AVELINO BANAAG, ROSABEL B. BANAAG AND ROWENA B. BANAAG (THE LAST TWO BEING REPRE­SENTED BY THE FORMER AS THEIR FATHER), PETITIONERS, VS. MANUEL S. BARTOLOME, ESTANISLAO S. BARTO…

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court filed on 28 October 1986, petitioners urge this Court to
review and reverse the decision dated 13 October 1986 of the Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 66054^[1]
affirming the decision dated 30 August 1979 of the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Laguna and San Pablo City in Civil Case No. SP-1105 which declared null and void, for
being simulated, a deed of sale of two (2) parcels of land located in San Pablo
City executed by the spouses Ildefonso Bartolome and Adelaida Jaro in favor of
their daughter Rosaura.

The antecedent facts as summarized by the respondent Court are as
follows:

“Ildefonso Bartolome and Adelaida Jaro were husband and
wife.  They had two legitimate children,
Rosaura Bartolome and Guillermo Bartolome. 
Guillermo died at the age of 12.

During their marriage, the spouses Ildefonso Bartolome and Adelaida
Jaro, in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated, May 10, 1946, acquired two parcels of
land from Maria Ambray in consideration of the sum of P500.00.  These properties (Lot No. 5 and Lot No. 10)
were registered in both their names under Original Certificate of Title No.
0-12 (Exh. “21”) and were described therein as follows:

`1. A parcel of land
(Lot No. 5, plan SWO. – 22182, Psu-117212. 
Case No. 49, G.L.R.O. Record No. 1508), situated in the City of San
Pablo, Province of Laguna.  x x x
containing an area of three thousand one hundred and nineteen  (3,119) square meters, more or less.  x x x

2.  A parcel of land (Lot No. 10, plan SWO. –
22182, Psu-117212, Case No. 49, G.L.R.O. Record No. 1508), situated in the City
of San Pablo, Province of Laguna.  x x x
containing an area of one thousand one hundred and one (1,101) square meters, more
or less.  x x x’

On December 31, 1949, the above-described properties were sold by
the spouses to their daughter Rosaura Bartolome for the price of P1.00 in a Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by them (Exh. B).  This is the
document that was declared void by the Lower Court.

By virtue of this Deed of Absolute Sale, Rosaura was issued
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-582 covering the properties described in
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-12.

Later, a guardianship
proceeding for the incompetent Adelaida Jaro was brought in the Court of First
Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City (Sp. Proc. No. 4322), where Rosaura was
appointed guardian of the property and person of her mother.  In the submitted inventory of the estate of
Adelaida Jaro Lot No. 5 and Lot No. 10 were included, as being owned by
her.  In this same proceeding, Rosaura,
as the guardian of Adelaida Jaro asked for authority to sell the whole of Lot
No. 10 and a portion of Lot No. 5 in order that a house may be constructed from
the proceeds thereof.  This was granted
by the Court and on August 31, 1951, Rosaura transferred ownership of the
following properties to the Young Man’s (sic) Christian Association (San Pablo
Branch).

‘1.  A parcel of land (Lot No. 10, plan SWO,
22182, Case No. 49, G.L.R.O. Record No. 1508), situated in the City of San Pablo, Province of Laguna.  x x x containing an area of one thousand one
hundred and one (1,101) square meters, more or less.  Covered by Transfer Certificate No. T-582.

2.  A parcel of land Lot No. 5-B of the
sub-division, (being a portion of Lot No. 5, Psu-117212 and described in the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 582), situated in the City of San Pablo.  x x x Containing an area of ONE THOUSAND
EIGHT HUNDRED AND THIRTY (1,830) sq. m. more or less.’

Following this, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 663 was issued in
the name of Rosaura for the remaining portion of the property (Lot No. 5-B).

In 1959, Rosaura Bartolome married Avelino Banaag.  They had two children — Rosabel and Rowena
Banaag.

