VIRGINIA JORGE AND ANITA VERGARA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. FRANCISCO Z. CONSOLACION (PRESIDING JUDGE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE BRANCH II, DAVAO CITY) EMILIO MATULAC, HIS AGENTS AND R…

This case was originally a litigation between two (2) sisters, Concepcion and Nieves, both surnamed Palma Gil, involving a
piece of land covered by TCT No. T-432 with a total area of 829 square
meters.  Civil Case No. 1160 was filed by
Concepcion against Nieves and her husband Angel Villarica for specific performance based on an actionable
document seeking, among other things to compel Nieves to cede to the former
256.20 square meters of the subject property. 
The trial court rendered a decision^[1]
dated April 7, 1954 in favor
of the plaintiff and against defendants ordering the latter to comply with the
terms of the document.  Said decision was
appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the assailed decision prompting
the winning party to move for the execution of the decision.

However, because the Provincial Sheriff in executing the decision
carved out a specific portion of the land covered by TCT No. 432 containing an
area of 256.20 square meters notwithstanding the pronouncement in the decision
rendered in Civil Case No. 1160 that the subject lot is an undivided portion of
the entire property covered by the title, the defendants brought the matter to
Us questioning the actuations of the Sheriff.

Meanwhile, Concepcion sold on October
24, 1956 portions of the subject property identified by the lower court as Lots
No. 59-C-1 and 59-C-2 to Iluminada Pacetes.  On the
other hand, defendant Nieves also mortgaged and sold a portion, known as Lot
59-C-4 to the Prudential Bank.

Subsequently, in Our Resolution, dated August 31, 1961
the actuation of the Sheriff was nullified and the case was remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings.

Upon motion of Iluminada Pacetes, the Court of First Instance issued an order, dated
December 7, 1961,
allowing her to be substituted for Concepcion Palma
Gil who died during the pendency of the case.

When the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance for
further proceedings, said court made finding of facts that the defendants
mortgaged and sold a portion of the subject property of Lot No. 59-C-4, which
lot was then segregated and allotted to her by virtue of the partition made by
the Provincial Sheriff of Davao, which partition was
questioned by the defendants before the Supreme Court.  Because of this, the lower court (CFI) ruled
in its Order dated February 17, 1964 that the defendants
had waived the benefits of the decision of the Supreme Court rendered on August
31, 1961, and that the conveyance of Lots Nos. 59-C-1 to Iluminada
Pacetes and 59-C-2 must stand.

On March 16, 1966,
Iluminada Pacetes sold the
Lots 59-C-1 and 59-C-2 to a certain Constancio Maglana.  Sale
was confirmed by Us in another related case, G.R. No.
52013.

Meanwhile, on May 10,
1977, petitioners herein entered into a Lease Agreement over a
portion of the land covered by TCT No. T-432 consisting of 218 square meters
with Nieves Palma Gil Villarica.

On April 22, 1980,
Maglana sold Lots 59-C-1 and 59-C-2 to Emilio Matulac.  The latter
is now the private respondent in the petition before Us,
while petitioners are the parties of the first part who entered into the
aforementioned Memorandum Agreement with the defendant Nieves Palma Gil Villarica.

The two orders of the Court of First Instance, dated December 7, 1961
and February 17, 1964
were questioned by defendants^[2]
by filing their Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of
First Instance.  Defendants brought the
question to Us on certiorari which was
dismissed by Us on September 16, 1974.  By virtue of the finality of the orders, Iluminada Pacetes filed a motion
for execution of the decision of the court of origin dated April 7, 1954, which was granted by said court in
its Order dated August 19, 1977.

On August 24, 1977,
defendants filed a motion to set aside the order of August 19, 1977, which the Court of First
Instance denied in its order dated September
2, 1977.  Consequently, on September 3, 1977, defendants filed
their Motion for Reconsideration of the orders dated August 19, 1977 and September 2, 1977. 
When the Court of First Instance denied said Motion for Reconsideration,
in its order dated September 16, 1977,
the defendants brought the matter to the Court of Appeals.  However, said court affirmed the questioned
orders prompting again defendants to elevate the same to Us
on certiorari.  In Our resolution,
dated January 13, 1982, in
G.R. No. 56399 We affirmed the ruling of the appellate
court.  In effect, therefore, the
decision of the trial court dated April
7, 1954, in Civil Case No. 1160 has become final and executory to be executed by virtue of the order dated August 19, 1977 which granted a writ
of execution.

