NICANOR SOMODIO, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, EBENECER PURISIMA AND FELOMINO AYCO, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse and set aside the Decision dated
September 29, 1987 and the Resolution dated February 2, 1988 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 11602.

I

On October 21, 1974, Jose Ortigas executed an instrument
designated as a Transfer of Rights, conveying to Wilfredo Mabugat the
possession of a residential lot situated at Rajah Muda, Bula, General Santos
City and described in the said instrument as:

“Lot No. (Unnumbered), bounded on the North by Temporary Road,
on the South by Customs Zone (Sarangani Bay), on the East by Public Land, and
on the West by Public Land.”

Nicanor Somodio, herein petitioner, contributed one-half of the
purchase price. On October 22, 1974,
Mabugat executed an Affidavit of Trust expressly recognizing the right of
petitioner over one-half undivided portion of the lot. Later, petitioner
discovered in the District Land Office that the lot was numbered “6328-X,
Csd 2281-D.” Thereafter, petitioner and Mabugat partitioned the property
into two portions, with petitioner taking the western part. Immediately after the partition, petitioner
took possession of his portion and planted thereon ipil-ipil trees, coconut
trees and other fruit-bearing trees.

In 1976, petitioner began construction of a structure with a dimension
of 22-by-18 feet on his lot. His
employment, however, took him to Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and he left the
unfinished structure to the care of his uncle. He would visit the property every three months or on weekends when he
had time.

Sometime in October 1977, petitioner allowed respondent Felomino
Ayco, to transfer his hut to petitioner’s lot. About six years later, petitioner demanded that Ayco vacate the premises
but such demand proved futile. Hence,
on August 23, 1983, petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer with
damages against respondent Ayco before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch I,
General Santos, docketed as Civil Case No. 2032-II.

Meanwhile, on June 26, 1983, respondent Ebenecer Purisima entered
the land and constructed a house thereon. Four days later, petitioner
filed against respondent Purisima a complaint for forcible entry before the
same court docketed as Civil Case No. 2013-I. Said case was later consolidated with Civil Case No. 2032-II.

In his answer, respondent Purisima averred that the lot was a
portion of the land subject of his application for miscellaneous sales patent
with the Bureau of Lands. Purisima
described the lot in question as:

“Lot No. 6328-Y, CSD-2281-D, Bula, General Santos,
Cotabato. Bounded on the North by
6328-X; on the South by Sarangani Bay; on the East by a Municipal Road; and
on the West by Lot No. 6328-W, containing an area of 1,095 square meters and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 9647″ (Rollo, p. 36; Underscoring
supplied).

Respondent Purisima contended that his father, a geodetic
engineer, had surveyed the parcel of land comprising of Lots Nos. 6427 and 6328
for the Small Farmers Fishpond Association, Inc. in February 1958, and that his
father’s survey plan was approved by the Director of Lands in 1960. Respondent Ayco, on the other hand, did not
present any evidence but merely anchored his right to possess the property on
the evidence of Purisima.

On April 30, 1986, the trial court rendered a decision finding
that respondent Purisima built his house “almost on the spot where
Somodio’s unfinished house” stood “thru stealth and strategy,”
not knowing that the house was built on Lot No. 6328-X and not on Lot No.
6328-Y, the lot said respondent was claiming (Rollo, p. 43). The court went on to state that:

“xxx. He (private
respondent Purisima) was a frequent visitor in Rajah Muda and had sometimes
stayed with Mrs. Maturan in Judge Purisima’s house on the adjoining lots, and
could not have remained unaware of the possession of Somodio. He must have depended on the thought that it
was his father who made the subdivision survey and had fenced an area which he
had claimed. He did not exactly verify
that the area fenced by his father had an area of only 1,095 square meters,
which did not include the area Lot No. 6328-X. As the situation exists, there is no expectation on his part that his
house on Lot No. 6328-X could eventually be standing on his property, for Lot
No. 6328-X is not claimed by him and has not been applied for even by his
father. His father has been abroad and
has not taken steps to apply for Lot No. 6328-X. This lot is not declared for taxation purposes in the name of any
claimant-applicant. Unless and until
there would be an administrative proceedings and the title ultimately issued in
favor of an applicant, the possession of the actual claimant and occupant has
to be respected and maintained in the interest of public order xxx”
(Rollo, pp. 43-44).

The Municipal Trial Court further held that petitioner was the
actual possessor of Lot No. 6328-X. The
court did not believe respondent Ayco’s claim that the administratrix of the
estate of respondent Purisima’s father authorized him to build a hut on Lot No.
6328-X in 1976. At any rate, the court
said that respondent Ayco was willing to vacate the premises provided he be
given financial assistance to do so (Rollo, pp. 43-44).

