ESTELA COSTUNA, PETITIONER, VS. LAUREANA DOMONDON, THE HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XCVIII, QUEZON CITY, THE HON. PRESIDING JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEAL…

The reversal and setting aside of the decision* of the Court of Appeals’ Thirteenth Division, in
CA-G.R. CV No. 10948, entitled Laureana Domondon, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
Estela Costuna,
defendant-appellant, promulgated on March 28, 1988, affirming the decision** of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XCVIII, Quezon City, dated November 22, 1984, are sought by the petitioner in this petition for review on certiorari.

Culled from the records,
the facts are as follows:

The spouses Amadeo and Estela Costuna (hereinafter referred to as Amadeo and the petitioner, respectively) during their
marriage acquired three parcels of land with an aggregate area of 599 square
meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1235,
18118, and 24365, all of which lots are located in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, and registered in the name of Amadeo Costuna.

On November 8, 1976,
Amadeo executed his last will and testament.  He was then 68 years old.  Following the execution of the last will and
testament aforesaid, the spouses were beset with marital problems.

Sometime in November, 1977, Amadeo
sustained third degree burns on his legs for which he was treated at various
hospitals, such as the Bonifacio Maternity Clinic and
the Bago-Bantay
General Hospital,
on different dates.  While already ill,
or on April 17, 1977,
relatives of Amadeo requested that he be brought to Samar as there were documents that needed his
signature pertaining to his Samar
properties.  Since then, Amadeo was never returned to the petitioner and stayed with his
sister.  Thus, a feud ensued among Amadeo’s relatives (sister Zosima
Barada, nephews, and nieces) and the petitioner over
his custody prompting the latter to institute a petition for habeas corpus on
June 18, 1978, before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon
City, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 25601.  Five days later, or on June 23, 1978, Amadeo
filed an action for partition before the then Juvenile Domestic and Relations
Court, docketed as Case No. Q-25545.  Failing to get the petitioner’s consent to
the desired partition notwithstanding repeated demands therefor,
Amadeo was constrained to execute a deed of sale, on
July 10, 1978, over the one-half (1/2) undetermined portion of the conjugal
property, without his wife’s consent, in favor of Laureana
Domondon (hereinafter referred to as the
respondent).  The death of Amadeo on November
5, 1978, however, rendered the aforecited
cases moot and academic.

With Amadeo’s death, Special
Proceedings No. Q-26351 was instituted by his widow (petitioner) with the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch LVIII.  Claiming
pro indiviso one-half (1/2) share over the earlier mentioned three lots by virtue of
the deed of sale executed in her favor by Amadeo on July 10, 1978,
the respondent opposed the allowance of the will.  For lack of jurisdiction, no ruling was
however made on her claim, but the probate court decreed the allowance of the
last will and testament and ordered the issuance of Letters of Administration
(should correctly be letters testamentary) in favor of petitioner in a decision
rendered on December 29, 1981.^[1]

Consequently, an action to compel the petitioner to give her
conformity to the deed of sale executed by her husband in favor of the
respondent was instituted by the latter
in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
XCVIII, docketed as Q-34527, which court,
making the following disquisition:

On the confronting issue of whether or not the defendant can be
compelled to signify her conformity in the deed of sale, it is the considered opinion of the court that weighing their respective
evidence and the end line of arguments of the parties in view of the peculiar
circumstances attendant to the case that the refusal of the defendant to give
consent to the sale of what rightly belongs to her husband was
unreasonable.  Consequently, the court
believes and so holds that defendant can be compelled to grant the same consistent
with the last provision of Article 166 of the New Civil Code whichever one-half
(1/2) portion of the whole estate she may choose from the survey plan of
the project of partition (Exh. 28, Q-25601) shall be
segregated.

