PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. FRANCISCO CABACTULAN, ALFREDO SUGURAN, JAIME LAPINGKAW AND JOHN DOE, ACCUSED. ALFREDO SUGURAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

In the present recourse, accused-appellant Alfredo Suguran seeks
a reversal of the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental, 10th Judicial Region, Branch XXI, finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment together with all its accessory penalties, and to
further indemnify the heirs of the deceased Pio Yagma in the amount of
P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment.^[1]

The records show that on May 5, 1985, an information^[2] was filed with the Regional Trial
court of Misamis Oriental, Branch XVIII, charging Francisco Cabactulan, Alfredo
Suguran, Jaime Lapingkaw and one John Doe with the crime of murder for the
death of Pio Yagma, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 5525 and later
consolidated with Criminal Case No. 5526 before Branch XXI of the same
court. It further appears that accused
Francisco Cabactulan and Jaime Lapingkaw jumped bail before they could be arraigned,
hence the case as against them was archived pursuant to the trial court’s Order
dated November 27, 1985.^[3] Trial
proceeded only with respect to accused Alfredo Suguran.

The facts as found by the court below are as follows:

“The evidence adduced by the Prosecution through the
testimonies of Nenita Yagma, Elsie Yagma and Dr. Apolinar Vacalares revealed
that at 7:00 or 8:00 o’clock in the evening of June 24, 1984, Pio Yagma
together with his wife and four children and their cousin Cristituto Timaynon
were in their house at Sitio Lokong of B. Dayawan, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental
having a prayer. While they were
singing religious songs, suddenly accused Alfredo Suguran, Francisco Cabactulan
and Jaime Lapingkaw and another man who was wearing a mask come (sic) up their
house and immediately tied Cristituto Timaynon. After tying Cristituto Timaynon, these aforesaid four persons
also hogtied Pio Yagma and Nenita Yagma. After that they blindfolded Nenita Yagma. Nenita Yagma then heard her husband moaning saying in Visayan
‘Agoy’ meaning it’s painful, and after that there was silence. Nenita Yagma later on managed to untie
herself and was horrified to see her husband sprawled in blood on the
floor. Her husband then asked for help
and told Nenita Yagma to fetch his brother Rudy Yagma so he could be brought to
the hospital. Consequently, Pio Yagma
was brought to the hospital accompanied by the sister-in-law of Nenita
Yagma. While in the hospital, Pio Yagma
was investigated by one PFC. Romeo E. Bade, wherein he identified his assailant
as accused Alfredo Suguran and Francisco Cabactulan and two others whom he
could not identify, as his assailants. This investigation was reduced into writing which Pio Yagma was able to
sign in the presence of Nenita Yagma, Romeo Bade and Elsi(e) Yagma (Exhs. A,
A-1, A-2, & A-3). However, sad to
say, Pio Yagma died at the hospital on the evening of June 26, 1984 and was
consequently buried at Villanueva, Misamis Oriental.

“On the other hand, the evidence of the accused Antonio (sic)
Suguran through the testimonies of Rodulfo* Jabeniao,
Marciana Galon and the accused himself tend to establish that at about 5:00 PM
of January 24, 1984 the accused was in the house of Rodulfo Jabeniao at
Poblacion, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, as he requested to borrow money from
Rodulfo Julian (sic) to pay for medicine for his sick children. Unfortunately,
however, the accused was not able to borrow money but Rodulfo Julian (sic) told
him that he would accompany him to the house of Mrs. Galon and have them
treated by her with herbal medicine. Together with his wife and children they proceeded to the house of Mrs.
Galon at Poblacion, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, which was about one half
(1/2) kilometer away from the house of Rodulfo Jabeniao. They arrived at Mrs. Galon’s house at about
6:00 PM. Aside from them there were no
other persons in the house of Mrs. Galon. Later on, their children were treated by Mrs. Galon. They stayed in the house of Mrs. Galon that
whole evening with his wife and himself alternating in watching their children. At about 8:00 AM the following day they left
the house of Mrs. Galon and they hiked their way back to their house, as there
was no available transportation. Since
the road is very steep it took them about 3 hours to reach their place by
hiking. The accused denied that he
killed Pio Yagma. Accused also declared
that he does not know Francisco Cabactulan, nor Jaime Lapingkaw. The testimony of the accused was corroborated
by Mrs. Galon and Rudolfo Jabeniao who both confirmed that the accused was in the
Poblacion of Villanueva on June 24, 1984 and that together with his family
passed the night at the house of Mrs. Galon.

