G.R. No. 81563. December 19, 1989
AMADO C. ARIAS, PETITIONER, VS. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPONDENT.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The facts of this case are stated in the dissenting opinion of
Justice Carolina C. Grino-Aquino which follows this majority opinion. The dissent substantially reiterates the
draft report prepared by Justice Grino-Aquino as a working basis for the Court’s
deliberations when the case was being discussed and for the subsequent votes of
concurrence or dissent on the action proposed by the report.
There is no dispute over the events which transpired. The division of the Court is on the
conclusions to be drawn from those events and the facts insofar as the two petitioners are
concerned. The majority is of the view that Messrs. Arias and Data should
be acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt.
The Court feels that the quantum of evidence needed to convict petitioners Arias and Data
beyond reasonable doubt, as co-conspirators in the conspiracy to cause undue
injury to the Government through the irregular disbursement and expenditure of
public funds, has not been satisfied.
In acquitting the petitioners, the Court agrees with the
Solicitor General[1]
who, in 80 pages of his
consolidated manifestation and motion, recommended that Messrs. Arias and Data
be acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de oficio. Earlier, Tanodbayan
Special Prosecutor Eleuterio F. Guerrero had also
recommended the dropping of Arias from the information before it was filed.
There is no question about the need to ferret out and convict
public officers whose acts have made the bidding out and construction of public
works and highways synonymous with graft or criminal inefficiency in the public
eye. However, the remedy is not to
indict and jail every person who may have ordered the project, who signed a
document incident to its construction, or who had a hand somewhere in its
implementation. The careless use of the
conspiracy theory may sweep into jail even innocent persons who may have been
made unwitting tools by the criminal minds who engineered the defraudation.
Under the Sandiganbayan’s decision in
this case, a department secretary, bureau chief, commission chairman, agency
head, and all chief auditors would be equally culpable for every crime arising
from disbursements which they have
approved. The department head or chief auditor
would be guilty of conspiracy simply because he was the last of a long line of
officials and employees who acted upon or affixed their signatures to a transaction.
Guilt must be premised on a more knowing, personal, and deliberate
participation of each individual who is charged with others as part of a
conspiracy.
The records show that the
six accused persons were
convicted in connection with the overpricing of land purchased by the Bureau of
Public Works for the Mangahan Floodway
Project. The project was intended to
ease the perennial floods in Marikina
and Pasig, Metro Manila.
The accused were prosecuted because 19,004 square meters of
“riceland” in Rosario,
Pasig
which had been assessed at P5.00 a square meter in 1973 were sold as
“residential land” in 1978 for P80.00 a square meter. The land for the floodway was acquired
through negotiated purchase.
We agree with the Solicitor-General that the assessor’s tax
valuation of P5.00 per square meter of land in Rosario, Pasig, Metro
Manila is completely unrealistic and arbitrary as the basis for conviction.
Herein lies the first error of the trial
court.
It must be stressed that the petitioners are not charged with
conspiracy in the falsification of public documents or preparation of spurious
supporting papers. The charge is causing
undue injury to the Government and giving a private party
unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
inexcusable negligence.
The alleged undue injury in a nutshell is the Government purchase
of land in Pasig,
Rizal for P80.00 a square meter instead of the P5.00
value per square meter appearing in the tax declarations and fixed by the
municipal assessor, not by the landowner.
The Sandiganbayan, without any clear
factual basis for doing so has assumed that the P5.00 per square meter value
fixed by the assessor in the tax declarations was the correct market value of
the Mangahan property and if the Government purchased
the land for P80.00 a square meter, it follows that it must have suffered undue
injury.
The Solicitor General explains why this conclusion is erroneous:
“1. No undue injury was caused
to the Government.
–
a. The P80.00 per
square meter acquisition cost is just, fair and reasonable.
It bears stress that the Agleham property
was acquired through negotiated purchase.
It was, therefor, nothing more than an
ordinary contract of sale where the purchase price had to be arrived at by
agreement between the parties and could never be left to the discretion of one
of the contracting parties (Article 1473, New Civil Code). For it is the essence of a
contract of sale that there must be a meeting of the minds between the seller
and the buyer upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the
price (Article 1475, New Civil Code).
Necessarily, the parties have to negotiate the reasonableness of the
price, taking into consideration such other factors as location, potentials,
surroundings and capabilities. After
taking the foregoing premises into consideration, the parties have, thus,
arrived at the amount of P80.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable
price for the Agleham property.
It bears stress that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to
prove that the true and fair market value in 1978 of the Agleham
property was indeed P5.00 per square meter only as stated by the assessor in
the tax declaration (Exhibit W). On the
contrary, the prosecution’s principal witness Pedro Ocol,
the Assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig, admitted
that the purchase price of P80.00 per square meter paid for the Agleham property as stated in the Deed of Sale (Exhibit G)
is ‘reasonable’ (tsn, August 19, 1983, p. 20) and
‘fair’ (Ibid, p. 76); that ‘the value of lands within the town of Pasig ranges from P80.00 to P500.00’ (Ibid, P. 21); that
the Agleham property is ‘around 300 meters’ from Ortigas Avenue, ‘adjacent to the existing Leongson [Liamson] Subdivision x x x and near Eastland Garment
Building’ (ibid, pp. 12-13); that said property is surrounded by factories,
commercial establishments and residential subdivisions (Ibid, pp. 73-74); that
the P5.00 per square meter assessed valuation of the Agleham
property appearing on the tax declaration (Exhibit W) was based on actual use
only (Ibid, pp. 26-27), it being the uniform rate for all ricefields
in Pasig irrespective of their locations (Ibid, pp.
