TOP FORM MFG. CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND JULIANA MALUBAY, RESPONDENTS.

Before Us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the decision of respondent National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), in its NCR Case No. AB-1-9943-81 entitled
“Juliana Malubay vs. Top Form Manufacturing (Phils.), Incorporated”
which ordered herein petitioner to reinstate private respondent Juliana Malubay
to her former position, without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
appertaining thereto with one (1) year backwages without deduction.

The antecedent facts of this case are as follows:

Private respondent Juliana Malubay began her employment with
petitioner Top Form Manufacturing (Phils.), Incorporated in March, 1979, as
Plant Supervisor, with a starting salary of P1,200.00 per month. She was initially assigned to supervise a
factory line of sixty machine operators. One month thereafter, she was given one more factory line, also with
sixty workers, to supervise. Sometime
in August, 1979, she was given a salary adjustment of P300.00 a month and in
February of the following year, another increment in salary was received by her
in the amount of P150.00 per month. Moreover, in October, 1980, she was promoted to the position of Over-All
Quality Supervisor in the first shift, from 5:45 a.m. to 1:45 p.m. with a
corresponding increase in salary of P350.00 a month. As such Head Supervisor, she had control and supervision over the
entire first shift consisting of 120 machine operators and some six
line-in-charge. She was also
responsible not only for the production and output but also for the quality of
products. In addition to her functions,
she was likewise given the task of training newly-hired factory workers and of
supervising the repair group composed of several employees.

On January 10, 1981, a Saturday, at about 2:00 o’clock in the
afternoon, private respondent and her co-supervisors were called to a meeting
at the conference room by Dickson Chan, Production Manager. During the conference, Dickson Chan reviewed
and examined as usual the production report for the day and he declared that he
was not satisfied with the production output, berating private respondent and
the other supervisors, thus:

“You Filipinos are lazy people and your Philippine laws are no
good, even your government is no good. In Hong­kong, factory workers can buy the most expensive foods and
clothes in the world, but, here you Filipinos are like beggars, it is just
because you are all lazy.”

Thereafter, he crumpled the production report and again threw
invectives at private respondent and her co-supervisors, to wit:

“You are bullshits, you Filipinos, get out, you are all lazy,
you are like pigs, all of you go home. I do not want to see your face again.”

Not satisfied and contended with what he had said. Dickson Chan picked up the stapler on his
desk and, but for some better impulse, would have thrown the same at private
respondent and her companions who, frightened, as they were, dispersed.

As a result of this unfortunate incident, private respondent told
and instructed her co-supervisors, “Huwag pumasok sa lunes para matauhan
si Dickson.” Thus, on the next
working day, January 12, 1981, a Monday, they absented themselves from
work. However, on January 13, 1981, she
and her companions reported for work.

On January 16, 1981, petitioner filed an application for
clearance to terminate the services of private respondent on the ground of
“Loss of Management Confidence”. Meanwhile, private respondent was placed under preventive suspension
leading to her termination effective January 13, 1981.

Thereafter, on January 19, 1981, private respondent filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against herein petitioner before the Ministry
of Labor and Employment, National Capital Region, Arbitration Branch in Manila.

On May 29, 1981, Labor Arbiter Conrado O. Lasquite rendered a
decision dismissing private respondent’s complaint. However, upon elevation of the matter to the NLRC, said body, in
a decision dated December 29, 1982, reversed the Arbiter and accordingly
disposed:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the
Decision appealed from is hereby set aside and another one entered, directing
the respondent company, thru its responsible officials, to reinstate
complainant to her former position without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges appertaining thereto with one (1) year backwages without deduction
considering that complainant is not entirely blameless.

SO ORDERED.” (p. 8, NLRC’s Decision; p. 23, Rollo.)

On March 2, 1983, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
of the aforementioned decision of the NLRC but the same was denied on October
12, 1983, for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant petition.

Very simply, the crux of the matter to be resolved in the
petition is whether or not private respondent’s services may be terminated or
loss of trust and confidence.

Petitioner argues that respondent Malubay committed willful
breach of trust and confidence reposed upon her when she agitated and led the
boycott against petitioner. It is
further averred that private respondent was not merely a participant in the
drama but the leader of the maverick group of supervisors who staged the
boycott; that Malubay, as a managerial employee, being Head Supervisor of the
entire first shift consisting of 120 machine operators, her powers and
functions are central to the effective operation of the company which entails
the conferment of the highest degree of trust and confidence, but because of
what she did, she had shown her unworthiness to continue in the employ of the
company.

On the other hand, private respondent submits that the
contentions of the petitioner are devoid of merit. Private respondent claims that she cannot be dismissed for loss
of trust and confidence if said prerogative of the employer is abusively and
whimsically exercised. As a matter of
fact, according to private respondent, it was Dickson Chan who was at fault
when the latter vituperated against private respondent and the other supervisors
present at the conference. Private
respondent further asserts that Chan maligned not only the employees but also
the entire Filipino people, the laws and the government of this Republic, so
that the company should have understood her feelings and actions.