As can be gathered from the records, the present case presupposes a situation where the husband
disposed of his legitimate share one-half (1/2) of the conjugal property so
that his pressing financial needs for medical and hospitalization expenses
could be met.  The defendant appears to
have been accorded all the formalities required of the marital companionship in
securing her consent but none of the representa­tions were heeded.  The fact that letters (Exh.
E, Q-34527; Exh. 28, Q-25601) for a proposed
partition and seeking of conformity for her to stamp approval of the deed of
sale were never denied since this was confirmed by the records of the
proceedings (t.s.n. July 28, 1978, pp. 19-20, Q-25601).  While it is argued that this has been done
upon the prodding of other interested parties, nowhere has it been shown that
the defendant ever reacted when she acknowledged the subject letters.  The contents of said letters were signifi­cant
since the proposed partition and/or conveyance of the husband’s one-half share
means life and death to the latter.  To
the husband’s mind, this so far is the only remaining alternative to keep him
alive.  There is a wife who is so near
yet so far and while there are relatives who are willing to help, they
themselves are similarly poor and impoverished. 
In the case of “Baello vs.
Villanueva,” 54 Phil. 213, the Court held that “For as conjugal
properties belong equally to husband and wife, any alienation by the husband without the consent of his wife
prejudices her in so far as it includes a part or whole of the wife’s half and
is to that extent invalid.” This decision of the court fortifies the
relative significance of Article 900 of the Civil Code providing that if the only survivor is the widow or widower, she
or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate of the deceased
spouse, and the testator may freely dispose of the other half.  The aforesaid decision sustains the belief of
the court that the disposition or alienation of the
conjugal property is not valid only to the extent of prejudicing the wife’s
one-half share of the realty and with respect to his own one-half share, the
disposition has been done in its right perspective.  In the present situation, consent to alienate
his one-half (1/2) share of the conjugal property has been sought and this was
manifested in plaintiff’s letters (Exh. E, Q-34527
and Exh. 28, Q-25601) and defendant’s refusal was
never justified.  To the mind of the
court, the defendant’s failure to give the rationale of her refusal to act on a
situation that demands the propriety
of a reply is unreasonable in the
concept of Article 166 and therefore, the court may compel her to grant the
same.^[2]

decided
in favor of plaintiff Laureana Domondon
and ordered the defendant Estela Costuna
to affix her signature on the deed of sale.

Aggrieved by the decision
of the trial court, Estela Costuna
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
10948.  In disposing the issue as to the
validity of the sale, the Court of Appeals stated thus:

The third assignment of error is primarily based on the allegation
that no sale of conjugal properties by the husband may be validly made without
the consent of the wife.  Appellant cited
Articles 166 and 167 of the New Civil Code which provide, viz:

“Art. 166.  Unless the
wife has been declared a non
compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined
in leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of
the conjugal partnership
without the wife’s consent.  If she refuses unreasonably to give her
consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.

“This article shall not apply to property acquired by the
conjugal partnership before the effective date of this Code.  (1413a).

“Art. 167.  In case of
abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property by the
husband, the courts, on petition of the wife, may provide for a receivership, or administration by
the wife, or separation of property. 
(n).”

The general rule is, the husband may not validly sell real estates
belonging to the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent.  However, this rule accepts exceptions,
wherein the husband may sell the real properties owned by the conjugal
partnership even without the consent of the wife:  1) sale of personal properties; 2) real
properties acquired before the effectivity of the New
Civil Code; 3) real properties acquired after effectivity
of the New Civil Code if wife is confined in a leprosarium, declared non compus mentis or spendthrift, or under civil interdiction;
4) if the purpose is to pay conjugal liabilities (Article 161); 5) if
the purpose is to secure the future of their children or finishing a career
(Art. 162); and 6) moderate gift for charity (Art. 174).

The sale by Amadeo of one-half (1/2) of
each of the conjugal properties to Domondon was
allegedly for the purpose of paying the husband’s hospital expenses in order
that he would get well.  In a decided
case, it was held that while the marriage and the legal conjugal partnership
subsists, the support of the wife, conversely, of the husband, is a charge upon
the partnership.  (Sumulong
v. Cembrano, 51 Phil. 719).  The partnership is not relieved of this
obligation by the mere fact that the spouses do not live under the same roof
(Ibid.).  The amounts advanced by third
persons for the subsistence of the wife (or husband) are chargeable against the
property of the conjugal partnership (Sochayseng
v. Trijillo, 31 Phil. 153; Galang
v. CA, 103 SCRA 90).

Estela Costuna
never rebutted the appellee’s assertion that the
proceeds of the sale were utilized for the hospitalization and medication of Amadeo.  Whether her
refusal to support her ailing and aging
husband was because of her outright refusal to do so or her financial
incapability to give, does not matter. 
It was sufficient that Amadeo had no other
recourse but to sell his share in the conjugal property.