72-74) and did not take into account the existence of many factories and
subdivisions in the area (Ibid., pp. 25-27, 72-74), and that the assessed value
is different from and always lower than the actual market value (Ibid, pp.
22-23).” (At pp. 256-259, Rollo)
A negotiated purchase may usually entail a higher buying price
than one arrived at in the course of expropriation proceedings.
In Export Processing Zone Authority v.
Dulay (149 SCRA 305, 310 [1987]) we struck down
the martial law decree that pegged just compensation in eminent domain cases to
the assessed value stated by a landowner in his tax declaration or fixed by the municipal assessor,
whichever is lower. Other factors must
be considered. These factors must be
determined by a court of justice and not by municipal employees.
In the instant case, the assessor’s low valuation, in the fixing
of which the landowner had no participation, was used
for a purpose infinitely more weighty than mere expropriation of land. It forms the basis for a criminal conviction.
The Court is not prepared to say that P80.00 to P500.00 a square
meter for land in Pasig
in 1978 would be a fair valuation. The
value must be determined in eminent domain proceedings by a competent
court. We are certain, however, that it
cannot be P5.00 a square meter. Hence,
the decision, insofar as it says that the “correct” valuation is
P5.00 per square meter and on that basis convicted the petitioners of causing
undue injury, damage, and prejudice to the Government because of gross
overpricing, is grounded on shaky foundations.
There can be no overpricing
for purposes of a criminal conviction where no proof adduced during
orderly proceedings has been presented and accepted.
The Court’s decision, however, is based on a more basic
reason. Herein lies
the principal error of the respondent court.
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued
by all too common problems – dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork,
multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence – is suddenly swept
into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally examine every
single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the
motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing his signature
as the final approving authority.
There appears to be no question from the records that documents
used in the negotiated sale were falsified.
A key tax declaration had a typewritten number instead of being
machine-numbered. The registration stampmark was antedated and the land reclassified as
residential instead of ricefield. But were the petitioners guilty of conspiracy
in the falsification and the subsequent charge of causing undue injury and
damage to the Government?
We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed
records, inspected documents, received procedures, and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly
sized office could personally do all these things in all vouchers
presented for his signature. The Court
would be asking for the impossible. All
heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and
on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into
negotiations. If a department secretary
entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call
the restaurant about the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was
present at the luncheon, inquire whether the correct amount of food was served,
and otherwise personally look into the reimbursement voucher’s accuracy,
propriety, and sufficiency. There has to
be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small
government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must
be signed. There are hundreds of
documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers that routinely
pass through his hands. The number in
bigger offices or departments is even more appalling.
There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval
appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction.
Was petitioner Arias part of the planning, preparation, and
perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to defraud the government?
Arias joined the Pasig
office on July 19, 1978. The negotiations for the purchase of the
property started in 1977. The deed of
sale was executed on April 20, 1978. Title was transferred to the Republic on June 8, 1978. In other words, the transaction had already
been consummated before his arrival. The
pre-audit, incident to payment of the purchase, was conducted in the first week
of October, 1978. Arias points out that
apart from his signature on the voucher, there is no evidence linking him to
the transaction. On the contrary, the
other co-accused testified they did not know him personally and none approached
him to follow up the payment.
Should the big amount of P1,520,320.00
have caused him to personally investigate the smallest details of the
transaction?
Yes, if the land was really worth only P5.00 a square meter. However, if land in Pasig was already worth P80.00 a
square meter at the time, no warning bell of intuition would have sounded an
inner alarm. Land along Ortigas Avenue on the way to Pasig is now worth P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 a square meter. The falsification of the tax declaration by
changing “riceland” to
“residential” was done before Arias was assigned to Pasig. Besides, there is no such thing as “riceland” in inner Metro Manila. Some lots in outlying or easily flooded areas
may still be planted to rice or kangkong but this is
only until the place is dedicated to its real purpose which is commercial,
industrial, or residential. If the Sandiganbayan is going to send somebody to jail for six
years, the decision should be based on firmer foundations.
The Sandiganbayan asked why Arias kept
the documents from October, 1978 to June
23, 1982. Arias explained
that the rules of the Commission on Audit require auditors to keep these documents and under no circumstance to relinquish
custody to other persons. Arias was auditor of the Bureau of Public Works in Pasig up to September 1, 1981. The seven months delay in the formal turnover
of custody to the new auditor was explained by prosecution witness Julito Pesayco, who succeeded him
as auditor and who took over the custody of records in that office.
