PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. NARCISO EVARDO Y JUAN, EFIPANIO EVARDO Y JUAN, TAMBI LADJA Y ANTISAN AND JOHN DOE, ACCUSED, NARCISO EVARDO Y JUAN, ACCUSED/APP…

Appellant Narciso Evardo y Juan together with Efipanio Evardo y
Juan, Tambi Ladja y Antisan and one John Doe were charged with the crime of
Robbery with Double Homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City
in an information which reads :

“That on or about September 18, 1987, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a scythe and a paddle, conspiring and
confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting with one another, by
means of violence and intimidation of persons and with intent to gain, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away from
the person of Ricardo Mendoza y Concepcion, one (1) Garand Rifle with Serial
Number 2489371 worth NINE THOUSAND PESOS (P9,000.00), Philippine Currency,
belonging to and taken against the will of said Ricardo Mendoza y Concepcion,
owner thereof; that on the occasion of the commission of the offense
above-described, and for the purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry
away the above-mentioned article, herein named accused, in pursuance of their
conspiracy and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, assault, attack, hack and hit with the use of the above-mentioned
weapons that they were then armed with at the persons of RICARDO MENDOZA y
CONCEPCION and ROBERT MENDOZA y ALEJANDRO, thereby inflicting upon the latter’s
persons mortal wounds which directly caused their deaths, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of said victims.

CONTRARY TO LAW.” (Rollo,
p. 2)

Four persons were originally charged in this case. Of the four, only appellant Narciso Evardo
is under custody since two of his co-accused, namely, Efipanio Evardo y Juan and
Tambi Ladja y Antisan died before the trial of the case commenced. The other accused designated as John Doe
remains unidentified.

The trial court culled the following facts from the testimonies
of witnesses presented by the prosecution:

“Deceased-victims Ricardo Mendoza y Concepcion and Robert Mendoza y
Alejandro are father and son, respectively. Both are farmers, however, Ricardo Mendoza is also a member of the
Civilian Home Defense Force or CHDF for short, and was issued a U.S. Cal. 30
Garand Rifle with Serial Number 2489371, valued at P9,000.00. Marcelina Alejandro Mendoza is the wife of
Ricardo Mendoza and mother of Robert Mendoza. They all reside in Limaong Island, Vitali District, Zamboanga City,
where they have a farm and house.

“At about 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon of September 18, 1987, the
accused Narciso Evardo and his brother Efipanio Evardo whose mother is the
first cousin of Marcelina Mendoza, arrived at the house of the Mendozas. Whereupon, Narciso Evardo invited Ricardo
Mendoza and Robert Mendoza to go with him and his brother to Kabog Island, a
nearby isle, to see a hidden pumpboat engine which he allegedly found thereat,
and that he wanted Ricardo Mendoza as his escort. This invitation was made in the presence of Marcelina Mendoza and
Vilma Mendoza.

“Acceding to the request, Ricardo Mendoza took along his government
issued Garand Rifle and was wearing a green fatigue shirt. Robert Mendoza also went along clad in a
green long sleeve shirt and maong pants. The group then left the Mendoza house.

“The following day, September 19, 1987, at about 7:00 o’clock in
the morning, Narciso Evardo appeared at the Mendoza’s house and asked if
Ricardo Mendoza and Robert Mendoza were already home and then informed Vilma
Mendoza that her father Ricardo Mendoza and brother Robert Mendoza returned to
the seashore after bringing him home, purportedly to look for some fish since
they (the Mendoza) did not have any viand at home. After telling Vilma Mendoza this, Narciso Evardo proceeded to the
house of the auntie of Vilma Mendoza, the sister of Ricardo Mendoza, which
house is about one hundred meters away from the house of the Mendoza’s, and
stayed there for sometimes (sic).

“Later, at about noontime or 11:00 o’clock of the same morning of
September 19, 1987, Marcelina Mendoza and her daughter Vilma were informed by
some CHDF members that dead persons were found at sea, one of whom was wearing
uniform fatigue shirt and the other in civilian clothing. Already suspecting that the dead persons
were Ricardo Mendoza and Robert Mendoza, the Mendoza women informed the CHDF
members that the last persons who were with the missing Mendoza men were the
Evardo brothers. Acting on such report,
Vicente Toribio, the CHDF team leader of Limaong and barrio councilman, ordered
three of his team members, namely: Alberto Mendoza, Francisco Toribio and Eduardo Mendoza to search for
Narciso Evardo. These three CHDF
members later found Narciso Evardo near a ricefield armed with a scythe
(Exhibit ‘I’). He was brought to Vicente
Toribio and the latter turned him over to the Vitali Police at the Log pond at
Vitali where the dead Ricardo Mendoza and Robert Mendoza were brought still
inside the vinta owned by Narciso Evardo.

