona
vs. Calupitan, 4 SCRA 450; Carantes
vs. Court of Appeals, 76 SCRA
516).  Since there is no trust
relationship between the ancestors of and between plaintiffs and defendants,
the same action prescribed in 4 years from the issuance of title on September
17, 1970, because the complaint was filed only on June 4, 1975, as ruled by the
lower court (de la Cerna vs. de la Cerna, 72 SCRA 515).”

We disagree.  The case of Liwalug Amerol, et al. v. Molok Bagumbaran, G.R. No.
L-33261, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 396 illuminated what used to be a
gray area on the prescriptive period for an action to reconvey
the title to real property and, corollarily, its
point of reference:

“x x x.  It must be
remembered that before August 30, 1950,
the date of the effectivity of the new Civil Code,
the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act
No. 190) governed prescription.  It
provided:

‘SEC. 43. 
Other civil actions; how limited. 
-Civil actions other than for the recovery of real property can only be
brought within the following periods
after the right of action accrues:

‘x x x                x
x x                 x x x

‘3.  Within
four years:  x x
x An action for relief on the ground of fraud, but
the right of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the
discovery of the fraud;

‘x x x                x x x                 x x x.’

“In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just
as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil
Code), so is the corresponding
obligation to reconvey the property and the title
thereto in favor of the true owner.  In
this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Article
1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.

‘Article 1144.  The following actions must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues:

(1) Upon a written contract;

(2) Upon an obligation created by law;

(3) Upon a judgment.

x x x                 x x x                 x x x

(Emphasis supplied).’

“An action for reconveyance based on
an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and not
otherwise.  A long line of decisions of
this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule.  Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an
action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens
title over the property.  The only discordant
note, it seems, is Balbin vs. Medalla,
which states that the prescriptive period for a reconveyance
action is four years.  However, this
variance can be explained by the erroneous reliance on Gerona
vs. de Guzman.  But in Gerona, the fraud
was discovered on June 25, 1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act No. 190, was
applied, the new Civil Code not coming into effect until August 30, 1950 as
mentioned earlier.  It must be stressed,
at this juncture, that Article 1144 and Article 1456, are new provisions.  They have no counterparts in the old Civil
Code or in the old Code of Civil Procedure, the latter being then resorted to
as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive period for an action for reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false
pretenses.”

An action for reconveyance has its basis in Section 53, paragraph 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, which provides:

“In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may
pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud
without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder of the decree
of registration on the original petition or application, x x
x.”

This provision should be
read in conjunction with Article 1456 of the Civil Code, which provides:

“Article 1456.  If property is acquired through mistake or
fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.”

The law thereby creates the obligation of
the trustee to reconvey the property and the title
thereto in favor of the true owner. 
Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and
Article 1456 of the Civil Code with Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code, supra,
the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of
fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date
of the issuance of the certificate of title. 
In the present case, therefore, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 10235 was
filed on June 4, 1975, it
was well-within the prescriptive period of ten (10) years from the date of the
issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-6836 on September 17, 1970.

Unfortunately for the
petitioners, however, We agree with the respondent
court and the trial court that the private respondents did not employ any fraud
in securing title to the questioned land. 
A perusal of the pertinent portions of the deposition of Epifanio Caro supports this
finding, to wit:

“ATTY. TANEO:

“Q   Now,
at the time you bought this land from Simeon Gallego
in 1948, who was residing in that
shack?

A     There was no more shack, but there was a
big house.

“Q   And
who was residing on that big house?

A     Jose
and his wife and children, and his sister.

“Q   Since
according to you at the time you bought this land from Simeon Gallego there was already that big house occupied by Jose Ronsales and his wife, their children and sister, did you
make any demand from them to vacate the premises since you have already
purchased the land from Simeon Gallego?

A     I
informed them that I have already bought the lot from Simeon Gallego, and I demanded from them rental of the house,
because their house was already there at the time I bought the land.

“Q   And
what was their answer, if any, to your demand?

A     They
promised me that they will also pay the rent, or if I wish to sell the land to them, they will buy the same.  But I told them that I will not sell the
land.

“Q   Now,
since you told them that you did not want to sell to them the portion of the
land occupied by their big house, what did they, if any, suggest to you
regarding their occupancy of the land?

“ATTY. ALINIO:

We would like now to
object to this line of questioning because this is irrelevant, immaterial, and
impertinent, not being raised in the complaint. 
Not one of the issues in this case.

“ATTY. GRIJALVO:

Subject to the
objection, witness may answer.

“WITNESS:

A     They
told me that they will just pay the rent.

“ATTY. TANEO:

“Q   Did
you agree?

A     I
agreed.  I consented, but they merely
promised and promised to me, but they did not pay anything.

“Q   In
other words you mean that after they suggested to rent
the land and you agreed, you made several demands from them to pay the rentals?

A     Yes,
sir, I demanded from them the rentals. 
But later when I demanded from them the payment of the rent, they told
me that it is not my land being occupied by their house, but it is the land of
the municipality.

“Q   Around
how many times did you demand from them for the payment of the rentals?

A     Two times.

“Q   And
on the second time you demanded for the payment of rentals and they did not
still pay, what was their reason, if any?