“Mercedes Yagma was presented as a rebuttal witness of the
prosecution. Said witness also declared
that (s)he knows the accused Alfredo Suguran because (s)he used to see him
going with Jaime Lapingkaw. That it is
not true that the road from Villanueva to Lokong is not passable by motor
vehicle for in fact there are passenger jeeps plying that route.”^[4]

Based on the autopsy conducted on June 26, 1984 by Dr. Apolinar
Vacalares, Chief Pathologist at the Northern Mindanao Regional Hospital, the
cause of death of the victim was massive hemorrhage due to stab wounds.^[5]
Only Elsie Yagma was presented by the prosecution to testify on the fact of
taking of the victim’s ante mortem statement because Pat. Romeo
Bade, who investigated the deceased, died during the trial of the case.

In this appeal, it is contended in appellant’s brief that the
trial court erred in (1) giving weight and credence to the testimony of Nenita
Yagma despite her failure to pinpoint the person who inflicted the wound on her
husband; (2) convicting appellant of the crime of murder despite insufficiency
of evidence showing that he is the perpetrator of the crime; and (3) convicting
appellant despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.^[6]

Appellant asseverates that there exists no clear and convincing
evidence pointing to him as the culprit. He claims that the identity of the alleged malefactors has not been
sufficiently established by the principal witness for the prosecution, Nenita
Yagma. It is argued that it was
improbable for said witness to have recognized the culprits for two reasons:
first, she was blindfolded and, hence, was not able to see who actually stabbed
her husband; and, second, the only available illumination at the time of the
incident was merely an improvised kerosene lamp and it was therefore unlikely
that Nenita Yagma could recognize with certainty the four persons who went up
to their house.

The basic issue posited before this Court hinges on the
prosecution witnesses’ credibility.

Prefatorily, the Court has heretofore repeatedly held that the
findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight and respect
and should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the findings are
not supported by the evidence or the court failed to consider material facts
and circumstances in its evaluation of the evidence.^[7] This
is because the trial court is deemed to be in a better position to examine real
evidence as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying
on the case.^[8]

There is no reversible error in the questioned decision rendered
by the court a quo which would warrant a reversal thereof, especially
if we are to take into account the irresoluteness of the defense of alibi
invoked by herein appellant. We further
find sufficiently clear and convincing evidence in this case to show that
appellant is guilty of the crime charged.

Appellant was positively identified by the prosecution witness,
Nenita Yagma. She already knew him even
before that fatal day of the crime.^[9] The
house where the killing took place was lighted by a kerosene lamp. Contrary to appellant’s postulation, it has
been held that a kerosene lamp gives off sufficient illumination like a
“gasera” or “lampara” and, in previous cases, this Court
has held that the illumination produced by these gadgets is sufficient for the
identification of persons.^[10]
Furthermore, the face of appellant was in full view of witness Nenita Yagma and
very near her while he was busy tying the victim and the witness.

More importantly, we cannot ignore the fact that apellant was
positively identified by the victim, Pio Yagma, in his ante mortem
statement as one of those who attacked and stabbed him. The veracity and due execution of this dying
declaration of the victim was never disputed nor controverted by
appellant. Taking into consideration
the seriousness of the victim’s wounds at the time of his declaration, plus the
fact that he died several hours thereafter, lead to the inescapable conclusion
that the declarant was conscious of his impending death and, therefore, such
declaration is admissible as a dying declaration since all the other requisites
were present.

We have said that for the validity of a declaration in articulo
mortis it is not indispensable that the declarant expressly state that
he has lost all hopes of recovery. It
is sufficient that the circumstances are such as to inevitably lead to the conclusion
that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant would not expect to
survive the injury from which he actually died. The degree and seriousness of the wounds and the fact that death
supervened thereafter constitute substantial evidence of the victim’s
consciousness of his impending death.^[11]

Appellant would insinuate that he is being implicated in this
case only because Nenita Yagma was motivated to do so by the latter’s uncle who
allegedly carried a grudge against the former.^[12] But
then, appellant failed miserably to establish that the same was the compelling
factor which induced the witness to conjure the charge of murder against
him. With the absence of any motive on
her part to prevaricate, it would be unnatural for the witness, as the wife of
the deceased victim and who is necessarily interested in seeing retribution
exacted for the crime, to impute the same to any person other than those
responsible therefor.^[13] In addition, when there is no
convincing evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witness was
actuated by improper motives, the presumption is that she was not so actuated
and her testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.^[14]

On the contrary, what is questionable and doubtful here is the
testimony of appellant when, in his direct examination, he categorically stated
that he does not know Francisco Cabactulan and Jaime Lapingkaw, his co-accused
in this case.^[15]
However, he failed to refute the testimony of the rebuttal witness for the
prosecution, Mercedes Yagma, that she often saw appellant in the company of his
aforesaid co-accused prior to the incident.^[16] This
merely strengthens the findings on the guilt of appellant.

