G.R. No. 83578. March 16, 1989
THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE TEOFILO L. GUADIZ, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 147,…
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force,
the President’s arm assigned to investigate and prosecute so-called
“dollar-salting” activities in the country (per Presidential Decree No.
1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002), asks the Court to hold as
null and void two Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated September 24, 1987[1] and May 20, 1988,[2] reversing its Decision, dated October 24,
1986.[3] The Decision set aside an Order, dated April
16, 1985, of the
Regional Trial Court,[4] as well as its Order, dated August
21, 1985. The Resolution, dated September 24, 1987
disposed of, and granted, the private respondent Karamfil
Import-Export Co., Inc.’s motion for reconsideration of the October 24, 1986
Decision; the Resolution dated May 20, 1988, in turn, denied the petitioner’s
own motion for reconsideration.
The facts are not in
controversy. We quote:
On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned
with the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force hereinafter referred to as
PADS Task Force for purposes of convenience, issued search warrants nos. 156,
157, 158, 159, 160 and 161 against the petitioners Karamfil
Import-Export Co., Inc., P & B Enterprises Co., Inc., Philippine Veterans
Corporation, Philippine Veterans Development Corporation, Philippine
Construction Development Corporation, Philippine Lauan
Industries Corporation, Intertrade Development (Alvin
Aquino), Amelili U. Malaquiok Enterprises and Jaime P. Lucman
Enterprises.
The application for the issuance of said search warrants was filed
by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan of the Bureau of Customs who is a deputized member
of the PADS Task Force. Attached to the
said application is the affidavit of Josefin M.
Castro who is an operative and investigator of the PADS Task Force. Said Josefin M.
Castro is likewise the sole deponent in the purported deposition to support the
application for the issuance of the six
(6) search warrants involved in this case. The application filed by Atty. Gatmaytan, the
affidavit and deposition of Josefin M. Castro are all dated March 12, 1985.[5]
Shortly thereafter, the private respondent (the petitioner below)
went to the Regional Trial Court on a petition
to enjoin the implementation of the search warrants in question.[6]
On March 13, 1985, the
trial court issued a temporary restraining order [effective “for a period
of five (5) days notice”[7]]
and set the case for hearing on March
18, 1985.
In disposing of the petition, the said court found the material issues to be:
1) Competency of this Court to act on petition filed by the
petitioners;
2) Validity of the search warrants issued by respondent State
Prosecutor;
3) Whether or not the
petition has become moot and academic because all the search warrants sought to
be quashed had already been implemented and executed.[8]
On April 16, 1985,
the lower court issued the first of its challenged Orders, and held:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby declares
Search Warrant Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, and 161 to be null and void. Accordingly, the respondents are hereby
ordered to return and surrender immediately
all the personal properties and documents seized by them from the petitioners
by virtue of the afore-mentioned search warrants.
SO ORDERED.[9]
On August 21, 1985,
the trial court denied reconsideration.
On April 4, 1986,
the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force went to the respondent Court of
Appeals to contest, on certiorari, the twin Order(s) of the lower court.
In ruling initially for the Task Force, the Appellate Court held:
Herein petitioner is a special quasi-judicial body with express
powers enumerated under PD 1936 to prosecute foreign exchange violations
defined and punished under P.D.
No. 1883.
The petitioner, in exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with
the Regional Trial Courts, and
the latter in the case at bar had no jurisdiction to declare the search
warrants in question null and void.
Besides as correctly pointed out by the Assistant Solicitor General the decision of the
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task
Force is appealable to the Office of the President.[10]
On November 12, 1986,
Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc. sought a
reconsideration, on the question primarily of whether or not the Presidential
Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is “such other responsible officer”
countenanced by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants of search and seizure.
As we have indicated, the Court of Appeals, on Karamfil’s motion, reversed itself and issued its
Resolution, dated September 1987, and subsequently, its Resolution, dated May 20, 1988, denying the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
In its petition to this Court, the petitioner alleges that in so
issuing the Resolution(s) above-mentioned, the respondent Court of Appeals
“committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted in excess of its
appellate jurisdiction,”[11]
specifically:
a)
In deviating from the settled
policy and rulings of the Supreme Court that no Regional Trial Courts may
countermand or restrain the enforcement of lawful writs or decrees issued by a
quasi-judicial body of equal and coordinate rank, like the PADS Task Force;
b)
For resorting to judicial
legislation to arrive at its erroneous basis for reconsidering its previous
Decision dated October 24,
1986 (see Annex “I”) and thus promulgated the questioned
Resolutions (Annexes “A” and “B”), which violated the
constitutional doctrine on separation of powers;
c)
In not resolving directly the
other important issues raised by the petitioner in its Petition in CA-G.R. No.
