PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DANTE ALEGRIA Y ARANA, JOHN DOE, ALIAS “KALBO”, ACCUSED, GENEROSO LABUAC Y BERBASA, FRANCISCO BUENAFLOR Y UMADHAY, ACCUSED-APP…

In the late afternoon of July
25, 1984, a security guard was found dead in the premises of the Warebank Phil., Inc., in Tondo, Manila,
where he was working.  There were sixteen
stab wounds in his body which had caused “cardio-respiratory arrest due to
shock and hemorrhage,” as the autopsy later disclosed.  His name was Antonio Corporal.

One month later, an information for his murder was filed against Generoso Labuac, Francisco Buenaflor, Dante Alegria, and one
John Doe, alias “Kalbo,” the last-named
being then (and up to now) at large.  Alegria died in the course of the trial and the charge
against him was dismissed.  Trial
proceeded only against Labuac and Buenaflor,
who were both eventually convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment and civil
damages in the sum of P40,000.00.^[1]
We deal only with these two in this appeal.

The lower court found that on the above-mentioned date, the four
accused agreed to enter the compound of Warebank to
steal empty bottles.  However, they were
seen by Corporal, who was then on duty. 
Corporal hit Labuac with his shotgun, but Kalbo wrested the weapon from the guard, who then drew his
knife.  For some reason, this was also
snatched from him, this time by Labuac who stabbed
the guard three times, then gave the knife to Buenaflor,
who continued to stab Corporal.  The
three then scaled the wall and escaped.  Alegria, who was outside the compound at the time, fled
with them.

These findings were based on the sworn statements^[2]
taken from Labuac, Buenaflor
and Alegria, and the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, principally Alex Sto. Domingo and Perla Balde, who both declared
that they saw Buenaflor carrying Corporal’s shotgun.^[3]
PC T/Sgt. Gregorio Gener, who took the sworn
statement of Labuac, and PC Sgt. Josefino
Rey, who took the sworn statements of Buenaflor and Alegria, both swore
that the affiants were informed of their constitutional rights and freely
confessed their participation in the murder of Corporal.^[4]

Alegria, Buenaflor
and Labuac took the witness stand and denounced their
supposed confessions as having been taken from them through threats and
violence.  Buenaflor
testified that he and Alegria were tied, blindfolded
and manhandled.  He said he was forced to
sign a paper when a .45 cal. gun was poked at his mouth.  He was not informed of his constitutional
rights nor was he represented and assisted by counsel.  Moreover, he did not understand, nor was he
shown the contents of, the document he was forced to sign.  Alegria testified
that when he was arrested, he was tied and mauled.  He said he did not give any statement but was
made to sign a paper the contents of which were not shown to him.  Labuac claimed he
was subjected to blows and forced to confess. 
He denied the sworn statement and signature attributed to him.

In addition, they all pleaded alibi, insisting they were far away
from the scene of the crime when it was committed.

In refutation, the prosecution stressed that the confessions were
obtained in faithful compliance with the constitutional requirements.  Both Gener and Rey testified that no compulsion was exerted upon the
accused when they freely gave their respective confessions.  This was evident in the documents themselves,
which opened with the following respective statements:

01. Tanong:   Francisco Buenaflor, ikaw
ay naririto sa aming tanggapan dahil sa isang
usapin nguni’t bago kita tanungin
ay nais ko munang ipabatid sa iyo and iyong
mga karapatan sa ilalim ng
ating binagong Saligang Batas tulad ng mga sumusunod:

Karapatan
mong manahimik pagka’t anuman ang iyong sabihin
ay maaaring gamiting ibedensiya pabor man o laban sa iyo
sa alin mang
hukuman dito sa Pilipinas.  Karapatan mong kumuha ng
abogado na papatnubay sa iyo
habang ikaw ay aking tinatanong at kung hindi mo kayang bumayad ay mayroon abogado ang opesinang
ito na libre.  Ang sasabihin mo kusang loob hindi ka pinilit
o pinangakuan ng pabuya bilang kapalit
ng iyong mga sasabihin at ang lahat ng
iyong mga sasabihin ay pawang katotohanan lamang.  Ang lahat ba ng
ito ay iyong nauunawaan?

Sagot:      Opo.

02.
Tanong:    Kailangan mo pa ba ang paglilingkod ng isang abogado?

Sagot:      Hindi na po.

