SPOUSES EUTIQUIANO CLUTARIO AND ARACELI CLUTARIO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GEORGE C. MACLI-ING, RTC JUDGE OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH C (100) AND SPOUSES MELQUIAD…

Private respondents, the Spouses Melquiades Gandia and Maria V.
Gandia, are the owners of a two-storey residential apartment located at No. 56 Liberty
St., Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City. Since
1961, while private respondents have been occupying the upper storey of the
house, petitioners have been staying on the ground floor by virtue of a verbal
lease agreement for a monthly rental of P150.00.

On May 9, 1980, private respondents, through their counsel, wrote
a letter to the petitioners giving them ninety (90) days to vacate the
premises. According to them, due to
their advanced age and failing health, they have decided to occupy the entire
apartment, including the ground floor leased to petitioners. Because petitioners did not heed the demand
letter, private respondents brought the matter to the Katarungan Pambarangay
for settlement, but this did not meet with success. Another demand letter was sent by private respondents to
petitioners on January 20, 1981.

In  the meantime, it appears
that from August 1980, petitioners were in arrears in the payment of their
rentals. On March 4, 1981, private
respondents filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioner Araceli Clutario^[1]
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Quezon City citing the following
two grounds: (1) their need for the
premises; and (2) non-payment of rentals by petitioners from August 1980. Pending the proceedings before the MTC, petitioners
paid the back rentals
from August 1980 until May 1981.

After trial, the MTC rendered judgment^[2] on
January 16, 1984 dismissing the complaint on the ground that private
respondents “failed to support their causes of action with substantial
evidence.”^[3]

Private respondents then filed an appeal with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City. On March 29, 1985, respondent Judge George C.
Macli-ing rendered a well-written decision reversing the MTC judgment. Respondent Judge ruled that petitioners’
non-payment of rentals for more than three months and private respondents’
genuine need for the leased premises are sufficient causes for petitioners’
ejectment. The dispositive portion of
the RTC decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and in lieu thereof, another one is rendered and
entered in favor of the appellants and against the appellees:

1. Ordering the defendants-appellees and all
persons claiming rights under them to vacate the premises, identified as the
Ground Floor of No. 56 Liberty Avenue, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City, and restore
possession thereof to plaintiffs-appellants.

2. Ordering defendants-appellees to pay rental
arrearages from June, 1981, at the rate of P150.00 per month, until such
arrearages shall have been fully paid and the premises vacated and possession
thereof restored to plaintiffs-appellants.

3. Ordering
defendants-appellees to pay P2,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.”^[4]

It was then petitioners’ turn to impugn this judgment by filing a
petition for review before the Court of Appeals. In a decision dated September 18, 1986,^[5] the
respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC judgment but deleted the award of
attorney’s fees to private respondents. Petitioners elevated the case before this Court, on a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Court
of Appeals’ decision affirming the RTC ruling that they can be ejected by their
lessors, the private respondents.

The petition is without merit.

B.P. Blg. 25 (1979), which was the governing law at the time of
the filing of the complaint and which the parties had to rely on, provides, in
section 5, six (6) grounds for ejectment.^[6] In
seeking to oust petitioners from the leased premises, private respondents
invoke two of those six grounds, namely: (1) arrears in payment of rent for three (3) months at any one time;^[7]
and (2) need of the lessors to repossess their property for their own use or
for the use of any immediate member of their family as a residential unit.^[8]
Petitioners contend that private respondents cannot avail of either ground.

No longer disputed is the rule that non-payment of rentals is a
sufficient ground for ejectment.^[9] Under
sec. 5 (b) of B.P. Blg. 25 (1979), the arrears in rent payment must be for at
least three (3) months. Petitioners started defaulting on their
payments in August 1980. On May 15,
1981, they paid P1,500.00 for their rents for the period August 1980 to May 15,
1981 at the rate of P150.00 per month. By then, they had been in arrears for nine (9) months. However, petitioners contend that private
respondents, by accepting the payment of the back rentals, waived their
non-payment of rentals for more than three (3) months as a ground for
ejectment.

The contention is without merit.

Case law is to the effect that the acceptance by the lessor of
the payment by the lessee of the rentals in arrears does not constitute a
waiver of the default in the payment of rentals as a valid cause of action for
ejectment.^[10]
The Court notes that when petitioners paid the back rentals on May 15, 1981,
private respondents had already filed the complaint for ejectment earlier, to
be specific, on March 4, 1981. The
conduct of private respondents subsequent to their acceptance of the back
rentals belies any intention to waive their right to eject petitioners
as a result of the latter’s failure to pay the rent for more than three (3)
months. They did not enter into an
amicable settlement with petitioners. Neither did they notify the trial court of their intention to have the
complaint dismissed. Instead, they
participated actively in the proceedings before the MTC during all the time
that the case dragged on for almost three years.^[11] When
the MTC decided adversely against them, private respondents appealed the
judgment to the RTC. Not only have they
participated earnestly in all subsequent proceedings even after they obtained
favorable judgments from the RTC and the Court of Appeals, but they have likewise
been consistent in their position that petitioners should be ejected, not only
because they need the leased premises, but also because of petitioners’ default
in the payment of rentals for more than three (3) months.

