G.R. No. 84921. June 08, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROLANDO DURAL (ALSO KNOWN AS RONNIE JAVELON) AND BERNARDO ITUCAL, JR., Y BALDERAS, ACCUSED, ROLANDO DURAL AND BERNARDO ITUCAL,…
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
An amended information for Double
Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons In Authority was filed on 15
February 1988 with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City charging the
accused Rolando Dural, also known as Ronnie Javelon and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. as
follows:
“That on or about the 31st day of January, 1988 at Caloocan
City, Metro-Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating and mutually
aiding one another, without any justifiable cause and with intent to kill with
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon the persons of TSGT CARLOS PABON PC and CIC RENATO MANGLIGOT PC, as duly appointed and
qualified members of the Philippine Constabulary, CAPCOM, Camp Bagong Diwa,
Bicutan, Taguig, while the latter were engaged in the performance of their
official duties, knowing the said TSGT CARLOS PABON PC and CIC RENATO MANGLIGOT
PC, to be agents of persons in authority by then and there shooting TSGT.
CARLOS PABON, PC and CIC RENATO MANGLIGOT PC, on the different parts of their
bodies, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries, which
eventually caused their death.
Contrary to law.”[1]
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and assigned
to Branch 131 of the said court. Both
accused entered a plea of not guilty
upon their arraignment on 14 March 1988.[2]
Pre-trial was conducted on 30 March 1988[3] and,
thereafter, the trial on the merits ensued.
The witnesses who testified for the prosecution were Rodrigo
Pascual, Sgt. Douglas Tagapulot, Cpl. Angel Floranda, Guillermo Jaramilla,
Vicente Rosadiño, Pfc. Juanito Abella, Edwin Balag, Rener Ramos, Dennis Santos,
Erlinda Pabon and Erlinda Mangligot. The parties agreed to dispense with the testimony of Dr. Desiderio
Moralida, whose autopsy reports on the victims were admitted by the
defense. The witnesses who testified
for the defense were Carmelita Aldaya, Lorelie Itucal, Armando Amba, Nilda
Maravilla, Bernardo Itucal, Grace Guevarra and Rolando Dural.
On 31 August 1988, the trial court promulgated a decision[4]
finding the accused guilty as charged. The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the
accused ROLANDO DURAL otherwise known as RONNIE JAVELON and BERNARDO ITUCAL,
JR. y BALDERAS beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds both accused GUILTY of
the crime of DOUBLE MURDER qualified by treachery with ASSAULTS UPON AGENTS OF
PERSONS IN AUTHORITY and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of
double RECLUSION PERPETUA; to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the
deceased T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon PC and CIC Renato Mangligot PC in the sum of
P30,000.00 each as death indemnity; to pay Mrs. Erlinda Pabon the sum of P23,299.00 representing the amount
she spent for the burial and wake of her husband T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon; to pay
Mrs. Erlinda Mangligot the sum of P29,550.00 representing the expenses she
incurred for the wake and burial of her husband CIC Renato Mangligot; and to
pay the costs.
It appearing that both accused are detention prisoners, the period
of preventive imprisonment they underwent shall be given full credit in their
favor.