We have before us, once again, an appellant whose defense is
founded on alibi. We have, therefore,
to again emphasize the rule that alibi, which is an inherently weak defense,
cannot prevail over the clear, direct and positive identification by the
prosecution witness of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime,^[17]
nor can it prevail over the dying declaration of the victim and the testimony
of the prosecution witness which uniformly pointed to appellant as the culprit.^[18]

Furthermore, an alibi in order to be given full faith and credit
must be clearly established and must not leave any room for doubt as to its plausibility
and verity.^[19]
Appellant’s defense of alibi is evidentially weak as he was not able to
convincingly demonstrate that it was not physically possible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.^[20]
In the instant case, no physical impossibility exists where the distance
between the scene of the crime and the place where the accused allegedly was at
that time is only five kilometers, which could easily be negotiated by jeep or
could otherwise be traversed on foot in more or less two hours.

The qualifying circumstance of treachery was properly appreciated
by the lower court. Appellant and his co?accused
deliberately employed a mode of execution which tended directly and especially
to insure the consummation of the criminal act without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the victim could have
made.^[21]
In the case at bar, where the four malefactors suddenly barged into the house
of the deceased and hogtied the three persons inside, and the latter were
caught by surprise and unable to defend themselves because of fear, much less
to offer a fight, the aggression is evidently treacherous. This is undeniably so where the victim, as
in this case, was hogtied and defenseless before being stabbed.^[22]

Lastly, because of repeated lapses of this nature, we would like
to stress and correct the error of the trial court in imposing the penalty of
life imprisonment instead of reclusion perpetua. In People vs. Literado,^[23]
we made abundantly clear the difference between the two penalties in this wise:

“The crime of murder is defined and punished under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty
provided thereunder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to death. Within the range of the
penalty prescribed, i.e., reclusion temporal maximum to death, is
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The penalty of reclusion perpetua is invariably
imposed for serious felonies penalized under the Revised Penal Code. It carries with it imprisonment for at least
thirty (30) years, after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, and
also accessory penalties, e.g., perpetual special disqualification, etc. (Art. 27, Revised Penal Code).

“Life imprisonment, on the other hand,
does not have any definite extent or duration nor does it carry accessory
penalties. It is imposed as a penalty
for serious offenses penalized by special laws. The crime of murder committed by appellant being penalized under
the Revised Penal Code, the proper imposable penalty should therefore be reclusion
perpetua instead of life imprisonment. It is necessary to employ legal terminology in the imposition of
penalties because of the substantial difference in their corresponding legal
effects and accessory penalties.”

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED,
subject to the modifications that the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua
and that the indemnity is hereby increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with
present case law.^[24]

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, Nocon, and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

^[1]
Original Record, 119-125; penned by Judge Celso P. Largo.

^[2]
Ibid., 52.

^[3]
Ibid., 65.

* His first name is spelled
“Rodolfo” in the transcripts of the stenographic notes
of the trial.

^[4]
Ibid., 120–122.

^[5]
Exhibit 8; ibid., 8.

^[6]
Rollo, 60.

^[7]
People vs. Laureta, Jr., 159 SCRA 256 (1988).

^[8]
People vs. Mandapat, 196 SCRA 157 (1991).

^[9]
TSN, October 29, 1986, 24.

^[10]
People vs. Reana, 120 SCRA 583 (1983); People vs. Almenario, et
al., 172 SCRA 268 (1989).

^[11]
People vs. Avila, 92 Phil. 805 (1953); People vs. Devaras, et
al., 37 SCRA 697 (1971); People vs. Sarabia, et al., 127 SCRA 100
(1984); People vs. Tanaman, et al., 152 SCRA 385 (1987).

^[12]
TSN, September 15, 1987, 52-53.

^[13]
People vs. Espera, et
al., 175 SCRA 728 (1987).

^[14]
People vs. Ruedas, 194 SCRA 553 (1991).

^[15]
TSN, October 26, 1987, 36-37.

^[16]
TSN, November 17, 1987, 45-46.

^[17]
People vs. Obando, et al., 182 SCRA 95 (1990).

^[18]
People vs. Clamor, 198 SCRA 642 (1991).

^[19]
People vs. Martinada, et al., 194 SCRA 36 (1991).

^[20]
People vs. Talla, et al., 181 SCRA 133 (1990).

^[21]
People vs. Valdemoro, 102 SCRA 170 (1981).

^[22]
People vs. Bakang, et al., 26 SCRA 840 (1969); People vs. Ong, et
al., 62 SCRA 174 (1975).

^[23]
G.R. No. 77114, May 27, 1992.

^[24]
People vs. Sison, 129 SCRA 643 (1990).