G.R. No. 83988. May 24, 1990

RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE’S RIGHTS (ULAP), PETITIONERS, VS. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT COMMAND, RESPONDENTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions May 24, 1990 EN BANC PADILLA, J.:

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PADILLA, J.:

In the Court’s decision
dated 29 September 1989, petitioners’ petition for prohibition seeking the declaration of the
checkpoints as unconstitutional and their dismantling and/or banning, was
dismissed.

Petitioners have filed
the instant motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of said
decision. Before submission of the
incident for resolution, the Solicitor General, for the respondents, filed his
comment, to which petitioners filed a reply.

It should be stated, at the outset, that nowhere in the
questioned decision did this Court legalize all checkpoints, i.e. at all
times and under all circumstances.
What the Court declared is, that checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under
exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on
the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril,
checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government. Implicit in this proposition is, that when
the situation clears and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have
absolutely no reason to remain.

Recent and on-going events have pointed to the continuing
validity and need for checkpoints manned by either military or police
forces. The sixth (6th) attempted coup d’etat (stronger than all
previous ones) was
staged only last 1 December
1989. Another attempt at a coup d’etat is taken almost for
granted. The NPA, through its sparrow
units, has not relented but instead accelerated its liquidation of armed forces and police
personnel. Murders, sex crimes, hold-ups
and drug abuse have become daily occurrences.
Unlicensed firearms and ammunition have become favorite objects of
trade. Smuggling is at an all-time high. Whether or not effective as expected,
checkpoints have been regarded by the authorities as a security measure designed to
entrap criminals and insurgents and to constitute a dragnet for all types of
articles in illegal trade.

No one can be compelled, under our libertarian system, to share
with the present government its ideological beliefs and practices, or commend
its political, social and economic policies or performance. But, at least, one must concede to it the
basic right to defend itself from its enemies and, while in power, to pursue
its program of government intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of
those objectives, the government has the equal right, under its police power,
to select the reasonable means and methods for best achieving them. The checkpoint is evidently one of such means
it has selected.

Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a
certain extent, on motorist’s right to “free passage without
interruption”, but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief
detention of travellers during which the vehicle’s
occupants are required to answer a brief question or two.^[1]
For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a
body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual
search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative
of an individual’s right against unreasonable search.

These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even
less intrusive. As held by the U.S.
Supreme Court:

“Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring
public. First, the potential
interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways are not taken
by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the
location of the checkpoints and will
not be stopped elsewhere. Second,
checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary
enforcement activity. The regularized
manner in which established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring
to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to
serve the public interest. The location
of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by officials
responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of
limited enforcement resources. We may
assume that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears
arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class, and since field officers may
stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or
harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case of roving-patrol
stops. Moreover, a claim that a
particular exercise of discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is
unreasonable is subject to post-stop
judicial review.” ^[2]

The checkpoints are nonetheless attacked by the movants as a warrantless
search and seizure and, therefore, violative of the
Constitution.^[3]

As already stated, vehicles are generally allowed to pass these
checkpoints after a routine inspection and a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively
searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable
belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the
vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Again, as held by the U.S. Supreme Court –

“Automobiles, because of their mobility, may be searched
without a warrant upon facts
not justifying a warrantless search of a residence or
office. Brinegar
v. United States, 338 US 160, 93 L Ed 1879, 69 S Ct 1302 (1949); Carroll v. United
States, 267 US 132, 69 L Ed 543, 45 S Ct 280,
39 ALR 790 (1925). The cases so holding
have, however, always insisted that the officers conducting the search have
‘reasonable or probable cause’ to believe that they will find the instrumentality
of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime before they begin their warrantless search.
x x x.”^[4]

Besides these warrantless searches and
seizures at the checkpoints are quite similar to searches and seizures
accompanying warrantless arrests during the commission
of a crime, or immediately thereafter.
In People vs. Kagui Malasuqui,
it was held –

“To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and
searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be
to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most
expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many
instances.”^[5]

By the same token, a warrantless search
of incoming and outgoing passengers, at the arrival and departure areas of an
international airport, is a practice not constitutionally objectionable
because it is founded on public interest, safety, and necessity.

Lastly, the Court’s decision on checkpoints does not, in any way,
validate nor condone abuses committed by the military manning the
checkpoints. The Court’s decision was
concerned with power, i.e. whether the government employing the military has
the power to install said checkpoints.
Once that power is acknowledged, the Court’s inquiry ceases. True, power implies the possibility of its
abuse. But whether there is abuse in a
particular situation is a different “ball game” to be resolved in
the constitutional arena.

The Court, like all other concerned members of the community, has
become aware of how some checkpoints have been used as points of thievery and extortion practiced upon innocent
civilians. Even the increased prices of
foodstuffs coming from the provinces, entering the Metro Manila area and other
urban centers, are largely blamed on the checkpoints, because the men manning
them have reportedly become “experts” in mulcting travelling
traders. This, of course, is a national
tragedy.

But the Court could not a priori regard in its now
assailed decision that the men in uniform are rascals or thieves. The Court had to assume
that the men in uniform live and act by the code of honor and they are assigned
to the checkpoints to protect, and not to abuse, the citizenry.^[6] The checkpoint is a military
“concoction.” It behooves the military to improve the QUALITY of
their men assigned to these checkpoints.
For no system or institution will succeed unless the men behind it are
honest, noble and dedicated.

In any situation, where abuse marks the operation of a checkpoint, the citizen is not
helpless. For the military is not above but subject to the
law. And the courts exist to see that
the law is supreme. Soldiers, including
those who man checkpoints, who abuse their authority act beyond the scope of
their authority and are, therefore, liable criminally and civilly for their
abusive acts.^[7]
This tenet should be ingrained in the soldiery in the clearest of terms by
higher military authorities.