The petition is well-taken.

The employer has a distinct prerogative to dismiss an employee if
the former has ample reason to distrust the latter or if there is sufficient
evidence to show that the employee has been guilty of breach of trust. This authority of the employer to dismiss an
employee cannot be denied whenever acts of violation are noted by the
employer. The law does not require
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee’s misconduct before the employer
can invoke such justification. It is
sufficient that there is some basis for the loss of trust or that the employer
has reasonable grounds to believe that the employee is responsible for the
misconduct and that the nature of the employee’s action renders the employee
unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of the position (Valladolid
vs. Inciong, 121 SCRA 205 [1983]; DOLE Philippines Inc. vs. NLRC,
123 SCRA 673 [1983]: Ocean Terminal
Services, Inc. vs. NLRC. 197 SCRA 491 [1991]; Baguio Country Club
Corporation vs. NLRC and GENOVE, G.R. No. 102397, September 4, 1992).

It is an inherent right of the employer to dismiss an employee
for loss of confidence. We have a
plethora of decisions that supports and recognizes this authority of the
employer to cut its relationship with the employee. In the case at bar, it is an admitted fact that private
respondent is an employee occupying a high managerial position which entails
great responsibility. Thus, petitioner
was justified in terminating the employment of the private respondent when she
committed acts inimical to her employer’s interest. We shall not belabor the time-honored tenet that while the law
protects the rights of the employee, it cannot authorize the oppression or
self-destruction of the employer. As We
ruled in Almira vs. B.F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. (58 SCRA 120
[1974]), through then Chief Justice Enrique Fernando:

“…The basic doctrine underlying the provisions of the Constitution
so solicitous of labor as well as the applicable statutory norms is that both
the working force and the management are necessary components of the
economy. The right of labor has been
expanded. Concern is evident for its
welfare. The advantages thus conferred,
however, call for attendant responsibilities. The ways of the law are not to be ignored. Those who seek comfort from the shelter that it affords should be
the last to engage in activities which negate the very concept of a legal order
as antithetical to force and coercion… It is even more important that reason
and not violence should be its milieu.” (at pp. 131-132.)

In the present petition. We cannot condone the act of private respondent in inciting her
co-supervisors and leading them in the boycott and wildcat strike. As aptly observed by the Labor Arbiter:

“Even assuming that complainant was berrated by her Production
Manager due to under par production output, her remedy is not to sabotage or
boycott company operations; she should have gone to higher management levels in
order to redress her grievances against her abusive immediate superior. Getting even with the company for the
misdeed of only one person, the Production Manager, is totally uncalled
for.” (p. 4, Labor Artiber’s
Decision; p. 14, Rollo.)

Further, We have laws to protect her and her co-supervisors from
oppressive foreigners. She should not
have taken the laws in her own hands. Private respondent should have viewed the incident between her and the
Production Manager from a professional point of view. However, due to her precipitate and irrational action, she hurt
the company instead.

The Labor Code, specifically Article 283, acknowledges the right
of the employer to put an end to the covenant with the employee, thus:

“Termination by employer. – An employer may terminate an employee for any of the following
just causes:

a. x x x

b. x x x

c. Fraud and willful breach
by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or his duly
authorized agent.”

It cannot be gainsaid, in this regard, that the act of private
respondent in initiating and leading the boycott, thereby disrupting and
impairing company operations, is sufficient reason for petitioner to lose its
trust and con­fidence on private respondent, considering that the latter is a
managerial employee of the company whose position carries the corresponding
highest degree of responsibility in improving and upholding the interests of
the employer and in exemplifying the utmost standard of discipline and good
conduct among her co-employees. Withal,
the termination of her employment is justified.

In the light of the foregoing, We are of the opinion, and so
hold, that respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
reinstatement of Malubay because Top Form Mfg. (Phils.), Inc. had just cause to
dispense with the services of private respondent. Nonetheless, considering that Juliana Malubay had worked with the
company, as the record shows, with zeal, competence and dedication with no
known previous bad record, the ends of social and compassionate justice would
be well served if she is paid full separation pay (National Steel
Corporation vs. Leogardo, Jr., 130 SCRA 502 [1984]: Engineering Equipment, Inc. vs. NLRC,
133 SCRA 752, [1984]; Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. of the Phils. vs.
Lariosa, 148 SCRA 187 [1987]).

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission dated December 29, 1982 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Top Form Manufacturing (Phils.),
Incorporated is directed to pay private respondent Juliana Malubay separation
pay to which she may be entitled under the law, or any collective bargaining
agreement or company rules or practice, whichever is higher.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Bidin, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.