ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU), PETITIONER, VS. HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR…

This is a petition for the issuance of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari for the reversal of the Decision^[1]
of the Director of Bureau of Labor Relations ordering the holding of a
certification election among the workers of Soriano
Fruits Corporation.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Associated Labor Unions, ALU for brevity, had a
collective bargaining agreement with the employer Soriano
Fruits Corporation which expired on September 30, 1987.  Prior to the said date, or on June 22, 1987, petitioner and the
employer signed a collective bargaining agreement which was to take effect on September 1, 1987 and was to remain so until August 31, 1990. 
The said collective
bargaining agreement was unanimously approved and ratified by the members of
the bargaining unit.

However, on August 10,
1987, private respondent National Federation of Labor (NFL), filed a petition for certification election questioning
the majority status of the incumbent union, pursuant to Executive Order 111 and
its Implementing Rules, there being more than majority of its members who have
expressed doubts on the sincerity of the incumbent union.^[2]
Acting on the said petition the Med-Arbiter scheduled a hearing on August 21,
1987 to determine the majority status of herein petitioner but the NFL
representative failed to appear despite due
notice.  Consequently, the hearing was
reset to September 8, 1987
to give NFL an opportunity to substantiate its claim but again, the NFL was not
represented.  Thereafter,
the parties were asked to submit their position papers.  To bolster its claim, ALU submitted several
petitions signed by members of the
bargaining unit to dismiss any petition filed by any union which seeks to
question the majority status of the incumbent union.  The signatories to the petition also
reaffirmed its loyalty to ALU.

On October 2, 1987,
the Med-Arbiter promulgated an Order^[3]
dismissing the petition for certification election on the ground of failure to
prosecute.  An appeal to the Bureau of
Labor Relations however, proved fruitful. 
On December 22, 1987
the respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations held that the Med-Arbiter erred in dismissing the
petition for certification election.  The
dispositive portion of the decision reads thus:

‘”WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal of
petitioner, National Federation of Labor is hereby given due course and the Order of the Med-Arbiter is set
aside.  Let, therefore a certification election proceed at Soriano
Fruits Corporation, after a pre-election conference to thresh out the list of
eligible voters, with the following
choices:

1.       National Federation
of Labor (NFL);

2.       Associated Labor
Unions (ALU).

SO ORDERED.”^[4]

ALU sought a reconsideration of the
above-cited decision but to no avail. 
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.

Petitioner alleges that in granting the petition for
certification election, the respondent Director acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in that:

“I.  THE HONORABLE
DIRECTOR MISSED THE LEGAL INTENT OF ARTICLE 257 AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER
111.

II.
 THE HONORABLE DIRECTOR ERRED IN
CLAIMING THAT THE PETITION IS SUPPORTED BY MORE THAN TWENTY (20%) OF THE RANK AND FILE.

III.  THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONCLUDED COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
RENDERS THE CERTIFICATION ELECTION MOOT AND ACADEMIC.”

This Court finds the petition bereft of merit.

Petitioner hinges its claim on Art. 257 of the Labor Code which
provides:

“Art. 257.  Petitions in unorganized establishments.  In any establishment where there is no
certified bargaining agent, the petition for certification election filed by a legitimate labor
organization shall be supported by the written consent of at least twenty (20%)
percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit.  Upon receipt and verification of such petition, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically
order the conduct of a certification election.”

But this provision finds no application in the case at bar
primarily because it applies to unorganized establishments.  For the said provision to apply, the
establishment concerned must have no certified bargaining agent.  This is
not the case in the present petition where
there was a collective bargaining agreement entered into by the management of
the Soriano Fruits Corporation and ALU, the
petitioner, which was then the bargaining agent.  This Court however, finds that it is Article 256 as amended by Executive Order 111 which must be
considered in the resolution of the present petition.  The said article states:

“Article 256.  Representation Issues in
Organized Establishments.  In organized establishments, when a petition
questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the Ministry within the sixty (60) day period before the
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order an election by secret ballot to ascertain the will of
the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit.” (Underscoring supplied)

A review of the records of this case would confirm the fact that
the petition for certification election filed by NFL on August 10, 1987 was well within the prescribed
sixty (60) day freedom period.