The main reason for the judgment of conviction, for the finding
of undue injury and damage to the Government is the alleged gross overprice for
the land purchased for the floodway project.
Assuming that P80.00 is indeed exorbitant, petitioner Arias cites his
testimony as follows:
“Q In
conducting the pre-audit, did you determine the reasonableness of the price of
the property?
A In
this case, the price has been stated, the transaction had been consummated and
the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title had been issued and transferred
to the government of the Philippines.
The auditors have no
more leeway to return the papers and then question the purchase price.
Q Is
it not a procedure in your office that before payment is given by the
government to private individuals there should be a pre-audit of the papers and
the corresponding checks issued to the vendor?
A Correct,
Your Honor, but it depends on the kind of transaction there is.
Q Yes,
but in this particular case, the papers were transferred to the government
without paying the price. Did you not
consider that rather odd or unusual? (TSN, page 17, April 27, 1987).
A No, Your Honor.
Q Why
not?
A Because
in the Deed of Sale as being noted there, there is a condition that no payments
will be made unless the corresponding title in the payment of the Republic is
committed is made.
Q In
this case you said that the title
is already in the name of the government?
A Yes,
Your Honor. The only
thing we do is to determine whether
there is an appropriation set aside to
cover the said specification. As of the price it
is under the sole authority of the
proper officer making the sale.
Q My
point is this. Did you not consider it
unusual for a piece of property to be bought by the government; the sale was
consummated; the title was issued in favor of the government without the price
being paid first to the seller?
A No, Your Honor. In all cases usually,
payments made by the goverment
comes later than the transfer.
Q That
is usual procedure utilized in road right
of way transaction?
A Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, p. 18, April 27,
1987).
Q And
of course as auditor, ‘watch-dog’ of the government there is also that function
you are also called upon by going over the papers… (TSN, page 22, April 27, 1987).
….vouchers called upon
to determine whether there is any irregularity as at all in this particular
transaction, is it not?
A Yes, Ma’am.
Q And
that was in fact the reason why you scrutinized also, not only the tax declaration but also the
certification by Mr. Jose and Mr. Cruz?
A As
what do you mean of the certification, ma’am?
Q Certification of Mr. Jose and Mr. Cruz in
relation to PD No. 296.
A They
are not required documents that an auditor
must see. (TSN, page 23, April 27, 1987).
and continuing:
A ….. The questioning of the
purchase price is now beyond the authority of
the auditor because it is inasmuch as the amount involved is
beyond his counter-signing authority. (TSN, page 35, April 27, 1987).” (At pp. 15-16,
Petition. Underlinings
supplied by petitioner)
The Solicitor General summarizes the participation of petitioner
Data as follows:
“As regards petitioner Data’s alleged participation, the
evidence on record shows that as the then District Engineer of the Pasig Engineering District he created a committee, headed
by Engr. Priscillo Fernando
with Ricardo Asuncion, Alfonso Mendoza, Ladislao
Cruz, Pedro Hucom and Carlos Jose, all employees of
the district office, as members, specifically to handle the Mangahan
Floodway Project, gather and verify documents, conduct surveys, negotiate with
the owners for the sale of their lots, process claims and prepare the necessary
documents; he did not take any direct and active part in the acquisition of
land for the Mangahan floodway; it was the committee
which determined the authenticity of the documents presented to them for
processing and on the basis thereof prepared the corresponding deed of sale;
thereafter, the committee submitted the deed of sale together with the
supporting documents to petitioner Data for signing; on the basis of the
supporting certified documents which appeared regular and complete on their
face, petitioner Data, as head of the office and the signing authority at that
level, merely signed but did not approve the deed of sale (Exhibit G) as the
approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works; he
thereafter transmitted the signed deed of sale with its supporting documents to
Director Anolin of the Bureau of Public Works who in
turn recommended approval thereof by the Secretary of Public Works; the deed of
sale was approved by the Asst. Secretary of Public Works after a review and
re-examination thereof at that level; after the approval of the deed of sale by
the higher authorities the covering voucher for payment thereof was prepared
which petitioner Data signed; petitioner Data did not know Gutierrez and had
never met her during the processing and payment of her claims (tsn, February 26, 1987, pp. 10-14, 16-24, 31-32).” (At
pp. 267-268, Rollo)
On the alleged conspiracy, the Solicitor General argues:
“It is respectfully submitted that the prosecution likewise
has not shown any positive and convincing evidence of conspiracy between the
petitioners and their co-accused. There
was no direct finding of conspiracy.
Respondent Court’s inference on the alleged existence of conspiracy
merely upon the purported ‘pre-assigned roles (of the accused) in the
commission of the (alleged) illegal acts in question’ is not supported by any
evidence on record. Nowhere in the
seventy?eight (78) page Decision was there any specific allusion to some
or even one instance which would link either petitioner Arias or Data to their
co-accused in the planning, preparation and/or perpetration, if any, of the
purported fraud and falsifications alleged in the Information. That petitioners
Data and Arias happened to be
officials of the Pasig District Engineering Office
who signed the deed of sale and passed on pre-audit the general voucher
covering the subject sale, respectively, does not raise any presumption or
inference that they were part of the alleged plan to defraud the Government, as
indeed there was none. It should be remembered that, as aboveshown, there was no undue injury caused to the
Government as the negotiated purchase of the Agleham
property was made at the fair and reasonable price of P80.00 per square meter.