SO ORDERED.”[5]
The evidence for the prosecution upon which the judgment of
conviction is anchored is summarized by the trial court in this wise:
“Two prosecution eye witneses (sic) Rener Ramos and Dennis Santos when presented to (sic) the
witness stand corroborated each other’s testimony more specifically on material
points and testified that:
‘At about 12:00 in the afternoon of January 31, 1988 both of them
(prosecution witnesses Rener Ramos and Dennis Santos) were at the Macaneneng
Street in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City as they were supposed to go a (sic)
‘tupadahan’ however, they were not able to arrive at the tupadahan because
while on their way or from a distance of twelve (12) arms-length they heard
successive gunfires (sic) so they run (sic) and hid themselves in a concrete
fence near a store; from the place they were hiding or from a distance of ten
(10) arms-length they saw three (3) men each of them armed with .45 (sic)
pistol, firing upon at (sic) the two Capcom soldiers on board a Capcom mobile
car which was then on a full stop although its engine, was still running; two
of the gunmen positioned themselves beside each of the side of the mobile car
while the third gunman whom they identified as accused Rolando Dural otherwise
known as Ronnie Javelon (Dural for brevity) climbed the hood of the mobile car
and positioned himself in front of the car; after the two Capcom soldiers were
immobilized, the gunman standing near the driver’s seat opened the left front
door of the car and got the .45 (sic) service pistol and armalite of the Capcom
soldiers; thereafter, the three gunmen left; during the shooting incident they
also noticed the presence of two persons, one was inside an owner jeep while
the other one whom they identified as accused Bernardo Itucal, Jr. (Itucal for
brevity) was standing near the
scene of the incident with one of his arm (sic) raised while one of his hand
(sic) was holding a .45 caliber
pistol; immediately after the three gunmen who fired at the Capcom soldiers
left; (sic) the man who was riding on the owner jeep told accused Itucal that
he was leaving and instructed Itucal to take care of everything; witness Dennis
Santos even quoted the very word (sic) of the man on board the owner jeep
‘Pare, bahala ka na diyan’; after that, the accused Itucal walked away; two
days after the incident or on February 3, 1988 eyewitnesses Ramos and Santos
voluntarily went at (sic) the Capcom headquarters at Dagat-Dagatan, Caloocan
City to narrate what they have witnessed, consequently the investigator brought
them at (sic) the Capcom headquarters
at Bicutan then at (sic) Camp Panopio Hospital; at the said hospital, they saw
one of the three gunmen (referring to accused Dural) who shot the two Capcom
soldiers; then they went back at (sic) Bicutan headquarters where they gave
their respective statements (Exhs. ‘D’ and ‘E’).'”[6]
Both Itucal and Dural denied authorship of the crime charged and
interposed the defense of alibi. The
former, a student of the Guzman Institute of Technology and a choir member of
the Muling Pagkabuhay Church located at Rosario Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
City, claims that at about 12:00 noon of 31 January 1988, while he was eating
inside his house at 63 Rosario Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, he heard
gun reports and shouts and when he peeped through the window, he saw people
running or scampering away. He and his
sister, Lorelie, wanted to go to nearby Macaneneng Street from where the gun
reports came, but they were not able to reach it because of the presence of
many onlookers at the scene of the shooting incident. Before 12:00 noon or in the morning of 31 January 1988, he was at
the Chapel conversing with some people there.
Accused Rolando Dural, a.k.a. Ronnie Javelon, who admitted
that his real name is Rolando Dural, testified thus: that he stayed in his sister’s house at Block 10, Lot 4, South
City Homes, Biñan, Laguna from 29 November 1987 up to 31 January 1988; two (2)
days before 1 February 1988, he told his sister, Agnes Javelon, that his
stomach and chest were aching and although he was suffering for quite a long
time, it was only on 1 February 1988 when he experienced severe pain; as a
consequence, his sister got in touch with Dr. Jeremias de la Cruz; the said
doctor first brought him to the latter’s clinic in Quezon City where his cyst
was removed and his wound at the left side of his body was sutured; then he was
brought to the St. Agnes Hospital where he was admitted under the name Ronnie
Javelon for the reason that it was his sister who will be shouldering his
hospital bills and expenses.[7]
The trial court rejected the defense of alibi on the ground that
eyewitnesses Rener Ramos and Dennis Santos, whose testimonies “were
logical, straightforward and probable”, and whose “credibility was
not shaken in any manner by the rigorous examination to which they have been
exposed,” positively identified the accused.[8] It
appreciated against the accused only the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Not satisfied with the lower court’s decision, accused Dural and
Itucal, hereinafter referred to as the Appellants, filed their notice of appeal
on 1 September 1988.[9]
Appellants interpose the following assignment of errors in their
Brief:[10]
“1. The lower
court erred in finding conspiracy among and between the accused.
2. The lower court
erred in giving weight to the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses
notwithstanding their inconsistencies on relevant and material points.
