FRANCISCO MANLAPAZ, DELFIN SANGCAP, DOMINGO SANGCAP, PEDRO CUNANAN, FAUSTO DE LA PEÑA AND HONORATA DE LA PEÑA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE LORENZO R. MOSQ…

Through this special civil action for certiorari and mandamus
with a prayer for preliminary injunction, petitioners would have us reverse and
set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals^[1]
which affirmed the order of the former Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
Branch VII, authorizing the immediate execution of the judgment rendered by the
former Municipal Court of Candaba, Pampanga in Civil Case No. 425 for
ejectment.

On October 20, 1971, herein private respondents, as plaintiffs,
filed an ejectment case in the Municipal Court of Candaba, Pampanga against
herein petitioners as defendants, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 425,
alleging that on or about September 1, 1971 herein petitioners, thru force,
intimidation and threats and with the use of guns, forciby ousted the private
respondents from Lots 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41, Block 21 of Bahay Pare,
Pampanga, which private respondents had been occupying and cultivating
peacefully, notoriously and continually for more than ten (10) years.

Petitioners resisted the ejectment case alleging lack of
jurisdiction due to the pendency of Civil Case No. 79371 in the then Court of
First Instance of Manila, and denied all other material allegations in the
complaint.

Thereafter, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts
wherein they agreed that:

1.       
The lots under litigation are Lots 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 and
41 of Block 21 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Candaba, Pampanga;

2.       
The said lots belong to the Land Authority;

3.       
Both parties had filed their respective applications to
purchase said lots from the Government;

4.       
On May 20, 1968, the Land Authority rendered its decision
dismissing the applications of petitioners;

5.       
On appeal to the Office of the President, the decision of the
Land Authority was reversed and the awards in favor of private respondents were
cancelled;

6.       
Private respondents seasonably petitioned for judicial review
and for annulment of said decision of the Office of the President before the
Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 79371;

7.       
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 79371, the Land
Authority issued Orders of Award to petitioners on September 21, 1970;

8.       
The ejectment case was filed by private respondents during the
pendency of said Civil Case No. 79371 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;

9.       
Private respondents have been regularly harvesting an average
one hundred (100) cavans per hectare from the land in dispute; and

10.   
On September 1, 1971, private respondents discovered
petitioners’ intrusion over subject property;^[2]

On February 27, 1974, the Municipal Court of Candaba rendered
judgment in favor of private respondents, ordering petitioners to vacate the
lots and restore possession thereof to private respondents, and to pay as
rentals twenty-five (25) cavans per hectare for each year from May, 1971 until
they shall have vacated the controverted lots.^[3]

Petitioners duly appealed the said decision to the Court of First
Instance of Macabebe, Pampanga, docketed therein as Civil Case No.
73-70-M. During the pendency of said
appeal, a motion for execution pending appeal was filed by private respondents
for failure of petitioners to file a supersedeas bond. On April 2, 1974, the Court of First
Instance of Candaba, Pampanga issued an order granting the same.^[4]

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. SP-02996, and obtained therefrom a
writ of preliminary injunction on a cash bond of P2,000.00.^[5]
However, on June 3, 1974, respondent court rendered a decision, the dispositive
part of which reads:

“IN VIEW WHEREOF, this Court is constrained to dismiss, as it now dismisses, and
denies certiorari; with costs, and preliminary injunction issued by this
Court on 30 April, 1974 is set
aside.

IT IS SO ORDERED.”^[6]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which allegedly
has not been resolved by respondent court and by reason of which the respondent
lower courts issued a writ of execution,^[7]
hence the petition at bar.^[8]

We find petitioners’ present recourse devoid of merit.

The writ of execution was properly issued pending appeal in the
case. Respondent judge had neither
abused his discretion nor committed an error of judgment, but merely complied
with his ministerial duty under the Rules of Court when he granted private
respondents’ motion for immediate execution of the judgments in their favor for
failure of petitioners to file a supersedeas bond.

Section 8, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court provides in part that:

“If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution
shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant
to stay execution files a sufficient bond, approved by the justice of the peace
or municipal court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the
Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down
to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of
the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from
time to time under the contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the
justice of the peace or municipal court to exist. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the court the
reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding
month or period at the rate determined by the judgment, on or before the tenth
day of each succeeding month or period. x x x.”

Under this rule, to stay the immediate execution of judgment in
an ejectment proceeding it is required that the defendant-appellant must (a)
perfect his appeal, (b) file a supersedeas bond, and (c) periodically deposit
the rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal. Failure to comply with said requirements is
a ground for the outright execution of the judgment upon petition of the
prevailing party.^[9]

It has been repeatedly held that the requirement for the filing
of a supersedeas bond is mandatory and cannot be dispensed with by the
courts. When the supersedeas bond is
not filed, the duty of the court to order the execution of the appealed
decision is ministerial and imperative and the execution of the judgment shall
then issue immediately,^[10]
without prejudice to the appeal taking its course.^[11]

In the instant case, petitioners’ failure to file a supersedeas bond necessary to stay
execution pending appeal made or rendered the original decision executory and
gave private respondents the right to immediate execution of the judgment which
the court is bound to grant and enforce.