ACCORDINGLY, the Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
are DENIED. This denial is FINAL.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Paras,
Feliciano, Bidin, and
Cortes, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurring
opinion.

Cruz and Sarmiento, JJ., dissenting
opinion.

Gancayco, J., on leave.

^[1]
U.S. v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 49 L Ed. 2d 1116 (1976)

^[2]
Ibid.

^[3]
Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution

^[4]
Dyke v. Taylor, 391 US 216,
20 L Ed 538, 88 S Ct 1472.

^[5]
63 Phil. 221

^[6]
Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SEC. 3. Civilian authority is, at all times,
supreme over the military. The Armed
Forces of the Philippines
is the protector of the people and the State.
Its goal is to secure
the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

^[7]
Aberca v. Ver, G.R.
No. 69866, 15 April 1988,
160 SCRA 590

Valmonte vs De Villa : 83988 : May 24, 1990 : J. Cruz : En Banc :<br /> Dissenting Opinion

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DISSENTING OPINION

CRUZ, J.:

I reiterate my original dissent and add the following
observations.

The majority would justify the checkpoints on the ground of
rampant criminality, e.g., the failed coup, the “sparrow”
killings, murders, sex crimes,
drug abuse, smuggling, etc. I was not aware that the failure of the authorities to suppress crime was an
excuse to suspend the Bill of Rights. It
has always been my impression that even criminals, and more so the innocent,
are entitled to the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The protection of the security of the State is a convenient
pretext of the police state to suppress individual rights. Constitutional shortcuts should not be
allowed in a free regime where
the highest function of authority is precisely to exalt liberty.

The ponencia says that the Constitution is not violated
because “the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual
search.” Assuming that this is all
the search entails, it suffers from the additional defect of inefficaciousness,
making it virtually useless. It did not
prevent the staging of the December 1 coup, where the rebels used all kinds of
high-powered weapons that were not detected by “a visual search.”

Under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, probable cause
is determined “personally by the judge,” not by a soldier or a
policeman. It is not for the peace
officer to decide when a warrantless search and seizure may be made save in the
exceptional instances allowed, as where a crime is being committed or before or
after its commission. I can hardly
believe that the majority is seriously offering this exception as a continuing
situation to justify the regular warrantless searches at the
checkpoints.

It is easy to say that “where abuse marks the operation of a
checkpoint, the citizen is not helpless.” Let us at least be
realistic. This Court would be the first
to dismiss the complaint if not supported by hard evidence, which we know is
not easily come by. The remedy, in my
view, is to remove the source of the evil instead of leaving it unchecked and
then simply suggesting a cure, which is not even effective. It is like inoculating a patient after
exposing him to contagion.

Valmonte vs Gen De Villa : 83988 : May 24, 1990 : J. Gutierrez Jr :<br /> Concurring Statement

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CONCURRING STATEMENT

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The problem we face in the resolution of this petition arises
from our knowledge that law enforcement officers use checkpoints as opportunities
for mulcting, oppression, and other forms of abuse. However, to completely ban
checkpoints as unconstitutional is to lose sight of the fact that the real
objective behind their use is laudable and necessary. If we say that ALL checkpoints are unconstitutional, we are banning a law enforcement measure
not because it is per se illegal but because it is being used for evil
purposes by the soldiers or police who man it.

This is another instance where the Supreme Court is urged to
solve a problem of discipline facing the executive and the military. My
reluctant concurrence with the majority opinion is premised on the hope that
our top military and police officials will devise effective measures
which would insure that checkpoints are
used only where absolutely needed and that the officers who are assigned to these checkpoints
discharge their duties as professional soldiers or peace officers in the best
traditions of the military and the police. I repeat that this is a problem of
enforcement and not legality.

Valmonte vs De Villa : 83988 : May 24, 1990 : J. Sarmiento : En Banc :<br /> Dissenting Opinion

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DISSENTING OPINION

SARMIENTO, J.:

The majority states that checkpoints are justified by “grave
peril.” The question, however, is whether or not the existence of such
grave perils has the effect of suspending the Bill of Rights, specifically, the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Under the Constitution, “[a] state of martial law does not
suspend the operation of the Constitution.” (CONST.,
art. VII, sec. 18.) If not even martial law can
suspend the fundamental law, I do not see how a mere executive act can.

That the State has the right to defend itself is a proposition
difficult to argue against. The query,
again, is whether or not it may defend itself against its enemies at the
expense of liberty. After fourteen years
of authoritarian rule, I think by now we should have learned our lesson, and
known better.

Although “routine inspections” are another matter, I
can not think that the checkpoints in question have been meant to undertake
routine inspections alone. As it is, no
ground rules have been given our law enforcers, which is to say that they have
the carte blanche to search vehicles and even persons without the benefit of a
valid judicial warrant. I do not believe
that this can be done in a constitutional regime.

I find references to the case of People v. Kagui Malasugui [63
Phil. 221 (1936)] to be
inapt. In that case, there was a waiver
of the right against unreasonable search and secondly, there existed a clear
probable cause for search and arrest.
Certainly, there was reason for excepting the
case from the rule. Malasugui, however, is an
exception. And obviously, the majority
would make a general rule out of it.

Certainly, it is different where the authority has probable cause
to believe that a crime has been committed by a suspect, in which case, it may
place him under arrest or search his person (Malasugui, supra). But I do not think that it may claim the
existence of probable cause for every vehicle or person stopped and searched at
a checkpoint. And precisely, checkpoints
are intended to allow the authorities to fish for probable cause even if in the
beginning there was none. This makes, to
my mind, the setting up of checkpoints unconstitutional.

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