3. The lower court
erred in not considering the defense of alibi interposed by both accused.
4. The lower court
erred in not considering the illegality of the arrest of both accused, in favor
of their defenses.
5. The lower court
erred in considering the qualifying circumstance of treachery.”[11]
In the first assigned error, appellants challenge the trial
court’s finding that conspiracy existed among the accused, with Itucal acting
as the lookout. They allege that the
evidence for the prosecution failed to establish that the appellants knew of
the criminal intent of their alleged two (2) unidentified companions.
The People[12]
maintains, however, that conspiracy was established by the presence of the
appellants and their companions at the scene of the crime and their
participation in the killing of the victims. Witnesses Ramos and Santos testified that they saw Dural go atop the
hood of the CAPCOM car and fire a shot at one of the CAPCOM soldiers seated in
the front seat. One Edwin Balag, a
witness for the prosecution and a neighbor of Itucal, testified that he had
witnessed the shooting of the CAPCOM soldiers and thereafter saw Itucal go atop
the hood of the CAPCOM car[13] and
shout “Mabuhay ang Sparrow.”
A conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[14]
Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy; it may be shown by acts and
circumstances from which may be logically inferred the existence of a common
design among the accused to commit the crime charged.[15]
It is sufficient that the
malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.[16]
Confederacy was established beyond cavil in this case among appellant Rolando
Dural, a.k.a. Ronnie Javelon, and the
two (2) other gunmen. Armed with deadly
weapons, they arrived together, each proceeding directly to a pre-assigned spot
from where they suddenly and unexpectedly shot their victims. They then fled together toward the same
direction after divesting the victims of their firearms. All these acts are eloquent proof of a
common plan and design deliberately and carefully executed with precision
through coordinated action.
There is no doubt in Our minds as to the participation of
appellant Dural — the evidence for the prosecution sufficiently established
his guilt with moral certainty.
Appellant Itucal, however, deserves a different treatment. The trial court held him liable as a
co-conspirator because of its finding that he acted as the look-out and
was armed with a .45 caliber pistol. Our evaluation of the evidence yields no factual foundation for such a
finding. It is based on claims,
bordering on speculation, of prosecution witnesses Rener Ramos and Dennis
Santos that from what they saw, Itucal must have been a
look-out. They did not categorically
declare that Itucal was such. They only
presumed or speculated that he was. The
following is the testimony on direct examination of Rener Ramos:
“Q Now aside from the persons that you have mentioned firing at the
soldiers inside the capcom car, were there any other persons if any?
x x x
A Yes, sir.
Q What were they doing?
A I saw two persons, sir, one was inside the owner jeep and the other
one was standing near the scene of the
incident.
Q How far was this owner jeep parked from the capcom car?
A More or less 2 to ½ armslength (sic) away, sir.
Q What about this other person whom you saw standing near the car,
how far was he from the capcom car?
A More or less two armslength (sic) away, sir.
Q What was this person, standing near the car
doing at that time?
A He
was standing there and he had his arm raised and one of his hand (sic) was holding a 45 caliber pistol.
Q Will you tell us what was his participation
in the killing?
x x x
A From I what saw, sir, he must
have been the look-out.
x x x
Q Now, you said, where are these two Persons that you have mentioned, the
one you said was seated on the driver seat of the owner jeep and the one
holding a 45 caliber firearm, which (sic) according to you acted as a look-out,
if ever you will see them again would you be able to identify them?
A Yes sir.
Q Will you please look around the courtroom, and see if they are around,
and if they are around please point to them?
A Only is here (sic), sir.
Q Please point to him?
A That person, sir.
(Witness pointing to
prisoner on left, stood up and gave his name as Bernardo Itucal).
Q Now, was he the one holding the firearm standing near the capcom car,
mobile car, which refers (sic) to be the look out?
A Yes sir.
Q Now, after these three persons who actually fired upon the soldiers’ car
left, what did the other two do, if any?
A The one who was riding at the owner jeep
told the other person who was standing outside he was leaving the said person
to take care of everything.