On June 14, 1961, Rosaura died and Ildefonso Bartolome replaced her
as guardian of incompetent Adelaida Jaro in the guardianship proceeding Sp.
Proc. No. 4322.  Since the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-663 in the name of Rosaura was
included in the inventory of the estate of Adelaida Jaro, the two children of
Rosaura, as represented by their father, brought a case (Civil Case No. SP-642)
against Adelaida Jaro, as represented by her guardian Ildefonso Bartolome.  In this case (Civil Case No. SP-642), Rowena
and Rosabel Banaag asked for the removal of the cloud cast upon the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-663.  This case (SP-642) was decided in accordance
with a compromise agreement signed by both parties which states:

‘1.  That
both parties hereto now agree to
consider Rosabel Bartolome-Banaag and Rowena Bartolome-Banaag, plaintiffs, as
owners in common of the following property:

‘A parcel of land (lot No. 5-B of the Subdivision plan Psd-33880
being portion of Lot 5 described on plan Psu-117212.  G.L.R.O. Record No. 1508), situated in the
City of San Pablo.  Bounded on the NW.,
and NE., by Lot 5-A of the subdivision plan; on the SE., by Lot 11 of plan
Psu-117212; and on the SW., by Provincial Road x x x containing an area of ONE
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE (1,289) Square Meters, more or less, by reason of which said Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-663 registered
in the name of Rosaura Bartolome in the Registry of Deeds of the City of San
Pablo, may be cancelled and transferred in the names of Rosabel Bartolome-Banaag,
minor and Rowena Bartolome-Banaag, minor, Filipinos, and residing at the City
of San Pablo;’

2.   That in consideration of the foregoing, the plaintiffs, Rosabel
Bartolome-Banaag and Rowena Bartolome-Banaag and their father and guardian ad-litem,
Avelino Banaag, hereby grant unto and recognize the exclusive, irrevocable, and
unlimited rights of the spouses Ildefonso Bartolome and Adelaide Jaro to enjoy
and/or reap or receive the fruits, income, or usufruct of the above property,
for as long as any of said spouses live, and for that reason Ildefonso
Bartolome and/or his spouse can possess, occupy, or even lease the said
property in any manner and for whatever terms and conditions he or she deems
best, without the necessity of asking the prior consent of the plaintiffs or
anybody else, but should both spouses Ildefonso Bartolome and Adelaida Jaro
predecease the plaintiffs the subsequent income to be derived from the contract
of lease of the lot after the death of said spouses will already go to Rosabel
B. Banaag and Rowena B. Banaag;

3.   That it is also agreed upon by the parties
hereto, that the house erected on the above mentioned lot is to be considered
as the exclusive and separate property of Adelaida Jaro, and as regards the
other improvements on said lot, the same should be considered and treated as
the separate and exclusive property of Ildefonso Bartolome, as it was the
latter who introduced and placed the same thereon;

4.   That during the lifetime of the spouse (sic)
Ildefonso Bartolome and Adelaida Jaro, none of the parties hereto can mortgage
or sell the property described in paragraph 1 above, except when all the
parties hereto agree in writing to mortgage or sell the same;

5.   That should the plaintiffs Rosabel
Bartolome-Banaag and Rowena Bartolome-Banaag predecease the spouses Ildefonso
Bartolome and Adelaida Jaro, it is agreed upon that one-half (1/2) of the
property described in paragraph 1 will revert to the spouses Ildefonso
Bartolome and Adelaida Jaro, and the other half, to Avelino Banaag and other
plaintiffs’ heirs and successore-in-­interest (sic);

6.   That it is likewise agreed upon that the
above agreements mentioned in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 may be annotated on the
back of the title of the land described in paragraph 1, but whether or not they
are annotated thereon, the said agreements are nevertheless binding and
effective to (sic) parties hereto, their privies, successors, administrators,
executors and assigns;

7.   That in view of the foregoing agreement, the
plaintiffs and the defendant agree to exclude the land described in paragraph 1
from the inventory of the estate of the incompetent, Adelaida Jaro in Special
Proceeding No. 4322, entitled:  In re:  Guardianship of the incompetent Adelaida
Jaro;