By virtue of Our affirmance
of the assailed orders and acting upon motion of Emilio Matulac,
respondent Judge Francisco Z. Consolacion issued the
Writ of Demolition dated April 30,
1982 and Special Order of Demolition dated May 26, 1982 for the removal of petitioners’
building and/or structures found therein.

Petitioners now question before Us the authority of the
respondent Judge in including in its writ of execution an order to eject herein
petitioners and to demolish their house and structure contending that
petitioners and private respondents were not parties to the original case and
that a separate and independent action to eject petitioners and to demolish
their house and structure should have been resorted to by respondent Emilio Matulac who as alleged by petitioners were not properly
substituted as one of the indispensable parties of the case.  They argued further that the order of the
trial court dated April 7, 1954 in Civil Case No. 1160 which was affirmed by Us
mentioned nothing about ejectment of the petitioners
or anyone who may be found occupying said lot in question nor the demolition of
any house or structure found thereat.

Petitioners claimed that the judgment in Civil Case No. 1160 was
limited in ordering the defendant Nieves Palma Gil Villarica:

“a)    To execute the necessary documents transfering in favor of the plaintiff 256 square meters
with 20 meters of Lot No. 59-C;

“b)    To construct the building on the land in
question; and

“c)    To execute the necessary documents ceding in
favor of the plaintiff the usufruct of the rent equivalent to one-half (1/2) of
the building constructed.”

Petitioners’ contentions do not hold water.

When We dismissed on September 16, 1974, the petition for certiorari
filed by defendants questioning the orders, dated December 7, 1961 and December
17, 1964, in effect We had confirmed the sale by plaintiff in Civil Case No.
1160, Concepcion Palma Gil, of Lot 59-C-1 and Lot
59-C-2 to Iluminada Pacetes
and affirmed the ruling of the trial court that defendants had waived the
benefit of Our Resolution rendered on August 31, 1961.  Thus, when defendant Nieves Palma Gil Villarica entered into a Lease Agreement with the
petitioners herein on May 10, 1977 over the subject lots, the former was no
longer in a capacity as owner to enter into such an agreement in order to bind
the subject property.  Consequently, such
contract cannot be binding on Iluminada Pacetes adjudged as owner of the land in question by the
court.  Thus, as gathered from the
background facts and the previous related orders and resolutions of the trial
court which were sustained by Us in Our aforementioned Orders and resolutions,
the intent or the gist of the dispositive portion of
the initial judgment in Civil Case No. 1160 was necessarily and substantially
altered when We ordered in Our resolution dated January 13, 1982, the immediate
implementation of the lower court’s order of execution dated August 19, 1977,
aptly observing that this case has dragged on for twenty-nine (29) years
because of the numerous motions filed by defendants which delayed the execution
of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1160.

Furthermore, be it remembered that after the issuance of said
order of execution petitioners herein without being a necessary party in Civil
Case No. 1160, filed with the respondent Judge, “An Urgent Motion to Hold
in Abeyance the Writ of Execution” (Annexes “A” pp. 100-101, Rollo).  By merely
claiming to be the owners of the building sought to be demolished despite the
fact that they were merely lessees of the losing party, petitioners cause the
continuous stay of the defendant Nieves for a few more months in the land
subject of the aforesaid case and was able to collect continuously the amount
of P600.00 from the petitioners as the latters’
monthly rental of the land to the prejudice of the herein plaintiff’s
successors-in-interest, respondent Emilio Matulac,
who appears to be the present registered owner of the land wherein the building
sought to be demolished had been constructed, as evidenced by TCT No. T-80631
of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City dated February 19, 1981.

A reading of the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, dated
March 3, 1982, (Annex “C”) of the order of respondent Judge denying
their Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Writ of Execution, shows that the
petitioners pray that no demolition of the building and/or improvements found
in the land subject of the execution shall take place, unless a special order
of demolition shall take place on grounds of equity and justice,
notwithstanding the finality of the judgment rendered by the trial court
against the defendant in Civil Case No. 1160. 
To counteract this move of petitioners, plaintiffs’ successor-in­-interest
who is now private respondent Emilio Matulac on April 10, 1982 filed a Motion for Issuance
of Special Order of Writ of Demolition, quoted as follows:

“COMES NOW plaintiff, through counsel, and unto this Honorable
Court respectfully alleges:

“1.  That on January 13, 1982, the Honorable Supreme
Court issued a Resolution, which stated among others:

‘x x x
it is fitting and proper that it be terminated as soon as possible by
implementing the lower court’s order of execution dated August 19, 1977.  x x xxx’

