ALFREDO S. MARQUEZ, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF LITTLE FOLKS SNACK MOBILE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND KAISAHAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (KAMPIL-K…

Private respondent Kaisahan
ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN) in behalf of seventy nine (79) of
its members who are employed at the
Little Folks Snack Mobile owned by
petitioner, filed on July 16, 1986 with
the Office of the Director of the
National Capital Region, Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) a complaint for underpayment of minimum wage, non-payment of ECOLA,
non-payment of incentive leave benefits and non-payment of overtime pay [Rollo,
p. 22, Petition, Annex “C”.] The complaint was later amended to
include non-payment of holiday pay, non-payment of premium pay on rest day,
non–payment of maternity leave benefits and illegal exaction [Rollo, p. 23,
Petition, Annex “D”.]

During the initial
hearing, the employees were required to submit a
computation of their claims while petitioner was ordered to submit his comment
thereon immediately upon receipt. After
several hearings, both parties were required to submit their respective
position papers. While the employees
were able to submit a position paper, petitioner failed to do so. Hence, the case was submitted for
resolution.

On October 30, 1986, Minerva Peran, the
representative of the employees during the proceedings before the hearing
officer, filed a motion to dismiss claiming that Samahan ng
mga Manggagawa sa Little Folks Snack Mobile (SAMAHAN) a local
chapter of respondent KAMPIL–KATIPUNAN, to which the seventy nine (79)
employees allegedly belong, and petitioner employer were able to settle
amicably their dispute through a compromise agreement [Rollo, p. 24, Petition,
Annex”E”.] The employees opposed the motion on the ground that
Minerva Peran was not authorized to enter into the alleged compromise agreement and much less to move for the
dismissal of the complaint. On January
20, 1987, the Regional Director rendered a decision [Rollo, p. 37, Petition,
Annex “H”] denying the motion to dismiss and directing petitioner to
pay the employees their various claims amounting to P625,000.94. On appeal, the Secretary of Labor affirmed the decision of the Regional Director. The two motions for reconsideration of the
order of the Secretary having been denied, the present petition was filed on
November 24, 1987 before the Court, alleging lack of jurisdiction and/or grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Labor in affirming the
decision of the Regional Director. The
prayer in the petition for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to prohibit the enforcement of the order of the Secretary of
Labor was granted by the Court on December 2, 1987.

Petitioner relies heavily
on the amicable settlement which was allegedly entered into with the employees
through their representative Minerva Peran. According to petitioner, with the execution of the amicable
settlement, the employees’ complaint was rendered moot and academic and petitioner’s submission of a position paper became unnecessary.

Indeed, on October 29, 1986, Minerva Peran
signed an agreement with petitioner reducing their claims from a total mount of P625,000 to only
P80,000 to be paid in several installments
[Rollo, pp. 24-26.] Peran signed as president of the SAMAHAN which had
allegedly disaffiliated from respondent KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN. However, Peran failed to show any evidence
that SAMAHAN had indeed disaffiliated from
KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN. More importantly,
the employees denied giving Peran the authority to enter into the amicable
settlement and to move for the dismissal of the complaint.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that money claims due to
laborers cannot be the object of settlement or compromise effected by the
union, union officers or counsel without the specific individual consent of
each laborer concerned [Danao Development Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. L-40706-7,
February 16, 1978, 81 SCRA 487.] This is so because the aggrieved parties are
the individual complainants themselves. Their representative can only assist but not decide for them [Kaisahan
ng mga Manggagawa sa La Campana v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-47853, November 16,
1984, 133 SCRA 220.] In the light of the categorical denial by the employees
that Peran was authorized to enter into an amicable settlement as regards their
claims, the Court holds that public respondent Secretary of labor ruled correctly in upholding the Regional
Director’s rejection of the agreement.

Petitioner next alleges denial of due process. It is claimed that when the Regional
Director awarded the employees’ claims in the same order denying Peran’s motion
to dismiss, even in the absence of petitioner’s position paper, the latter was
deprived of the right to be heard. However,
the antecedent facts prove otherwise.

After the submission by the employees of their position paper on
September 30, 1986, petitioner was required by the hearing officer to submit
his own position paper and supporting documents on or before October 7,
1986. On said date, petitioner failed
to submit his position paper but
instead asked for an extension of seven days within which to submit the
same. On October 14, 1986, petitioner’s
representative failed to appear but the hearing officer accorded him leniency
by resetting the hearing to October 21, 1986. Despite due notice, petitioner’s representative again failed to appear
and submit a position paper. Consequently, the case was deemed submitted for resolution. It was then on October 30, 1986 that Minerva Peran filed a motion to dismiss invoking the disputed amicable settlement.