The claim of petitioners that the order of execution is contrary
to the doctrine laid down and reiterated in
the cases of Rallon vs. Ruiz, Jr., et al.,^[12]
Realiza vs. Duarte,^[13]
and Hernandez, et al. vs. Clapis, et al.^[14]
is without merit.

The aforementioned cases stand on different factual settings,
hence the common dictum therein is not applicable in the case at bar. In those cases, the order of the executive
department, giving the defendant in the ejectment case preferential right over
the land in dispute, was already final and executory. The rights of the defendants therein over the property that they
claimed were already settled and not contested by the adverse parties.

In the present case, the right of petitioners over the land in
controversy is doubtful. The decision of
the Office of the President giving petitioners preferential rights to own the
questioned lots, setting aside the decision of the Land Authority awarding the
same to private respondents, was questioned by the latter before the Court of
First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 79371. In fact, on November 17, 1972, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
upon learning of the pendency of said case, ordered the suspension of the
processing of all papers relative to the disputed lots and the holding in
abeyance of further action on said papers until Civil Case No. 79371 shall have
been terminated.^[15]
In addition, on August 10, 1977, private respondents submitted to the Court a copy of the decision in Civil Case No.
79371 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated April 28, 1977, declaring
the letter decision of the Office of the President dated October 4, 1968 and
its letter order of February 27, 1970 as null and void, and declaring private
respondents Hernando, Teodoro, Pablo, Renato, and Bonifacio, all surnamed
Rivera, as qualified applicants of the questioned lots.^[16]

Moreover, in the present case the decision is not yet final but
became executory by reason of the very act of herein petitioners in not filing
a supersedeas bond necessary to stay execution pending appeal as required by
Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Herein petitioners could have prevented the execution of said decision
by simply complying with the rules but they opted not to do so, hence they have
only themselves to blame.

On the issue of jurisdiction, it is the contention of petitioners
that the Municipal Court of Candaba has no jurisdiction over the ejectment case
for two reasons, namely, (1) a civil case for annulment of the decision of the
Office of the President is still pending final determination in the Court of
First Instance of Manila, and (2) there was no compliance with Presidential
Decree No. 316 requiring prior referral of the ejectment case to the Department
of Agrarian Reform.

We reject these pretensions.

Firmly settled is the rule that a municipal court has
jurisdiction over forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases even if the
ownership of the property is in dispute.^[17]
A resume of the basic legal
principles in point would be apropos.

In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the main issue is
one of priority of possession. The
legal right thereto is not essential to the possessor’s cause of action, for no
one may take law into his own hands and forcibly eject another or deprive him
of his possession by stealth, even if his title thereto were questionable or
actually disputed in another case.^[18]
If the plaintiff can prove prior physical possession in himself, he may recover
such possession even from the owner, but on the other hand, if he cannot prove
such prior physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry
and detainer even if he should be the owner of the property.^[19]

An action for recovery of possession is totally distinct and
different from an action for recovery of title or ownership. In fact, a judgment rendered in a case for
recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question of possession and not
that of ownership. It does not in any
way bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.^[20]
Section 7 of Rule 70 expressly states that:

“The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or
detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise
bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action
between the same parties respecting title to the land or building, nor shall it
be held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same
parties upon a different cause of action not involving possession.”

We have held that in giving recognition to the action of forcible
entry and detainer the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact
has actual possession; and in case
of controverted right, it requires the parties to preserve the status quo
until one or the other of them sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of
competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just that the person who has
first acquired possession should remain in possession pending this decision; and
the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a petty warfare over the
possession of the property which is the subject of dispute. To permit this would be highly dangerous to
individual security and disturbing to social order.

Therefore, where a person supposes himself to be the owner of a
piece of land and desires to vindicate his ownership against the party actually
in possession, it is incumbent upon him to institute an action to this end in a
court of competent jurisdiction; and he can not be permitted, by invading the
property and excluding the actual possessor to place upon the latter the burden
of instituting an action to try the property right.^[21]
In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as
there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of
the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the
holder should refuse to deliver the thing.^[22]
When a person is in possession of the land and has maintained that possession
for years, he cannot be forcibly dispossessed thereof, even by the owner.^[23]

