ALEJANDRA RIVERA OLAC, ANTONIO OLAC, THERESA RIVERA AND FELOMINO ESCOBAR, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PROCULO RIVERA AND LEONA SIENES, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by spouses Alejandra Rivera and
Antonio Olac, and Theresa Rivera and Felomino Escobar, assailing the decision
of the Court of Appeals rendered on March 15, 1988, raising the following as
errors:

(a) In denying an execution as a matter of right and
in upholding that “the matter in issue in this case involves the exercise
of the discretion of the respondent Judge, which we find valid and legal.”

(b) In holding that
“the dispute on the execution of the partition portion arose with respect
to the 15-hectare lot claimed by the therein petitioners”, obviously
referring to the fifth paragraph of the decision of the court a quo.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
with the Court of Appeals praying among others that a writ of mandamus
be issued directing respondent Judge Pedro C. Gabaton of the Regional Trial
Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch XLI of Dumaguete City, to issue a writ of execution of the
decision rendered by Judge Cipriano Vamenta, Jr. of the defunct Court of First
Instance, 12th Judicial District, Branch III in Civil Case No. 4744 for
partition, recovery and accounting.

The properties subject of Civil Case No. 4744 were described in
the original complaint as:

“1. A parcel of land bounded on the North by
Andres Jordan; on the East by Cabangahan Creek; on the South by Clodualdo
Calooy and Proculo Rivera; on the West by the Sicopong River; with an
approximate superficial area of 20,000 sq. m., more or less, assessed at
P500.00 under Tax Dec. No. 1835;

“2. A parcel of land bounded on the North by the
Sicopong River; on the East by Proculo Rivera and Clodualdo Calooy; on the
South by Andres Jordan; and on the West by the Sicopong River, with an
approximate superficial area of 26,375 sq. m., more or less and assessed at
P800.00 under Tax Dec. No. 4140.”^[1]

In their complaint, petitioners Alejandra Rivera and Theresa
Rivera claim to be the legitimate children of private respondent Proculo Rivera
by his first wife, the late Natividad Nuique who died in 1941. Since the death of Natividad, respondent
Rivera had enjoyed the produce of the said parcels of land to the exclusion of
the petitioners and refused to partition the property in question inspite of
demands by petitioners, thereby forcing them to file the instant complaint with
the trial court.

In resolving the conflict between petitioners and private respondents,
the court below made the following findings of fact:

“On the other hand, defendant Proculo Rivera adduced evidence
that during his marriage with Natividad Nuique, he acquired real property in
Amio, Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental. He presented a document of sale (Exh. “6”) dated August 1,
1939 purporting to show that he bought said parcel of land from Antero
Maputy. It will be noted that said
acquisition occurred in 1939 during his marriage with Natividad Nuique and
before the death of the latter in 1941. Said property is the same land described under par. 2 of the complaint
and is therefore a conjugal property of spouses Proculo Rivera and Natividad
Nuique. Defendant also adduced evidence
showing that he acquired a 15-hectare lot during his marriage with Leona Sienes
through homestead application as shown in Exhibit “2” dated July 23,
1963.

“It is the finding of this court that said 15-hectare lot does
not belong to the conjugal partnership between defendant Proculo Rivera and
Natividad Nuique because the same was acquired after the death of Natividad
Nuique and during his marriage with Leona Sienes.”^[2]

On June 18, 1979, the trial court, through Judge Vamenta, Jr.
rendered a decision as follows:

“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgement is hereby rendered:

a) Declaring the two
parcels described in the complaint as the conjugal properties of defendant
Proculo Rivera and his first wife Natividad Nuique;

b) Ordering the
partition of said two lots into two equal parts;

c) Pursuant to Rule
69, Rules of Court, the parties are ordered to submit a deed of partition of
the lots in question for approval of the court within thirty (30) days from the
service of copy of the decision, and in case of failure thereof, commissioners
shall be appointed to effect the partition;

d) Condemning the
defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P 5,000.00 as moral damages, and P
1,000.00 for attorney’s fee.”^[3]

Apparently the decision failed to state clearly whether the
15-hectare lot, which supposedly belongs to the conjugal property of Proculo
and Leona, is an entirely distinct property from the two parcels of land
described in the complaint or whether it forms part of said two parcels. As a result, the partition of the properties
in question was not fully executed, there being a dispute on how the parcels of
land was to be partitioned.