Q To whom (sic) this person addressing?
A The person who was standing, sir, and holding the 45 caliber.
Q You were referring to accused Bernardo Itucal?
A Yes sir.
Q And afterwards what happened?
A The person who was carrying 45 pistol walked away, sir and we left, sir, because we fell (sic)
nervous at that time, sir.”[17]
The pertinent portion of the direct testimony of Dennis Santos on
the same point is as follows:
“Q
Now, aside from these persons including Rolando Dural whom you saw firing their
gun, were there other persons there aside from the three?
A Yes sir, there were still other (sic).
Q How many?
A Two (2), sir.
Q What were they doing at that time?
A One was boaring (sic) a vehicle and he was
sporting a violet overall attire and the other one was standing near the
basketball court and from what I saw he acted as a look out,
sir.
Q How far was this look out from from (sic) the capcom car?
A About two armslength (sic) away, sir.
Q How about the owner jeep how far was it parked in relation to the capcom
car?
A The same distance, sir.
Q What did that look out do if, any, that you have mentioned?
A The person who was inside the owner jeep
shouted in a loud voice and said, ‘Pare bahala ka na diyan.’ And the one who
acted as a look out followed the three gunmen who entered Rosal Street, sir.
Q Now, was this look out that you have mentioned armed at that time or
not?
A I did not notice, sir.
Q If ever you will see this look out again, would able (sic) to identify
him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please look around the courtroom and see if he is inside, and
if he is inside please point to him.
A Witness pointing to the other prisoner stood up and gave his name as Bernardo Itucal.
Q What about the driver of the said owner jeep is he inside the courtroom?
A No, sir he was not present.”[18]
On cross-examination, Rener Ramos categorically admitted that it
was only when the three (3) gunmen had swiftly walked away toward Rosal Street
that he saw Itucal for the first time:
“Q In other words, there was only
or it was only after the gunmen have fled that you were able to see Bernardo
Itucal, isn’t?
Fiscal:
That would be
misleading, your honor. Not fled.
x x x
Q You stated a while ago that after the gunmen have taken the 45 caliber
and the armalite of the soldier, they ran away, isn’t?
A They walked away fast, sir?
Q Away from the sight (sic) where the killing took place, isn’t?
A Yes sir, they were turning their heads towards a street (sic) Rosal.
Q And it was at that point that you were saying that you saw Bernardo
Itucal standing with a 45 on his hand and very near the incident, isn’t?
A Yes, sir.
Q And this was the first time that you saw Bernardo Itucal, isn’t?
A Yes sir.”[19]
Dennis Santos also admitted on cross-examination that he saw Itucal
for the first time only after the gunmen had left the scene, thus:
“Q You said, that the look out was accused Bernardo Itucal, you have seen
Bernardo Itucal only after the gunmen have went (sic) away from the scene of
the incide (sic), isn’t?
A Yes sir.”[20]
and that the only basis for his belief
that Itucal was the lookout was the following parting statement of the driver
of the owner-type jeep addressed to Itucal: “Pare, bahala ka na diyan.” Thus:
“Q Why did you say that, Mr. Witness, that Bernardo Itucal was a look out?
A Because I heard the
passenger of the owner jeep bid goodbye, sir, so I gathered that he was his
companion and he remarked, ‘Pare, bahala ka na diyan.'”[21]
If Itucal was the lookout, he had to come either ahead of or
simultaneously with the gunmen. By the
very nature of his duty or task, a lookout should not come to the scene of the
crime after its consummation. There is
absolutely no evidence that Itucal came ahead of or simultaneously with the
gunmen; on the contrary, as shown above,
he was seen for the first time only after the gunmen had walked away. That he was armed which could have enhanced
the prosecution’s theory that he was a co?conspirator, was not likewise
sufficiently proven. While Rener Ramos
testified that he was, his companion, Dennis Santos, who similarly focused his
eyes on Itucal and the others and witnessed almost everything that took place,
did not notice any weapon in Itucal’s possession. According to Rener Ramos, Itucal “had his arm raised and one
of his hand (sic) was holding a 45 caliber pistol.” If such were indeed
the fact, Dennis Santos would not have failed to see it. That is not all to it. Another prosecution witness, Edwin Balag —
who even testified that he had seen Itucal, his neighbor whom he had known for
more than two (2) years,[22]
climb atop the hood of the CAPCOM car after the gunmen shot the soldiers and
shout “mabuhay ang sparrow” — did not state that Itucal
was armed.[23]
The prosecuting Fiscal did not attempt to extract any information or testimony
to that effect from him. It was the
court which asked the appropriate question after the re-direct examination of
Balag, but the witness categorically admitted that Itucal was not armed at that time, thus:
“COURT:
Itucal was not armed at that time?