8.   That should any of the agreements mentioned
in paragraphs 2 to 6 of the foregoing be declared void, or nullified by the
plaintiffs, their privies, executors, kins (sic), administrators and successors
in interests (sic), it is understood
that all the other agreements above mentioned should likewise be
considered void or nullified, and in that event,
the property described in paragraph 1 of this compromise agreement will
revert to the ownership of the conjugal estate of the spouses Ildefonso
Bartolome and Adelaida Jaro, as when it was originally registered in their
names; and on the other hand, should Ildefonso Bartolome or his spouse sell or
mortgage said property (Lot) without the written Consent of all parties hereto,
the guilty party or parties would forfeit or lose his or her right to the
usufruct and other benefits stipulated in the paragraph 2 above;

9.   That the guardian ad-litem, Avelino Banaag,
husband of the late  Rosaura Bartolome,
waives and renounces in favor of the plaintiffs his right and interest to the
property described in paragraph 1 of this compromise agreement;

10. That except for
the foregoing agreements, the plaintiffs and the defendant waive and renounce
any further claim or counter-claim one may have against each other in the above
entitled case;’

Pursuant to the said decision in Civil Case No. SP-642, the Court,
in the guardianship proceeding of incompetent Adelaida Jaro issued an order
excluding the lot covered by TCT No. T-663, then registered in the name of Rosaura, from the
inventory of the estate of Adelaida Jaro. 
Thereafter, TCT No. T-663 was cancelled and TCT No. 6215 was issued in
the names of Rosabel Banaag and Rowena Banaag.

Beginning June, 1949, Ildefonso Bartolome carried an extra-marital
relationship with Constancia Santiago, a widow. 
Out of this relationship, 4 children were born namely:  Manuel, born on May 10, 1951; Estanislao,
born on September 28, 1952; Minerva Expedita, born on April 19, 1956; and
Peter, born on June 29, 1966.  Upon
Adelaida Jaro’s death on January 8, 1968, Constancia Santiago, and her children
with Ildefonso Bartolome started residing in the house constructed on the lot
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6215, now registered in the
names of Rosabel Banaag and Rowena Banaag.

After the death of Ildefonso Bartolome on Feb. 22, 1972, several
demands to leave the premises were made on Constancia Santiago and her
children, by the Banaag family.  It was
only then that Constancia Santiago and her children found out about the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed between Maria Ambray and the spouses Ildefonso Bartolome
and Adelaide Jaro and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed between the said
spouses and their daughter, Rosaura Bartolome.

Shortly after, on April 28,
1973, Constancia Santiago and her children by Ildefonso Bartolome
(plaintiffs-appellees in this case) brought a complaint to annul the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed between spouses Ildefonso Bartolome and Adelaida Jaro
and their daughter, Rosaura Bartolome. 
Avelino Banaag, Rosabel, Banaag, and Rowena Banaag
(defendants-appellants in this case) filed a motion to dismies (sic) but the
Court denied it for lack of merit and ordered the plaintiffs to amend their
complaint to clarify their status — whether Legitimate, acknowledged natural
children, or otherwise illegitimate children of the deceased Ildefonso
Bartolome.  Trial on the merits was had
in due course.

On August 30, 1979, the Lower Court rendered a decision with the following
dispositive portion:

‘WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1)  declaring the Deed of
Absolute Sale, Annex “A” of the petition and marked Exhibit
“B”, null and void for being simulated;

(2)  ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel
Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-6215 in the name of herein plaintiffs (sic) Rosabel Bartolome-Banaag and
Rowena Barto­lome-Banaag and to issue in lieu thereof another certificate of
title covering the same parcel of land and improvements existing thereon in the
following proportion:

(a)  to defendants Rosabel Bartolome-Banaag and
Rowena Bartolome?Banaag, 805.625 square meters in equal pro indiviso
share;

(b)  to plaintiffs Manuel S. Bartolome, Estanislao
S. Bartolome and Expedita S. Bartolome and Peter S. Bartolome, minor, 483.375
square meters in equal pro­-indivisio (sic) share;

(c)   dismissing defendants counterclaim and the
parties to bear respectively their
own expense of litigation.

No pronouncements as
to costs.