Petitioner however maintains that the respondent Director
misconstrued the legal intent behind the above-cited provision and that it
should not have been given a literal interpretation.  Petitioner insists further that the right of the
members of the bargaining unit to choose which union should represent them is
not an absolute one since a prior hearing must be had to ascertain the veracity
of the allegations contained in
the petition.

This argument is untenable.

The provision of Article 256 which provides that the Med-Arbiter
shall automatically order an election is clear and leaves no room for
further interpretation.  The mere filing
of a petition for certification election within the freedom period is
sufficient basis for the respondent Director to order the holding a
certification election.  The fact that
NFL did not appear during the hearings set by the Med-Arbiter is of no
moment.  As the Solicitor General correctly pointed out, there is no
prohibition on the conduct of hearings by the Med-Arbiter on the competing
stands of the unions.  Neither does the
law require the same to be held whereby the absence or presence therefrom of any union representative would affect the
petition for certification election.  In
fact, it is the denial of the petition for certification election grounded solely on the
absence of NFL in the scheduled hearings which is frowned upon by the law.  This is consistent with the principle in
labor legislation that “certification proceedings is not a litigation in
the sense in which the term is ordinarily understood, but an investigation of
non-adversary and fact finding character. 
As such, it is not bound by technical rules of evidence.”^[5]

Petitioner suggests that to grant the petition for certification election would “open
the floodgates to unbridled and scrupulous (sic)
petitions whose only objective is to prejudice the industrial peace and
stability existing in the Company.”^[6]
This Court believes however that the workers’ choice regarding their
representative who inevitably reflects and works for their common interest is
of paramount importance.  This policy was
lengthily explained in the concurring opinion of then Chief Justice Fernando in
the case of Confediration of Citizens Labor Unions
(CCLU) vs. National Labor Relations Commission^[7]
where he categorically stated that “the slightest doubt therefore cannot
be entertained that what possesses significance in a petition for certification
is that through such a device the employees are given the opportunity to make
known who shall have the right to
represent them.  What is equally
important is that not only some but all of them should have the right to
do so.”^[8]

Petitioner next contends that the respondent Director erred in
relying upon the claim of the respondent Union that the
petition for certification election is
supported by more than twenty percent
(20%) of the rank and file
considering that the said petition
merely contained the lone signature of the NFL
representative.

This averment is likewise unmeritorious.

Petitioner bases its
argument again on Article 257 which prescribes the twenty percent (20%)
requirement.  But it must be reiterated that the said requirement applies only to
unorganized establishments.  It is
Article 256 instead which must be applied. 
A perusal of the said Article would confirm the falsity of the claim of
petitioner.  Nowhere in the said provision does it require the
written consent of twenty percent (20%) of the employees in the bargaining unit.  Hence,
the issue of whether or not the
petition for certification election is supported by twenty percent (20%) of the
bargaining unit concerned is immaterial to the case at bar.  What is
essential is that the petition was filed during the sixty-day freedom
period.

The petition to dismiss the petition for certification election^[9]
filed by NFL and signed by some 224 employees
signifying their satisfaction with the services of the incumbent union
should not be given any weight at all. 
The possibility that the workers were merely coerced to sign the
petition such that they did so for fear of reprisal from the members of ALU is
not remote.  However, this does not
discount the possibility that the workers voluntarily signed the said
petition.  Whatever reason the workers
may have had for signing the same may be ascertained once a certification
election is held.  It is in this
democratic process that the workers are given the opportunity to freely choose,
by secret ballot, who they want to
represent them.  In this manner, the
workers are free of any undue pressure which either competing union may exert
upon them.

