PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ARCADIO MANRIQUE, JR. AND JOHN DOE, ACCUSED, ARCADIO MANRIQUE, JR., ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 30, San Pablo City in Criminal Case No. 4373-SP, finding Arcadio
Manrique, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and sentencing him to
suffer “the supreme penalty of death. However, with the abolition of the death penalty, the penalty has to be
reduced to reclusion perpetua in accordance with Article III,
Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution.” (Judgment, p. 14; Rollo, p. 51)

In said criminal case, Arcadio Manrique, Jr. and John Doe, were charged with
Murder, committed as follows:

“That on or about May 21, 1985 in the City of San Pablo,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused above-named, with intent to kill, with treachery and with
insult or in disregard of the respect due the victim as Station Commander of
the PC-INP of San Pablo City, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shot one P/Lt. COL. RODELO DIONGLAY with unlicensed firearms, with
which the accused were then conveniently provided, thereby inflicting gunshot
wounds upon the person of said P/Lt. Co. Rodelo Dionglay which caused his
immediate death. (Decision, p. 1;
Rollo, p. 38)

The accused John Doe remains unidentified and at large. Arcadio Manrique, Jr. entered a plea of
“not guilty” and after trial, was sentenced accordingly.

On the basis of the evidence adduced at the trial, the court a quo found that at 6:00 p.m. of May 21, 1985 in
Barangay Bagong Pook, San Pablo City, appellant shot and killed Lt. Col. Rodelo
Dionglay, the commander of the San Pablo, Laguna PNP Station. The victim was at that time seated on a
bench in front of his house, playing dama with Ricardo Dinglasan in the
presence of about six other persons. Appellant, with the accused John Doe, sneaked from behind the
victim. Appellant was armed with a .38
caliber revolver while John Doe had a .45 caliber pistol. Appellant fired the first shot, hitting Lt.
Col. Dionglay at the back. When the
latter stood up and ran to escape from his assailants, John Doe fired
successive shots at him. Appellant and
his companion retreated back to back from the crime scene with their firearms
raised in readiness. The wounded victim
sought refuge in the house of Pablo Recaña, where he collapsed near the comfort
room.

Immediately after the incident, Ricardo Dinglasan and Pablo
Recaña were summoned to the police headquarters, where they gave the
descriptions of the assailants.

On May 22, 1985, the two eye-witnesses went to the National
Bureau of Investigation office in San Pablo City. An NBI artist made a sketch of the assailants based on the
description given by them.

On June 5, 1985, Recaña and Dinglasan were again summoned to the
police headquarters. Shown a police
album, they pointed to a picture of appellant as one of the assailants of Lt.
Col. Dionglay.

On June 25, 1985, Pablo Recaña and Marlene D. de Mesa, daughter
of the slain police official, personally identified appellant in a police
line-up at Camp Nakar, Lucena City, as one of the assailants.

Before this Court, appellant claims that the procedure for his
identification by the prosecution’s witnesses was conducted irregularly, to
wit:

(1)   that
there was no police line-up as alleged by the prosecution;

(2) that Pablo Recaña and Marlene D. de Mesa
contradicted each other on the number of persons present in the room where the confrontation was made; and,

(3)   that while the police investigators fetched
several witnesses from San Pablo City for the identification of the assailant,
only one was able to to point to him. (Appellant’s Brief, pp. 7-8)

Furthermore, appellant argues that the police investigators
failed to pursue the theory that the killing of Lt. Col. Dionglay was the
handiwork of subversive elements as reported in the issue of the Peoples
Journal of May 22, 1985. (Appellant’s
Brief, pp. 8-9)

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there is no
rule or set procedure which requires that for anyone to be identified and named
as a suspect in a crime, he had to stand among other people to be ceremoniously
picked-out (Appellee’s Brief, pp. 13-14) like what is done in the movies.

The other contentions of appellant are likewise
unmeritorious. Whether there were
inconsistencies on the number of persons in the office of Major Bautista, as
testified to by the witnesses, the same relate to minor details, which do not
destroy the credibility of their testimonies (People v. Doctolero, 193 SCRA 632
[1991]). Testimonal inconsistencies to
merit due consideration by the courts, must relate to material matters. The defense has not shown the significance
or the materiality of the correct counting of the number of persons present
during the confrontation.

With regard to the fetching of additional witnesses from San
Pablo City, the fact that only one of them was able to identify the appellant
bolsters the veracity of the identification. If the bringing of the additional witnesses was stage-managed, all the
“rehearsed” witnesses should have pointed their fingers at the
appellant.

Appellant anchors his defense of alibi on the testimony of Artemio
Cosico, the owner of the construction project where he worked. Cosico testified that at the time of the
commission of the crime, appellant was at his work place, partaking drinks with
his foreman. The trial court was in
wonder why the foreman was not presented as a witness to corroborate
appellant’s alibi.

Cosico made a poor impression as a witness on the trial court,
which observed: “x x x This witness is unreliable as he has shown his
propensity for evasiveness and unresponsive answers.” (Judgment, p. 7;
Rollo, p. 44)

As appellant himself admitted, he left his house at 6:00 p.m. of
May 21, 1985 and returned an hour later. Furthermore, he admitted that the travelling time needed to negotiate
ADB Subdivision, where appellant lived, to Bagong Pook, where the crime was
committed, did not exceed 15 minutes.

The defense of alibi cannot be given any weight in the absence of
a convincing proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have
been at the place of the commission of the crime (People v. Vasquez, 196
SCRA 564 [1991]).

There was no arbitrariness in the discarding by the police of the
theory that the subversives were behind the killing. After the identification of appellant, it was useless for the
police to pursue any other theory of the case.

The inquiry by the police into the motive of appellant, while not
necessary, helped explain why Lt. Col. Dionglay was liquidated. The inquiry showed that a policeman under
Lt. Col. Dionglay’s command, was a suspect in the killing of a brother of appellant and that Lt. Col. Dionglay had a heated
altercation with another brother of appellant regarding the custody of said
policeman.

The trial court correctly qualified the killing to murder as it
was committed with treachery. The
shooting was sudden, unexpected and done at close-range when the victim had no
expectation whatsoever that he would be attacked (People v. Serenio, 179 SCRA
379 [1989]). Likewise, the trial court
correctly appreciated the presence of the aggravating circumstance of insult or
disregard of the respect due the victim on account of his rank. Appellant admitted that he knew that the
victim was the Chief of Police and the one in charge of the maintenance of
peace and order in San Pablo City.

The indemnity of P30,000.00 as civil liability of the accused to
the heirs of the deceased in murder cases has been increased to P50,000.00 (People v. Yeban, 190 SCRA 409 [1990]).

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the indemnity to be paid by appellant to the heirs of the
victim is increased to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Griño-Aquino,
and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.