SO ORDERED.’”^[2]

Petitioners appealed this decision to the then Intermediate
Appellate Court, assigning the following errors:

“I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REVOKING
A FINAL DECISION IN ANOTHER CASE
WHICH IS NOT A SUBJECT OF THE LITIGATION.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NULLIFYING THE DEED OF SALE EXHIBIT
“B”.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT THE HOUSE IS PART OF THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF ILDEFONSO BARTOLOME AND
ADELAIDA JARO.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT UPON MOTION
OF DEFENDANTS.

V

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
THE AMENDMENT OF THE DEFECTIVE, ORIGINAL COMPLAINT WHICH ALLEGES NO CAUSE OF
ACTION.

VI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING
PLAINTIFFS ACKNOWLEDGED SPURIOUS CHILDREN OF ILDEFONSO BARTOLOME, THRU
AUTHENTIC WRITINGS, AND CONTINOUS (SIC)
POSSESSION OF THE STATUS
OF A CHILD OF ILDEFONSO BARTOLOME.”^[3]

In its decision^[4]
of 13 October 1986, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the lower court’s
judgment, making the following disquisitions:

1)  Although it is true that by the lower court’s
decision in Civil Case No. SP-1105 it rendered the compromise judgment in Civil
Case No. SP-642 without effect, the lower court did not err in so deciding as
what was put in issue in the earlier case (Civil Case No. SP-642) was the
inclusion of the property in the inventory of the estate of Adelaida Jaro.  The validity of the contract of sale was not
passed upon in said case.  In fact, the
compromise agreement would not have been entered into had there been no
contract of sale between Rosaura Bartolome and her parents.

2) The finding that
the sale is null and void for being simulated is well founded.  Lot Nos. 10 and 5-B were bought by the
spouses.  IIdefonso Bartolome and
Adelaida Jaro for P500.00.  Three (3)
years later, the same lots were purchased by Rosaura for only P1.00.  Not
only that, only two (2) years later, Rosaura herself, on behalf of her mother,
sold Lot No. 10 and a portion of Lot No. 5 for as much as P12,000.00.  While as a rule the law does not require for
validity of a sale that the price be adequate, it ordains that the price be
real and not fictitious.  In the case at
bar, “the inadequacy of price was so gross as to shock the conscience of
man.  The price was not merely inadequate
but fictitious and simulated.”

3) Neither did the
lower court err in considering the house standing on Lot No. 5-B as part of the
conjugal property of the spouses Ildefonso Bartolome and Adelaida Jaro.  Defendants (petitioners) themselves admit
that the money used to construct said house came from the proceeds of the sale
of Lot No. 10 and a portion of Lot No. 5-B to YMCA.  Since said lots were undeniably purchased by
said spouses during their marriage, and
thus are conjugal property, consequently, the subject house is conjugal
property.

4) The trial court
did not err in denying the motion to dismiss because, contrary to defendants’
(petitioners’) contention, plaintiffs had capacity to sue notwithstanding
minority at the time of the filing of their complaint since they were duly
represented by their mother. 
Furthermore, they have successfully proven their status as acknowledged
spurious children of Ildefonso Bartolome through authentic writing as well as
testimonial evidence presented during the trial of this case.  Hence, the plaintiffs had all the right to
question the validity of the contract of sale entered into by their father as
said land could have been passed on to them upon his death.

Nor could the complaint be dismissed on the ground that it failed
to state a cause of action in view of the fact that plaintiffs merely alleged
that they are children and heirs of Ildefonso Bartolome without any proof
thereof.  A complaint should not be
dismissed for insufficiency even if the allegations therein are ambiguous,
indefinite or uncertain if a cause of action can nonetheless be made out therefrom.  As already stated, plaintiffs alleged that
they are children of Ildefonso Bartolome. 
It is obvious that if such claim is proven and the document sought to be
annulled is declared void, as was done by the trial court, the plaintiffs
(private respondents) have a right to inherit a portion of the property left by
their father.