A No, sir.”[24]
That Itucal shouted “mabuhay ang sparrow” and was told by the driver of
the owner-type jeep: “Pare, bahala ka na diyan,” do not conclusively prove
that he was a co-conspirator in the absence of any evidence, as in this case,
that he was a member of a subversive organization which operates the sparrow
unit and that the driver of the owner-type jeep was also a co-conspirator. Even assuming for the sake of argument that
he was a sympathizer of such a subversive organization, mere sympathy is not
enough to prove his participation in the conspiracy. The parting statement of the driver of the owner-type jeep could
be addressed to anybody at the scene and is susceptible of two (2)
interpretations, one of which is inconsistent with the participation of Itucal
either in the planning of the crime or in the execution of such plan. In the light of the presumption of innocence
guaranteed by the Constitution, and in the absence of credible inculpatory
evidence, that interpretation in his favor must prevail. While admittedly the alibi of Itucal is
weak, the evidence of the prosecution against him is likewise feeble. The
prosecution cannot use the weakness of Itucal’s defense to enhance its case; it
must rely on the strength of its own evidence.[25] And considering
that Itucal’s culpability could only be anchored on his participation in a
conspiracy, such participation must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. The prosecution has failed to
successfully discharge that burden in this case, leaving this Court
unconvinced, due to reasonable doubt, of the guilt of Itucal.
With the foregoing exposition, resolution of the second and third
assigned errors is no longer necessary. However, for the satisfaction of accused Dural, let it be stated that
the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as
to whether there was a basketball game going on at the time the first gunfire
was heard, who among the appellants climbed atop the hood of the CAPCOM car,
and which of two (2) written statements of Ramos and Santos were first made,
refer to trivial or minor points. Settled is the rule that
discrepancies on minor matters do not impair the essential integrity of the
prosecution’s evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses’ honesty.[26]
As a matter of fact, there is at all no inconsistency in the testimonies of the
witnesses on the second issue. As
correctly pointed out by the People, both appellants did in fact climb atop the
hood. According to Ramos and Santos,
Dural did so and fired at one of the soldiers seated in the front seat of the
car.[27]
According to Balag, Itucal climbed atop the hood only after the three (3)
gunmen had fired at their victims.[28]
As to alibi, it is a fundamental
juridical dictum that it cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused.[29]
In the instant case, Dural was
positively identified by the principal witnesses for the prosecution. It is equally settled that for alibi to
prosper, it must not only be shown that the accused was at some other place at
the time of the incident but that it was physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[30]
This was not proven by Dural.
The fourth assigned error is without merit. It is too late for the appellants to
question the illegality of their arrests. The irregularity, if any, was cured when they submitted themselves to
the jurisdiction of the trial court by filing a petition for bail,32 entering a plea of not guilty and actively
participating at the pre-trial and trial.