In light of the surrounding circumstances of the case, as well as
the prevailing jurisprudence, the Court rules that the acceptance by private
respondents of the petitioners-lessees’ back rentals did not constitute a
waiver or abandonment of their cause of action for ejectment against the
latter.

Proof of any one of the factors enumerated in section 5 of B.P.
Blg. 25 (1979) is sufficient cause for judicial ejectment of a lessee. Having proved one of such grounds, i.e.,
arrears in payment of rent for three (3) months at any one time, private
respondents may legally eject petitioners without having to prove the other
grounds for ejectment. Nevertheless, to
bolster their action for ejectment, private respondents invoked in their
complaint a second ground for ejectment, namely, their need for the leased
premises.^[12]

Petitioners are bound by the established jurisprudence that under
B.P. Blg. 25 (1979), the need by the lessor of the leased premises for his own
use or that of his immediate family is a valid ground for ejectment.^[13]
They, however, submit that this ground for ejectment is not available to
private respondents who own, apart from the disputed premises, three other
apartment units located at Nos. 56-A, 56-B and 56-C Liberty St., Murphy, Cubao,
Quezon City, at least one of which is allegedly available for occupancy by
private respondents.

Indeed, for the lessor to be able to validly eject the lessee on
the ground of need for the leased property, it must be shown that there is no
other available residential unit to satisfy that need.^[14]
The non-availability must exist at the time of the demand by the lessor on the
lessee to vacate the property.^[15] In
the instant case, petitioners allege that the other apartment units of private
respondents are vacant and available to the latter for occupancy.^[16]
Private respondents deny this allegation, claiming that the other units were
occupied when they gave notice to the petitioners to vacate the disputed
premises, and remain so occupied until now.^[17] None
of the three courts which have already adjudicated on the controversy gave
credence to petitioners’ allegation. The MTC which decided in petitioners’ favor did not make a finding that
the other apartment units of private respondents were available for occupancy
by the latter. On the contrary, the
respondent Court of Appeals ruled that “the other apartments of private
respondents were tenanted.”^[18] The
Court finds no cogent reason to disturb this finding.

The MTC, in deciding in favor of petitioners, ruled that private
respondents did not need the disputed premises which is the ground floor of the
apartment unit leased to petitioners, because they were already occupying the
upper floor of the unit. The relevant
portion of the MTC decision reads:

On this score, the evidence is clear that the plaintiffs, though
owners of the residential house identified as No. 56 Liberty Avenue, Murphy,
Quezon City, occupying the upper floor thereof, are the only persons living on
this upper floor of the house. The only
reason advanced by them for needing to repossess the ground floor or lower part
of the house occupied by the defendant, is because the plaintiffs are aging and
sickly, as according to the plaintiffs’ letter (Exh. “B”) to the
defendant, plaintiffs “personally need that lower portion of the house for
personal use and occupancy since they are getting older and aggravated by their
poor health, they get easily tired in going up and downstairs.” Obviously,
plaintiffs’ need of the lower portion of the house is for convenience. It is the view of this Court that when the
framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 included “need of the premises” as
a ground for judicial eviction, personal convenience is not intended, because
the law states clearly that the repossession of the property for the use of the
owner/lessor (or immediate member) must concur with the other requisites, one
of which is that the owner/lessor does not own any other residential unit.

Plaintiffs’ position therefore, on this ground, is not only weak but
more so not in accord with the spirit, intent and letter of Batas Pambansa Blg.
25. It may be true that plaintiffs are
sickly and aging but their physical condition is not a legal argument to effect
eviction of the defendant.^[19]

The need for the leased premises by the lessor as a valid ground
for ejectment has already been given a liberal interpretation in Caudal v.
Court of Appeals,^[20]
where it was held that the conversion of the leased property into a servants’
quarters was a legitimate need within the purview of sec. 5 (c) of B.P. Blg. 25
(1979). The Court, speaking through
then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, made the following statements:

Observe that the law does not strictly confine the meaning of the
word “residence” mainly for habitation purposes as restrictedly
interpreted by petitioner. In a way,
the definition admits a measure of liberality, albeit limited, since a
residence may also be the site of a home industry, or a retail store or be used
for business purposes so long as it is principally used for dwelling
purposes. The law in giving greater
importance to the abode being used principally for dwelling purposes, has set
the limitation on the maximum amount of capitalization to P5,000.00, which is
small by present standards.