Noting that the ocular inspection of the area showed that the
houses of respondents Purisima and Ayco were “inside Lot No. 6328-X”
and not on Lot No. 6328-Y, the Municipal Trial Court held that the case became
one which entailed mere removal of the houses from the lot in question. Accordingly, the court ordered private
respondents to remove their respective houses, to deliver the land to
petitioner, and to pay attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, General Santos
City, affirmed in toto the decision of the Municipal Trial
Court. Respondents then elevated the
cases on a petition for review to the Court of Appeals, which, in its decision
dated September 27, 1987, set aside the decisions of the two trial courts and
ordered the dismissal of the two complaints filed by petitioner.

The Court of Appeals held that herein petitioner had not
“clearly and conclusively established physical, prior possession over Lot
No. 6328-X.”

Petitioner’s motion for the reconsideration of the decision of
the Court of Appeals having been denied, he filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari.

We grant the petition.

II

The procedural issue raised by private respondents should first
be resolved. The issue is whether the
instant petition is proper considering that petitioner “merely touch(es)
upon questions of fact which had been carefully considered” by the Court
of Appeals (Rollo, p. 92). As a general
rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding on this
Court. This rule, however, is not
without exceptions, one of which is when the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals and the trial court are contrary to each other. In such a case, this Court may scrutinize
the evidence on record in order to arrive at the correct findings based on the
record (Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 1 [1990]; Roman Catholic
Bishop of Malolos, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 411 [1990]).

Upon a review of the records, we are convinced that petitioner
indeed enjoyed priority of possession over Lot No. 6328-X, notwithstanding
respondent Purisima’s claim to the contrary.

In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is
entitled to the physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the
party-litigants. Anyone of them who can
prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even
from the owner himself. This rule holds
true regardless of the character of a party’s possession, provided that he has
in his favor priority of time which entitles him to stay on the property until
he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria (De
Luna v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 276 [1992]).

Petitioner took possession of the property sometime in 1974 when
he planted the property to coconut trees, ipil-­ipil trees and fruit
trees. In 1976, he started the
construction of a building on the property. It is immaterial that the building was unfinished and that he left for
Kidapawan for employment reasons and visited the property only intermittently. Possession in the eyes of the law does not
mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it
can be said that he is in possession (Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175
[1918]). It is sufficient that
petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his will.

Article 531 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

“Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing
or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of
our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring
such right.”

Even if the Court of Appeals is correct in its finding that
petitioner started introducing improvements on the land only in 1981, he still
enjoyed priority of possession because respondent Purisima entered the premises
only in 1983.

It should be emphasized that the Court of Appeals noted that none
of the parties had produced tax declarations or applications as public land
claimants. As such, what should have
been scrutinized is who between the claimants had priority of possession.

Moreover, neither is the fact that respondent Purisima’s father
surveyed the property of help to his cause. As the Court of Appeals found, respondent Purisima’s father surveyed the
land for the Small Farmers Fishpond Association, Inc., not for himself. Although respondent Purisima now claims that
Lot No. 6328-X was in payment of his fee for the services of his father and
that he caused the construction of a perimeter wall in the area, these facts do
not mean that respondent Purisima himself had prior possession. He did not present any proof that his father
had authorized him to enter the land as his successor-in­-interest. Neither did he present proof that between
1958, when his father allegedly took possession of the land, and 1983, when
said respondent himself entered the land, his father ever exercised whatever
right of possession he should have over the property. Under these circumstances, priority in time should be the pivotal
cog in resolving the issue of possession.

The Court of Appeals opined that petitioner had not properly
identified the lot he had occupied. The
matter of identification of the land, however, had been resolved by respondent
Purisima’s admission in his pleadings, as well as by two ocular inspections.

In his answer to the complaint, respondent Purisima claimed
possession over Lot No. 6328-Y, while petitioner identified the lot adjacent to
it, Lot No. 6328-X, as the area where private respondents built their
houses. That these two lots are
distinct from one another was resolved by the ocular inspection conducted by a
Senior Geodetic Engineer of the Office of the City Engineer, who found that
“south of lot 6328-H across a 10-meter wide road is lot 6328-Y and from
thence to the south is lot 6328-X.” On June 13, 1985, the Municipal Trial
Court judge himself went to the premises in question and discovered that aside
from the houses of respondents Purisima and Ayco, five other houses had been
built on Lot No. 6328-X.

Petitioner’s prior possession over the property, however, is not
synonymous with his right of ownership over the same. As earlier stated, resolution of the issue of possession is far
from the resolution of the issue of ownership. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual
title to an estate (German Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
177 SCRA 495 [1989]; Manuel v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 603 [1991].

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and that of the trial courts REINSTATED. Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and
Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., (Chairman), on
official leave.