08622-SP despite the fact that petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently and
convincingly that respondent RTC, in issuing the questioned Orders in Special
Proceeding No. M-624 (see Annexes “C” and “D”), committed
grave abuse of discretion and/or acted in excess of jurisdiction:
1.
In ruling that (a) the description
of the things to be seized as stated in the contested search warrant were too
general which allegedly render the search warrants null and void; (b) the
applications for the contested search warrants actually charged two offenses in
contravention of the 2nd paragraph, Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court;
and (c) this case has not become moot and academic, even if the contested search
warrants had already been fully implemented with positive results; and
2.
In ruling that the petitioner PADS
Task Force has not been granted under PD 1936 “judicial or quasi-judicial
jurisdiction.”[12]
We find, upon the foregoing facts, that the essential questions
that confront us are — (i) is the Presidential
Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force a quasi-judicial
body, and one co-equal in rank and standing with the Regional Trial Court, and
accordingly, beyond the latter’s jurisdiction; and (ii) may the said presidential
body be said to be “such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law” to issue search warrants under the 1973 Constitution? — questions we take up seriatim.*
In submitting that it is a quasi-judicial
entity, the petitioner states that it is endowed with “express powers and
functions under PD No. 1936, to prosecute foreign exchange violations as
defined and punished under PD No. 1883.”13 “By
the very nature of its express powers as conferred by the laws,” so it is
contended, “which are decidedly quasi-judicial or discretionary function, such as to conduct preliminary investigation on the
charges of foreign exchange violations, issue search warrants or warrants of
arrest, hold-departure orders, among others, and depending upon the evidence
presented, to dismiss the charges or to file the corresponding Information in
court (cf. Executive Order No. 934, PD No. 1936 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
effective August 26, 1984),
petitioner exercises quasi-judicial power or the power of adjudication.”14
The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution now assailed,15 was of the opinion that “[t]he grant of
quasi-judicial powers to petitioner did not diminish the regular courts’
judicial power of interpretation. The right to interpret a law and, if
necessary to declare one unconstitutional, exclusively pertains to the
judiciary. In assuming this function,
courts do not proceed on the theory that the judiciary is superior to the two
other coordinate branches of the government, but solely on the theory that they
are required to declare the law in every case which come before them.”16
This Court finds the Appellate Court to be in error, since what the petitioner
puts to question is the Regional
Trial Court’s act of assuming jurisdiction over the private respondent’s
petition below and its subsequent countermand of the Presidential Anti-Dollar
Salting Task Force’s orders of search and seizure, for the reason that the
presidential body, as an entity (allegedly) coordinate and co-equal with the
Regional Trial Court, was (is) not vested with such a jurisdiction. An
examination of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force’s petition shows
indeed its recognition of judicial review (of the acts of Government) as a basic privilege of the courts. Its objection, precisely, is whether it is the Regional Trial Court, or the
superior courts, that may undertake such a review.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,17 the
Court of Appeals exercises:
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all
final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial
Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4)
of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.18
xxx xxx xxx
Under the present Constitution, with respect to its provisions on
Constitutional Commissions, it is provided, in part that:
x x x Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof.19
On the other hand, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.20
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise:
x x x The Supreme Court may designate certain branches of the
Regional Trial Court to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and
domestic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases which do not
fall under the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies and agencies and/or such
other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the interest of a
speedy and efficient administration of justice.21
xxx xxx xxx
Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983.22
x x x The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court [now,
Court of Appeals] from quasi-judicial bodies shall continue to be governed by the provisions of
Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the same
is not inconsistent with the provisions of B.P. Blg.
