G.R. No. 63226. December 20, 1991
EUGENIA LLABAN Y CATALAN, LUCIA BARBANERA JURBAN, MARTIN LLABAN, BEATRIZ BARBANERA JURBAN, LUIS LLABAN NACUA, SERGIO LLABAN NACUA MANUEL LLABAN NACUA, EULALIA LLABAN ABELLA, EP…
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Principally involved in this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the jurisdiction of the then Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cebu,
sitting as a cadastral court, to modify or amend a 1916 decision in a cadastral
case by directing the issuance of a final decree in the names of parties who
are not the original adjudicatees of a cadastral lot.
From the pleadings of the parties, the following facts are not controverted:
In a decision rendered on 13 September 1916 in Cadastral Case No.
12 (LRC Rec. No. 9468), the then Court of First Instance of Cebu
rendered a decision adjudicating Lot No. 6017 of the Cebu
Cadastre as follows:
“POR LAS RAZONES EXPUESTAS, el Jusgado
adjudica todo el Lote 6017 in la forma siguente; una octava parte
a favor de Juliana y Faustina apellidadas
Pacana; una octava parte a favor de Marcela, Laureana, Mariano, Santiago, Ariste,
Calixto, Marcelo, Bibiano y
Antonia apellidados Llaban;
una octava parte a favor de Rita y Julian apellidados
de la Serna; una octava parte
a favor de Antonia y Maxima apellidadas Dacula; una octava
parte a favor de Maximo Llaban; una octava
parte a favor de Mamerto,
Atanasia, Francisco y Crispina
apellidados Llaban; una octava parte
a favor de Esteban, Mateo, Natalio, Felipe, Fernando,
Apolonia, Bibiano, Ciriaca y Juana apellidados Cavan; y una octava
parte a favor de Tomas y Bibiana
apellidados Llaban. Se sobresee la contestación presentada por Juan L. Orbeta;”[1]
In its Auto of 3 March 1925, the cadastral court issued an order
reinstating the above decision.[2]
Upon motions of the spouses Filemon
Sotto and Carmen Rallos de Sotto, who claimed to have
purchased the shares of some of the adjudicatees of
the lot or their heirs, the cadastral court, on 1 March 1932, issued an Auto, the pertinent portion of which reads:
“3. Que despues de dictada dicha sentencia, ciertos adjudicatarios o herederos de adjudicatarios del Lote No. 6017, vendieron su respectiva participación
en el mencionado terreno a lós esposos Carmen Rallos de Sotto y Filemón Sotto,
a saber:
Francisco Llaban
(hijo de
Ariste
Llaban –
– – – – – – – – – 1/64 parte
Bibiana
Llaban
(alias Flaviana) – – – – – – – – – – 1/64 “
Vicenta
Jaban (hija de
Antonia Llaban
– – – – – – – – – – 1/64 “
Teodoro
Llaban (hijo de
Santiago
Llaban –
– – – – – – – – – 1/64 “
Juliana de la Serna –
– – – – – – – – – 1/16 “
Marcela Pacaña
(hija de Faustina
de la Serna que es hermana
de Julian de la Serna – – – – – – – – – – 1/16 “
Julian de la Serna –
– – – – – – – – – 1/16 “
Marcela Llaban – – – – – – – – – – 1/64 “
Vicenta
Fernandez (abuela de
Tomas y Bibiana
Llaban,
los
cuales ya no tienen
madre
ni padre ni tampoco
hijos) – – – – – – – – – – 1/8 “
Antonia Dacula – – – – – – – – – – 1/16 “
Basilia
Daclan (hija de Maxima
Dacula
hermana èsta de
Antonia Dacula – – – – – – – – – – 1/16 “
Apolonia Cavan – – – – – – – – – – 1/48 “
Rita de la Serna –
– – – – – – – – – 1/16 “
Matea Cavan – – – – – – – – – – 1/48 “
Marcelo Llaban – – – – – – – – – – 1/64 “
4. Que al llamarse a vista las dos móciones arriba mencionadas, ninguna oposición se ha presentado, no obstante al hicho de haber sido notificadas todas las partes interesadas
en el Lote No. 6017; por el
contrario, Apolonia Cavan estaba presente
en el acto de la vista de las
repetidas mociones y no manifestó oposición alguna.