5) 
Anent the finding that plaintiff?appellees (private respondents)
are acknowledged spurious children of Ildefonso Bartolome, the
record of this case reveals that the decision of the trial court is supported
by both documentary and testimonial evidence. 
The testimonies of Carmen
Bartolome (sister of the late Ildefonso Bartolome), Constancia Santiago, and
Manuel Bartolome himself (one of the private respondents) indubitably show that
plaintiffs (private respondents) had been in continuous possession of the
status of illegitimate children of Ildefonso Bartolome.  On the other hand, documentary evidence on
record proved that Ildefonso Bartolome, during his lifetime, voluntarily recognized
the plaintiffs (private respondents) as his spurious children.  These consist of:  (1) report cards of private respondents with
the signature of Ildefonso found on the space provided at the back thereof for
parent’s signature; (2) Ildefonso’s SSS Form dated 11 August 1970 wherein plaintiffs (private
respondents) were named as dependents and new beneficiaries; (3) Ildefonso’s
income tax return for 1968 wherein plaintiffs (private respondents) were listed
as his dependents; (4) Ildefonso’s statement of income and assets for 1969
wherein plaintiffs (private respondents) were listed as family members; (5) SSS
Form on distribution of death benefits wherein one?half (1/2) of the
death benefits was allotted to plaintiffs (private respondents); (6) the Deed
of Waiver executed by petitioner Avelino Banaag admitting plaintiffs (private
respondents) are children of the late Ildefonso Bartolome; and (7) photographs
showing the late Ildefonso Bartolome together with Constancia Santiago and
plaintiffs (private respondents).

Dissatisfied with the above decision, petitioners took this
present recourse, making the following assignment of errors in their Brief:

“I

THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED WHEN IT
SUSTAINED THE ALTERATION AND REVOCATION OF THE FINAL DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO.
SP-642 OF THEN COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SAN PABLO CITY, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN
THE SUBJECT OF THIS INSTANT CASE BY:

(a) CANCELING THE
T.C.T. NO. T-6215 ALREADY IN THE NAMES OF THE PETITIONERS HEREIN ROSABEL AND
ROWENA BARTOLOME BANAAG PURSUANT TO SAID DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. SP-642; AND

(b) DECLARING THE
HOUSE ERECTED ON COVERED BY T.C.T NO. 6215 AS CONJUGAL PROPERTY WHEN IT HAS ALREADY BEEN DECLARED AS EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY OR PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY
OF THE LATE ADELAIDA JARO, PURSUANT ALSO TO THE SAID DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. SP-642

II

THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED WHEN IT
SUSTAINED THE DECISION CIVIL
CASE SP-1105 ALSO AT THE CFI OF SAN PABLO
CITY, WHEN IT DECLARED:  THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS HEREIN AS ACKNOWLEDGED SPURIOUS CHILDREN OF THE LATE ILDEFONSO
BARTOLOME WHEN THE SAID RESPONDENTS DID NOT ASK FOR IT IN THEIR PRAYER IN THE COMPLAINT, CONSIDERING THAT
THE COMPLAINT IS FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE DEED
OF ABSOLUTE SALE, ANNEX “A”, (EXH. “B”).”^[5]

In the resolution^[6]
of 26 November 1986, We gave due course to the instant petition and required
private respondents to file an answer thereto, which they complied with on 24
February 1987.^[7]

On 18 May 1987, We required both
parties to submit their respective briefs which petitioners complied
with on 13 July 1987^[8]
and the private respondents on 25 August 1987.^[9]
Petitioners filed a Reply Brief on 24 March 1988.^[10]

We find no merit in
this petition.  Respondent Court did not
commit any reversible error.

I

Respondent Court correctly ruled that the validity of the deed of
sale in question was not raised in Civil Case No. SP No. 642.  Private respondents were neither parties in
said case nor in privity with the parties therein.  The decision therein, based on a compromise
agreement, cannot bind them.

As We stated in Tan, et al. vs. Barrios, et al.:^[11]

“Res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt.  ‘Matters adjudged in a cause do not prejudice
those who were not parties to it.’ (54 C.J. 719).  It is a cardinal rule of procedure that a
court’s judgment or order in a case shall not adversely affect persons who
were not parties to the self same case (Icasiano vs. Tan, 84 Phil. 860).”