On November 27, 1981, Judge Vamenta, Jr. issued an order to
clarify his decision, stating among others that:

“It is the view of the Court that the decision rendered in this
case is so clear and explicit wherein it orders the partition of the two
parcels of land described in the Complaint whose boundaries and area are
specifically mentioned therein; that no partition was ordered by the
Court on the 15- hectare lot mentioned in the decision.”^[4]

Despite the clarification, petitioners contend that the
15-hectare lot claimed by the respondents is the very same land formerly
declared under Tax Dec. No. 1835,^[5]
subject matter of their complaint, and which the trial court ordered to be
partitioned being the conjugal property of Proculo and his first wife
Natividad.

On the other hand, respondents maintain that the 15-hectare lot,
denominated as lots No. 2230 and 2231, are distinct and separate from the
properties stated in the complaint.

In view of the
conflicting claims, the trial court appointed commissioners to effect partition
of the properties pursuant to the June 18, 1979 decision. The first commissioner appointed, Edilberto
D. Elmido, Municipal Treasurer of Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental, reported
inability to equitably partition the properties in question because of the
conflicting claims of the petitioners and the respondents in the matter of the area of the
property sought to be divided.^[6]

Consequently, the court appointed another set of commissioners on
June 4, 1982, composed of Casildo Gabo, Feliciano Zerapuelas and Atty. Elizur
Umbac, who made the following findings and recommendations:

“1. It is hereby recommended that Lot No. 2231
be excluded from the court prohibition and be partitioned into equal parts
between both parties.

“2. The description of the second parcel of land
coincides with Lot No. 2229 and not Lot No. 2230. The evidence (Exhibit “6”), however, shows that the lot
mentioned in Exhibit “6” is within Lot 2230 which is covered by a
Homestead Patent and which the Court declared to be not subject of
partition. In other words, the second
parcel as described in the complaint is not the same as the lot described in
Exhibit “6”. The issue on
this point must therefore be settled. Hence the Commission cannot recommend partition of any of these lots
above-mentioned.”^[7]

When the parties manifested their dissatisfaction with the
recommendations of the second set of commissioners, the court appointed a third
commissioner in the person of Engineer Melchor Catadman with a mandate to
relocate and partition the properties mentioned in the complaint. Engr. Catadman made the following findings:

“the order mentioned of 2 parcel of
land (sic) covered by Tax Declaration in which no technical description, thus
cannot be relocated (sic). However, Tax
Declaration No. 11819 has two (2) lots mentioned, Lots 2230 and 2231,
Pls-404-D, situated at Amio, Sta. Catalina, Negros Or. & Mr. Proculo Rivera presented Psu-07-03-003437, surveyed in
the name of Leona Sienes, adjacent to Lots 2230 & 2231, Pls-404-D on the
western side.”^[8]

Based on the foregoing, Judge Gabaton issued an Order dated
August 11, 1986 modifying the previous order of Judge Vamenta, Jr., by adopting
the recommendation of the second set of commissioners headed by Atty.
Umali. The dispositive portion of said
order of Judge Gabaton reads, as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, in the interest of justice,
this court hereby ordered (sic) the partition of Lot No. 2231 only and submit
the deed of partition within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order.”^[9]

Note, however, that according to the
commissioners led by Atty. Umbac, lot 2231 is included in the 15-hectare lot
which was declared conjugal property of spouses Proculo and Leona. The report of the commissioners state:

“If we examine the boundaries of Parcel “A” or Lot
2231 in the sketch in page 3 of this report,^[10] it
would appear that said first parcel^[11] is
either included in Lot 2231 or both first parcel and Lot 2231 are one and the
same. The boundaries of these two
parcels of land coincide. However, in view of the court prohibition
not to partition the 15-hectare
lot, of which Lot 2231 is included, Lot 2231 cannot be included in the
partition without amendment of the court decision.”^[12]

On September 2, 1987, the same judge issued another order
reconsidering and setting aside his previous order of August 11, 1986, the
dispositive portion of which, reads:

“The main action in this case is the motion for execution of a
decision which has long become final and executory but since execution could
not be done without relocating first the parcels of land in questioned (sic),
this Court appointed a commissioner to relocate the same but the same could not
be relocated. That being the case,
considering the fact that this court can no longer alter or change the decision
which has long become final and executory, the motion for execution and
relocation are hereby dismissed.”^[13]

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the said order of Judge
Gabaton and sought for an alias writ of execution,^[14]
which was however denied on November 16, 1987.^[15] On
elevating the matter to the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus to
compel the judge to execute the decision of June 18, 1979, the petition was
dismissed. Said the appellate court:

“A writ of mandamus
will not also issue in this case. While it is true that it is ministerial on the part of the Judge to
order the execution of its judgment which has already become final, the matter
in issue in this case involved a property which was expressly excluded from the
partition. The matter involves the
exercise of discretion of the respondent Judge which We find valid and
legal.”^[16]

From the foregoing, both the trial court and the appellate court
agree that a final judgment can no longer be altered, and thus, it is the
ministerial duty of the judge to order its execution in conformity with the
decision.^[17]
In the case of Paylago v. Nicolas^[18] this Court held that the writ of
execution, as a general principle, must conform substantially to every
essential particular of the judgment issued. Execution not in harmony with the judgment has no validity.

