SPOUSES MARCIANO BANDOY AND SEGUNDINA BANDOY, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND DOMINGO P. EMPAYNADO, RESPONDENTS.

This is an appeal by certiorari of the decision (pp. 27-31,
Rollo) of the Court of Appeals dated January
13, 1987 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 09391 entitled “Spouses Marciano
and Segundina Bandoy,
Petitioners, vs. Hon. Luis L. Victor, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Branch XCVI, RTC, and Domingo Empaynado, Respondents,”
which affirmed the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Region, Branch XCVI, Quezon City, dismissing the
herein petitioners’ complaint for ejectment on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction due to the lack of demand to pay rentals and to
vacate the premises.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Spouses Marciano and Segundina Bandoy herein
petitioners, were lessees of a residential house and lot owned by the
University of the Philippines
and located at No. 88-D, phase 4, Pook
Amorsolo, U.P. Campus, Quezon City.

Sometime in April 1984, petitioners sublet certain spaces of the
property to Eduardo Empaynado, herein private
respondent, for a monthly rental of P550.00. 
Empaynado failed to pay the rental for the
month of July, 1985.  Upon demand by
petitioners, Empaynado still failed and refused to
pay.

Petitioners brought the matter to the office of the barangay captain for settlement, but to no avail.  On August
20, 1985, a certification to file action against Domingo Enpaynado for ejectment and
non-payment of house rentals including light and water (Annex “A” to the
petition, p. 10, Rollo) was issued by the
office of the barangay captain.

On November 26, 1985,
petitioners filed a complaint for ejectment against Empaynado and attached thereto the certification to file
action issued by the barangay captain.  The case was filed with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Metro Manila, Quezon
City and docketed as Civil Case No. XXXV-48898.

In his answer, Enpaynado admitted that
he did not pay the rentals since July 1985 but denied that there was a demand
to vacate and pay made upon him by spouses Marciano
and Segundina Bandoy.

After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the spouses.  The decision, dated March 6, 1986 reads, in part:

“x x x.

“At any rate, the court is of the view that a demand to vacate
before the barangay court is a substantial equivalent
of the required extrajudicial demand to pay and vacate required by the Rules of
Court prior to the filing of an ejectment case court.

“x x x.

“ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff spouses Marciano and Segundina
Bandoy ordering the defendant Domingo Ernpaynado and all persons claiming rights under him to
vacate the residential house or extension thereof at the lot known as No. 88-D,
Phase 4, Pook Amorsolo,
U.P. Campus and to surrender the same peacefully to the plaintiffs.  The defendant is likewise required to pay all
unpaid rentals at the rate of P550.00 a month from July 1985 up to the time the
defendant vacates the premises at bar; and to pay the plaintiff P700.00 as
reasonable attorney’s fee and the costs of suit.

“SO ORDERED.” (pp. 21-22, Rollo)

Domingo Empaynado appealed the decision
to the Regional Trial Court which rendered a decision dated June 2, 1986 dismissing the case for ejectment for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
court.  The decision reads:

“ACCORDINGLY, in the light of the foregoing disquisition, on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the decision appealed from is hereby set
aside and this case ordered dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

“SO ORDERED.” (p. 25, Rollo)

Spouses Marciano and Segundina Bandoy filed a petition
for review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court the Court of
Appeals.  In a decision promulgated on January 14, 1987, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the case also for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
trial court.  The decision reads, in
part:

“x x x.

“And where the Metropolitan Trial Court did not acquire
jurisdiction, the above jurisprudence would hold and all we can do is to
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

“WHEREFORE, there having been no error committed by the
Regional Trial Court, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.

“SO ORDERED.” (pp. 30-31, Rollo)

Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals,
petitioners come to Us on a lone assignment of error,
that:

“THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW AND IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT THAT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE.”

It is the contention of petitioners that no further demand to
vacate was made by petitioners after the certification to file was issued by
the Barangay captain for the reason that the case was
already certified for court action. 
Under this situation, any further demand to vacate was merely repetitive
and unnecessary.

There is no merit in this contention.

It is not disputed that the complaint contains no allegation that
there was a prior demand to vacate made by the petitioners upon private
respondent.  It is a settled rule that
“where the complaint contains no allegation that a demand had been made
upon the defendant to vacate the premises but only an allegation that a demand
was made for payment of the rentals agreed upon, it is held that such
allegation is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon a justice of the peace
court” (Casilan vs. Tomassi,
et al., 10 SCRA 261, 264; Santos vs. Vivas, 96 Phil,
538, 540).  The certification issued by
the office of the barangay captain is not conclusive
as to the jurisdiction of the court to which the case was subsequently
filed.  What was certified by the barangay captain was that no settlement was reached by the
parties in the barangay level.  It did not certify that all the requisites
for the filing of an unlawful detainer case had been
complied with.

In the case of Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, L-7,
January 22, 1946 (75 Phil.
672), relied upon by petitioners, there was no allegation in the complaint that
a notice to quit or vacate was made upon the defendants.  However, during the presentation of evidence,
plaintiffs offered Exhibit “A” as evidence, which is a notice to quit
alleged to have been served upon defendants prior to the filing of the
action.  This was objected to by the
defendants and the objection was sustained by the trial court.  The defendants filed with the Court of First
Instance a petition for mandamus to compel the municipal court judge to
admit Exhibit “A”.  By virtue
of a writ of mandamus issued by the Court of First Instance, the
evidence was admitted.  In that case, it
was held that:

“even supposing
without conceding, that the complaint is deficient (in not alleging the notice
to quit) the deficiency was cured by the evidence,” (p. 679, supra)

But, the above case of Co Tiamco cannot
be applied in this case.  In the Co Tiamco case, it was proven that there was indeed a notice
to quit or demand to vacate served upon the defendants.  The notice to vacate was offered and admitted
in evidence.  In the case at bar, the
complaint was defective because of its failure to allege that there was a prior
demand to vacate.  The defect was not
cured because no evidence of a prior demand to vacate was presented in the
trial court.  The affidavit of Empaynado relied upon by the trial judge to the effects
that:  “na ako ang
tinutukoy ni Marciano Tamis Bandoy dahil di
umano’y sa di magandang asal
namin na gusto niyang paalisin sa kanyang extension.” does
not prove that the spouses demanded that he vacate the premises.  What Empaynado
admitted in the said affidavit was that the spouses intended to expel him out
of the premises (“gusto niyang paalisin“) but has not actually or definitely demanded
that he vacate the premises.  An
intention to oust is different from an actual or definite demand to
vacate.  It is the latter which confers
jurisdiction upon the municipal court.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED.  The decision of respondent Court of Appeals
is affirmed.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.