That there were erasures and superimpositions of the words and
figures of the purchase price in the deed of sale from P1,546,240.00 to
P1,520,320.00 does not prove conspiracy.
It may be noted that there was a reduction in the affected area from the
estimated 19,328 square meters to 19,004 square meters as approved by the Land
Registration Commission, which resulted in the corresponding reduction in the
purchase price from P1,546,240.00 to
P1,520,320.00. The erasures in the deed
of sale were simple corrections that even benefited the Government.
Moreover, contrary to the respondent Court’s suspicion, there was
nothing irregular in the use of the unapproved survey plan/technical
description in the deed of sale because the approval of the survey
plan/technical description was not a prerequisite to the approval of the deed
of sale. What is important is that
before any payment is made by the Government under the deed of sale the title
of the seller must have already been cancelled and another one issued to the Government
incorporating therein the technical description as approved by the Land
Registration Commission, as what obtained in the instant case.” (At pp.
273-275, Rollo)
We agree with the counsel for the People. There is no adequate evidence to establish
the guilt of the petitioners, Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, beyond reasonable doubt. The inadequate evidence on record is not
sufficient to sustain a conviction.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan insofar as it convicts and sentences
petitioners Amado C. Arias and Cresencio
D. Data is hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioners
Arias and Data are acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras,
Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., joins in the dissent of
Mme. Justice Griño-Aquino.
Griño-Aquino, J., see
dissenting opinion.
[1]
The Solicitor General was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Zoilo A. Andin and Solicitor Luis
F. Simon.
Normal
Clean
Clean
6 pt
6 pt
0
3
MicrosoftInternetExplorer4
st1:*{behavior:url(#ieooui) }
/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:”Table Normal”;
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-parent:””;
mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin:0in;
mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:”Times New Roman”;}
DISSENTING OPINION
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
The lone issue in these consolidated petitions for review is
whether the Sandiganbayan committed a reversible
error in convicting the
petitioners, Amado C. Arias and Cresencio
D. Data, of having violated Section 3, paragraph (e), of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with the scandalous overpricing of land
purchased by the Government as right of way for its Mangahan
Floodway Project in Pasig, Rizal. The pertinent provision of the Anti-Graft Law
reads as follows:
“SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. – In
addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
“xxx xxx xxx
“(e)
Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.”
The amended information against them, to which they pleaded not
guilty, alleged:
“That on or about the period covering April, 1978 to
October, 1978, in Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Cresencio D. Data, being then the district Engineer of the province of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works, and as such, headed and
supervised the acquisition of private lands for the right-of-way of the Mangahan Floodway Project of the Government at Sitio Mangahan, Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila; accused Priscillo
G. Fernando, then the Supervising Engineer of the Office of the District
Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works who acted
as assistant of accused Cresencio D. Data in the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused Ladislao
G. Cruz, then the Senior Engineer of the Office of the District Engineer of
Rizal, Ministry of Public Works, who was charged with
the acquisition of lots needed for the Mangahan
Floodway Project; accused Carlos L. Jose then the Instrumentman
of the office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works who acted as
the surveyor of the Mangahan Floodway Project;
accused Claudio H. Arcaya, then the
Administrative Officer I of the Rizal District Engineer’s
Office, Ministry of Public Works who passed upon all papers and documents
pertaining to private lands acquired by the Government for the Mangahan Floodway Project; and accused Amado
C. Arias, then the Auditor of Rizal Engineering
District, Pasig, Metro Manila, who passed upon and
approved in audit the acquisition as well as the payment of lands needed for
the Mangahan Floodway Project all taking advantage
of their public and official positions, and conspiring, confederating and
confabulating with accused Natividad C. Gutierrez,
the attorney-in-fact of Benjamin Agleham, who is the
registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Rosario, Pasig,
Metro Manila and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0097, with
accused Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. Jose and Claudio Arcaya acting with evident bad faith, while accused Cresencio D. Data, Priscillo G.
