BALTAZAR, PEDRO, URSULA, AND DOMINGO, ALL SURNAMED PANTIG, PETITIONERS, VS. VENANCIO BALTAZAR, RESPONDENT.

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to
annul and set aside:  a) the September 1,
1987 resolution*
of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 03198 entitled “Baltazar, Pedro, Ursula and Domingo, all surnamed Pantig vs. Venancio Baltazar” granting the private
respondents’ motion for new
trial and b) the December 1, 1987 resolution of the Court
of Appeals denying the motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

During his lifetime, Macario Baltazar, divided his properties by
way of inheritance, among his children and his grandchildren, the surviving
heirs of his deceased daughter
Anastacia Baltazar who died in 1952,
namely:  BaItazar, Pedro, Ursula and
Domingo, all surnamed Pantig.  He gave the properties known as Banga, Pagpito and Sukol, named after the sitios where the properties
were situated; that because the grandchildren were still minors, the properties
adjudicated to them known as Lot No. 1471 of the Sexmoan Cadastre, with an area
of 139,126 square meters were placed under the joint management/administration
of Venancio Baltazar and Maxima
Baltazar and her husband, Justo Garcia (Rollo, p. 66).

In 1924, upon
agreement of Maxima and Venancio, Lot No. 1471 was converted into a fishpond
and said land was covered by Tax Declaration No. 6081 in the name of Macario
Baltazar (Rollo, Ibid.).

When Pedro Pantig, son of the deceased Anastacia Baltazar, became
of age, he and his brothers and sisters demanded from their uncle, Venancio
Baltazar, the return of their properties to them, but their uncle merely told
them not to worry and instead gave them P200.00 semi-annually as their shares
in the produce of the fishpond;
their last share of P400.00 was received in
1969 (Rollo, Ibid.).

On July 23, 1968, applicant Venancio Baltazar filed in Court an application for registration of
three parcels of land, designated as Lots Nos. 1471, 1747 and 1801 of the Sexmoan Cadastre, with an area of 139,296
square meters, 20,592 square meters and 3,178 square meters, respectively, all
situated at Barangay San Antonio and Sta. Monica,
Pampanga (Rollo, Decision, p. 18).

In  the said application for registration, the applicant alleged
that he acquired Lot No. 1747 and Lot No.
1801 from Jose L. Lacsamana on December 7, 1953 and Lot No. 1471, partly by
inheritance from his late father Macario Baltazar who died in 1925 and that his possession thereof, together with that of his
predecessor-in-interest, has been open, peaceful, public, continuous and
adverse and in the concept of owner for more than thirty years (Rollo, Ibid.).

The late Hon. Malcolm G. Sarmiento, then Presiding Judge of this
Branch (CFI), appointed the Branch Clerk of Court Irene T. Galura (now retired)
as Commissioner to receive the evidence
for the applicant and the applicant presented three (3) witnesses before the Commissioner
and thereafter submitted the application for decision (Rollo, Ibid.).

In a decision
rendered on August 29, 1969, the court
confirmed the applicant’s title to the three parcels of land described in the application, including
the lot in question (Lot 1471) and ordered that the same be decreed in favor of Venancio Baltazar.  On March 6, 1970, an order for the issuance of the corresponding decree was issued (Rollo,
Ibid.).

On May 20, 1970, petitioners Pantig filed a petition for review
of judgment in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XLI, San Fernando, Pampanga, insofar as Lot 1471 is
concerned, alleging that the same is their
property and that Venancio Baltazar has defrauded them by intentionally omitting them in his application for registration
of the land and by stating in
the application that the said land belongs to him, notwithstanding his full
knowledge that the same lawfully
belongs to the herein petitioners, despite the fact that Venancio Baltazar was merely holding the property in trust as an uncle administrator of the property (Rollo, Ibid., p.
18).

Because of the petition for
review, the same court, in its order of June 24, 1970, ordered the Land Registration Commissioner to hold in abeyance
the issuance of a decree over Lot No. 1471 (Rollo, Ibid., p. 19)
but on December 15, 1972, dismissed the petition
for review without prejudice on the part of petitioner to file an ordinary
action for reconveyance (Rollo, Ibid.).

On January 25, 1973, petitioners
elevated the dismissal of their
petition to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) which
remanded the case to the court of origin, which was ordered to act on the petition for review in accordance
with the law and the evidence, as presented in support of
the petition as well as that presented in opposition thereto (Rollo, Annex “D”, p. 30).