129.23
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appeals from specified agencies. – Any provision of existing law or Rule of
Court to the contrary notwithstanding, parties aggrieved by a final ruling, award, order,
decision, or judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations; the Secretary of Labor under Section 7 of Republic Act
Numbered Six hundred and two, also known as the “Minimum Wage Law”; the Department of Labor under Section 23 of Republic Act Numbered Eight hundred seventy-five, also known as the “Industrial
Peace Act”; the Land Registration Commission; the Securities and
Exchange Commission; the Social
Security Commission; the Civil
Aeronautics Board; the Patent Office and the Agricultural Inventions Board, may
appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals, within the
period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions
of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, or questions of law, or all three kinds of
questions. From final judgments or
decisions of the Court of Appeals, the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari
to the Supreme Court as provided
in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.24
Because of subsequent amendments, including the abolition of
various special courts,25
jurisdiction over quasi-judicial bodies has to be consequently, determined by
the corresponding amendatory statutes.
Under the Labor Code, decisions and awards of the National Labor
Relations Commission are final and executory, but,
nevertheless, “reviewable by this Court through
a petition for certiorari and not by way of appeal.”26
Under the Property Registration Decree, decisions of the
Commission of Land Registration, en consulta, are appealable to the Court of Appeals.27
The decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are
likewise appealable to the Appellate Court,28 and so are decisions of the Social Security
Commission.29
As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from
decisions of certain administrative bodies to the Court of Appeals, it means
that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in terms of rank
and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.
As we have observed, the question is whether or not the
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task force is, in the first place, a
quasi-judicial body, and one whose decisions may not be challenged before the
regular courts, other than the higher tribunals — the Court of Appeals and
this Court.
A quasi-judicial body has been defined as “an organ of
government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the
rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making.”30 The most common types of such bodies have been
listed as follows:
(1)
Agencies created to function in
situations wherein the government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special
privilege, like the defunct Philippine Veterans Board, Board on Pensions for
Veterans, and NARRA, and Philippine Veterans Administration.
(2) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is
seeking to carry on certain government functions, like the Bureau of
Immigration, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Board of Special Inquiry and
Board of Commissioners, the Civil Service Commission, the Central Bank of the
Philippines.
(3) Agencies set up to function in
situations wherein the government is performing some business service for the
public, like the Bureau of Posts, the Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan Waterworks
& Sewerage Authority, Philippine National Railways, the Civil Aeronautics
Administration.
(4) Agencies
set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to regulate
business affected with public interest, like the Fiber Inspection Board, the
Philippine Patent Office, Office of the Insurance Commissioner.
(5) Agencies set up to function in
situations wherein the government is seeking
under the police power to regulate private business and individuals, like the
Securities & Exchange Commission, Board of Food Inspectors, the Board of
Review for Moving Pictures, and the Professional Regulation Commission.
(6) Agencies
set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to adjust
individual controversies because of some strong social policy involved, such as
the National Labor Relations
Commission, the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Regional Offices of the
Ministry of Labor, the Social Security Commission, Bureau of Labor Standards,
Women and Minors Bureau.31
As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to
adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and unless its decisions are
seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same attain
finality and become executory. A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar
Salting Task Force’s organic act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force was not
meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims
and execute its judgments. As the President’s arm called upon to
combat the vice of
“dollar-salting” or the blackmarketing and
salting of foreign exchange,32 it is
tasked alone by the Decree to handle the prosecution of such activities, but
nothing more. We quote:
SECTION 1. Powers of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting
Task Force. – The Presidential
Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, hereinafter referred to as Task Force, shall
have the following powers and authority:
a)
Motu proprio or upon complaint, to investigate and prosecute all
dollar salting activities, including the overvaluation of imports and the undervaluation of exports;
b)
To administer oaths, summon
persons or issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses
or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records, statements of
accounts, agreements, and other as may be necessary in the conduct of
investigation:
c)
To appoint or designate experts,
consultants, state prosecutors or fiscals, investigators and hearing officers to
assist the Task Force in the discharge of its duties and responsibilities;
gather data, information or documents; conduct hearings, receive evidence, both
oral and documentary, in all cases involving violation of foreign exchange laws
or regulations; and submit reports containing findings and recommendations for
consideration of appropriate authorities;
d)
To punish direct and indirect contempts with the appropriate penalties therefor under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; and
To adopt such measures and take such actions as may be necessary to
implement this Decree.
xxx xxx xxx
“f. After due
investigation but prior to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges with
the fiscal’s office or the courts as the case may be, to impose a fine
and/or administrative sanctions as the circumstances warrant, upon any person
found committing or to have committed acts constituting black-marketing or salting abroad of foreign exchange, provided
said person voluntarily admits the facts and circumstances constituting the offense
and presents proof that the foreign exchange retained abroad has already been
brought into the country.