Fernando and Amado C. Arias, acting with manifest
partiality in the discharge of their official public and/or administrative
functions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously cause undue injury, damage and prejudice to the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines by causing, allowing and/or approving the
illegal and irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds in favor of
and in the name of Benjamin P. Agleham in the amount
of P1,520,320.00 under General Voucher No. 8-047, supported by a certification,
dated September 14, 1978, which was purportedly issued by the Municipal
Treasurer of Pasig, and certified xerox
copies of Tax Declarations Nos. 47895 and A-018-00911, both in the name of
Benjamin P. Agleham, and an alleged owner’s copy of
Tax Declaration No. 49948, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, said
supporting documents having been falsified by the accused to make it appear
that the land mentioned in the above-stated supporting papers is a residential
land with a market value of P80.00 per square meter and that 19,004 square
meters thereof were transferred in the name of the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines under Tax Declaration No. 49948, when in truth and in fact,
the afore-stated land is actually a riceland with a
true and actual market value of P5.00 per square meter only and Tax Declaration
No. 49948 was truly and officially registered in the names of spouses Moise Javillonar and Sofia San
Andres, not in the name of the Government, and refers to a parcel of land at Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila; that the foregoing falsities were
committed by the accused to conceal the fact that the true and actual price of
the 19,004 square meters of land of Benjamin P. Agleham,
which was acquired in behalf of the Government by way of negotiated purchase by the accused officials herein
for the right of way of the Mangahan Floodway project
at an overprice of P1,520,320.00 was P92,020.00 only; and finally, upon receipt
of the overpriced amount, the accused misappropriated, converted and misapplied
the excess of the true and actual value of the above?mentioned land,
i.e., P1,428,300.00 for their own personal needs, uses and benefits, to the
damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount of P1,428,300.00.” (pp. 29-31, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)
Priscillo Fernando did not face trial
for he has remained at large, his present whereabouts being unknown (p. 48, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 75, Rollo
of G.R. No. 81563).
In 1975, the Bureau of Public Works initiated the Mangahan Floodway Project to ease the perennial floods
affecting the towns of Marikina
and Pasig,
Metro Manila. The project would traverse
the northern and southern portions of Ortigas Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila (Exhibits A
and A-1). An announcement was published
in leading newspapers advising affected property owners to file their
applications for payment at the District Engineer’s Office (p. 29, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 56, Ibid.).
The implementation of the Mangahan
Floodway Project was entrusted to the Pasig
Engineering District headed by the District Engineer, Cresencio
Data. He formed a committee composed of
Supervising Civil Engineer Priscillo Fernando, as
over-all in charge, Alfonso Mendoza and Pedro Hucom
for acquisition of improvements, and Instrumentman
Carlos Jose for surveys (p. 26, Sandiganbayan
Decision, p. 53, Ibid.). The team
was tasked to notify lot owners affected by the project of the impending
expropriation of their properties and to receive and process applications for
payment.
The reclassification of all lands around the Mangahan
Floodway Project was suspended in 1975 by order of the President (p. 45, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 72, Ibid.). Implementing that order, a memorandum was
sent to Data on August 27, 1976, by Public Works Director Desiderio
Anolin, directing that all affected lands covered by
the Mangahan Floodway Project shall be excluded from
reevaluation and reassessment (Annex A, Exh. DD,
Counter-Affidavit of Data, p. 70, Sandiganbayan
Decision, p. 97, Ibid.).
Among the lots affected was a 19,004-square-meter portion of a
30,169-square-meter riceland in Pasig registered in the name of
Benjamin Agleham under Original Certificate of Title
No. 0097 issued on May 5, 1977
(Exh. H). The land was previously owned by
Andrea Arabit and Evaristo
Gutierrez, parents of the accused Natividad
Gutierrez.
After Agleham acquired the 3-hectare
land in 1973 from the Gutierrez
spouses, he had it subdivided into three (3) lots under plan (LRC) Psd-278456
which was approved by the Land Registration Commission on June 1, 1978 (Entry
No. 27399/12071, Exh. H). Lot
1, with an area of 19,004 square meters, is the portion that Agleham, through Natividad
Gutierrez, sold to the Government in
1978 for the Mangahan Floodway Project.
On December 15, 1973,
Agleham’s property, classified as a “ricefield” with an area of 3.2 hectares, was declared
for taxation under Tax Declaration No. 28246 (Exh.
Y). Its assessed value was P4,800 or
P0.15 per square meter (p. 10, Sandiganbayan
Decision, p. 37, Ibid.).
On February 27, 1978, another Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh.
Y-1) was issued for the same “ricefield”
with a revised area of 30,169 square meters.
The declared market value was P150,850 (or P5
per square meter), and the assessed value was P60,340.
Ten months later, or on December
15, 1978, Tax Declaration No. 47895 was cancelled and replaced by
Tax Declaration No. A-018-00911 (Exh. Y-2) wherein the market value of the same
“ricefield,” jumped to P301,690 (P10 per square meter).
Its assessed value was fixed at P120,680. The description and value of the property,
according to Pedro Ocol, the Assistant Municipal
Assessor of Pasig, was based on the actual use of the
property (riceland) not on its potential use (p. 13, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 40, Ibid.). The valuation was based on a compilation of
sales given to the Municipal Assessor’s office by the Register of Deeds, from
which transactions the Assessor obtained the average valuation of the
properties in the same vicinity (p. 14, Sandiganbayan
Decision, p. 41, Ibid.).
Among those who filed an application for payment (Exhs. FF and FF-1) at the District Engineer’s Office was
the accused, Natividad Gutierrez, who was armed with
a Special Power of Attorney allegedly executed on February 24, 1978 by Benjamin
Agleham in her favor (Exhs.
C and C-1). She
submitted a falsified xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. B) bearing a false date: December 15, 1973 (instead of February 27,
1978) and describing Agleham’s 30,169-square-meter
property as “residential” (instead of riceland),
with a fair market value of
P2,413,520 or P80 per square meter (instead of P150,845 at P5 per square
meter). Its assessed value appeared to
be P724,056 (instead of P60,340). Gutierrez submitted Agleham’s Original Certificate of Title No.
