IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF:  LUCIEN TRAN VAN NGHIA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. RAMON J. LIWAG, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTA…

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
filed by Lucien Tran Van Nghia alleging that he was
arrested without warrant and deprived of his liberty by respondent Commissioner
of Immigration and Deportation and his agents.

Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is a
French national with temporary address in Sta. Ana, Manila.  Originally admitted to the Philippines
on November 1, 1981 as a
temporary visitor, his status was changed to that of an immigrant on November 16, 1984 based on his
representation that he is financially capable and will invest in the Philippines.  To date, however, petitioner has not made any
investment and has engaged only in French tutoring and practice of acupressure.

On May 28, 1987,
respondent CID Commissioner Ramon J. Liwag received a
sworn complaint from a certain Dionisio G. Cabrera,
Jr., allegedly petitioner’s landlord, accusing petitioner of being an
undesirable alien for “committing acts inimical to public safety and
progress.”^[1]

Acting thereon, respondent Commissioner Liwag
issued on June 1, 1987 a
mission order to a team of seven (7) CID agents for them “to locate and
bring subject to Intelligence Division for proper disposition” and
“submit report.”^[2]

On June 2, 1987,
the aforementioned CID agents went to petitioner’s residence in Sta. Ana to
invite the latter to the CID headquarters for verification of his status but
petitioner and his then lady companion reportedly locked themselves inside
their bedroom and refused to talk to the agents.

The immigration agents then sought the assistance of members of
the Western Police District.  Once again
petitioner adamantly refused to be taken in and in the ensuing struggle, both
petitioner and the lawmen were injured. 
Finally, petitioner was subdued and immediately taken to the CID
Intelligence Office.

A warrant of arrest was issued by respondent Commissioner on June 2, 1987 but there is nothing in
the records to convince this Court that said warrant was served on petitioner
prior to his apprehension.  Said warrant
was based on the following acts and circumstances:

“That he applied for and
was granted permanent status on his representation that he is financially
capable of investing in the Philippines but he made no investments but engaged
in tutoring in French and practice of acupressure; that he wilfully
refused to recognize the authority of immigration agents who were sent to
invite him to CID for verification of his status and physically resisted being
taken in by the agents resulting in physical injuries to himself and the
agents; that he has thereby made himself an undesirable alien subject to
deportation.”^[3]

By reason of the injuries he allegedly sustained when he was
“brutally seized” by the CID agents, petitioner, upon request of the
French consul, was transferred from his detention cell at the immigration
office to the Philippine General Hospital for urgent medical treatment.

On June 10, 1987,
petitioner’s counsel filed the instant petition for habeas corpus to avert the
“threatened removal” of petitioner from PGH and to question the valdity of his detention by respondent Commissioner.  A return of the writ was filed by the
Solicitor General and the Court heard the case on oral argument on June 17, 1987.  Thereafter, the parties were required to
submit their respective memoranda.

The core issue is the legality of the arrest and detention of
petitioner by the Immigration Commissioner preparatory to deportation
proceedings.  Petitioner insists that
respondent official has no power, authority or jurisdiction to cause his arrest
because under the 1987 Constitution, it is provided that “no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce x x
x.”^[4]

The aforesaid argument raised by petitioner has been resolved in
the case of Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago, G.R. No. 82544.  June
28, 1988, where the Court, through Madame Justice Melencio-Herrera, said: :

“‘The requirement of probable cause to be determined by a
Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.’ (Morano
vs. Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner, infra).  There need be no ‘truncated’ recourse to both
judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding.

“The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board
(G.R. No. 10280, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 27 [1963] reiterated in Vivo vs. Montesa, supra,
that under the express terms of our Constitution (the 1935 Constitution), it is
therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by
authority other than a judge if the purpose is merely to determine the
existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation.’

“What is essential is that there should be a specific charge
against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be
conducted (Section 37 [c]) with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that
the charge be substantiated by competent evidence.  x x x.”

The particular circumstances obtaining in the case at bar have
seriously placed on doubt the legality and propriety of petitioner’s
apprehension by respondent Commissioner. 
For unlike in the Harvey case where the warrantless
capture of two suspected alien pedophiles was based on probable cause
ascertained only after close surveillance for a three-month period during which
their activities were monitored, herein petitioner was “invited” by a
combined team of CID agents and police officers at his apartment unit on the
strength of a mission order issued by the Commissioner on Immigration based on
a sworn complaint of a single individual. 
The essential requisite of probable cause was conspicuously absent.

But even assuming that the arrest of petitioner was not legal at
the beginning, certain events have supervened to render his petition moot and
academic or to otherwise cure whatever defect there was at the inception of his
arrest.

Firstly, petitioner is no longer under confinement.  On June
20, 1987, petitioner was released upon the posting and approval of
a personal bailbond on June 19, 1987 in the amount of P20,000.00 during the pendency of the administrative proceedings by the CID or
until further orders of the Court.^[5]
The general rule in a number of cases is that the release, whether permanent or
temporary, of a detained person renders the petition for habeas corpus moot and
academic, unless there are restraints attached to his release which precludes
freedom of action, in which case the Court can still inquire into the nature of
his involuntary restraint under the Villavicencio vs.
Lukban rule.^[6]

In Moncupa vs. Enrile,
supra, the Court granted the writ of habeas corpus inspite
of the fact that petitioner Moncupa had been
temporarily released from detention on orders of the defense minister.  In the Moncupa
case, it was shown that attached to his discharge was the prohibition to
travel, to change his abode and to grant interviews to members of the mass
media without official permission.  He
was also ordered to report regularly to the military authorities.  The Court subsequently nullified said
conditions and ruled:

“Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the
petitioner.  It is not physical restraint
alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.  x x x.^[7]

“Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more
of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process,
where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary,
and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of
subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those
applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the
writ.”^[8]

Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is not
similarly restrained.  The only condition
in his bailbond is that ordinarily found in any other
analogous undertaking, which is “to appear and answer the complaint x x x; will at all times hold
himself x x x amenable to
the orders and processes of the Court; and after conviction, he will surrender
himself x x x in execution
of such judgment x x x.”^[9]

Secondly, records show that formal deportation proceedings have
been initiated against petitioner before the Board of Special Inquiry of the
CID.^[10]
The restraint (if any) against petitioner’s person has therefore become
legal.  The writ of habeas corpus has
served its purpose.^[11]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

So ordered.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.

^[1] Rollo, p. 38.

^[2] Rollo, p. 41.

^[3] Rollo, p. 44.

^[4] Article III, Section 2.

^[5] Rollo, pp. 46, 52 and 72.

^[6] Toyoto v. Fidel Ramos, G.R. No. 69270,
October 15, 1985, 139 SCRA 316; Moncupa v. Enrile, G.R. No. 63345, January 30, 1986, 141 SCRA
233.

^[7] Supra,
p. 236.

^[8] Supra, pp. 238-239.

^[9] Rollo, p. 52.

^[10] Rollo, p. 122.

^[11] Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago,
supra.