RODOLFO SUAREZ, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CESARIO MANIGBAS, RESPONDENTS.

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision^[1]
of the Court of Appeals condemning petitioner Rodolfo Suarez to pay moral
damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees in favor of private respondent Cesario Manigbas.

Respondent Manigbas used to be a
security guard of the D’Robe Security Agency of which
petitioner, Capt. Rodolfo Suarez, was the general manager.  He was assigned to the Security Bank and
Trust Agency branch at Sucat, Paranaque, Metro
Manila.  During his tour of duty with the
said bank, he alleged that his employer pulled him out of his assignment and
later dismissed him.  This dismissal was contested by him before the National Labor
Relations Commission.

Respondent found another employment with the RP Guardian Security
Agency.  While he was with his second
employer, petitioner Suarez signed and sent a letter to the Philippine Association of
Detective and Protective Agency Operators,
(PADPAO), an association of security agencies, which reported misdemeanors
committed by several of its guards, including the respondent.  The remarks pertaining to respondent Manigbas states, to wit: “Padding payroll; used to
leave his post every weekend without a reliever nor
permission from the Agency: 
misrepresentation on the submission of Daily Time Record.” (p. 19,
Memorandum of Petitioner) Consequently, plaintiff was dismissed by the RP Guardian Security Agency and was
unemployed for six (6) months until re-hired by the said agency but on temporary basis.  Plaintiff claimed that the letter of
defendant Suarez to the PADPAO posed him to public ridicule, inconvenience,
humiliation and contempt which
resulted in his being blacklisted
by security agencies
giving him difficulty in finding employment and causing him mental
torture and anguish.

Petitioner Suarez denied that respondent was summarily relieved or dismissed from
employment.  He claimed that after his relief of his assignment
with the Security Bank and Trust Company branch at Sucat,
Paranaque,
Metro Manila, the respondent refused to accept re-assignment.  Respondent’s relief was done in  accordance
with the company rule not to allow guards to
stay for a long time at
one post for security reasons.  The
letter complained of was a privileged communication consistent with the call of
the PADPAO to make available to
it information on misdemeanors of security guards.  It was written in good faith and without any
intention to cause damage to the respondent.

The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the respondent
awarding moral damages in the amount of
P10,000;
exemplary damages in the amount of P3,000; actual damages in the amount of P1,000; attorney’s fees in
the amount of P2,000 and costs.  On
appeal to respondent court, the said decision
was affirmed with the modification eliminating the award of actual damages.

Hence, this petition.

Basically, petitioner raises the following issues:

1.  Whether or not the regional trial court had
no jurisdiction over the case at bar considering
that the total money claims of respondent is only ten thousand
pesos (P10,000); and

2.  Whether or not the letter sent to PADPAO is covered by the rule on
privileged communication.

In the resolution
of August 22, 1988, the petition was given due course and the parties were
required to submit their respective memoranda within thirty (30) days from
notice thereof.  Petitioner filed his
memorandum of November 7,
1988 while respondent
filed his on October 27, 1988.

Anent the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the court a quo
in entertaining this case, petitioner’s contentions are devoid of merit.  While though it is clear from the complaint
filed that the total amount claimed by respondent Manigbas
is ten thousand pesos (P10,000) and that under BP 129, the Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases in which the
demand, exclusive of interest and cost, or the value of the property in
controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000), petitioner
is estopped from invoking this rule since he never
questioned this flaw until this case was appealed to the respondent Court of
Appeals from the adverse decision of the trial court.  It is settled that any decision rendered
without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time,
even on appeal before this Court.  The
only exception is where the party raising the issue is barred by estoppel.  (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29,
reiterated in Solid Homes, Inc. v. Payawal and Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 84811, August 29, 1989).