0097 (Exh. H-1), the technical description of the
property, and a xerox copy of a “Sworn Statement of
the True Current and Fair Market Value of Real Property” required
under P.D. No. 76 (Exh. I). The xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 was supposedly certified by
the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, Alfredo Prudencio.
The documents supporting Agleham’s
claim were “examined” by the Administrative Officer, accused Claudio Arcaya, who, after initialing them, turned them over to accused Ladislao G. Cruz. A Deed of Absolute Sale for Lot 1 (19,004
square meters valued at P80 per square meter) was prepared by Cruz who also
initialed the supporting documents and transmitted them to District Engr. Data.
On April 20, 1978, the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhs. G and G-1) was signed
by Data and Gutierrez (as attorney-in-fact of Agleham). Thereafter, Data sent the papers to Director Desiderio Anolin of the Bureau of
Public Works who recommended to the Assistant Secretary of Public Works the
approval of the Deed of Sale (Exh. G-1). Afterwards, the documents were returned to
Data’s office for the transfer of title to the Government. On June 8, 1978, the sale was registered and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12071 (Exh. T) was issued in the name of
the Government.
General Voucher (Exh. S) No.
85-2-7809-52 dated “9/29/78” for the amount of P1,520,320
bore four (4) certifications of: (1)
Cruz as Senior Civil Engineer; (2) Priscillo G.
Fernando as Supervising Civil engineer II; (3) Cresencio
Data as District Engineer I; and (4) Cesar V. Franco as Project Acting
Accountant (p. 56, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 83, Ibid.).
On October 23, 1978, the voucher and its supporting documents
were pre-audited and approved for payment by the accused, Amado
C. Arias, as auditor of the Engineering District. The next day, October 24,
1978, sixteen (16) PNB checks with Serial Nos. 188532 to 188547, inclusive (Exhs. X to X-15), for the total sum of P1,520,320.00 were issued to Gutierrez as payment for Agleham’s 19,004-square-meter lot.
In October, 1979, an investigation was conducted by the Ministry
of National Defense on the gross overpricing of Agleham’s
property. During the investigation,
sworn statements were taken from Alfredo Prudencio,
Municipal Treasurer of Pasig (Exh.
AA), Pedro Ocol, Assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig (Exh. BB),
and the accused Claudio Arcaya (Exh.
EE). Prudencio denied having issued or signed the certification
dated September 14, 1978 (Exh. J), attesting that Agleham’s property covered by Tax Declaration No. 47895 had
a market value of P2,413,520 and that the taxes had
been paid from 1975 to 1978. Prudencio also impugned the initial (purporting to be that
of his subordinate Ruben Gatchalian, Chief of the
Land Tax Division) that was affixed below Prudencio’s
typewritten name in Exhibit J. Both Prudencio and Gatchalian disowned
the typewritten certification. They
declared that such certifications are usually issued by their office on
mimeographed forms (Exh. J-1).
Assistant Municipal Assessor Pedro Ocol
produced and identified the original or genuine Tax Declaration No. 47895 dated
February 27, 1978, and a certified copy thereof (Exh.
Y-1). Therein, Agleham’s property of 30,169 square meters was classified
as a “ricefield” and appraised at P5 per
square meter, with an assessed value of P60,340 and a
market value of P150,850. Ocol testified that the supposed xerox
copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895
(Exh. B), which Gutierrez submitted
as one of the supporting documents of the general voucher (Exh. S), was fake, because
of the following tell-tale signs:
(1) the tax declaration number was typewritten, not machine-numbered as in the genuine tax declaration, Exhibit
Y;
(2) the stampmark
of registration was antedated to December 15, 1973 in the fake, instead of the correct
date – February 27, 1978 – in
the genuine tax declaration;
(3) the classification of the property
was “residential,” instead of “ricefield,”
which is its classification in the genuine document; and
(4) the lot was overpriced at P80 per
square meter in the fake tax declaration, instead of the appraised value of
only P5 per square meter appearing in the genuine declaration.
Also found to be fake was Tax
Declaration No. 49948 in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
(Exhs. K and K-1). The genuine Tax Declaration No. 49948 (Exhs. U and V-2) was actually filed on October 18, 1978 in
the names of the spouses Moises Javillonar
and Sofia Andres, for their 598-square-meter residential property with a
declared market value of P51,630.
The Agleham deed of sale was
pre-audited by the auditor of the Rizal Engineering
District, Amado Arias, who approved the payment of
P1,520,320 to Gutierrez without questioning the fact that the amount of the
purchase price therein had been altered, i.e., “snowfaked
(sic) and later superimposed by the amount of P1,520,320 in words and
figures” (p. 71, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 98, Ibid.), nor checking the veracity of the supporting documents listed
at the back of the General Voucher (Exh. S),
numbering fifteen (15) in all, among which were:
(1) the fake Tax Declaration No. 47895
showing that the value of the land was P80 per square meter (Exh. B);
(2) fake Tax Declaration No. 49948 in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines
(Exh. K);
(3) the forged certification of
Municipal Treasurer Prudencio that the fair market
value of the land was P100 per square meter (Exh. J);
(4) a false certification (Exh. D) dated September 19, 1978 signed by accused Cruz, Jose,
and Fernando, certifying that the Agleham property
was upon ocular inspection by them, found to be “residential;”
(5) a falsely dated certification where
the original date was erased and a false date (February 15, 1978) was superimposed (Exh.