Thereafter, no further civil or criminal action may be instituted
against said person before any other judicial regulatory or administrative body
for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1883.
The amount of the fine shall be determined by the Chairman of the
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force and paid in Pesos taking into consideration the amount of foreign exchange retained abroad, the exchange rate differentials,
uncollected taxes and duties thereon, undeclared profits, interest rates and
such other relevant factors.
The fine shall be paid to the Task Force which shall retain Twenty
percent (20%) thereof. The informer, it
any, shall be entitled to Twenty percent (20%) of the fine. Should there be no informer, the Task Force
shall be entitled to retain Forty percent (40%) of the fine and the balance
shall accrue to the general funds
of the National government. The amount
of the fine to be retained by the Task Force shall form part of its
Confidential Fund and be utilized for the operations of the Task
force.”33
The Court sees nothing in the aforequoted
provisions (except with respect
to the Task Force’s powers to issue search warrants) that will reveal a
legislative intendment to confer it with quasi-judicial responsibilities
relative to offenses punished by Presidential Decree No. 1883. Its undertaking, as we said, is simply, to
determine whether or not probable cause exists to current the filing of charges
with the proper court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to recommend action
“of appropriate
authorities”. It is not unlike a fiscal’s office that conducts a preliminary investigation
to determine whether or not prima
facie evidence exists to justify haling
the respondent to court, and yet, while it makes that determination, it cannot
be said to be acting as a quasi-court.
For it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not
the fiscal.
It is not unlike the Presidential Commission on Good Government
either, the executive body appointed to investigate and prosecute cases
involving “ill-gotten wealth”.
It had been vested with enormous
powers, like the issuance of writs of sequestration, freeze orders, and similar processes, but that did not, on account thereof alone, make it a
quasi-judicial entity as defined by recognized authorities. It cannot pronounce judgment of the accused’s culpability, the jurisdiction to do which is
exclusive upon the Sandiganbayan.34
If the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is not, hence,
a quasi-judicial body, it cannot be said to be co-equal or coordinate with the
Regional Trial Court. There is nothing
in its enabling statutes that would demonstrate its standing at par with the said court.
In that respect, we do not find error in the respondent Court of
Appeal’s resolution sustaining the assumption of jurisdiction by the court a
quo.
It will not do to say that the fact that the Presidential Task
Force has been empowered to issue warrants of arrest, search, and seizure,
makes it, ergo, a “semi-court”.
Precisely, it is the objection interposed by the private respondent
whether or not it can under the 1973 Charter, issue such kinds of processes.
It must be observed that under the present Constitution, the
powers of arrest and search are exclusive upon judges.35 To that extent, the case has become moot and
academic. Nevertheless, since the
question has been specifically put to the Court, we find it unavoidable to
resolve it as the final arbiter of legal controversies, pursuant to the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution during whose regime the case was commenced.
Since the 1973 Constitution took force and effect and until it
was so unceremoniously discarded in 1986, its provisions conferring the power
to issue arrest and search warrants upon an officer, other than a judge, by
fiat of legislation have been at best, controversial. In Lim v. Ponce de Leon,36 a 1975 decision, this Court ruled that a fiscal
has no authority to issue search warrants, but held in the same vein that, by
virtue of the “responsible officer” clause of the 1973 Bill of
Rights, “any lawful officer authorized by law can issue a search warrant or warrant of arrest.”37
Authorities, however, have continued to express reservations whether or not
fiscals may, by statute, be given such a power.38
Less than a year later, we promulgated Collector of Customs v.