The rule then that when a right or fact
has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,
so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and
those in privity with them,^[12]
cannot be invoked in this case.  It may
be true that one of the signatories to the compromise agreement in that case is
Ildefonso Bartolome, natural father of private respondents.  However, he signed as guardian of incompetent
Adelaide Jaro.  The introductory portion
of the compromise agreement^[13]
explicitly states:

“The plaintiffs, represented by their father and guardian ad-litem, AVELINO BANAAG, and the
defendant, represented by her guardian ILDEFONSO BARTOLOME, x x x respectfully submit, for
approval and judgment, the following terms of compromise agreement, viz:  x x
x.”

Besides, at the time the compromise agreement was signed and the
decision approving the same was handed down, private respondents Manuel,
Estanislao, Expedita and Peter, all surnamed Bartolome, were still minors

II

On the second assigned error, petitioners assert that it was
erroneous for the court to declare the private respondents as recognized and
acknowledged illegitimate children of the late Ildefonso Bartolome when such a
declaration was not asked for. 
Precisely, private respondents merely assumed and thereafter alleged
that they were duly acknowledged spurious children of Ildefonso Bartolome
without seeking the declaration of such status by a competent court as is
required.^[14]
They contend further that both the
lower court and the appellate court erred in considering:  (1) the
report cards, SSS Form dated 11 August 1970 and the other documentary evidence
submitted as “authentic documents” in the light of Article 278 of the
New Civil Code; and (2) that private respondents
have been in continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children of
Ildefonso Bartolome as shown by the direct acts of the latter and his family.^[15]

Three (3) issues
are presented by this assignment of error: 
(1) whether or not the trial court could properly declare private
respondents as recognized spurious children of Ildefonso Bartolome
notwithstanding their failure to ask for such declaration; (2) whether or not
the documents executed by Ildefonso Bartolome and presented in evidence are
authentic writings which effectively
operate as a recognition of private respondents as his spurious children, even
if no action was brought by the latter to compel the former during his lifetime
to give such recognition; and (3) whether or not private respondents have been
in continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children of Ildefonso Bartolome.

As this case was
litigated and decided by the trial court prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, the rights of the parties shall be determined in accordance with the law
then applicable, Book I of the New Civil Code. 
The latter provides two (2) modes of acknowledgment of illegitimate
issues:  (1) by voluntary recognition by
the putative parent made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record or in an authentic writing under Article 278 of the Civil Code;
and (2) by compulsory recognition under the circumstances mentioned in Article
283 of the same law, which includes continuous possession of the status of a
child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or his
family.  Recognition is compulsory when
by court action, the child causes the putative parent to acknowledge his
filiation.  It is also called judicial
recognition.^[16]

Apparently, petitioners
have miscomprehended the complaint filed by private respondents in Civil Case No. SP-1105, erroneously mistaking it to be one for
compulsory recognition of the latter as illegitimate children of Ildefonso
Bartolome.  This accounts for their
insistence that the court erred in making such a declaration without private
respondents asking for it.  Private
respondents did not ask for such declaration because they were not
seeking to oblige their putative father to recognize them as his spurious
children.  On the contrary, as shown in
their amended complaint, private respondents claim that they have already been
voluntarily recognized by Ildefonso Bartolome as such.  It is by virtue of said voluntary recognition
that they claim to have hereditary rights in the estate of Ildefonso
Bartolome, which allegedly includes the property subject of the Deed of Sale sought to be annulled.  In compliance with fundamental rules of
procedure, private respondents presented evidence in the course of the trial to
prove their allegations:  Clearly
therefore, the trial court could properly make a finding on whether said
allegations of private respondents are supported by their evidence.

The two (2) other related
issues on voluntary recognition thru authentic writings and the continuous possession of status are purely factual. 
On this matter, the respondent Court held:

“x x x.  A careful examination of the record of the case reveals that the decision of the
trial court is supported by
evidence and applicable jurisprudence. 
Withal, there is no error
in factor law that would merit a
reversal or modification of the
same.”^[17]

Respondent Court did indeed make
a thorough examination, as evidenced by its careful and
meticulous appraisal and evaluation of the facts.