Further, the authority given to the Bureau of Lands over the
disposition of public lands does not exclude the courts from their jurisdiction
over possessory actions, the public character of the land notwithstanding. The exercise by the courts of such
jurisdiction is not an interference with the alienation, disposition and
control of public lands.^[24]
The determination of the respective rights or rival claimants to public lands
is different from the determination of who has the actual possession or
occupation with a view to protecting the same and preventing disorder and
breaches of the peace. A judgment of
the court ordering restitution of a parcel of land to the actual occupant, who
has been deprived thereof by another through the use of force or another
illegal manner, can never be prejudicial interference with the disposition or alienation of public lands. On the contrary, if courts were deprived of
jurisdiction over the cases involving conflicts of possession, the threat of
judicial action against breaches of peace committed on public lands would be
eliminated, and a state of lawlessness would probably be produced between
applicants, occupants, or squatters, where force or might, not right or
justice, would rule.^[25]

It is, therefore, clear that the municipal court correctly
assumed jurisdiction over the case below as
the complaint filed before it sufficiently avers that private
respondents seek to recover possession of the lots from petitioners. The pendency of Civil Case No. 79371,
wherein the question of ownership was raised, is of no moment. Pending final adjudication of ownership, the
municipal court has jurisdiction to determine in the meantime the right of
possession over the land.^[26]

Prior referral of this case to the Department of Agrarian Reform
under the provisions of Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 316, in relation
to Presidential Decree No. 27, is not necessary. The said laws are not applicable to the case at bar. There is here no allegation in the pleadings
nor any showing in the records that a tenancy relation exists between
petitioners and private respondents. Both groups are claiming a right of possession in the concept of an
owner. The referral provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 316 apply only in cases wherein the parties are
landlords and tenants and not when they are applicants of a public land
claiming preferential right over it, as in this case.

As we ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.^[27]:

“x x x for the lands subject of the action to come under
Operation Land Transfer under Pres. Decree No. 27, there must first be a
showing that they are tenanted lands and for the action to come within the
referral provisions of Pres. Decree Nos. 316 and 946, it must first be
established that the action involves tenants. The aforecited decrees specifically speak of ‘tenant–farmer’, ‘sharecrop
or lease tenancy’, ‘tenant’, and ‘tenant–tiller’.”

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and
the writs prayed for are DENIED. The
temporary restraining order issued by the Court on May 16, 1975 is hereby
lifted.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Penned by Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan, with Justices Luis B. Reyes and Efren I.
Plana concurring.

^[2]
Rollo, 56-57.

^[3]
Ibid., 67.

^[4]
Ibid., 94-99.

^[5]
Rollo, CA-G.R. No. SP-02996, 50.

^[6]
Ibid., id., 130.

^[7]
Rollo, 12.

^[8]
Although the case in this Court had thereafter been submitted for decision, in
its resolution of May 16, 1990 the Court granted the motion of petitioners’ new
counsel to file a memorandum in support of the petition. Petitioners’ memorandum was filed on June
28, 1990 and private respondents filed their memorandum on September 8, 1990.

^[9]
Romero vs. Pecson, etc., et al., 83 Phil. 308 (1949); Villaroman vs.
Abaya, etc., et al., 91 Phil. 20 (1952).

^[10]
Yu Tiong Tay, et al. vs. Barrios, etc., et al., 79 Phil. 597 (1947); De
la Cruz, et al. vs. Burgos, et al., 28 SCRA 977 (1969); Fuentes vs.
Bautista, etc., et al., 53 SCRA 420 (1973).

^[11]
Laurel, et al. vs.
Abalos, etc., et al., 30 SCRA 281 (1969); Caparros vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., 170 SCRA 758 (1989).

^[12]
28 SCRA 331 (1969).

^[13]
20 SCRA 1264 (1967).

^[14]
98 Phil. 684 (1956).

^[15]
Rollo, CA-G.R. No. 02996, 83.

^[16]
Rollo, 345-355.

^[17]
Lopez vs. Santiago, etc., et al., 107 Phil. 668 (1960); De Gaerlan, et
al. vs. Martinez, etc., et al., 85 Phil. 375 (1950); De la Cruz, et al. vs.
Burgos, et al., 28 SCRA 977 (1969).

^[18]
De la Cruz, et al. vs. Burgos, et al., supra, and cases
cited therein.

^[19]
Masallo vs. Cesar, 39 Phil. 134 (1918); Prado vs. Calpo, et al.,
10 SCRA 801 (1964).

^[20]
Spouses Medina and Bernal vs. Valdellon, etc., et al., 63 SCRA 278
(1975).

^[21]
Dizon vs. Concina, et al., 30 SCRA 897 (1969).

^[22]
Art. 536, Civil Code.

^[23]
Padin vs. Humphreys, et al., 19 Phil. 254 (1911).

^[24]
National Development Company, et al. vs. Hervilla, 151 SCRA 520 (1987).

^[25]
3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 Ed., 273, as cited in Villaflor vs.
Reyes, et al., 22 SCRA 385 (1968); Guerrero vs. Amores, et al.,   159 SCRA 374 (1988).

^[26]
Santiago, etc. vs. Cruz,
54 Phil. 640 (1930).

^[27]
99 SCRA 722 (1980).