There being no issue that execution is proper, We find that the
real controversy lies on which properties are subject to partition. It is not amiss to say that the decision of
June 18, 1979 left much to be determined. As a general rule, a court judgment should be considered in its entirety
to get the true meaning and intent of any particular portion thereof.^[19]
In the present case however, the controversial decision referred to a certain
exhibit (Exhibit “6”), which supposedly coincides with the second
parcel of the lot subject of the complaint, and which now appears to be part of
the 15-hectare lot declared to be conjugal properties of spouses Proculo and
Leona.

Judge Gabaton, instead of ordering the partition of properties subject of the
complaint, hesitated and relied heavily on the pronouncement in the June 18, 1979 decision that the 15-hectare lot
should not be partitioned totally disregarding the 2 parcels of lot subject of
the complaint, which was ordered partitioned and which order has become final
and executory.

Judge Gabaton failed to appreciate the rule that where there is
conflict between the dispositive portion of
the decision and the body thereof, the dispositive portion controls
irrespective of what appears in the body of the decision. The exception being where the inevitable
conclusion from the findings of fact in the opinion is so indubitable and clear
as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion.^[20]

But when the dispositive part of a final order or decision is
definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without the need
of interpretation or construction, the same is considered as the judgment of
the court, to the exclusion of anything
said in the body thereof.^[21]

The dispositive portion or the fallo is what
actually constitutes the resolution of the court and which is the subject of
execution, although the other parts of the decision may be resorted to in order
to determine the ratio decidendi for such a
resolution. Where there is conflict
between the dispositive part and the opinion of the court contained in the text
of the decision, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the
dispositive portion is the final order while the opinion is merely a statement
ordering nothing.^[22] Hence execution must conform more
particularly to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision.

Premises considered, We find Merit in the present petition. Partition may be effected in accordance with
the dispositive portion of the decision of the court below, the boundaries and
area as alleged in the complaint being clear and distinct.

WHEREFORE, this case is hereby remanded to the court a quo for execution of the decision dated June 18,1979.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melo, J., no part.

^[1]
Annex “A” of the Petition; Rollo, p. 20.

^[2]
Ibid, p. 2; Rollo, p. 104.

^[3]
Annex “1” of Respondents’ Memorandum, p. 3; Rollo, p. 105.

^[4]
Annex “2” of Respondents’ Memorandum, p. 2; Rollo, p. 107.

^[5]
Annex “C” of Petition; Rollo, p. 29.

^[6]
Annex “3” of Respondents’ Memorandum; Rollo, pp. 108-109.

^[7]
Annex “4” of Respondents’ Memorandum, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp.
114-115.

^[8]
Annex “11” of Respondents’ Memorandum; Rollo, p. 141.

^[9]
Annex “14” of Respondents’ Memorandum, p. 3; Rollo, p. 157.

^[10]
Please refer to Annex “4” of Respondents’ Memorandum, p. 3; Rollo,
p.12.

^[11]
First parcel refers to the first parcel of lot subject of the complaint,
described as Noth, Andres Jordan; East, Cabangahan Creek; South, Clodualdo
Calooy and Proculo Rivera; West, Sicopong River.

^[12]
Ibid, p. 4; Rollo, p. 113.

^[13]
Annex “17” of Respondents’ Memorandum, Rollo, p. 168.

^[14]
Original Records, pp. 124-125.

^[15]
Annex “18”, Respondents’ Memorandum, Rollo, p. 169.

^[16]
Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 53.

^[17]
Baclayon v. C.A., G.R. No. 89132, 182 SCRA 761 (1990).

^[18]
G.R. No. 38152, 189 SCRA 727 (1990).

^[19]
De Ralla v. Director of Lands, 83 Phil 491.

^[20]
Aguirre v. Aguirre, L-33080, 58 SCRA 461 (1974).

^[21]
Contreras v. Felix, 78 Phil 570; Edwards v. Arce, 98 Phil 688.

^[22]
Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag et al. G.R. No. L-16250, 11 SCRA 333
(1964).