“ATTY. ALINIO:

Objection,
because the witness has already answered the same or similar questions.

“ATTY. TANEO:

The witness stated that
he made around two demands for the payment of rentals.  When he made the demand later after there was
an agreement that they would just pay the rental, they reasoned out that the land
occupied by their house is a portion of the land of the municipality.  Since the witness stated that there was a
second demand, the purpose now of the pending question is if there was any
other reason stated by them.

“ATTY.
GRIJALVO:

Subject to the objection,
witness may answer.

“WITNESS:

A     They
will not pay, because according to them the land on which their house stands is
a portion of the land owned by the municipality.  But actually it is my own, and the
municipality has nothing to do with
it.” (pp. 207-212, Records)

“x x x

“ATTY. TANEO:

“Q   The
last time you stated that you know Lot No. 55. 
When for the first time did you know about this Lot
55?

A     I
know this lot for the first time when I bought this lot from Simeon Gallego.

“Q   At
that time did you know that this lot already bears Lot No. 55?

A     I
know it because one Purit told me that she inherited
the same from her grandmother.

“Q   This
Purit you are mentioning, are you referring to Purificacion Villanueva Ronsales who is the widow of Jose Ronsales?

A     Yes, sir.

“Q   When
was this when this Purit mentioned to you about this Lot
55?

A     When
I bought said land.” (pp. 215-216, Records)

It is clear, therefore,
that as early as 1948, Epifanio Caro
was already aware of the adverse claim of the private respondents.  He should have been vigilant of his right as
the allegedly new owner of the questioned land. 
What he did was the reverse, he slept on his
rights for a number of years.  In the
recent case of Bagtas v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 50732, August 10, 1989, We held that considerable delay in asserting
one’s right before a court of justice is strongly persuasive of the lack of
merit of his claim, since it is human nature for a person to enforce his right
when same is threatened or invaded. 
Thus, he is estopped by laches
from questioning the ownership of the questioned land.  Not only that.  There is also estoppel
in pais in this case because Epifanio Caro filed his answer with respect to Lot
No. 54 only while Purificacion Villanueva filed her
answer with respect to Lot No. 55 (see Tijam, et al.
v. Sibonghanoy, et al., G.R. No. L-21450,
April 15,
1968, 23 SCRA 29).  In addition, the trial court observed (pp.
414-415, Records):

“The Tax Declaration of the land bought by Epifanio
Caro, Exhibit 4, states that
its adjacent owner on the east is Pascual (sic) Lacson who is the grandmother of the defendants.  When said land was declared in the name of Epifanio Caro in 1969, the
adjacent owner on the East is still Pascuala Lacson, Exhibit E.  The
Tax Declaration of the land bought by Epifanio Caro from the heirs of Custodia Jalandoni, Exhibit 8 shows that the land in question is not
an adjacent property.  The same is true
with the Tax Declaration of the land bought by Epifanio
Caro from the heirs of Rafael Gaylan,
Exhibit 9.  This clearly shows that Lot
No. 55 which originally belonged to Pascuala Lacson is a different and distinct parcel from the lands
bought by Epifanio Caro
from Simeon Gallego, from the heirs of Custodia Jalandoni and from the
heirs of Rafael Gaylen (sic).”

While We commiserate with the
petitioners because of Epifanio Caro’s
lack of formal education still, his negligence and belated action were
undoubtedly the root cause of the present controversy:

“Q   Is
this the same survey plan which Mr. Gonzales gave you?

A     That
is the one but I have not read it because I do not understand English or
Spanish because I have never gone to school (p. 217, Records).”

“x x x

“Q   Now,
when the cadastral survey was conducted, did you take occasion to verify also
the cadastral survey of your lot?

A     I did not bother anymore because I
entrusted everything to them (p. 232, Records).”

“x x x

“Q   Now,
when you purchased the lot from Simeon Gallego
because you said you could not read English nor
Spanish, did you ask the help of somebody else to explain to you the document?

A     I
have not asked the help of anybody.

“Q   In
other words you did not read nor understand the sale in your favor executed by
Simeon Gallego?

A     I
have confidence in him because it was prepared by the father of the mayor.

“Q   Did
you not inquire from Simeon Gallego of the boundaries
of the church from him?

A     Before
that I knew that the boundaries of the lot of Loreta
Martinez was the municipal building, a road and a church.

“Q   Now,
before you purchased the property from Simeon Gallego
did you not also ask the help of somebody to examine the tax declaration in the
name of Simeon Gallego?

A     No,
because I already knew that that lot was owned by Martinez.

“Q   And
therefore, I gather from you that you relied on your knowledge, own knowledge
when you purchased the land from Simeon Gallego about
the boundaries of the land?

A     I
relied on my own knowledge because I know it fully well.

“Q   You
did not, you said, anymore examine the tax declaration?

A     I
did not bother because I knew that the lot was owned by Martinez.

“Q   Did
you inquire also from the Martinezes the boundaries
of their lots?

A     I did not bother because I knew fully well
because since 1909 I was already there in the church (pp. 251-253, Records).”

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED.  The decision dated January 28, 1986 and the resolution dated September 11, 1986 of the respondent
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION regarding
prescription.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

Griño-Aquino, J., no part.