Villaluz,39 in which we categorically
averred: “[U]ntil
now only the judge can issue the warrant of arrest.”40 “No law or presidential decree has been
enacted or promulgated vesting the same authority in a particular responsible
officer.’”41
Apparently, Villaluz had settled the
debate, but the same question persisted following this Court’s subsequent
rulings upholding the President’s alleged emergency arrest powers.42 [Mr. Justice Hugo Gutierrez would hold, however,
that a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) is (was) not a species of
“arrest” in its technical sense, and that the (deposed) Chief
Executive, in issuing one, does not do so
in his capacity as a “responsible officer” under the 1973 Charter,
but rather, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in times of emergency, or
in order to carry out the deportation of undesirable aliens.43 In the
distinguished Justice’s opinion then, these are acts that can be done without
need of judicial intervention because they are not, precisely, judicial but
Presidential actions.]
In Ponsica v. Ignalaga,44 however, we held that the mayor has
been made a “responsible officer” by the Local Government Code,45 but had ceased to be one with the approval of the
1987 Constitution according judges sole authority to issue arrest and search
warrants. But in the same breath, we did
not rule the grant under the Code unconstitutional based on the provisions of
the former Constitution. We were agreed,
though, that the “responsible officer” referred to by the fundamental law should be one
capable of approximating “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.”46
In striking down Presidential Decree No. 1936 the respondent
Court relied on American jurisprudence, notably, Katz v. United
States,47 Johnson
v. United States,48 and Coolidge v. New
Hampshire49, in
which the American Supreme Court ruled
that prosecutors (like the petitioner) cannot be given such powers because of
their incapacity for a “detached scrutiny”50 of the
cases before them. We affirm the
Appellate Court.
We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force
exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground,
it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached “judge” to determine the
existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is
naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his office “is to see that justice is done and not
necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused,”51 he stands, invariably, as the accused’s
adversary and his accuser. To permit him
to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both
judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent,
Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002,
unconstitutional.
It is our ruling, thus, that when the 1973 Constitution spoke of
“responsible officer” to whom the authority to issue arrest and
search warrants may be delegated by legislation, it did not furnish the
legislator with the license to give that authority to whomsoever it
pleased. It is to be noted that the
Charter itself makes the qualification that the officer himself must be
“responsible”. We are not
saying, of course, that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (or any
similar prosecutor) is or has been irresponsible in discharging its duty. Rather, we take “responsibility”,
as used by the Constitution, to mean not only skill and competence but more
significantly, neutrality and independence comparable to the impartiality
presumed of a judicial officer. A
prosecutor can in no manner be said to be possessed of the latter qualities.
According to the Court of Appeals, the implied exclusion of prosecutors
under the 1973 Constitution was founded on the requirements of due process,
notably, the assurance to the respondent of an unbiased inquiry of the charges
against him prior to the arrest of his person or seizure of his property. We add that the exclusion is also demanded by
the principle of separation of powers on which our republican structure
rests. Prosecutors exercise essentially
an executive function (the petitioner itself is chaired by the Minister, now
Secretary, of Trade and Industry), since under the Constitution, the President
has pledged to execute the laws.52 As such,
they cannot be made to issue judicial processes without unlawfully impinging
the prerogative of the courts.
At any rate, Ponsica v. Ignalaga should foreclose all questions on the matter,
although the Court hopes that this disposition has clarified a controversy that
had generated often bitter debates and bickerings.
The Court joins the Government in its campaign against the
scourge of “dollar-salting”, a pernicious practice that has
substantially drained the nation’s coffers and has seriously threatened its
economy. We recognize the menace it has
posed (and continues to pose) unto the very stability of the country, the
urgency for tough measures designed to contain if not eradicate it, and
foremost, the need for cooperation from the citizenry in an all-out
campaign. But while we support the
State’s efforts, we do so not at the expense of fundamental rights and
liberties and constitutional safeguards against arbitrary and unreasonable acts
of Government. If in the event that as a
result of this ruling, we prove to be an “obstacle” to the vital endeavour of stamping out the blackmarketing
of valuable foreign exchange, we do not relish it and certainly, do not mean
it. The Constitution simply does not
leave us much choice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Cruz, Feliciano, and
Cortes, JJ., in the result.
Melencio-Herrera, J., no part, did not participate in the deliberations.
[1]
Herrera, Manuel, J., Camilon and Magsino,
JJ., Concurring.
[2]
Herrera, Manuel, J., Bellosillo and Magsino, JJ., Concurring.