Article 171 of the New Civil Code provides that “the husband
may dispose of the conjugal partnership property for purposes specified in
Articles 161 and 162”.  This means
that the husband may alienate the conjugal properties even without the consent
of the wife if the proceeds thereof will be utilized for those provided under
Articles 161 and 162.

In the case at bar, the applicable provision is paragraph (1) of
Article 161 which provides:

“(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also
for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the
partnership;”

The support of either
spouses (sic) is definitely for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.  For if either of them is physically ill, the
conjugal partnership likewise suffers.

Considering the above reasons, We are predisposed to decree that the
sale of one-half of the conjugal properties made by the husband for his
hospitalization and medical purposes was valid.

Lastly, Estela Costuna
alleged that the sale was void because it was merely simulated and in fact the
consideration thereof was not given.

After a careful and thorough peru­sal of the transcript of
stenographic notes and the evidence presented therein, We find that the
consideration was paid and indeed utilized for the hospitalization and
medication of Amadeo Costuna.  Appellant’s allegation is conjectural.  She failed to prove her assertions.  The documentary evidence on record showed
that the consideration was received and utilized for the purpose alleged in the
deed of sale.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED with costs against appellant.^[3]

In view of the decision
of the Court of Appeals, the petitioner filed the present petition.

In her petition, the
petitioner faults the Court of Appeals in deciding a question of substance not
in accordance with the applicable law (Articles
166 and 167) of the new Civil Code and jurisprudence.^[4]

The central issue is the
validity or nullity of the deed of sale executed by Amadeo in favor of the respondent over his one-half (1/2)
aliquot share in the conjugal partnership without the consent of his wife.  The ancillary issue is whether or not
the conjugal partnership should be made liable for the payment of the hospital
and medical expenses of Amadeo who allegedly
abandoned the conjugal home and his wife.

The petitioner submits
that the deed of sale executed by Amadeo in favor of
private respondent over his undetermined one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal
partnership is spurious and simulated, hence invalid.  Firstly, the element of consent (her consent)
is wanting.  Secondly, the alleged sale
was not a voluntary act of Amadeo but was
orchestrated by the persons who were desirous of depriving her of her
inheritance which fact is bolstered by the following:  a) at the time of the execution of the deed
of sale, Amadeo was 81 years old and gravely ill; b)
while the deed of sale was signed by Amadeo, his
signature was illegible; c) the probability that he was unconscious at the time
that he signed the document and that somebody may have guided his hand is not
remote; d) the absence of the signature of both parties in the acknowledgement
portion of the deed, and e) the variance between the dates appearing in the
deed itself and the acknowledgement; thirdly, because of want of consideration.  Not only is the supposed buyer financially
incapable to pay the purchase price, there is also the uncertainty of the
amount actually paid.  The petitioner
maintains that Amadeo’s hospital and medical expenses
should not be chargeable against the conjugal partnership as Amadeo by his own free will deserted and abandoned
her and their conjugal home when he opted to live with his relatives.  She claims that never was she remiss in her
duties to her husband.  She asserts that
her husband’s relatives held him (husband) in “captivity” making it
impossible for her to give him the care, attention, and love that he most
needed.  Nonetheless, she avers that all
efforts were exerted by her, to regain custody of her husband but in vain.  In fact, as a last ditch effort, she filed habeas corpus proceedings which case was
unfortunately rendered moot and academic by the death of Amadeo
on November 5, 1979.  She claims to have
shouldered the funeral bills and other miscellaneous expenses of Amadeo as the relatives suddenly abandoned him.  Finally, she theorizes that Art. 161 of the new Civil Code does not include illness or old age of one or both
of the spouses as among the expenses
for which the conjugal partnership may be held liable and that the case of Sumulong vs. Cembrano^[5] is not applicable to the case at bar because
here Amadeo abandoned her and the conjugal home.