E), issued by Engr. Fernando pursuant to DPWTC
Circular No. 557, certifying that he had examined the real estate tax receipts
of the Agleham property for the last three (3) years;
(6) the technical description of the
land (Exhs. F and F-1) attached to the deed of sale
dated April 20, 1978 was not an approved technical description for the
subdivision survey executed by Geodetic Engineer Cipriano
C. Caro was verified and approved by the Land
Registration Commission on May 28, 1978 only.
There were “substantial variations” noted by the Sandiganbayan between the approved technical description
and the technical description of the land in the deed of sale (p. 61, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 88, Ibid.);
(7) the special power of attorney dated February 24, 1978, supposedly given
to Gutierrez by Agleham (Exhs.
C, C-1) bore a fictitious residence certificate of Agleham
(p. 64, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 91, Ibid.);
and
(8) the fake Sworn Statement on the
Current and Fair Market Value of Real Properties (Exh.
Z) dated October
1, 1973, contained a forged signature of Agleham,
presumably made by Gutierrez herself.
The Sandiganbayan observed that Agleham’s supposed signature “appears to be identical
to accused Gutierrez’ signatures in the General Voucher (Exh.
S), in the ‘Release and Quitclaim’ which she signed in favor of Agleham on July
20, 1983 (Exh. CC), and
in her affidavits (Exhs. FF
and FF-1).” (pp. 64-65, Sandiganbayan
Decision, pp. 91-92, Ibid.).
After payment of the Agleham claim, all
the supporting documents were kept by Arias.
Even after he had been replaced by Julito Pesayco on September 1, 1981, as auditor of the Rizal Engineering District, he did not turn over the
documents to Pesayco.
It was only on June 23, 1982, after this case had been filed in the Sandiganbayan
and the trial had begun, that Arias delivered them to Pesayco
(Exh. T-1).
After a trial lasting
nearly six years, the Sandiganbayan
rendered a 78-page decision on November 16, 1987, whose dispositive
portion reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Natividad G. Gutierrez, Cresencio
D. Data, Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. Jose, Claudio H.
Arcaya and Amado C. Arias
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and
hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for THREE
(3) YEARS, as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS, as maximum; to further suffer perpetual
disqualification from public office; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of P1,425,300, and to pay their
proportional costs of this action.” (p. 104, Rollo
of G.R. No. 81563.)
Both Arias and Data appealed.
Arias anchors his petition for review of the Sandiganbayan’s
decision (G.R. No. 81563) on his contention that the court’s findings that he
conspired with his co-accused and that he was grossly negligent are based on misapprehension
of facts, speculation, surmise, and conjecture.
Data’s main defense is that the acquisition of the Agleham property was the work of the committee of Precillo Fernando in which he did not take an active part,
and that the price which the Government paid for it was reasonable. Hence, it suffered no injury in the
transaction.
In his consolidated brief or comment for the State, the Solicitor
General recommends the acquittal of the petitioners because the Agleham property was allegedly not grossly overpriced.
After deliberating on the petitions in these cases, we find no
error in the decision under review. The Sandiganbayan did not err in finding that the petitioners
conspired with their co-accused to cause injury to the Government and to unduly
favor the lot owner, Agleham.
A conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of the acts
charged, but may and generally must be proven by a number of indefinite acts,
conditions and circumstances (People vs. Maralit,
G.R. No. 71143, Sept. 19, 1988; People vs. Roca, G.R.
No. 77779, June 27, 1988.
This case presents a conspiracy of silence and inaction where
chiefs of office who should have been vigilant to protect the interest of the
Government in the purchase of Agleham’s two-hectare riceland, accepted as gospel truth the certifications of their subordinates, and approved
without question the million-peso purchase which, by the standards prevailing
in 1976-78, should have pricked their curiosity and prompted them to make
inquiries and to verify the authenticity of the documents presented to them for
approval. The petitioners kept silent
when they should have asked questions; they looked the other way when they
should have probed deep into the transaction.
Since it was too much of a coincidence that both petitioners were
negligent at the same time over the same transaction, the Sandiganbayan
was justified in concluding that they connived and conspired to act in that
manner to approve the illegal transaction which would favor the seller of the
land and defraud the Government.
We cannot accept Arias’ excuse that because the deed of sale had
been signed and the property transferred to the Government which received a
title in its name, there was nothing else for him to do but approve the voucher
for payment. The primary function of an
auditor is to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant
expenditures of government funds.