Finally, the petitioner assails the decision of the respondent
Director on the ground that “the ratification
of the collective bargaining agreement renders the certification election moot
and academic.”^[10]

This contention finds no basis in law.

The petitioner was obviously referring to the contract-bar rule
where the law prohibits the holding of certification elections during the
lifetime of the collective bargaining agreement.  Said agreement was hastily and prematurely
entered into apparently in an attempt to avoid the holding of a certification election. 
The records show that the old collective bargaining agreement of
the petitioner with Soriano Fruits Corporation was to
expire on August 31, 1987.  However, three (3) months and eight (8) days
before its expiry date, or on June 22,
1987, the petitioner renewed the
same with the consent and collaboration of management.  The renewed agreement was then ratified by
the members of the bargaining unit and was thereafter sent to the Bureau of
Labor Relations for certification.  In the meantime, on August 10, 1987 (21 days before the expiration of
the old collective bargaining agreement on August 31, 1987) a petition for certification election was
filed by respondent union, NFL.  From the
foregoing facts, it is quite obvious that the renewed agreement cannot
constitute a bar to the instant petition for certification election for the
very reason that the same was not yet in existence when the petition for
certification election was filed on August 10, 1987 inasmuch as the same was to
take effect only on September 1, 1987, after the old agreement expires on
August 31, 1987.

In the case of Associated Trade Unions-ATU vs. Noriel,^[11]
this Court held that “it is
indubitably clear from the facts heretofore unfolded that management and
petitioner herein proceeded with such indecent haste in renewing their CBA way
ahead of the sixty-day freedom period in their obvious desire to frustrate
the will of the rank and file
employees in         selecting their
bargaining representative.  To countenance the actuation of the company and the petitioner herein would be violative
of the employees constitutional right to
self-organization.^[12]

The Solicitor General, in his comment, brought the attention of this
Court to the fact that petitioner had violated the provisions of Article 254^[13] when it renewed the collective bargaining agreement before the commencement of the
sixty-day freedom period.  This Court
does not subscribe to this view.  What
the aforecited rule prohibits is the modification
and alteration of the present collective bargaining agreement during its
lifetime.  In the present case, the
alterations and modifications were to take effect only on September 1, 1987, i.e., after the expiration of
the old agreement.  It must be noted that
the new agreement did not suspend the old one. 
Neither did it terminate nor modify the
same.  Petitioner therefore did not
commit any violation of Article 254 of the Labor Code, contrary to the
allegations of the Solicitor General.

However, it is apparent that certiorari does not lie in the instant petition for this Court
does not see any substantial reason to withhold the primordial right of workers
to select their bargaining representative.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.  The
temporary restraining order issued by resolution of this Court of July 11, 1988
is hereby lifted and declared to be of no force and effect.  The decision is immediately executory.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1] Penned by Hon. Pura Ferrer-Calleja.

^[2] Page 4, Rollo.

^[3]
Penned by Hon. Conrado Macasa,
Sr.

^[4] Page 121, Rollo.

^[5] LVN Pictures, Inc. vs. Philippine Musician’s Guild 110 Phil.
728 (1961).

^[6] Page 6, Rollo.

^[7] 60 SCRA 467 (1974) citing Federation of the United Workers
Organization vs. CIR 54 SCRA 305 (1973).

^[8] Ibid.

^[9]
Annex C, Petition.

^[10] Page 8, Rollo.

^[11] 88 SCRA 96 (1979).

^[12] Ibid, 101, citing Antipolo Highway Lines vs. Inciong
64 SCRA 441 (1975).

^[13]
Article 254 provides that “when there is a collective bargaining agreement,
the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall
terminate or modify such agreement during its lifetime.  However, either party can serve a written
notice to terminate or modify the same at least sixty (60) days prior to its
expiration date.  It shall be the duty of
both parties to respect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement
during the sixty-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the
parties.”