RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE’S RIGHTS (ULAP), PETITIONERS, VS. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT COMMAND, RESPONDENTS.

Valmonte versus De Villa

The Case

This is the case of Valmonte versus De Villa. The petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Rights, brought an original action for prohibition against General Renato de Villa and the National Capital Region District Command. They asked the Court to declare military and police checkpoints unconstitutional and to order their dismantling or banning. The case matters because it fixes the constitutional boundary between the State's police power to defend itself and the individual's right against unreasonable searches and seizures. It is the anchor case on the validity of routine checkpoint stops.

Procedural History

The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition before the Supreme Court, seeking a declaration that the checkpoints were unconstitutional and asking that they be dismantled or banned. In a decision dated 29 September 1989, the Court dismissed the petition. The petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration, followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration. Before the incident was submitted for resolution, the Solicitor General, appearing for the respondents, filed his comment, to which the petitioners filed a reply. The Court, sitting en banc, resolved the motions in the decision now before us.

Facts

The government, through the military and the police, had installed checkpoints in the National Capital Region. Motorists passing through these checkpoints were stopped briefly and required to answer a question or two, and the vehicles were subjected to a visual search. The petitioners challenged this practice as a warrantless search and seizure violative of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The Court looked at the setting in which the checkpoints operated. It noted that a sixth attempted coup d'etat, stronger than all previous ones, was staged only last 1 December 1989, and that another attempt was taken almost for granted. The New People's Army, through its sparrow units, had accelerated its liquidation of armed forces and police personnel. Murders, sex crimes, hold-ups and drug abuse had become daily occurrences. Unlicensed firearms and ammunition had become favorite objects of trade, and smuggling was at an all-time high.

Against this background, the authorities regarded checkpoints as a security measure designed to entrap criminals and insurgents and to constitute a dragnet for all types of articles in illegal trade. The Court also acknowledged that some checkpoints had been used as points of thievery and extortion upon innocent civilians, and that even the increased prices of foodstuffs coming from the provinces were largely blamed on the men manning them.

Issues

• Whether or not checkpoints are illegal per se and violative of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
• Whether or not a routine checkpoint stop, limited to a visual search and a brief question or two, amounts to an unreasonable search.
• Whether or not a warrantless search at a checkpoint may be justified by probable cause.
• Whether or not the validity of the checkpoint power is affected by the abuses committed by the men manning the checkpoints.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which the movants invoke against the checkpoints, provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

This is the right the petitioners say the checkpoints violate, and the Court measures the checkpoint against it.

Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which the Court cites on the duty of the men in uniform, provides:

Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

This grounds the Court's assumption that soldiers manning checkpoints act to protect, and not to abuse, the citizenry.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court clarified that nowhere in its earlier decision did it legalize all checkpoints, at all times and under all circumstances. What it declared was that checkpoints are not illegal per se. Under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government. Implicit in this is that when the situation clears and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain. The government, in pursuing its program for public welfare, has the equal right under its police power to select the reasonable means and methods for best achieving its objectives, and the checkpoint is evidently one of such means.

On the second issue, the Court admitted that the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on the motorist's right to free passage without interruption. But as a rule it involves only a brief detention, during which the occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of the right against unreasonable search. Fixed checkpoints are even less intrusive, and the Court adopted the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court that such stops involve less discretionary enforcement activity and leave less room for abusive or harassing stops.

On the third issue, the Court held that if vehicles are stopped and extensively searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. It quoted the United States Supreme Court:

Automobiles, because of their mobility, may be searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying a warrantless search of a residence or office. The cases so holding have, however, always insisted that the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe that they will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime before they begin their warrantless search.

The Court added that such warrantless searches are quite similar to searches and seizures accompanying warrantless arrests during the commission of a crime, or immediately thereafter, and that a warrantless search of incoming and outgoing passengers at the arrival and departure areas of an international airport is not constitutionally objectionable because it is founded on public interest, safety, and necessity.

On the fourth issue, the Court stressed that its decision does not validate nor condone abuses committed by the military manning the checkpoints. Its decision was concerned with power, that is, whether the government employing the military has the power to install said checkpoints; once that power is acknowledged, the Court's inquiry ceases. Power implies the possibility of its abuse, but whether there is abuse in a particular situation is a different question to be resolved in the constitutional arena. The citizen is not helpless, for the military is not above but subject to the law, and soldiers who abuse their authority act beyond the scope of their authority and are liable criminally and civilly for their abusive acts.

Doctrine

Checkpoints are not illegal per se. They may be installed by the government under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on the balance or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, and they lose their reason to remain once those perils are removed. A routine checkpoint stop, for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection is limited to a visual search, does not violate the right against unreasonable searches and seizures under Section 2, Article III. An extensive search at a checkpoint requires probable cause. The validity of the checkpoint power is distinct from the abuse of that power; abuse is a separate question, and abusive soldiers are liable criminally and civilly, consistent with Section 3, Article II, which places civilian authority at all times supreme over the military.

Disposition

The Court denied the motion and the supplemental motion for reconsideration, and the denial was final; the petitioners did not obtain the declaration and dismantling they sought.

Remember This

Memorize the line: checkpoints are not illegal per se, and a routine stop limited to a visual search and a brief question or two is not an unreasonable search. Examiners use this case to test the police power exception to the search and seizure clause, the distinction between the checkpoint power and its abuse, and the contrast with the dissenting view that probable cause must be determined personally by the judge.