“2.  That on February 18, 1982, this Honorable Court issued an order
granting the motion of plaintiff for issuance of writ of execution and/or writ
of possession;

“3.  That defendants Virginia Jorge and Anita Vergara actual occupants of the land filed a series of
motion for reconsideration, the last was denied by
this Honorable Court on March 26, 1982;

“4.  That on March 25, 1982, plaintiff through
counsel filed a manifestation before this Honorable Court without
prejudice to the writ of execution and possession thus issued, allowing
Virginia Jorge and Anita Vergara for humanitarian
reasons until April 9, 1982 to vacate the premises under the following
conditions:

‘a)   Issue a definite Special Order of Writ of
Demolition of all the structures and/or building in the premises, on April 9,
1982, if and when Virginia Jorge and Anita Vergara
are still in the premises;

‘b)   That said Virginia Jorge and Anita Vergara will shoulder all the expenses of the demolition of
all the structures in the premises;

‘c)   Such other terms as are consistent with truth
and equity.

“5.  That until now, April 9, 1982, inspite of the
period requested by them and granted Virginia Jorge and Anita Vergara are still staying in the
premises;

“6.  That justice and equity demand that a Special
Order of Writ of demolition of all structures and/or building be issued by this
Honorable Court.

“WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Court that a Special Order of Writ of Demolition be issued and such other
relief as may be proper.

“Davao City,
Philippines, April 10, 1982.

“(SGD.)
VEGA, BATILLER & GOC-ONG

LAW OFFICE

“By:  CIRILO A. GOC-ONG”

The aforesaid motion was contested by
petitioners in their opposition, dated April
22, 1982.  Acting on both
pleadings, the respondent Judge issued an Order, dated April 30, 1982, granting to movant
Matulac the remedy asked and prayed for.

Petitioners on May 6,
1982, filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the order.  On May
26, 1982, respondent Judge had issued an order the pertinent
portion of which reads:

“O R D E R

“This bears on the
‘Motion for Reconsideration’ of the Order of the Court granting plaintiff’s
motion for issuance of Special Order of Writ of Demolition dated April 30,
1982, based on the following grounds, to wit:

‘1.   That there was no substitution of parties
after the death of Iluminada Pacetes
who was substituted for plaintiff Concepcion Palma
Gil and therefore the Motions filed for the Issuance of the Writ of Execution,
Possession, as well as the Special Order for Demolition and the Orders issued
granting the same are all null and void.

‘2.   That the Motions for Execution, Possession
and Special Order of Demolition are all defective for non?notification
thereof to defendants of record.

‘3.   There was no proper notification of the
Motion for Special Order of Demolition.

‘4.   That the Special Order of Demolition is
improper against movants for they are not parties to
the case.’

and the
Opposition thereto filed on May 7, 1982
by Atty. Cirilo A. Goc-ong,
counsel for the plaintiff, based on the following grounds, to wit:

‘1.  That all motions for reconsidera­tion
(about five) previously filed by movants had been
denied by this Honorable Court;

‘2.    That Virginia George and Anita Vergara have not intervened and were not allowed to
intervene by this Honorable Court;

‘3.    That consequently movants
have no right to file any pleading, much less, a Motion for Reconsideration;

‘4.    That since February 18, 1982, movants have been filing many pleadings to delay the enforcement of
the writ of execution;

‘5.    That in fact the records will show that movants were granted up to April 9, 1982, within which to vacate the premises but
still stubbornly refused;

‘6.    That all pleadings which movants
may subsequently file before this Honorable Court should be treated as a scrap
of paper and Atty. Pedro Alcantara should be
admonished for filing said useless pleadings;

‘7.    That justice and equity demand that said
motion for reconsideration be denied.

“After a thorough deliberation of the grounds advanced by both
parties, the Court finds no merit on the first ground advanced by movants, because the same was already resolved by the
Supreme Court in its decision dated August 26, 1980, a portion of which reads
as follows:

‘With regard to the appellant’s contention that Iluminada
Pacetes has no personality to ask for the execution
of the decision, this Court finds the same to be of no moment.  It must be remembered that Iluminada Pacetes brought the
subject land from the late Concepcion Palma Gil.  With the transfer of interest to her, Iluminada Pacetes was thus subrogated
to the rights and obligations of the late Concepcion
Palma Gil with respect to the land.  She
would be the one benefited or injured by the judgment or become entitled to the
avails of the suit.  Besides Iluminada Pacedes has been
properly substituted to the deceased plaintiff upon her motion and with the
approval of the Court.  She is,
therefore, a real party-in­-interest.’