There is denial of due
process when a party is not accorded an opportunity to be heard in a case filed against him [Macabingkil v. Yatco, G.R. No. L-23174, September
18, 1967, 21 SCRA 150, citing the cases U.S. v. Ling Su Fun, 10 Phil. 104
(1908) and Lopez v. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23 (1924).] However, what the
law prohibits is the absolute lack of an opportunity to be heard [Batangas,
Laguna, Tayabas and Co. v. Comm-Cadiao, G.R. No. L-28725, March 12, 1968, 22
SCRA 987; Superior Concrete Products v. WCC, G.R. No. L-42020, March 31, 1978,
82 SCRA 270.] Hence, it has been ruled that there was no denial of due process where the employer was duly represented by
counsel and given sufficient opportunity to be heard and present his
evidence [Pantranco v. NLRC, G.R. No. 64152, December 29, 1983, 126
SCRA 526] nor where the employer’s failure to be heard was due to the various
postponements granted to it [Kiok Loy v. NLRC, G.R. No. 54334, January 22,
1986, 141 SCRA 179] or to his repeated failure to appear during the hearings [Divine Word High School v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 72207, August 6, 1986, 143 SCRA 346.]

Petitioner, in this case,
was given at least three chances by the hearing officer to submit his
position paper but failed each time. Even prior to the hearing officer’s order for the submission of the
position paper, petitioner was given the opportunity to traverse the employees’
complaint when he was ordered to comment on the employees’
computation of their claims submitted on August 20, 1986. The comment was never submitted
since petitioner failed to appear during the two hearings set for the purpose,
despite due notice. Clearly, petitioner
was granted ample opportunity to present his case before the Regional Director.

Moreover, petitioner
appealed the decision of the Regional Director with the Secretary of
Labor. Two motions for reconsideration
were likewise filed from the Secretary of Labors order of affirmance. Whatever defect the Regional Director
committed based on an alleged denial of due process was deemed cured by the
filing of an appeal and the motions for reconsideration [De Leon v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 56968, April 30, 1984, 129 SCRA 117; Remerco Garments
Manufacturing v. Minister of Labor and Employment, G.R. Nos. 56176-77, February
28, 1985, 135 SCRA 167; Sampang v. Inciong, G.R. No. 50992, June 19, 1985, 137
SCRA 56; Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc., v. The Honorable Regional
Director/Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 54285, December 8, 1988.]

Finally, petitioner
impugns the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and the Regional Director to
award the money claims of the employees contending that all money
claims of workers arising from an employer-employee relationship are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter as provided by Art. 217 of the
Labor Code, as amended.

This contention, which is
being raised for the first time in this
petition, can no longer be considered by the Court at this stage, consistent
with the ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29,
35-36, that –

. . . a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs.
Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In
the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that
the question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties is
barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated –
obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court
. . . And in Littleton vs. Burges, 16
Wyo. 58, the Court said that it
is not right for a party who has
affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to
secure an affirmative relief, to
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

Elaborating on this ruling, the Court in Crisostomo v.
CA, G.R. No. L-27166, March 25, 1970, 32 SCRA 54, 60, stated that:

* * *

The petitioners, to borrow the language of Mr. Justice Bautista
Angelo (People vs. Archilla,
G.R. No. L-15632, February 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 699, 700-701), cannot adopt a posture of double-dealing without
running afoul of the doctrine of estoppel. The principle of estoppel is in the interest
of a sound administration of the laws. It should deter those who are disposed to trifle with the courts by
taking inconsistent positions contrary to the elementary principles of right
dealing and good faith (People vs.
Acierto, 92 Phil. 534, 541
[1953]). For this reason, this Court
closes the door to the petitioners’ challenge against the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals and will not even honor the question with a pronouncement.

A reading of the
above-quoted statements may give the impression that the doctrine applies only
to the plaintiff or the party who, by bringing the action, initially invoked
but later repudiated the jurisdiction of the court. But while the rule has been applied to estop the plaintiff from
raising the issue of jurisdiction [Tolentino v. Escalona, G.R. No. L-26886,
January 24, 1969, 26 SCRA 613; Rodriquez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-29264,
August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 419; Crisostomo v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-27166, March 25,
1970, 32 SCRA 54; Ong Ching v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-35356, May 18, 1973,
51 SCRA 13; Capilitan v. Dela Cruz, G.R. Nos. L-29536-7, February 28, 1974, 55 SCRA 706;
Florendo v. Coloma, G.R. No. 60544, May
19, 1984, 129 SCRA 304; Solicitor General v. Coloma, Adm. Matter No.
84-3-886-0, July 7, 1986, 142 SCRA 511; Sy v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-76639, July
16, 1987, 152 SCRA 103] it has likewise been applied to the defendant [Carillo
v. Allied Worker’s Association of the Phils., G.R. No. L-23689; July 31, 1968,
24 SCRA 566; People v. Munar, G.R. No. L-37642, October 22, 1973, 53 SCRA 278;
Solano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41971, November
29, 1983, 126 SCRA 122; Royales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
65072, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 470] and more specifically, to the respondent employer in a labor case [Tajonera v. Lamaroza, G.R. Nos.
L-48907-49035, December 19, 1981, 110 SCRA 447; Akay Printing Press v. Ministry
of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 56951, December 6, 1985, 140 SCRA 381;
Philippine Overseas Drilling and Oil
Development Corporation v.
Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 55703, November 27, 1986, 146 SCRA 79; Cebu
Institute of Technology v. Ople, G.R. Nos. 58870, 68345,
69224-5, 70832, 76521, 76596, December 18, 1987; 156 SCRA 629.] The active
participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupled with
his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body
where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that
jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will
bar said party from later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction.

