PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ARNEL MITRA AND DENNIS ABADILLA, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

Accused Arnel Mitra
and Dennis Abadilla were charged with the crime of
murder in the Regional Trial Court of Lucena,
allegedly committed as follows:

“That on or about the 30th day of March, 1986, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, with evident
premeditation and treachery, armed with a deadly weapon, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab with said weapon one Nestor Alana Burac, thereby
inflicting upon the latter stab wounds which caused his death.

“Contrary to law.” (At pp. 2-3,
Original Records)

The crime was allegedly perpetrated not only by the two
appellants but together with another person by the name of Victor Garganta.  The
latter, however, managed to escape and remained at large up to the date of the hearing so that trial proceeded only against Mitra and Abadilla who pleaded
‘not guilty’ when arraigned.

The lower court findings upon which guilt beyond reasonable doubt
was established are summarized
as follows:

“At about 4:00 o’clock
in the afternoon of March 30, 1986
a quarrel took place between Ildefonso Catamio, father-in-law of the victim Nestor Burac and Nena Mañago while they were at the Alitao River,
Gulang-gulang, Lucena City
while having a picnic celebrating the Easter
Sunday.  Ildefonso
Catamio was with his daughter Maria Burac, his son-in-law Nestor Burac,
and the latter’s three children Michael Burac, Myra Burac and Janice Burac, and
spouses Alberto Obado and Marina Obado
and their children.  On the other hand,
at the other side of the river were the group of Nena
Mañago and her children, and accused Dennis Abadilla, Arnel Mitre and Victor Garganta.  A quarrel took place between Ildefonso Catamio and Nena Mañago.  The quarrel is over a land dispute the
tenancy of which is being claimed by Ildefonso Catamio.  The property is owned by Floro
Mitra, the father of one of the accused Arnel Mitra.  In the exchange of words the group of Aling Nena Mañago
was agitated, as Arnel Mitre
joined in the exchange of words challenging the group of Ildefonso
Catamio to fight him in the following manner ‘kung sino ang matapang
sa inyo ay lumapit (Tsn May 16, 1986, page
60).  The victim Nestor Burac accepted the challenge but was prevented to reach the
group of Arnel Mitra
notwithstanding attempts on his part to free himself from the hold of
his companions.  To avoid actual
confrontation, Myrna Obado suggested that her group
will leave the place and go home, they could not however immediately do so, as
the group of Aling Nena
started crossing the river, and proceeded to the house of Aling
Nena which is just on the embankment of the river. 
In going home the group of Catamio have to
pass the house of Aling Nena;
they managed to pass said house and saw the group of Aling
Nena who were looking and staring at them in a very
hostile and unfriendly manner.  They
managed however to pass thru unmolested and unharmed and reached the National
Highway where they settled in a waiting shed to wait for a passenger vehicle to
bring them home to Lucena City.  While waiting for a ride Arnel
Mitra, Dennis Abadilla and
Victor Garganta arrived.  The victim Nestor Burac
was holding and carrying his youngest daughter Janice with his left
hand, when Victor Garganta went to his back drew a three-edged pointed
instrument and stabbed him on his right side just below the armpit.  The sudden attack and the blow temporarily
disabled him as he fell on his knees and his daughter was thrown away from his
hold.  Nestor Burac
ran away for dear life towards the other side of the road but tripped himself
and fell down.  He tried to stand up and
was in a squatting position near the fence when Dennis Abadilla hit him on the head with a big stone; Arnel Mitra uttered
the following ‘sige, sige, iyan ang patayin
mo’ and while Mitra
was giving this Order Victor Garganta continued
stabbing Nestor Burac.  Then Cesar Naynes,
the Purok Leader in Gulang­-gulang
came.  He told him to leave the
victim.  Nestor Burac
with the help of Cesar Naynes was boarded in a pick
up which was flagged down and the victim was brought to the Quezon Memorial Hospital.

“Arnel Mitra
was arrested at eight o’clock in the
evening of March 30, 1986
by the police while Dennis Abadilla was arrested
before twelve o’clock midnight.

“The witness Marina Burac, wife of
the victim and an eye witness to the case gave a written statement of how the
incident happened at 10 o’clock in
the evening of March 30, 1986.  Another eyewitness to the incident Michael Burac gave his statement at nine
forty o’clock of March 31,
1986.” (At pp. 39-41, Rollo)

The appellants claimed they were enjoying with a picnic group on
one side of the river at the time they learned about the killing of Nestor Burac.  When they
arrived at the place where people wait for rides, things were already
normal.  The appellants state that they
do not personally know Nestor Burac.  They claim that the killers were Victor Garganta and a certain “Jun.” They disclaimed any
knowledge of or participation in the crime.

The case is now before us on appeal with the accused-appellants
assigning the following errors of the trial court:

I

THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSED HAD NO MOTIVE OR REASON
TO COMMIT THE CRIME CHARGED.