03.
Tanong:    Nangangako ka ba na ang lahat
ng iyong mga sasabihin ay pawang katotohanan lamang?

 Sagot:     Nangangako po ako.^[5]

x                 
x                    x

K A S U L A T
A N

AKO, Jerry Labuac, na
nakalagda sa ibaba ay napaghihinalaan sa pagpatay sa
guwardiya ay napaalalahanan
gaya ng mga
sumusunod:  May
karapatan akong manahimik; May karapatan akong huwag magbigay
ng aking salaysay; May karapatan akong kumuha ng
aking sariling Abogado at kung wala ay bibigyan ako dito,
ngunit ako’y magtatapat at di ko na kailangan
pa ang tulong ng sino mang
Abogado; Alam ko rin na
ang lahat ng sasabihin ko
dito ay maaaring gamitin laban o’ pabor sa aking
depensa sa alin mang Hukuman
sa Kapuluan.  Na ako’y di tinakot, sinaktan
o’ pinilit sa pagbibigay ko ng
salaysay ko dito at bilang patotoo ay inilagda ko ang aking
pangalan sa ibaba nito.

(SGD.) GERRY BERBASA^[6]

x                 
x                    x

01. Tanong:  Bago kita tanungin, Dante Alegria ay nais ko munang
ipaalam sa iyo ang iyong
mga karapatan sa ilalim ng
ating Binagong Saligang Batas tulad ng mga sumusunod;

Karapatan mong manahimik pagkat anuman ang iyong
sasabihin ay maaaring gamiting ibedensiya (sic) pabor man or laban sa iyo sa
alin mang hukuman dito sa
Pilipinas, Karapatan mong kumuha ng
isang abogado na papatnubay sa
iyo habang ikaw ay aking tinatanong,
Na, ikaw ay hindi pinilit, tinakot o pinangakuan ng pabuya bilang kapalit
ng iyong sasabihin, at nangangako ka na ang Iahat
ng iyong sasabihin ay pawang katotohanan lamang ang lahat ba
ng aking sinabi ay iyong nauunawaan?

Sagot:      Opo.

02.
Tanong:    Kailangan mo pa ba ang paglilingkod ng isang abogado?

Sagot:      Hindi na po pagkat
kayo ko namang sagutin ang iyong
mga itatanong.^[7]

The Court is familiar with such statements and has consistently
found them invalid.  They do not persuade
that the accused was fully and fairly informed of his rights in the sense that
they were each painstakingly explained to him and he was apprised of the effects
of their waiver or forfeiture.  Such
statements are especially unacceptable where they are made by persons of
limited education, and more so if no counsel was at hand to assist and advise
him.

In the case at bar, Labuac was hardly
literate, not even having finished Grade 1, and, like Buenaflor
and Alegria, was not represented by counsel.  While there was a lawyer who was allegedly
called to be present at their interrogation, he did not actively assist and
advise them, being there merely to give a semblance of legality to the
proceedings.  There is nothing in the
record to show that the lawyer made a single manifestation or representation on
behalf of the person he was supposed to protect against any possible abuse of
the investigators.

The right to the assistance of counsel is one of the basic rights
of the person under investigation for the commission of an offense.  Lawyers are supposed to be well-versed in the
intricacies of criminal proceedings with which the ordinary layman, not to
mention the uneducated suspect, is not familiar.  Without a lawyer’s advice and active
representation, the suspect is likely to be ensnared into making damaging
admissions the legal significance of which he may not understand or
realize.  The lawyer is required to be
there to prevent the suspect from making rash statements that may later be used
against him at the trial.  The lawyer is
required to be there to see to it that the investigation is conducted in
accordance with the Constitution, without the employment of violence, force,
intimidation or threat, or any other means vitiating the free will.  So vital is this right that where the suspect
cannot afford the services of counsel, he will be provided with one for
free.  Any confession obtained from a
suspect in the absence of counsel and without his assistance shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him. 
The only exception is where the right to counsel is categorically waived
and such waiver is made in writing and in the presence of counsel.

The sworn statements signed by Buenaflor
on August 28, 1984, by Labuac on August
29, 1984, and by Alegria on August 28, 1984, showed that they had
been taken only in the presence of P/Cpl. David Maravilla,
P/Cpl. Jesus Ordinario, and P/Sgt. Jaime Esidera, respectively. 
Sgt. Rey merely testified that P/Lt. Macario Cendaña, a lawyer, was
present when Buenaflor and Alegria
supposedly waived their right to counsel.^[8]
The lawyer who was supposed to have advised and assisted Labuac
was P/Lt. Macario Z. Sembrano,
the same person who took their oaths and certified that he was “satisfied”
that the statement were freely and knowingly given.^[9]
Significantly, these lawyers appear to be members of the police organization
investigating the suspects and, no less remarkably, were not presented as
witnesses to authenticate the confessions.  It is also noteworthy that Gener
admitted on the stand that he had prepared Labuac’s
statement in advance and that Labuac had merely
signed it later.