The general rule is
that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the
Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing
or revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive;^[18]
it is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over
again.  It is only in exceptional
circumstances where this Court may review findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals.  In Remalante vs.
Tibe et al.,^[19] this Court took the occasion to
enumerate such exceptional circumstances:

“In several decisions of recent vintage [Rizal Cement Co.,
Inc. v. Villaruel, G.R. No. L30272, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 15; Ramos v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-25463, April 4, 1975, 63 SCRA 331; Garcia v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. L-26490, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 623; Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Co., G.R. No. L-22533,
February 9, 1967, 19 SCRA 289], the Court summarized and enumerated the
exceptional circumstances that would compel the Supreme Court to review
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, to wit:

(1)  when the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures [Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil.
257 (1953)];

(2)   when  the inference made is  manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible
[Luna v. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15 (1942)];

(3)   when
there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts [Buyco v.
People, 95 Phil. 253 (1954)];

(4)  
when the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts [De la Cruz
v. Sosing, 94 Phil. 26  (1953).; Castillo
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-48290, September 29, 1983, 124 SCRA 808];

(5)   when
the findings of fact are conflicting [Casica v. Villaseca, 101 Phil. 1205
(1957)]; and

(6)  
when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee [Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Ins. Co., Inc., 103  Phil. 401 (1958)].”

Then added, by way of footnote, are the
following:

“x x x:  … (7) the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents [Garcia
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
L-26490, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 622]; (10) the finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by
the evidence on record [Salazar v. Gutierrez,
G.R. No. L-21727, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 242].

However, in Garcia, supra,
the Court considered exception Nos. 7, 8 and 9 as circumstances that, taken
together, compelled it to go into the record of the case in order to find out
whether or not it fell within any of the six established exceptions.

On the other hand, exception No. 10 may be considered as an
illustration of the fourth exception — that
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.”

At least four (4) of the documents presented in evidence by the
private respondents, namely, Ildefonso Bartolome’s SSS Form E-4 dated 11 August
1970 (Exhibit “F”), Individual Income Tax Returns for 1967 and 1968
(Exhibits “J” and
“K”) and his Individual Statement of Income and Assets for the year 1969 (Exhibit “M”) are
undoubtedly authentic documents within the contemplation of Article 278 of the
Civil Code.  They are signed by him and
contain express statements that private respondents are his sons and daughter.  The authenticity of his signature is not questioned.

A writing is authentic, for purposes of Article 278 of the Civil Code, if it is the
genuine or indubitable writing of the father (or mother), and includes a public
instrument (one acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official
with the formalities required by law) and, of course, a public or official
document in accordance with Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.^[20]

The voluntary recognition
of private respondents as illegitimate children of Ildefonso Bartolome renders
unnecessary the need for proof of continuous possession of such status since
such is only one of the grounds for investigation of paternity or maternity
under Article 289 of the Civil Code or for compulsory recognition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
No. CV-66054, promulgated on 13
October 1986 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against
petitioners.

IT IS SO
ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Romero, JJ., concur.

---

^[1]
Per then Presiding Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, concurred in by Associate
Justices Lorna S. Lombos-Dela Fuente and Gloria C. Paras.

^[2]
Rollo, 6-12.

^[3]
Rollo, 12-13.

^[4]
Annex “A” of Petition; Id., 20-35.

^[5]
Rollo, 62-63.

^[6]
Id., 44.

^[7]
Id., 52-57.

^[8]
Id., 60-80.

^[9]
Id., 88.

^[10]
Id., 97.

^[11]
190 SCRA 686, 698 (1990).

^[12]
Miranda, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 141 SCRA 302; Alvarez, et al. vs. IAC, et al., 185 SCRA
8.

^[13]
Rollo, 39.

^[14]
Rollo, 74-75.

^[15]
Id., 76.

^[16]
Baluyut vs. Baluyut, 186 SCRA 506, 512; Mangulabnan vs. IAC, 185
SCRA 760.

^[17]
Rollo, 32.

^[18]
Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 737.

^[19]
158 SCRA 138.

^[20]
Gapusan-Chua vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 183 SCRA 160.