[3]
Herrera, Manuel, J., Camilon and Magsino,
JJ., Concurring.
[4]
Guadiz, Teofilo, presiding
Judge, Branch CXLVII, Makati,
Metro Manila.
[5]
Order, dated April 16, 1985,
1.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Id.
[8]
Id., 2. Reference to “Court” is Regional Trial Court.
[9]
Id., 9.
[10]
Decision, dated October 24, 1986,
4-5.
[11]
Petition, 6.
[12]
Id., 7-9.
*
We decide this case notwithstanding the private
respondent’s prayer for extension to file a memorandum. (The Solicitor General has asked that he be
excused from filing one.) We do so since
the pleadings on file with the
Court have sufficiently shown the respective positions of the parties and since only questions of law are involved, questions
we can already resolve without the aid of any more other pleading or paper.
13 Id.,
15-16.
14 Id.,
16.
15 Dated May 20, 1988.
16 Id.,
2-3.
17 Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129.
18 Supra, sec. 9,
par. (3)
19 CONST. (1987), art. IX
(B), sec. 7.
20 Supra, sec. 19,
par. (6).
21 Supra, sec. 23.
22 RESOLUTION OF THE COURT
EN BANC, DATED JANUARY 11, 1983, PROVIDING FOR THE INTERIM OR TRANSITIONAL RULES AND GUIDELINES RELATIVE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1981 (B.P. BLG. 129).
23 Supra, par. 22, subpar. (c).
24 Rep. Act No. 5434, sec.
1.
25 The Court of Agrarian
Relations for instance, was abolished by Batas Blg.
129, sec. 44. The Labor Code, sec. 298, on the other hand, abolished the Court of Industrial
Relations.
26 Asiaworld
Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, No. L-56398, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 219, 225.
27 Pres. Decree No. 1529,
sec. 117; Rep. Act No. 5434, sec. 1, supra.
28 Batas Blg.
129, supra, sec. 9(3), amending Pres. Decree No.
902-A, sec. 6.
29 Supra.
30 GONZALES, AMINISTRATIVE
LAW, A TEXT 13 (1979).
31 Id.,
14-15.
32 See Pres. Decree No. 1883
as amended by Pres. Decree No. 2002.
33 Pres. Decree No. 1936,
sec. 1; Pres. Decree No. 2002, supra,
sec. 2; emphasis in original.
34 Presidential Commission
on Good Government v. Peña, G.R. No. 77663,
April 12, 1988; Feliciano, J., Concurring with qualifications. While the
Regional Trial Courts may not take cognizance of cases involving the
Commission, this is so because the various Executive Orders creating it
specifically invested the Sandiganbayan of the
jurisdiction, and not because it is co-equal with the said courts.
35 CONST. (1987), art. III,
sec. 2.
36 No. L-22554, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 299.
37 Supra, 306, fn. 7;
emphasis supplied.
38 BERNAS, THE 1973
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION A REVIEWER-PRIMER 37 (1981).
39 Nos. L-34038, 34243,
36376, 38688, 39525, 40031, June 18,
1976, 71 SCRA 356.
40 Supra, 380.
41 Supra.
42 See Cruz v. Gatan, No. L-44910, November 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 226 in which the Court
sustained the Arrest, Search, and Seizure Order (ASSO) under General Order No.
2-A; Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, No. L-61388, April 20, 1983, 121 SCRA 472 and
Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, Nos. L-61016-7, April
26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538, in which we held valid Presidential Commitment Order(s)
(PCOs) pursuant to Letters of Instructions Nos.
1125-A and 1211; and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile,
No. L-61388, July 19, 1985, 137 SCRA 647, in which we recognized the validity
of Presidential Detention Action(s) (PDAs) per
Presidential Decree Nos. 1877 and 1877-A.
43 Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, supra, 604.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., Concurring.
44 No. L-72301, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 647.
45 Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337, sec. 143, pars. (1), (3).
46 Ponsica
v. Ignalaga, supra, 662.
47 389 US
347 (1967).
48 333 US
10 (1948).
49 403 US
433 (1971).
50 Resolution, dated September 24, 1987, id., 2.
51 Crespo
v. Mogul, No. L-53373, June 30,
1987, 151 SCRA 462, 470.
52 CONST. (1987), art. VII,
sec. 5.