ANSCOR TRANSPORT & TERMINALS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND POMPEI D. CRISOSTOMO, RESPONDENTS.

The petitioner, Anscor Transport and Terminals, Inc., prays for the
reversal of the decision of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission,
in MNC-NCR Case No. 4-1252-87 thereof, entitled “Pompei
D. Crisostomo, Complainant-Appellee,
versus Anscor Transport and Terminal, Inc., Respondent-Appellant”.  The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of Merit and the
decision appealed from is Affirmed, subject to the
modification as decreed above.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.1

The decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission affirmed that of the labor arbiter,
granting the private respondent’s, Pompei Crisostomo’s, prayer in his complaint for illegal
dismissal, subject to the modification that “on account of the obvious strained
employer-employee relationship between the parties,”2 the private
respondent shall not be reinstated but paid separation pay.

The facts are undisputed.

The private respondent, Pompei Crisostomo, was hired by
the petitioner on October 11, 1982 to drive a truck.  On October 25, 1984, Crisostomo set
out to deliver reportedly 450 bags of fertilizer from the Anscor
Paco Office, in Manila, to Mandaluyong,
arriving thereat an hour later.  When the cargo was unloaded in Mandaluyong, Anscor cargo
handlers allegedly found that the goods were short by twenty-nine bags.

On October 30 and November
6, 1984, Crisostomo was made to face an “investigative
committee”, upon charges of theft, which he denied and wherein he claimed
that the bags might have been overcounted upon
loading.  On November 7, 1984, Anscor dismissed
him.

On April 4, 1986,
Crisostomo went
to the labor arbiter on a complaint for illegal dismissal.  On January
4, 1988, the labor arbiter ordered his reinstatement with backwages.  On October 28, 1988, the respondent
National Labor Relations Commission affirmed, save for the modifications
earlier adverted to, the labor arbiter’s decision.

On December 5, 1988,
Anscor filed the instant petition, alleging that:

A.   RESPONDENT NLRC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LABOR
ARBITER’S FINDINGS THAT HEREIN PETITIONER FAILED TO CLEARLY ESTABLISH THAT
HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SHORTAGE OF HIS
CARGO ON OCTOBER 25, 1984.3

B.   THE HON. NLRC ERRED IN FINDING THAT NO FORMAL
INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED BY HEREIN PETITIONER ON POMPEI CRISOSTOMO.4

C.   THE NLRC ERRED IN AWARDING P. CRISOSTOMO
BACKWAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P16,956.00 AND SEPARATION
PAY.5

The lone issue is whether or not the respondent National Labor
Relations Commission, in rendering the challenged decision, has been guilty of
a grave abuse of discretion to warrant certiorari.

The first assigned error pertains to facts, that is, whether or
not Pompei Crisostomo had
been guilty of pilferage to justify Anscor’s action.  We
have held, however, that the question of “facts” is, as a general rule, the sole realm of an
administrative body,6 so long as there is substantial evidence to
back up its action.7

We reject, indeed, Anscor’s claims that in absolving Crisostomo,
the respondent Commission had misapprehended the facts or had speculated merely
on the events.  We do not find to be
well-taken its reliance on the pieces of evidence supposedly unearthed during
the investigation of the case pointing allegedly to Crisostomo’s
culpability.  Cargo receipt No. 10485,
which Crisostomo allegedly signed and which allegedly
indicated that 450 bags of fertilizer were loaded on board the delivery
truck, is not sufficient proof that 450 bags were, in fact, stowed on the
truck.  Although the private respondent signed the receipt, he is not
necessarily bound by its contents, or does he guarantee its correctness,
in the absence of any showing that he took part in the loading of the cargo. 
As the Solicitor General submits, “[i]t
was only after the loading was done and the cargo was covered, tied, and ready for delivery that the driver
was called upon to sign the cargo receipt ….”8 “To lay the blame,”9 he adds,
“on the driver just because he signed the cargo receipt is grossly unfair
to say the least.”10

The alleged statements of Anscor’s
checkers (surveyors) that they loaded 450 bags on Crisostomo’s
delivery truck are nothing conclusive. 
First, Anscor’s
checkers could have simply overcounted the
cargo.  Second, it was quite unlikely
that they would admit a mistake–and risk charges of negligence—that they
miscounted the bags.

The Court indeed finds the evidence inconclusive as to whether or
not there was in fact a loss sustained by Anscor.  As we indicated, Anscor
could have been mistaken, from the beginning, that it had 450 bags, when it
possibly had just 421.

To hold, therefore, Crisostomo for
theft is unwarranted, first, because Anscor itself
can not be sure that twenty-nine bags were actually missing, and second,
because no one saw Crisostomo in the act of stealing.