II

THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE CONSIDERATION TO THE IMPARTIAL AND VOLUNTARY TESTIMONY
OF DISINTERESTED WITNESSES.

III

THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN STRICTLY APPLYING THE STRAIGHT JACKET RULE ON ALIBI WITHOUT
CONSIDERING EXCEPTIONAL/ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT PROSECUTION WITNESSES
COULD HAVE BEEN ILL-MOTIVATED.

IV

THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER AND GIVE WEIGHT TO THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSED
STAYED AT HOME AND DID NOT HIDE FROM POLICE AUTHORITIES.” (At p. 56,
Original Record)

On the 1st assignment of error, the accused-appellants contend
that they had no motive to kill the victim, Nestor Burac
because neither of them personally know the victim nor
the knife-wielder, Victor Garganta and his companion,
Jun.  They further contend that Victor Garganta and Jun were not among the group picnicking with
them and that Dennis Abadilla was merely invited by Arnel Mitra to the picnic.  What they are trying to say is that it is
impossible for them to have conspired to commit a crime when they do not know
the victim nor the perpetrators.

It was, however, established from the records that Garganta, Mitra, and Abadilla were among the group of Nena
Mañago, with whom Ildefonso
Catamio, father-in-law of Nestor Burac,
had an altercation regarding a land
dispute.  In the exchange of words, Arnel Mitra challenged the group
to a fight and it was the victim, Nestor Burac who
tried to answer the challenge.  It was
further established that it was Mitra who urged Garganta to stab the victim and that it was Dennis Abadilla who hit the head of the victim with a big stone.

The appellants further contend that consideration should have
been given to the testimonies of Ligaya Padillo, a teacher and Cesar Naynes,
an Assistant Purok Leader, whom they consider as
disinterested witnesses.

Prosecution witnesses, being mostly relatives of the victim, are
claimed by the appellants to be interested witnesses whose testimonies should
be given lesser weight.

In People v. Tunhawa, G.R. No. 81470, October 27, 1988; People
v. Canada, 144 SCRA 121 [1986]; and People v. Radomes 141 SCRA 548 [1986], it has been held that
mere relationship of prosecution witnesses to the victim does not make their
testimony biased nor render such testimony unworthy of belief in the absence of
an improper motive making the witness testify against the accused.  We have time and again upheld the
well-established principle that findings of fact of trial courts are accorded
great weight and respect considering that they had the opportunity to observe
the deportment and behavior of witnesses (People v. Panuelos,
136 SCRA 501 [1985]; People v. Magdaraog, 160 SCRA
153 [1988]; People v. Cabanit, 139 SCRA 94
[1985]).  No improper motive on the part
of prosecution witnesses to testify falsely was established by the defense in
this case.

The appellants’ contention that the witnesses implicated them on
account of their desire to extort money from them appears ridiculous and
far-fetched.  It is seen from the records
that the victim’s family clearly wanted the perpetrators of the crime
punished.  To use the death of a loved
one to extort money is difficult to believe and contrary to human nature.  There is nothing in the records to sustain
this contention of the appellants.

The accused-appellants further assail the denial of their defense
of alibi.  Apart from the fact that alibi
is the weakest of all the defenses an accused can
invoke (People v. Muñoz, 163 SCRA 730 [1988]), the
appellants were positively identified by the prosecution witnesses.  It was not physically impossible for the
appellants to be at the scene of the crime. 
In fact they were within the vicinity of Raymar
Subdivision where, across from it, the crime was committed.  The appellants’ defense of alibi, therefore,
cannot prevail over the positive identification made by prosecution witnesses,
aside from the added fact that it was not physically impossible for them to
have been at the situs of the crime at the time it
was committed (People v. Berbal and Juanito, G.R. No. 71527, August 10, 1989; and People v. Nolasco, 163 SCRA 623 [1988]).

Anent the last assigned error, the fact that the accused stayed
at home and did not hide from the police is not conclusive evidence of absence
of guilt.  In fact, not a few criminals
have been arrested in their residences. 
The accused-appellants are likewise banking on the absence of derogatory
findings against them in their records. 
We have, however, held in People v. Cerelegia,
147 SCRA 528 [1987] that evidence of good character cannot prevail over clear
and convincing evidence of the commission of a crime.

A new issue further raised by the appellants is whether or not
the affidavits of retraction of the prosecution witnesses are such newly
discovered evidence contemplated in the rules as basis for a new trial.

We do not agree with the appellants on the point raised as the
said affidavits are not the newly-found evidence contemplated by law.  The prosecution witnesses had been subjected
to gruelling cross examinations in court but they
clung to their version.  Thus, whatever
retraction of testimonies they may have made later could only be a mere after thought.

As the Solicitor General has commented, such facts were already available at the time of
the trial.  To grant a new trial at every
instance would result in no end to the litigation process.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Motion for New Trial
is hereby DENIED and the judgment appealed from is affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.