When the complaint was
pending before the Regional Director, petitioner did not raise the issue of
jurisdiction but instead actively participated in the hearings. After the adverse decision of the Regional
Director and upon the elevation of the case on appeal to the Secretary of Labor,
still no jurisdictional challenge was made. Even in the two motions for reconsideration of the DOLE decision
of affirmance, petitioner did not assail
the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor or the Regional
Director. The Court will not now allow petitioner to raise
this issue, estoppel having
already set in to bar the challenge.

To be sure, the Court is
not unaware of the ruling in Calimlim v. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-34362,
November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 399, reiterated in Dy v. NLRC, G.R. No. 68544, October 27,
1986, 145 SCRA 211, to the effect that the ruling in Sibonghanoy being
an exception to the general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a court may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal should not be
applied in the absence of the pivotal element of laches. The Court, however, will not hesitate to
apply the doctrine laid down in the Sibonghanoy case even absent the
extraordinary circumstances therein [See Akay
Printing Press v. Minister of Labor and Employment, supra; Cebu
Institute of Technology v. Ople, supra] where the entertainment of the
jurisdictional issue at a belated
stage of the proceedings will result in a failure of justice and render
nugatory the constitutional imperative of protection to labor [See Article
II, Section 18 and Article XIII,
Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution.]

Illustrative is the case
of Carillo v. Allied Worker’s Association of
the Philippines, supra, where certain employees filed a case with the Court
of Agrarian Reform against their employer seeking reinstatement to their
positions as security guards. When the
Court of Agrarian Reform decided
in favor of the workers, the employer filed a petition with the Supreme Court questioning
for the first time the jurisdiction
of the Court of Agrarian Reform
invoking Dequito v. Lopez, G.R. No. L-27757, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1352,
which held that the work performed by a security guard is not
embraced in the term “agrarian relations” and that a matter of this
character should be litigated either in an ordinary judicial tribunal or where a
reinstatement is sought, in the Court
of Industrial Relations. The Court in
rejecting the jurisdictional challenge applied the Sibonghanoy ruling adding that:

* * *

Social justice would be a
meaningless term if in a situation
like the present, an element of rigidity would be affixed to procedural
precepts and made to cover the matter. Flexibility should not be ruled out. Precisely, what is sought to be accomplished by such a fundamental
principle expressly so declared by the Constitution (Article, II Section 5,
[1935] Constitution of the Philippines) is the effectiveness of the community’s effort to assist
the economically underprivileged. For under existing
conditions, without such succor and support, they might not, unaided, be able
to secure justice for themselves. To
make them suffer, even inadvertently, from the effect of a judicial ruling, which perhaps they could not
have anticipated, the Dequito decision having been promulgated only last March
28th, when such a deplorable result could be avoided, would be to disregard
what the social justice concept stands for.

Moreover, there is equally the obligation on the part of the State
to afford protection to labor (Article XIV, Section 5, [1935] Constitution of
the Philippines). The responsibility is
incumbent then, not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary, to
translate this pledge into a living
reality. The present case is an
appropriate occasion for the discharge of such a trust. To preclude relief under
the circumstances herein disclosed
would be to fail to submit to
the dictates of a plain constitutional command. That we should not allow to happen. [Carillo v. Allied Worker’s
Association of the Philippines, supra, at pp. 573-574.]

In the case at bar, the
various money claims of the employees were never disputed by petitioner
during the proceedings before the Regional Director and the Secretary of
Labor. What was sought was the
reduction of petitioner’s liability by entering into an amicable settlement
with the representative of the employees who turned out to be not
authorized. Having failed in his
attempt to reduce the claims of the employees, the ends of justice and equity
require that petitioner be not allowed to defeat the employees’ right by the
expedient of raising the issue of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on December 2, 1987
enjoining the enforcement of the order of the Secretary of Labor dated November
12, 1987 is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J, Gutierrez, Jr.,
and Bidin JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.