Nor is there merit in the fifth assigned error. Per the testimonies of Rener Ramos and
Dennis Santos, the victims who had no opportunity to defend themselves as they
were still inside the CAPCOM car which was still maneuvering, were shot at close
range immediately after the three (3) gunmen, one of whom is appellant Dural,
surrounded the car with each positioning himself, at pre-assigned spots, i.e.,
the left, right and front portions of the
car. The autopsy reports33 showed that both victims sustained gunshot wounds
mostly in the head. The suddenness of
the attack on the unwary victims and the simultaneous and coordinated gunfire
trained at them insured the execution of the deed without risk to the gunmen
arising from any defense which the victims might make. Treachery then attended the commission of
the deed. The killing of the two (2)
CAPCOM soldiers was thus qualified to murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make.34
There is no doubt in Our minds that appellant Dural and the two
(2) other gunmen knew that the victims, T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and C1C Renato
Mangligot, were members of the Philippine Constabulary detailed with the CAPCOM
as they were then in uniform and riding an official CAPCOM car. The victims, who were agents of persons in
authority, were in the performance of official duty as peace officers and law
enforcers. For having assaulted and
killed the said victims, in
conspiracy with the other two (2) gunmen, appellant Dural also committed direct
assault under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The crimes he committed, therefore, are two (2) complex crimes of
murder with direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority. Pursuant then to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, the maximum of the penalty for the more serious crime, which is
murder, should be imposed. The maximum
of the penalty prescribed for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code is death, but in view of
the prohibition on the imposition of the death penalty,35 the proper imposable penalty would be reclusion perpetua. The
trial court correctly imposed on appellant Dural two (2) penalties of reclusion perpetua. In
conformity with the prevailing jurisprudence, the indemnity for each death
shall be increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) AFFIRMING, insofar as accused-appellant
ROLANDO DURAL (also known as RONNIE JAVELON) is concerned, the Decision of
Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City in Criminal Case No. C?30112,
subject to the above modification of the death indemnity;
(2) ACQUITTING, on the
ground of reasonable doubt, accused-appellant BERNARDO ITUCAL, JR.; and
(3) Ordering
accused-appellant ROLANDO DURAL (also known as RONNIE JAVELON) to pay one-half (1/2) of the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, (Chairman), Bidin, Romero, and Melo, JJ., concur.
[1]
Original Records (OR), 4-5. The
original information was filed on 8 February 1988.
[2]
Id., 10.
[3]
Id., 23.
[4]
OR, 147-162; Rollo, 29-44. Per
Judge Antonio J. Fineza.
[5]
Id., 162.
[6]
OR, 148-149; Rollo, 30-31.
[7]
OR, 152-153.
[8]
Id., 154.
[9]
Id., 169.
[10]
Rollo, 49-63.
[11]
Rollo, 49.
[12]
Brief for the Appellee; Id., 75-98.
[13]
Id., 84-85.
[14]
Article 8, Revised Penal Code.
[15]
People vs. Tingson, 47 SCRA 243 [1972]; People vs. Cabiling, 74
SCRA 285 [1976]; People vs. Cercano, 87 SCRA 1 [1978].
[16]
People vs. San Luis, 86 Phil. 485 [1950].
[17]
TSN, 11 May 1988, 5-7. Underscoring
supplied for emphasis.
[18]
TSN, 11 May 1988, 23-24. Underscoring
supplied for emphasis
[19]
Id., 13-14.
[20]
TSN, 11 May 1988, 26.
[21]
Id., 26-27.
[22]
TSN, 14 April 1988, 19.
[23]
Id., 6-7.
[24]
Id., 23.
[25]
People vs. Flores, 186 SCRA 303 [1990]; People vs. Malbago, 185
SCRA 311 [1990].
[26]
People vs. Bernardino, 193 SCRA 448 [1991].
[27]
TSN, 11 May 1988, 5; 23.
[28]
TSN, 14 April 1988, 6.
[29]
People vs. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232 [1980]; People vs. Clores, 184
SCRA 638 [1990]; People vs. Beringuel, 192 SCRA 561 [1990].
[30]
People vs. Nabor, 185 SCRA 615 [1990]; People vs. Florida, G.R.
No. 90254, 24 September 1992.
32 OR, 18-19.
33 Exhibit “O” and
“P”; Id., 74-75.
34 Article 14(16), Revised
Penal Code.
35 Section 19(1), Article
III, 1987 Constitution.