On April 5, 1984,
a decision was rendered in favor of the petitioners Pantig, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, a new judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:

‘1)   That portion of the Decision rendered on August 21, 1969
confirming applicant-respondent’s title to Lot 1471 is
hereby set aside;

‘2)   Petitioners’ title to Lot 1471, described in
plan AP-19164 (Exhibit D) and in its technical
description (Exhibit H),
is hereby confirmed and orders that the same be decreed in an
undivided equal shares in favor of petitioners Baltazar
Pantig, Domingo Pantig, Pedro Pantig and Ursula Pantig, Filipinos, of legal ages, all married, the first two being
residents of Sexmoan, Pampanga,
and the last two being residents of Guagua, Pampanga; and,

‘3)   Upon the finality of this decision,
respondent Venancio Baltazar is hereby ordered to surrender possession of Lot
1471 to the petitioners and to render within sixty (60) days thereof an
accounting of the produce thereof from 1969.

“Once this Decision
becomes final, let the
corresponding decree issue.

“With costs against applicant-respondent Venancio Baltazar.

“SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, p. 27).

On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals), on March 21,
1986, affirmed the decision of the lower court, the dispositive
part of which reads:

“WHEREFORE finding no reversible error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby AFFIRMED.

“SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, Annex “D”, p. 36).

On April 8, 1986,
the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.  And on April 16, 1986, respondent filed a Supplemental Motion for New Trial under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 based on the
following grounds:

I

THAT THE HEIRS OF RESPONDENT-APPELLANT VENANCIO BALTAZAR WERE
DEPRIVED OF THEIR DAY IN COURT;

II

THAT NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCES HAVE BEEN FOUND WHICH IF PRESENTED
WOULD PROBABLY ALTER THE DECISION IN THE INSTANT CASE.  (ROLLO, P. 134).

After the parties had filed their respective pleadings and their
oral arguments heard, the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals)
promulgated a Resolution dated September
1, 1987, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, the motion for new trial is
hereby GRANTED to give an opportunity for
the movants to adduce their newly discovered evidences.

“Let the records of this case be remanded to the trial court for
appropriate proceedings.” (Rollo, Annex “A”, p. 3).

To said resolutions, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its resolution dated December
1, 1987 (Rollo, Annex “B”, pp. 58-59).

 Hence, the petition.

The Second Division of this
Court, in its resolution dated February
15, 1989 gave due
course to the petition and required both parties to file their simultaneous
memoranda (Rollo, Petition, pp. 8-16; Resolution, p. 145).          

Memorandum for petitioners (pp. 121-128) was filed on March 21, 1989 while private respondent’s memorandum was
filed on April 1, 1989
(Rollo, pp. 129-146).

The pivotal issue in this case
is whether or not the private
respondent is entitled to a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Section 1 of Rule 37 of the New Rules of Court enumerates the
grounds for new trial, among
others:

“a)   x x x

“b)   Newly discovered evidence, which he could
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered,
and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.

 “c)  x x x.”

A motion for new trial upon the ground of newly discovered
evidence, is properly granted where there is concurrence of the following
requisites, namely:  a) the evidence had
been discovered after trial; b) the evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and c) the
evidence is material, and not merely corroborative, cumulative, or impeaching
and is of such weight that if
admitted, would probably alter the result (Tumang v. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA
332 [1989]).

In order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly
regarded as “newly discovered” for purposes of a grant of a new trial, what is
essential is not so much the time when the evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge
of the party now submitting it; what is essential is, rather, that the offering
party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such evidence
before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it (Ibid.).

In the case at bar, the fact that the deed of sale, the contracts
of lease mortgage and the like, are allegedly newly discovered, are not supported
by the records.  On the contrary, they
could have been produced during the trial in the lower court, any time from
July 1970 up to April 4, 1984, inasmuch as they are known by Venancio Baltazar
and his heirs or his counsel and are easily obtainable from the
parties to the contract, from the notary public who notarized them or from the clerk of court where copies are
filed.  Said documents
cannot, therefore, be considered as considered as newly discovered evidence but more correctly ascribed as suppressed evidence.

Nonetheless, after a careful study of the findings of the trial
court (Decision, pp. 18-27) which were supported
by substantial evidence and unanimously
affirmed by the Court of Appeals (Rollo, Decision, pp. 28-36), there appears no basis for the claim that the alleged newly
discovered evidence would alter the result of the said decision.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby
GRANTED, the assailed resolutions dated September 1, 1987 and December 1, 1987
are hereby SET ASIDE, and the the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March
21, 1986 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

*
Penned by Justice Jorge R. Coquia concurred in by Justices Ricardo P. Tensuan and
Oscar M. Herrera with separate dissenting opinions of Justices Floreliana C.
Bartolome and Bienvenido C. Ejercito.