Thus, if an abode can be used
for limited business purposes, we see
no reason why it cannot be used
as an abode for persons rendering services
usually necessary or desirable for the
maintenance and enjoyment of a home and
who personally minister to the personal
comfort and convenience of the members
of the houses.^[21]

In the case at bar, it appears that the decision of private
respondents to occupy both the lower and upper portions of the property sprang,
not only from mere convenience, but from necessity as well, due to their
advanced age and the poor health of respondent Melquiades Gandia. While the upper portion of the premises may
have been sufficient to satisfy private respondents’ residential needs in 1961
when they leased the lower portion to petitioners, it no longer sufficed in
1980 or nineteen (19) years later when they served the notice to vacate, their
personal circumstances having drastically changed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED
and the Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Bidin, Davide, Jr., and Melo, JJ.,
concur.

^[1]
Although petitioner Araceli Clutario was named sole defendant before the MTC,
she was joined by her husband, petitioner Eutiquiano Clutario, in all
subsequent proceedings.

^[2]
Penned by Judge Pacifico L. Punzalan.

^[3]
MTC Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 60.

^[4]
RTC Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 65.

^[5]
Penned by Justice Reynato S. Puno with the concurrence of Justice (now Supreme
Court Justice) Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Justice Venancio D. Aldecoa, Jr. of the
Twelfth (12th) Division of the Court of Appeals.

^[6]
SEC. 5. Grounds for Judicial Ejectment. —
Ejectment shall be allowed on the following grounds:

a. Subleasing or assignment of
lease of residential units in whole or in part, without the written consent of
the owner/lessor: Provided, That in the
case of subleases or assignments
executed prior to the approval of this Act, the sublessor/assignor shall have
sixty days from the effectivity of this Act within which to obtain the written
approval of the owner/lessor or terminate the sublease or assignment.

b. Arrears in payment of rent for
three (3) months at any one time: Provided,
That in case of refusal by the lessor to accept payment of the rental agreed
upon, the lessee shall either deposit, by way of consignation, the amount in
court, or in a bank in the name of and with notice to the lessor.

c. Need of owner/lessor to
repossess his property for his own use or for the use of any immediate member
of his family as a residential unit, such owner or immediate member not being
the owner of any other available residential unit: Provided, however, That the period of lease has
expired: Provided, further,
That the lessor has given the lessee notice three months in advance of the
lessor’s intention to repossess the property: and Provided, finally, That the owner/lessor or immediate
member stays in the residential unit for at least one year, except for
justifiable cause.

d. Ownership by the lessee of
another residential unit which he may use as his residence: Provided, That the lessee shall have
been notified by the lessor of the intended ejectment three months in advance.

e. Need of the lessor to make
necessary repairs of the leased premises which is the subject of an existing
order of condemnation by appropriate
administrative authorities concerned in order to make the said premises safe
and habitable: Provided, That after said
repair, the lessee ejected shall have the right of first refusal of the lease
of the same premises.

f. Expiration of the period of a written lease contract.

In no case shall the lessor or his successor-in­-interest be entitled
to eject the lessee upon the ground that the leased premises has been sold or
mortgaged to a third person.

^[7]
B.P. Blg. 25, sec. 5 (b).

^[8]
B.P. Blg. 25, sec. 5 (c).

^[9]
Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78538, October 25, 1989, 178 SCRA 671;
Ipapo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 72740, January 27, 1987, 147 SCRA
342. See also Ercillo v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 55361, December 10, 1990, 192 SCRA 163 which used Art.
1673 of the Civil Code instead of B.P. Blg. 25 for its ruling that the failure
of the lessee to pay rents is a ground for ejectment.

^[10]
Cetus Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 77647, 77648, 77649,
77650, 77651, 77652, August 7, 1989, 176 SCRA 72.

^[11]
The complaint was filed on March 4, 1981 and the MTC rendered judgment on
January 16, 1984.

^[12]
This was initially their only ground for seeking to eject petitioners when they
brought the matter to the Katarungan Pambarangay but subsequently, petitioners,
by being in arrears in the payment of rentals, provided them another cause for
ejectment.

^[13]
Galang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76221, July 29, 1991, 199 SCRA 683;
Pascua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76851, 78431, March 19, 1990, 183
SCRA 262; Mabutol v. Pascual, G.R. No. 60898, September 29, 1983, 124
SCRA 867.

^[14]
B.P. Blg. 25, sec. 5 (c).

^[15]
See Pascua v. Court of Appeals,
supra, note 12 at pp. 269­-271.

^[16]
Petition, p. 4; Rollo, p. 8.

^[17]
Comment, p. 2; Rollo, p. 111.

^[18]
Court of Appeals Decision, p. 4; Rollo, 40.

^[19]
MTC Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 59.

^[20]
G.R. No. 83414, July 31, 1989, 175 SCRA 798.

^[21]
Id., at 804-805. Underscoring supplied.