“In the meantime, Marcelina Mendoza and her daughter Vilma went to
the logpond at Vitali to verify the identity of the reported dead persons
thereat. The policemen stationed at the
Vitali Police Sub-Station who were previously informed by CHDF members of the
presence of dead persons at the logpond were also present. Police Investigator Cresencio Guevarra
conducted an investigation and caused some photographs (Exhibits ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’,
‘D’, ‘E’ and ‘F’) to be taken under his direction of the deceased-victims as
they lay dead in the vinta. Found on
board the vinta, containing the dead bodies of the deceased-victims, was also a
wooden paddle (Exhibit ‘J’) owned by Narciso Evardo, but the Garand Rifle of
Ricardo Mendoza was nowhere to be found. Guevarra also investigated Marcelina Mendoza and the latter told him that
the persons of Efipanio and Narciso Evardo went to pick up the victims at their
house on the pretext of getting a pumpboat engine at Kabog Island and
thereafter both the deceased-victims Ricardo Mendoza and Robert Mendoza never
returned home.

“Police Investigator Guevarra said he was the one who prepared the
Initial Investigation Report (Exhibit ‘G’) and the Final Report (Exhibit
‘H’). He further said that he included
in his report the fact that the accused Narciso Evardo admitted to him having
participated in the killing of the deceased-victims and implicating even Tambi
Ladja. Guevarra also said that he was
present during the preliminary investigation of this case at the Fiscal’s
Office and he was only one meter away from Narciso Evardo when the latter
admitted before the Investigating Fiscal and Atty. Edding that he and Efipanio
Evardo were the ones who killed the deceased-victims (Rollo, pp. 12-14).”

On the other hand, appellant testified that he was working as a
janitor of a certain Dr. Ahmad in Basilan for eight (8) years. On September 11, 1987, he received a letter
from his mother informing him that his father was sick and that he was needed
to help harvest the palay in their farm at Limaong Island. While in said island, he stayed with the
other accused, his younger brother Efipanio (Decision, p. 5). He denied having knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the death of his uncle and cousin and further claimed
that he and his companions, namely, Jalil Darusalem and Tambi Ladja were
tortured by CHDF members (Rollo, p. 19). To corroborate his testimony that he was maltreated, the defense
presented PFC Rodolfo Rodriguez, a policeman assigned to the Zamboanga City
Jail who testified that in accordance with the entry in the logbook of the
police station, when accused Narciso Evardo was admitted to the City Jail
together with his companions Jalil Darusalem and Tambi Ladja, they had
lacerated and cut wounds and also contusions on different parts of their
bodies. Furthermore, to show the extent
of the injuries he suffered as well as the other persons arrested in connection
with this case, appellant presented Purificacion Nualla, a records clerk of the
Zamboanga Regional Training Hospital who testified in connection with the
Medico-Legal Certificates of appellant (Exhibit ‘1’), Jalil Darusalem (Exhibit
‘2’) and Tambi Ladja (Exhibit ‘3’) (Rollo, p. 17). Also presented was the Certificate of Death of Tambi Ladja
(Exhibit ‘4’), who died at the hospital as the result of the injuries he
sustained allegedly in the hands of some CHDF members of Vitali, Zamboanga City
(Ibid.).

After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed
judgment as follows:

“WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, this Court finds the
accused NARCISO EVARDO y JUAN, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
the crime of ROBBERY WITH DOUBLE HOMICIDE and there being neither aggravating
or mitigating circumstance attending the commission thereof hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased victims Ricardo Mendoza y Concepcion and Robert Mendoza y Alejandro
the total amount of P 60,000.00 and to pay the costs.

“Being a detention prisoner, the said accused Narciso Evardo shall
be credited with the full time of the period of his detention during the
pendency of this case provided he has voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by
the same disciplinary rules imposed on convicted prisoners.

“It appearing that there remains up to the moment an unidentified
accused in this case, let the records of the case against such accused be sent
to the files without prejudice to its re­instatement upon his subsequent
identification and arrest.

SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, p. 20)

In this appeal, appellant assigns the following as errors:

“I. That the Honorable Trial Court has erred in finding accused guilty on
the basis of the following Circumstantial Evidence, to wit:

“A) That it was
accused and his brother Epifanio who invited both the deceased-victims to
accompany him and serve as his guard on his trip to Kabug Island purposely to
see a pumpboat engine on said Island;

“B) That ownership
of a vinta or banca belongs to accused;

“C) That accused
attempted to establish an alibi when he told Vilma Mendoza that her father and
brother has (sic) already returned to Limaong Island but has (sic) gone back to
the sea to look for some fish to be used as their viand at home;

“D) That accused
admitted that he is a Muslim convert, which according to the Trial Court
provides motive for the crime.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp. 2-3)

Appellant argues that the records do not contain any evidence
that he ever participated directly or indirectly in the commission of the crime
charged (Appellant’s Brief, pp. 3-4). In support thereof, he
cites part of the trial court’s decision, to wit:

“A thorough examination of the evidence presented in this case
clearly indicates that there is no evidence directly pointing to the herein
accused as one of the malefactors in the commission of the crime
charged. All that the prosecution was
able to present are circumstantial evidences which tend to link the herein
accused in the killing of the deceased victims.” (Appellant’s Brief, p. 3)

In other words, appellant faults the trial court for convicting
him based on circumstantial evidence.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict if there
is: (a) more than one circumstance, (b)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt (Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court; see also People v.
Santito, Jr., 201 SCRA 87 [1991]; People v. Lazarte, 200 SCRA 361 [1991];
People v. De la Cruz, 200 SCRA 379 [1991]; People v. Austria, 195 SCRA 700
[1991]).

In determining whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
support a conviction, all the facts and circumstances involved in the case are
to be considered together as a whole (People v. Pedrosa, 169 SCRA 545 [1989]).

The trial court in convicting the accused in the case at bar,
enumerates four proven circumstances.

The first circumstance established by the prosecution is the fact
that it was appellant Narciso Evardo and his brother Efipanio who invited both
the deceased-victims to accompany him and serve as his guard on his trip to
Kabog Island purportedly to see a pumpboat engine which he said he found on
said island (Rollo, p. 18).

The second circumstance established by the prosecution is the
ownership of the vinta or banca where the deceased victims were found
dead. Although appellant denies
ownership of this vinta or banca, as well as the wooden paddle found in it, yet
the testimonies of Vicente Toribio, Alberto Mendoza and Francisco Toribio
strongly points to the accused Narciso Evardo as the owner of said banca. As a matter of fact, Vicente Toribio even
said that he borrowed the same banca once from the accused (TSN, July 6, 1988,
p. 72). In the case of Alberto Mendoza,
he identified the banca depicted in the photographs marked Exhibits ‘A’ to ‘F’,
as the one belonging to herein accused (Rollo, p. 18). While Francisco Toribio declared having
known the accused since childhood and he knows that the banca where the
deceased-victims were found is the very banca owned by the accused (TSN, July
6, 1988, pp. 82-83).

Appellant vehemently denies, however, having been to Kabog Island
and further avers that the banca where the cadavers of the victims were found,
belongs to the CHDF or ACTS members since it bears a number and the words
“Service for ACTS members only” written at its side.

After examining the photographs of said banca (Exhibits ‘A’ to
‘F’) however, the trial court saw none of the alleged markings on the subject
vessel. What is clear, on the other
hand, is that the prosecution was able to prove that appellant actually owned
the aforesaid banca. Appellant failed
to disprove the detailed testimonies of the three prosecution witnesses who
pointed to him as the owner of the banca. In the absence of any improper motive of the witnesses to implicate
appellant, we respect the findings of the trial court in the matter of
credibility of witnesses (People v. Caraig, 202 SCRA 357 [1991]; People v.
Ballinas, 202 SCRA 516 [1991]).

More importantly, the third circumstance that links the accused
Narciso Evardo to the crime was his attempt to put up an alibi or calculated
excuse when he told Vilma Mendoza that her father and brother had already
returned to Limaong Island but had gone back to the sea to look for some fish
to be used as their viand at home (Rollo, p. 19). The accused made this gesture when he went back to the house of
the Mendoza’s at about 7:00 o’clock in the morning of September 19, 1987. The only plausible reason for this behavior
of the accused, according to the trial court, is to delude the women folks of
the Mendoza victims that all was well when he and the deceased victims parted,
and therefore he could not be blamed for whatever may have befallen them
thereafter.