It is true that in administrative proceedings, the guilt of a party need not be shown by
proof “beyond reasonable doubt” required by our penal laws, yet,
there must be substantial evidence to support
it.  In this connection “substantial evidence” has been defined as
follows:

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla.  It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.11

The fact that there was
“evidence” (assuming it was “evidence”) that the petitioner
was liable, we do not find it to be evidence that is
substantial enough along the teaching of Ang Tibay.  As we said, Anscor itself can not say for sure that it had in fact lost
twenty-nine bags of fertilizer, and if the corpus delicti,
as it were, was doubtful, to pin
responsibility for the “loss” on another is even more doubtful.  Contrary to Anscor’s
opinion, the alleged evidence against Crisostomo was
hardly “airtight”,12 assuming it constitutes evidence at all.

Although loss of
confidence is a valid cause to
terminate an employee,13 it must however rest on an actual breach of
duty committed by the employee and not on the employer’s caprices.14

The Court finds little
necessity in dwelling lengthily on Anscor’s claims
that contrary to the respondent Commission’s findings, Crisostomo had not been denied due process.  For assuming that the respondent had indeed
been given his day in court,15 we can not accept, nonetheless, the evidence unravelled during the investigation of the case at the
plant level, as evidence, indeed, that the respondent is guilty.  As we said,
Anscor’s findings in this regard are inconclusive,
and can not reasonably warrant termination of employment.

In this connection, we can not
give weight to the
respondent Commission’s conclusion that “[h]ad it not been for the
apparent denial of due process attendant to the dismissal of herein
complainant, We could have sustained the dismissal of
complainant on account of loss of confidence.”16 As this
Court stated, Anscor has successfully adduced no
acceptable proof to buttress its “loss of trust” on the
petitioner.  It is therefore of little
moment that the private respondent did conduct investigation proceedings
because that is but one step.
What is more important is that notwithstanding such proceedings, Anscor had failed to demonstrate the private respondent’s
liability in a manner satisfactory to this Court.  The respondent Commission’s above aside was
totally unnecessary and the Court regrets it.

The Court finds, however, merit in the last assigned error,
insofar as it assails the grant of separation pay rather than backwages.  We also
find that the respondent labor body committed an error in modifying the labor
arbiter’s decision decreeing reinstatement.

The Court does not agree that the cases of Divine Word High School
v. NLRC17 and Asiaworld Publishing
House, Inc. v. Ople18 are
applicable to this case, in terms of “impracticability” of
reinstatement.

In Divine Word, it was held:

Nonetheless We hesitate ordering the
reinstatement of private respondent Luz Ballano Catenza as a high school teacher in the petitioner high
school, which is a Catholic institution, serving the educational and moral
needs of its Catholic studentry.  While herself
innocent, the continued presence of Mrs. Catenza as a
teacher in the school may well be met with antipathy and antagonism by some
sectors in the school community.19

In both cases, it must be stressed that
the aggrieved employees occupied responsible positions (a high school teacher
in Divine Word, a vice-president in Asiaworld), in
which a consistent level of confidence is required.  In the case at bar, however, the private
respondent was a company driver, a position that does not obviously call for
the trust management reposes, say, upon
a vice-president (as in Asiaworld).  Be that
as it may, Asiaworld in fact tells us:

If the respondent had been a laborer, clerk, or other rank and file
employee, there would be no problem in ordering her reinstatement with
facility.  But she was Vice President for
Marketing of Asiaworld.  An officer in such a key position can work effectively only if she enjoys
the full trust and confidence of top management.20

And obviously, Divine Word and Asiaworld
were decided on the merits of their peculiar conditions.  These conditions, however, are, to repeat,
peculiar, and can not be applied universally. 
Otherwise, reinstatement can never be possible simply because some
hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a result of
litigation.  That is human nature.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.  The Decision, dated October 28, 1988, of the
respondent National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED subject to the
modification that the petitioner is hereby ORDERED to pay to the private respondent backwages
based on the latest pay scale for drivers, equivalent to three (3) years with
no deductions or qualification, and that the petitioner is ORDERED to reinstate the private
respondent.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman),
Padilla, and Regalado,
JJ., concur.

Paras, J., on leave.

1 Rollo, 57.

2 Id.

3 Id., 4.

4 Id., 12.

5 Id., 15.

6 See e.g., Philippine Associated
Smelting and Refinery Corporation (PASAR) v. National Labor Relations
Commission, Nos. 82866-67, June 29, 1989, 174 SCRA 550, and cases mentioned
therein.

7 Supra; see also Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940), to which we return and return.

9 Id.

10 Id.

11 Ang Tibay
v. Court of Industrial Relations, supra, 642.

12 Rollo, id., 6.

13 Batas Blg. 130, sec. 15.

14 Hernandez v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 84302, August 10, 1989; Starlite
Plastics v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 78491, March 16, 1989.

15 It
appearing that he was given the opportunity to face his accusers and to belie the charges
against him.  (See
Adamson & Adamson, Inc. v. Amores, No.
58292, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 237.)

16 Rollo, id., 56.

17 No.
72207, August
6, 1986, 143 SCRA 346.

18 No.
56398, July
23, 1987, 152 SCRA 219.

19 Divine
Word High School v. NLRC, supra, at 350.

20 Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v.
Ople, supra, at 227.