The sworn statements are invalid on their face, but they become
even more questionable when viewed against the allegations of the affiants that
they had been manhandled into signing the supposed confessions.  It is true that the accused-appellants did
not present any medical evidence of the injuries inflicted upon them nor did
they complain to the prosecutor when they were brought before him.  It would seem, though, that the continuing
threat exerted upon them by the police, coupled with the fact that they were
and would remain under its detention, was enough to deter them from making any
complaint at that time.

The Court finds that the conviction of the accused-appellants by
the trial court is based mainly on the supposed confessions despite their
obvious invalidity.  We agree with the
Solicitor General that they are void and should have been regarded as inadmissible
evidence against both Labuac and Buenaflor.^[10]
They are so rejected now, and with a sharp reprimand for those police officers
who took them without according the affiants the right to the assistance of
counsel as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. 
The charges of alleged maltreatment of the accused-appellants while
under the custody of the police are hereby referred to the Commission on Human
Rights for appropriate action.

Take away the “confessions” and what does the
prosecution have?  The Solicitor General
concedes that the charge against Labuac should be
dismissed and his conviction reversed because of insufficiency of the evidence
linking him to the murder of Corporal. 
We agree.  But in the case of Buenaflor, the People submit that the testimonies of Sto. Domingo and Balde should
suffice to convict the accused-appellant as one of the killers of
Corporal.  We disagree.

Sto. Domingo and Balde
merely testified that they saw Buenaflor carrying
Corporal’s shotgun on the occasion and in the premises of the killing.  Neither saw Buenaflor
stab Corporal; neither, in fact, saw the killing of Corporal.  No eyewitnesses were presented.  All Sto. Domingo
and Balde said was that they saw Buenaflor
in the Warebank compound with the slain man’s
rifle.  From this declaration, which by
itself proves nothing, the conclusion is drawn that Buenaflor
fatally stabbed Corporal.  We think the
connection is tenuous.

The only way to hold Buenaflor liable
for the killing of Corporal even if there was no eyewitness to the fatal
stabbing is to establish a conspiracy among the co-accused.  But no such conspiracy has been proved among
the co-accused by the remaining evidence of the prosecution, which cannot now
include the extrajudicial confessions. 
We are exonerating Labuac.  Alegria is dead and
the charge against him has been dismissed. 
The man known only as Kalbo has yet to be apprehended and tried.  Conspiracy cannot be found on the basis alone
of the extrajudicial confessions of the accused-appellants and Alegria which we have all rejected as coerced and therefore
invalid.

It follows that Buenaflor should also
be acquitted, likewise for the insufficiency of the evidence against him.  His alibi may be weak, but the prosecution
evidence is even weaker and cannot prove his involvement in the slaying of
Corporal.  It is true that Buenaflor was positively identified by Sto.
Domingo and Balde, but not as the person who actually
stabbed and killed Corporal.  Buenaflor was identified only as the person they saw
holding a shotgun, but that is not enough to convict him of murder.  That kind of circumstantial evidence cannot
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused.  Like Labuac
(who enjoys the added advantage that he was not seen at the scene of the
crime), Buenaflor entitled to be cleared on the
ground of reasonable doubt.

We commend the Solicitor General for his zeal and
conscientiousness in protecting the accused-appellants from the evils of the
coerced extrajudicial confession, over which this Court has repeatedly
expressed special concern.  It can never
be stressed too strongly that the law-enforcement officers should be the first
to obey the law they are sworn to protect and that even a sincere desire to
insure its observance is no justification for them to violate it themselves in
the name of duty.

It is quite possible that Labuac and Buenaflor did participate actively in the slaying of
Corporal, but the evidence of the prosecution cannot sustain such
conclusion.  In the absence of proof
beyond reasonable doubt that they murdered Corporal, it must be presumed that
they did not.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the accused-appellants are ACQUITTED.

Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Commission on Human
Rights.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and Mediladea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Through Judge Remigio E. Zari.

^[2]
Exhibits “B,” “E” and “F,” Folder of Exhibits,
pp. 2, 7 and 9.

^[3]
TSN, December 18, 1984, p.
5; ibid., March 26, 1985,
p.3.

^[4]
TSN, February 6, 1985, pp.
3, 8; February 19, 1985,
pp. 11, 12.

^[5]
Exhibit “E,” Folder of Exhibits, p. 7.

^[6]
Exhibit “B,” ibid., p. 2.

^[7]
Exhibit “F”, Id.,
p. 9.

^[8]
TSN, February 19, 1985, p.
12.

^[9]
TSN, February 6, 1985, pp.
5, 10.

^[10] Rollo, p. 70;
Manifestation in Lieu of Appellee’s Brief, p. 45.