The finding of the court a quo regarding the fourth
circumstance which states that:

“The fourth circumstance which is admitted by the accused Narciso
Evardo himself is the fact that he is a Muslim convert. This circumstance also provides the motive
for the crime. It is of judicial
knowledge that there still exist the armed movement of the Moro National
Liberation Front or MNLF for short, in Mindanao and Sulu and that its members
are still active in the Vitali area of Zamboanga City. It is of common knowledge that this movement
lack arms and materials to pursue their goals and the only way to replenish or
increase their armory is either to purchase or grab guns where ever it is
available.

x x x

“It is therefore not farfetched to assume that the accused Narciso
Evardo is sympathetic to the cause of the MNLF and the only reason why he could
have committed the crime was because he coveted the Garand rifle which was
issued to his uncle Ricardo Mendoza as a CHDF member. And the fact that this rifle is missing even after the discovery
of the dead bodies of the deceased victims in the bank owned by the accused,
only proves the point.” (Rollo, p. 19).

dwelled on the realm of speculation and
unjustly prejudiced appellant’s religious conviction. Suffice it to say that being a Muslim convert per se
does not necessarily make one a member of the MNLF. For the same reason, a Christian convert cannot be said to be a
member of the NPA. In any event, the
conclusion arrived at is purely conjectural and does not by itself provide
sufficient proof to sustain a conviction for robbery.

Save for the inference that appellant is a member of the MNLF, no
incontrovertible proof was adduced by the prosecution in support of the charge
of robbery and the trial court, therefore, erred in convicting appellant with
the complex crime of robbery with homicide. Robbery itself must be proven, otherwise, the accused may be convicted
only of the killing, homicide or murder, as the case may be (People v. Badilla,
185 SCRA 554 [1990]). To sustain
conviction for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, it must be
established with certitude that the killing was a mere incident to the robbery,
the latter being the main purpose and objective of the criminals. It contemplates a situation where the
homicide resulted by reason or on the occasion of the robbery (People vs. Robante,
178 SCRA 552 [1989]). In the case at
bar, appellant can only be convicted of two counts of homicide there being no
proof with moral certainty that the homicide was committed by reason or on the
occasion of robbery.

In sum, We find the circumstantial evidence presented and proved
before the trial court constituted an unbroken chain of events which
established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt on two counts of
homicide.

Appellant’s denials regarding his invitation to the victims to
accompany him to see a pumpboat engine as well as ownership of the vinta where
the cadavers of the victims were found were not supported by clear and
convincing evidence. On the contrary,
his bare denials only served to strengthen the prosecution’s claim that he
participated in the commission of the offense proven.

In People v. Arbolante (203 SCRA 85 [1991]), We held that
“denial, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense and can easily be defeated by
the affirmative and credible testimonies of prosecution witnesses pointing to
the accused as the perpetrators of the crime for which they are charged.”
Denial of guilt, uncorroborated by any reliable evidence, cannot overthrow the
clear and convincing testimonies of prosecution witnesses as to the culpability
of the accused (People v. Arceo, 202 SCRA 170 [1991]).

As to the credibility of witnesses, We find no cogent reason to
disturb the findings of the trial court since it is in a better position to
decide the matter having had the opportunity to observe the behavior, demeanor,
conduct and attitude of the witness at the trial (People v. Briones, 202 SCRA
708 [1991]; and a long line of cases).

Lastly, appellant puts up the defense of alibi but in order for
such defense to prosper, it is not enough to prove that he was somewhere when
the crime was committed. He must
likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at
the scene of the crime (People v. Urquia, Jr., 203 SCRA 735 [1991]).

In the case at bar, although the appellant may have been possibly
in his brother’s house in the evening of September 18, 1987, he failed to prove
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene or at the
vicinity thereof at the time the crime was committed.

He who raises the defense of alibi bears the burden of proving by
clear, full and satisfactory evidence the facts he alleges. In the absence thereof, alibi is bound to
fail (People v. Alvarez, 169 SCRA 730 [1989]).

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby MODIFIED to the
extent that appellant Narciso Evardo y Juan is found guilty of two (2) counts
of Homicide and there being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance
attending the commission of the crime, the Court hereby sentences him twice to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The civil liability of appellant is
increased to P50,000.00 for each
set of heirs or a total of P100,000.00 for both sets of heirs.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Romero, and Melo, JJ., concur.