MERLIN P. CAIÑA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BRANCH IV, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY.

Merlin P. Caiña, whom we denominate petitioner, questions the
award of damages made by the Municipal Trial Court while acquitting him of the
charge of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. The award of damages was initially deleted
on appeal but was later on reinstated by the Regional Trial Court upon a motion
for reconsideration.

The records of this case were sent to the Court of Appeals
inspite of the appellant’s error in filing a notice of appeal to the Supreme
Court on a pure question of law. The
appellate court forwarded the case to us. Instead of rejecting the case at that time, this Court considered the
issue sufficiently important to warrant this review. The completed records were re-assigned to the undersigned ponente
for study and report preparatory to full court deliberations only on August 5,
1992.

The facts of the case are as follows:

The petitioner, Merlin P. Caiña, accused of reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries, was acquitted of the criminal charge
against him in a decision rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of Cagayan de
Oro City, Branch 4. However, the
petitioner was ordered to pay the private complainant, Dolores Perez, the sum
of P2,893.40 representing actual damages. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:

“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, and for failure of the prosecution
to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is
hereby acquitted.

“However, the accused is ordered to pay the private complainant the
amount of P2,893.40 representing the actual damages incurred by the private
complainant in connection with this case.” (Records, pp. 479-480)

The petitioner, questioning the award of damages, appealed to the
Regional Trial Court. The Regional
Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 24 rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing observations, the decision
pertaining to the civil aspect only, appealed from, is hereby REVERSED and a
new one entered, absolving accused of civil liability. It is understood that this decision does not
touch the trial court’s decision on the acquittal of the accused.” (Rollo, p.
33)

The private complainant subsequently filed a Motion for
Reconsideration upon which the Regional Trial Court reversed its former
decision, to wit:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing observations, this court
hereby RESOLVES to reconsider its decision dated February 17, 1986 and
consequently to AFFIRM as it hereby affirms in toto the decision appealed from
as far as the civil aspect of
the same is concerned.” (Rollo, p. 43)

As a result of such reversal, the petitioner filed this appeal
raising one legal Issue to be resolved:

“THAT THE TRIAL COURT AND THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN AWARDING CIVIL LIABILITY AGAINST THE HEREIN PETITIONER AND THE SAID AWARD IS
VOID AND ILLEGAL.” (Rollo p. 26)

The petitioner alleges that the award for damages is void and
illegal as there was no finding of any preponderance of evidence as to the
causal connection between the given set of facts and the damage suffered by the
private complainant. In fact, there is
a clear showing from the face of the decision of the trial court that the fact
from which the civil liability might arise does not exist.

Before discussing the merits of this case, we first discuss the
procedural aspect.

The procedure adopted by the petitioner in this case is
improper. This is evident from the fact
that the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court to
the Supreme Court claiming that the issue raised is a pure question of law
(Records, p. 805). The proper procedure
that should have been followed was to file a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Regional Trial Court in its order issued March 31, 1987
(Records, p. 807) correctly reminded the petitioner that the appeal to the
Supreme Court shall be through a petition for certiorari governed by
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However,
the Regional Trial Court forwarded the records of the case to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in turn,
noting in the Notice of Appeal that only questions of law were involved,
thereupon transmitted the records of said case to this Court (Rollo, p. 1).

This Court en banc, through a resolution entitled Murillo
v. Consul, UDK-9748, March 1, 1990 laid down the following
guidelines for appeals in civil cases and criminal cases except where the
penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed: (1) If an appeal is attempted from a
judgment of a Regional Trial Court by notice of appeal, that appeal can and should
never go to this Court, regardless of any statement in the notice that the
court of choice is the Supreme Court; (2) If an appeal by notice of appeal is
taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals and in the latter
Court, the appellant raises naught but issues of law the appeal should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; (3) If an appeal is essayed from the
judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction by notice of appeal, instead of by petition for review, the appeal
is inefficacious and should be dismissed; and (4) it is only through petitions
for review on certiorari that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court
may properly be invoked.

Applying the rules abovementioned, the Court of Appeals should
hot have transmitted the records to this Court.

But even assuming arguendo that a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 was correctly filed, from a reading of the petitioner’s brief, it
can be seen that what the petitioner is raising is a question of fact.

The case of Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 193 SCRA 93, 100-101 [1991],
distinguishes between questions of fact and questions of law. We quote:

x x x    x x x     x x x

“x x x a question of
law – which exists ‘when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on
a certain state of facts’ – ‘there is a question of fact when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts,’ (Ramos,
et al. v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I., et al., 19 SCRA 289, 292, citing
II Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 2784, and II Martin, Rules of Court, 255; SEE
also, Francisco, The Rules of Court, Annotated and Commented, 1968, ed., Vol.
III, pp. 485-488) or when the ‘query necessarily invites calibration of the
whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other
and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation.’ (See Lim v. Calaguas,
83 Phil. 796, 799, and Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Rich, 28 SCRA 699, 705,
cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1979 ed., p. 474)

x x x    x x x     x x x

Questions on whether or not there was a preponderance of evidence
to justify the award of damages or whether or not there was a causal connection
between the given set of facts and the damage suffered by the private
complainant or whether or not the act from which civil liability might arise
exists are questions of fact.

In this regard, the petitioner’s case should not have been
elevated to this Court since a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 allows only questions of law to be raised (Section 2, Rule 45, Rules of
Court).

The proper procedure that he should have adopted was to file a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals within 15 days from notice of
judgment pointing out errors of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or
modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed (See Resolution
of Court of Appeals dated August 12, 1971, par. 22 [b] of Interim Rules of Court
and Sec. 22, BP 129).

However, this Court noting that this case was last acted upon by
the Regional Trial Court six (6) years ago and the records of the case have
already been brought to this Court, has decided to delve on the merits of the
case.

The petitioner’s contention is meritorious. We grant the petition.

It is clear from the decision of the Municipal Trial Court that
there was no finding of recklessness, negligence and imprudence on the part of
the accused. We quote:

“With respect to the evidence presented by the prosecution, it is
the thinking of the court that the most important or paramount factor in cases
of this nature, is to evidently prove the recklessness, negligence and
imprudence of the accused. The prosecution
failed to show a clear and convincing evidence of such recklessness,
negligence and imprudence. Prosecution witness Rene
Abas stated that
the speed of the jeep of the accused was on a regular speed or not so fast or just the very
speed the jeep
can run. (Decision, p. 5, Records, p. 477,
Underlining Supplied).

It can be gleaned therefore from the decision that the act from
which civil liability might arise does not exist.

It is noted by the Court that in the dispositive portion of the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court, the accused (petitioner in this case)
acquittal was based on the ground that his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt making it possible for Dolores Perez to prove and recover
damages. (See Article 29, Civil Code)
However, from a reading of the decision of the Municipal Trial Court, there is
a clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise does not
exist. Civil liability is then
extinguished. (See Padilla v. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 558, 570 [1984])

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned order of the Regional Trial
Court issued on July 14, 1986 is SET ASIDE while the Regional Trial Court’s
decision issued on February 17, 1986 reversing the decision of the Municipal
Trial Court pertaining to the civil aspect, absolving accused of civil
liability, is hereby REINSTATED.

Bidin, Davide Jr., and
Romero, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on official leave.