“Emilio Matulac, having brought the
land in question from Constancio Maglana,
who bought it from Iluminada Pacetes,
is subrogated to the rights, interests and obligations of the latter, and
therefore, is a real party in interest, and has personality to ask for the
execution of the decision in this case.

“The second and third grounds of movants
are not well-taken, because the record shows, that the motions for execution,
possession and special order of demolition were all served on Atty. Reynaldo Villarica, counsel for the defendants, through FAR
Corporation.

“As to the 4th ground of movants,
that the special order of demolition is improper against them for they are not
parties to the case, this Court finds no merit in the same because movants Virginia Jorge and Anita Vergara
are actually in possession of the land in question now without authority, and
so the special order to demolish their building and/or structures thereof is
properly applicable to them.

“Moreover, movants have no
personality to intervene in this case, they being not parties to the case.

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant motion is hereby
DENIED.

“SO ORDERED.

“Davao
City, May 26, 1982.

“FRANCISCO E.
CONSOLACION

J u d g e”

(Annexes “F” for Respondents,
pp. 125-127, Rollo)

Consequently, on May 27,
1982, a “Writ of Demolition (Annex “G” for
Respondents, pp. 128, Rollo), was issued by the
respondent Judge.  It has been shown
therein that all the legal requirements as provided for under Sec. 10 and Sec.
14 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for the issuance of the writ of demolition
had been strictly complied with before the demolition of the structures and that
possession by the private respondent had been finally carried out and/or
enforced.  Secs. 10 and 14 of Rule 39
read as follows:

“Section 10.  – If a judgment directs a party to execute a
conveyance of land or deliver deeds or other documents, or to perform any other
specific act, and then fails to comply within the time specified the court may
direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other
person appointed by the court and the act so done shall have like effect as if
done by the party.  If real or personal
property is within the Philippines, the court in lieu of directing conveyance
thereof may enter judgment divesting the title of any party and vesting it in
others and such judgment shall have the force and effect of conveyance executed
in due form of law.”

“Section 14. – When the property
subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the
judgment debtor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove
said improvements except upon special order of the court issued upon petition
of the judgment creditor after due hearing and after the former has failed to
remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.”

It appears from the record that the said
buildings and/or structures were actually demolished last June 14, 1982, and
the land hereof is now in the possession of the private respondent Emilio Matulac as per “Delivery Receipt” dated June 15, 1986 (p. 11, Rollo).

We agree with the trial court in its finding that respondent
Emilio Matulac had every right to ask for the writ of
execution, since having bought the land in question from Constancio
Maglana, who bought the land from Iluminada
Pacetes, he was subrogated to the rights, interests
and obligations of the latter and therefore, is a real party in interest as
against the alleged rights of petitioners who were in possession of the land in
question as lessees by virtue of a Contract or Agreement of Lease with Nieves
Palma Gil Villarica who was declared not the owner of
the land in question.  It is established
therefore that petitioners were in possession of the land in question without
the legal right to do so.  Hence the
special order to demolish their building and/or structures therein was properly
applicable to them, as they had no authority from the registered owner, who has
every right as an act of ownership to request the court for a special order of
Demolition of any existing structure found within his property.

It is noted that during the rendition of the judgment in Civil Case
No. 1160, the parties were not yet awarded their respective shares in the
property.  In other words, there was yet
no partition of the property and the parties were merely entitled to pro-indiviso shares. 
Under the circumstances, no ejectment order could
be directed to the defendant (Nieves Palma Gil) or to any of the co-owners of
the property in question.  Furthermore,
the power of the court to issue the order of execution cannot be limited to
what is stated in the dispositive portion of the
trial court’s judgment in Civil Case No. 1160, in view of the continued failure
of Nieves Palma Gil Villarica or the defendant in
said case, to comply with what was required of her in said judgment.  In fact, Nieves Palma Gil Villarica
was in possession of the property illegally for several years, depriving the
plaintiff Concepcion and her successors-in-interest
of their legal right to possess the lot in question.  The petitioners, as mere lessees of the
losing party, have no rights whatsoever to claim and to be protected by the
mantle of the law and neither do they have the right to intervene and/or block
the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1160.

WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., (Chairman), on leave.

^[1]
Penned by Judge Enrique A. Fernandez

^[2] Nievas Palma Gil and husband Angel Villarica