The private respondent on
the other hand naturally supports the common ruling of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that the deed of sale is valid,
notwithstanding the absence of consent, because the disposition of the one-half
(1/2) undivided portion of the conjugal partnership properties was
intended to generate funds to cover Amadeo’s hospital
and medical expenses.  She argues that
the disposition of one half (1/2) of the conjugal estate should be effected by
either one of the spouses without the consent and conformity of the other for
as long as what belongs to the other by such act would not suffer or be
prejudiced.  She submits that if consent
is wanting, it was
not Amadeo’s fault as it can not be denied that the
petitioner’s consent, first to the intended partition and later to the sale,
was repeatedly sought by Amadeo, as required
by law and out of marital courtesy, but the petitioner tenaciously withheld her
consent.  She asserts that the
petitioner’s refusal was not only unreasonable, unjustified, but above all,
cruel, for Amadeo was asking for his legitimate share
not to squander but to enable him to settle his hospital bills and defray the
cost of his medication.  The private
respondent theorizes that the petitioner in turning her back and denying her
husband the moral and financial assistance at the time when most needed and her
refusal to stamp her approval on the deed of sale are devoid of cogent reason.  She asserts that no other motive could be
attributed to the petitioner but her selfishness and cupidity thinking that
perhaps she could own all the conjugal partnership properties upon her
husband’s death, they having no children. 
She contends that the Court of Appeals did not err when it applied the
provisions of Art. 161 of the Civil Code because the payment of the hospital
and medical expenses no doubt redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.  She maintains that there is
here no case of abandonment.  That while
it is true that Amadeo left the conjugal home, the
reason for his leaving was his desire for survival.

There is no denying that Amadeo sought the petitioner’s consent to the deed of sale
which consent was adamantly withheld by the petitioner.  As may be gleaned from the records,
her refusal stemmed from her belief that the deed of sale was executed in fraud
of her, yet she did not do anything to impugn the said deed notwithstanding
that the right is vested on her by law.^[6]
She assailed for the first time the validity of the sale only when Civil Case
No. Q-34527 was instituted by the respondent
in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, to compel
her to give her consent.

Notably, what was sold by
Amadeo without the petitioner’s consent was
only an undetermined one-half (1/2) share in the community properties.  He left intact that other undetermined 1/2
share which should belong to the petitioner. 
And the reason for the sale was, as correctly found by the trial court
and Court of Appeals, for Amadeo’s hospitalization
and medication.  It was therefore
Amadeo’s understandable human spirit to live longer
that induced him to execute the deed of sale without the consent of the
petitioner.

We concede that the consent of the petitioner is essential for
the validity of the sale, but, in this case, where consent was unreasonably
withheld, we are constrained to relax the application of the law and consider
the sale as falling within the recognized exceptions.  The Court can not overlook the vital fact
that Amadeo executed a last will and testament designating
the petitioner as his sole heir.  In this
connection, we find merit in the respondent’s assertion that no other motive
could be attributed to the petitioner but her greed.

The question of whether or not Amadeo’s
hospital and medical expenses are chargeable to the conjugal partnership is
answered in the affirmative and finds firm support in Art. 161 of the Civil
Code, which provides inter alia:

The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:  (1) all debts and obligations contracted by
the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.

The benefit required by this article need not be quantified into
pesos or square meters of real property. 
It is enough that the transaction would result to some discernible advantage or good to the conjugal
partnership, directly or indirectly. 
Thus, the health and well-being of both or either of the spouses would
undeniably redound to the benefit of their conjugal partnership.  The advancement of the interests of the
conjugal partnership depends in great measure on the soundness of the body and
mind of the partners.

Considering all the foregoing, we hold that the conjugal
partnership property is liable for the hospital and medical expenses of Amadeo.

There is in this case no convincing reason to disturb the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals which are generally binding on this
Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. 
With costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

* Penned by Chua, Segundino G., J., Purisima,
Fidel P. and Lapeña, Jr., Nicolas P., JJ.,
concurring.

** Rendered by the Honorable Remigio E. Zari.

^[1]
Decision-CFI, Rizal,
Quezon City, Br. LVIII, SP-26351, Ernani
Cruz Paño, District Judge; rollo,
71-73.

^[2]
Decision, RTC, Quezon
City, Br. XCVIII, rendered by the Hon. Remigio Z. Zari dated Nov. 22, 1984; rollo,
65-70.

^[3]
Rollo, 58-64.

^[4]
Amended petition, rollo,
85.

^[5]
51 Phil. 719.

^[6]
Article 173, Civil Code, provides:

ART. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from
the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of
the husband entered into without
her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the
husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal
partnership property.  Should the wife
fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the
marriage, may demand the value of property
fraudulently alienated by the
husband.