RODOLFO SUAREZ, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CESARIO MANIGBAS, RESPONDENTS.

Suarez versus Manigbas

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Rodolfo Suarez against the Court of Appeals and Cesario Manigbas. Suarez, the general manager of a security agency, had written a letter to the association of security agencies reporting supposed misdemeanors of Manigbas, a former guard. The Court of Appeals condemned Suarez to pay moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The case matters because it fixes two rules a reviewee must carry into the examination room: the doctrine of estoppel by laches against a party who belatedly attacks the jurisdiction of the court that tried him, and the limits of the qualified privilege of communication when malice is shown.

Procedural History

Manigbas sued Suarez in the Regional Trial Court. After trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of Manigbas, awarding moral damages of 10,000 pesos, exemplary damages of 3,000 pesos, actual damages of 1,000 pesos, attorney's fees of 2,000 pesos, and costs. Suarez appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the decision but modified it by eliminating the award of actual damages. Suarez then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari. The Supreme Court gave the petition due course and required the parties to submit their memoranda, which they did.

Facts

Cesario Manigbas was a security guard of the D'Robe Security Agency, of which Rodolfo Suarez was the general manager. He was assigned to a bank branch at Sucat, Paranaque, Metro Manila. During his tour of duty, he alleged that his employer pulled him out of his assignment and later dismissed him. He contested the dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission. He then found new employment with the RP Guardian Security Agency.

While Manigbas was with his second employer, Suarez signed and sent a letter to the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, an association of security agencies. The letter reported misdemeanors committed by several guards, including Manigbas. The remarks on Manigbas stated that he was padding payroll, that he used to leave his post every weekend without a reliever and without permission from the agency, and that he misrepresented in the submission of his Daily Time Record. As a consequence, Manigbas was dismissed by the RP Guardian Security Agency and was unemployed for six months, until he was rehired on a temporary basis. He claimed that the letter exposed him to public ridicule, inconvenience, humiliation, and contempt, that he was blacklisted by security agencies, and that he suffered mental torture and anguish.

Suarez denied that Manigbas was summarily relieved or dismissed. He claimed that after Manigbas was relieved of his assignment at the bank branch, Manigbas refused to accept reassignment, and that the relief followed the company rule against allowing guards to stay too long at one post for security reasons. Suarez insisted that the letter was a privileged communication, made in response to the call of the association for information on the misdemeanors of security guards, and written in good faith without intention to cause damage.

Issues

• Whether or not the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case, considering that the total money claim of the respondent was only 10,000 pesos.
• Whether or not the letter sent to the association of security agencies is covered by the rule on privileged communication.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote a statutory text; it applies the settled doctrine of estoppel by laches as restated in the cases it cites. The rule the Court invokes is this:

It is settled that any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court. The only exception is where the party raising the issue is barred by estoppel.

This rule bears on the first issue, because Suarez raised the defect in jurisdiction only after he had lost in the trial court and appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Court also applies the doctrine of qualified privilege as stated in the case of United States versus Bustos:

A communication made in good faith upon any subject matter in which the party making the communication has an interest or concerning which he has a duty is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contains incriminatory or derogatory matter which, without the privilege, would be libelous and actionable.

This rule bears on the second issue, because Suarez invoked it to shield his letter from liability.

And the Court applies the rule from Lu Chu Sing versus Lu Tiong Gui:

The fact that a communication is privileged does not mean that it is not actionable, the privileged character simply does away with the presumption of malice which the plaintiff has to prove in such a case.

This rule bears on the second issue, because it explains why a privileged letter may still be the basis of an award of damages once malice is proved.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the contention of Suarez is devoid of merit. It is true that the complaint claimed only 10,000 pesos, and that under the law the Regional Trial Courts exercise exclusive original jurisdiction only where the demand amounts to more than 20,000 pesos. But Suarez is estopped from invoking the rule. He never questioned the defect until the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals from the adverse decision of the trial court. He could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction by seasonably taking exception, but instead he invoked that very jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, he participated in the trial by cross-examining the respondent. He cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which he had submitted himself voluntarily.

On the second issue, the Court held that the answer is in the negative: the letter is not a privileged communication. The Court acknowledged that a privileged communication is not necessarily not actionable, and that malice may be proved by extrinsic, internal, or circumstantial evidence. Here malice is strongly shown. The letter put Manigbas in a bad light before his peers and before the security agencies. Its charges were not substantiated by any proof, contrary to the association's guideline that reports on security guards be based on actual facts and not on imaginary or personal considerations. Besides, the letter was written almost three months after Manigbas's employment with the D'Robe Security Agency had already been terminated, and his termination had caused him to file a labor case that resulted in the payment of his back wages. The Court concluded that Suarez was guided and motivated by revenge, and that the letter, in the guise of an official communication, was designed to damage Manigbas's name and to compromise his future employment, resulting in his blacklisting. These facts deny Suarez the benefits of qualified privilege and justify the imposition of personal liability. The Court quoted with approval the rule that a private communication, maliciously made by one person to another, although in the performance of a legal, moral, or social duty, is not privileged.

Doctrine

First, a decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal. The exception is estoppel: a party who invokes the jurisdiction of the court by filing an answer, seeking affirmative relief, and participating in the trial cannot later attack that jurisdiction after an adverse ruling. This is the rule of estoppel by laches.

Second, a communication made in good faith on a matter in which the writer has an interest or a duty, addressed to a person with a corresponding interest or duty, is privileged, even if it contains derogatory matter. But the privilege does not make the communication non-actionable; it merely does away with the presumption of malice, which the plaintiff must then prove by extrinsic, internal, or circumstantial evidence.

Third, malice defeats the privilege. A private communication, maliciously made, although in the performance of a legal, moral, or social duty, is not privileged. A report made in the guise of an official communication, unsubstantiated, and sent after the employment had ended and after a labor case had been won, betrays revenge and is not protected.

Disposition

The petition was denied for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed in its entirety, leaving Suarez liable to Manigbas for moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a privileged communication does not mean an actionless one, for the privilege only removes the presumption of malice, which the plaintiff may still prove. Examiners use this case to test estoppel by laches against a belated attack on jurisdiction, and to test whether malice destroys the qualified privilege of a communication made in the performance of a duty.