While petitioner could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception thereto, they instead invoked the very same
jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking affirmative relief from it.  What is more, they participated in the trial
of the case by cross-examining
respondent.  Upon the premises, petitioner
cannot now be allowed belatedly
to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to
which they had submitted themselves voluntarily.  (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, supra)

With regard to the issue on whether or not the letter sent to the
PADPAO and signed by petitioner, considering the derogatory remarks on the
private respondent, is covered by the
protective mantle of privileged communication, the answer is in the negative.  Petitioner, in support of his contention that
such letter is privileged communication, cites the case of U.S. v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, wherein the court laid down the
following:

“A communication made in good faith upon any subject matter in which the party
making the communication has an interest or concerning which he has a duty is
privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty,
although it contains incriminatory or derogatory
matter which, without the privilege, would
be libelous and actionable.” (p.
21, Memorandum for the Petitioner)

And also the case of Santiago
v. Calvo, 48 Phil. 919, where the Court held:

“Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the
charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still
cover the mistake of the individual.  The
privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in
intemperate terms.  A privileged
communication should not be subjected
to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity.” (p.
22, Memorandum for the Petitioner)

Petitioner contends that the alleged
libelous letter to the PADPAO is a privileged
communication, hence, not actionable. 
We believe that the letter sent is not really a privileged
communication.

In the case of Lu Chu Sing vs. Lu Tiong Gui, 76 Phil. 669, the
Court said that “the fact that a communication is privileged does not mean that it is not actionable, the privileged character simply does away with
the presumption of malice which the plaintiff has to prove in such a
case.” And the evidence
necessary to prove malice on the part of the writer of a privileged communication is not strictly documentary for it
may be either extrinsic, internal, and circumstantial, like any other fact
necessary to make out plaintiff’s
case (U.S. vs. Canete, 38 Phil. 253).

As aptly put by the
respondent Court:

“In the present case, malice is strongly shown in appellant’s
writing the letter which put the
person of the appellee in bad light before his peers
and the security agencies who may have come across
said letter in the course of his employment. 
The said letter accused the appellee of
“padding payroll – Used to leave his post every weekend and without a
reliever nor permission from the agency. 
Misrepresentation on the submission of Daily Time
Record.” These charges, however, were not duly substantiated
by any
proof contrary to the PADPAO guidelines that the report on security guards been
based on “actual facts and not
on imaginary or personal considerations.” (Exh. 2). 
Besides, the letter was written almost three months after appellee’s employment with the D’Robe
Security Agency of which the appellant was the general manager had already been
terminated.  In fact, appellee’s
termination caused him to file a labor case against the D’Robe
Security Agency with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment docketed as NLRC
NRC No. 5-3833-82 and resulted in the payment of his back wages.  With this in mind, appellant was guided and
motivated by revenge in writing and sending the derogatory letter to the PADPAO
which, in the guise of an official
communication was designed to damage appellee’s name
as well as compromise his future employment with any security agency associated with the PADPAO.  In other words, this would result in the
blacklisting of appellee by prospective
employers.  In fact, appellee’s
employment with the RP Guardian
Security Agency hangs on a balance.  As a
consequence, he was dismissed; although he was re-hired after six months this
was on a temporary basis pending the
outcome of the present case. 
These significant facts evidently betray the conduct of appellant who
shall be denied the benefits of qualified
privilege and justify the imposition of personal liability to the appellee.

“A private communication, maliciously made by one person to
another, although in the performance of a legal, moral or social duty, is not privileged (Imperial vs. Ziga,
L-19726, April 13, 1967, 19 SCRA 726). 
According to Justice Street in his work, Foundation of Legal Liability,
quoted in U.S. vs. Canete,
et al., (38 Phil. 253), malice is a “term used to indicate the fact
that the defamer is prompted by personal ill-will or spite, and speaks not
merely in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person
defamed (People vs. De los Reyes, (CA) 47 O.G.
3569).”

(pp. 32-33, Rollo)

PREMISES CONSIDERED,
this petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.  The questioned decision of respondent Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman),
Padilla, Sarmiento, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Penned by Justice Jorge R. Coquia and concurred in by
Justices Josue N. Bellosillo
and Venancio D. Aldecoa,
Jr.