The auditorial function of an auditor,
as a representative of the Commission on Audit, comprises three aspects: (1) examination; (2) audit; and (3)
settlement of the accounts, funds, financial transactions and resources of the
agencies under their respective audit jurisdiction (Sec. 43, Government
Auditing Code of the Phil.).
Examination, as applied to auditing, means “to probe records, or
inspect securities or other documents; review procedures, and question persons,
all for the purpose of arriving at an opinion of accuracy, propriety,
sufficiency, and the like.” (State Audit Code of the
Philippines, Annotated by Tantuico, 1982 Ed., p. 57.)
Arias admitted that he did not check or verify the papers
supporting the general voucher that was submitted to him for payment of P1,520,320 to Agleham or his
attorney-in-fact, Natividad Gutierrez. Arias did not question any person for the purpose
of determining the accuracy and integrity of the documents submitted to him and
the reasonableness of the price that the Government was paying for the less
than two-hectare riceland. We reject his casuistic explanation that since his subordinates had passed
upon the transaction, he could assume that it was
lawful and regular for, if he would be a mere rubber stamp for his
subordinates, his position as auditor would be useless and unnecessary.
We make the same observation concerning District Engineer Cresencio Data who claims innocence because he allegedly
did not take any direct and active participation in the acquisition of the Agleham property, throwing the blame on the committee which
he created, composed of Fernando, Asuncion, Mendoza, Cruz, Hucom
and Jose that negotiated with the property owners for the purchase of
properties on the path of the Mangahan Floodway
Project. He in effect would hide under
the skirt of the committee which he himself selected and to which he delegated
the task that was assigned to his office – to identify the lots that would be
traversed by the floodway project, gather and verify documents, make surveys,
negotiate with the owners for the price, prepare the deeds of sale, and process
claims for payment. By appointing the
committee, he did not cease to be responsible for the implementation of the
project. Under the principle of command
responsibility, he was responsible
for the manner in which the committee performed its tasks for it was he who in
fact signed the deed of sale prepared by the committee. By signing the deed of sale and
certifications prepared for his signature by his committee, he in effect, made
their acts his own. He is, therefore,
equally guilty with those members of the committee (Fernando, Cruz and Jose)
who accepted the fake tax declarations and made false certifications regarding
the use and value of the Agleham property.
The Solicitor General has pointed out that Data signed, but did
not approve, the deed of sale of Agleham’s property
because the approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public
Works. It should not be overlooked,
however, that Data’s signature on the deed of sale was equivalent to an attestation that the transaction was
fair, honest and legal. It was he who
was charged with the task of implementing the Mangahan
Floodway Project within his engineering district.
We find no merit in the Solicitor General’s argument that the Agleham riceland was not
overpriced because the price of P80 per square meter fixed in the deed of sale
was reasonable, hence, the petitioners are not guilty of having caused undue
injury and prejudice to the Government, nor of having given unwarranted
benefits to the property owner and/or his attorney-in-fact, Gutierrez. He further argues that the valuation in the
owner’s genuine tax declaration may not be used as a standard in determining
the fair market value of the property because PD Nos. 76 and 464 (making it
mandatory in expropriation cases to fix the price at the value of the property
as declared by the owner, or as determined by the assessor, whichever is
lower), were declared null and void by this Court in the case of Export
Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) vs. Dulay, 149
SCRA 305, and other related cases.
That argument is not well taken because PD Nos. 76 and 464
(before they were nullified) applied to the expropriation of property for
public use. The acquisition of Agleham’s riceland was not done
by expropriation but through a negotiated sale.
In the course of the negotiations, there was absolutely no allegation
nor proof that the price of P80 per square meter was its fair market value
in 1978, i.e., eleven (11) years ago.
What the accused did was to prove the value of the land through fake tax
declarations (Exhs. B, F, K), false certifications (Exhs. J, D and E) and a forged sworn
statement on the current and fair market value of the real property (Exh. Z) submitted by the
accused in support of the deed of sale.
Because fraudulent documents were used, it may not be said that the
State agreed to pay the price on the basis of its fairness, for the Government
was in fact deceived concerning the reasonable value of the land.
When Ocol testified in 1983 that
P80 was a reasonable valuation for the Agleham’s land,
he did not clarify that that was also its reasonable value in 1975, before real
estate values in Pasig soared as a result of the
implementation of the Mangahan Floodway Project. Hence, Ocol’s
testimony was insufficient to rebut the valuation in Agleham’s
genuine 1978 Tax Declaration No. 47895 that the fair valuation of the riceland then was only P5 per square meter. A Tax Declaration is a guide or indicator of
the reasonable value of the property (EPZA vs. Dulay,
supra).
The petitioners’ partiality for Agleham/Gutierrez
may be inferred from their having deliberately closed their eyes to the defects
and irregularities of the transaction in his favor and their seeming neglect,
if not deliberate omission, to check, the authenticity of the documents
presented to them for approval. Since
partiality is a mental state or predilection, in the absence of direct
evidence, it may be proved by the attendant circumstances.
WHEREFORE, I vote to
affirm in toto the decision of the Sandiganbayan in SB Crim. Case
No. 2010, with costs against the petitioners, Amado
Arias and Cresencio Data.