En vista de todo cuanto
antecede, el Juzgado adjudica
a los esposos Carmen Rallos de Sotto y Filemón Sotto, vecinos del municipio de Cebú, (calle Colón
No. 410) provincia de Cebú,
y ciudadanos filipinos, las porciones o participaciones del Lote No. 6017 que
corresponden a los adjudicatarios o herederos de adjudicatarios, tales como ellos están numbrados
en el pârràfo tres (3) presento Auto.”[3]
No party appealed from the 13 September 1916 decision as modified by the above Auto
of 1 March 1932. Neither was any decree issued pursuant
thereto.
Forty-two (42) years later, specifically on 7 March 1974, some claimants (private respondents
herein), represented by Atty. Paul Gorres, filed a
petition for the issuance of a decree of registration over the aforesaid
lot. Acting on the petition; then
vacation Judge Francisco R. Burgos issued an Order directing the Commissioner
of Land Registration to issue a decree in favor of the adjudicatees
based on the dispositive portions of the decision of 13 September 1916 and the Auto of 1 March 1932.[4]
Complying with the Order, the Commissioner submitted a Report dated 5 August 1977[5]
which quoted the dispositive portions adverted to and
contained the following pertinent observations:
“2. That as gleaned from the above?quoted
portion of the decision, the civil status of the adjudicatees
was inadvertently omitted which is necessary in the preparation of the final
decree of registration of Lot No. 6017 as provided for under Section 40 of Act.
496;
x x
x
4. That this Commission entertains a doubt which
portions of said lot were adjudicated to spouses Carmen Rallos
de Sotto and Filemon Sotto and which share of the adjudicatees mentioned in the decision dated September 13,
1916 were affected thereof (sic);
5. That it is imperative that the tracing cloth
or print copy of plan Psd-17733 be submitted to this Commission prior to the issuance
of the decree of registration;
6. That the said plan and its technical
descriptions should be approved by the Court and the same should be in
conformity with the decision dated September 13, 1916 and Order dated March 1,
1932.”
The Commissioner then recommended that:
“WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended to the Honorable
Court that —
1.
This Commission be furnished the tracing cloth
or print copy of plan Psd-17733;
2.
Plan Psd-17733 and its technical descriptions be
duly approved by the Court;
3.
The civil status of the adjudicatees
be indicated pursuant to Section 40 of Act 496; and
4.
Clarifications be made as to the portions of
the lot which were adjudicated to spouses Carmen Rallos
de Sotto and Filemon Sotto and which share of the adjudicatees were affected thereof (sic).”
On 14 May 1979, herein private respondent Jose G. Paulin, one of the claimants, in his own behalf and on
behalf of his co-claimants, filed a petition,[6]
hereinafter referred to as the Paulin petition, which
sought to submit to the court a certified xerox copy
of Subdivision Plan Psd-17733 of Lot No. 6017 which indicates subdivision Lots Nos. 6017-A to 6017-H, inclusive,
pursuant to the request of the Land Registration Commission. The certification made by one Roman Mataverde, OIC of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands,
stated that the names and civil status of the claimants to the respective sublots are indicated in “the petition.” It is shown in the
plan that the land was originally surveyed from December 1910 to February 1912
and that the subdivision plan is based on the Order of 1 March 1932 and was
approved by the then Director of Lands, Hon. Jose Gil, on 12 November 1940.
The Paulin petition further enumerates
the subdivided lots corresponding to the following parties:
“(a) For Lot No.
6017-A to Gerardo Panogalinog, single, Filipino, of legal age, and
resident of 234 V-Rama Avenue, Cebu
City;
(b) For Lot No. 6017-B to Apolonia
Cavan, married to Mamerto Tablada, of legal ages, Filipinos, residents of 236 V. Rama Avenue, Cebu City;
(c) For Lot No. 6017-C, in lieu of Marcos Nacua, to Jose G. Paulin, single,
of legal age, Filipino, resident of 238 V. Rama
Avenue, Cebu City;
(d) For Lot No. 6017-D to Ceferino
Gabutan, married to Guillerma
Baculi, Filipinos, of legal ages, residents of
238-1-A V. Rama Avenue, Cebu
City;
(e) For Lot No. 6017-E to Serapio
Alcoseba, married to Basilia
Minoza, Filipinos, of legal ages, residents of
238-1-B V. Rama Avenue, Cebu
City;
(f) For Lot 6017-F to Ciriaco
Bacatan, married to Fortunata
Guba, Filipinos, of legal ages, residents of 238-1 C
V. Rama Avenue, Cebu City;
(g) For Lot No. 6017-G, to
Trinidad Lim, single, Filipino, of legal age, and resident of 238 V. Rama Avenue, Cebu City; and
(h) For Lot No. 6017-H to Filemon Sotto, married to Carmen Rallos,
Filipinos, of legal ages, and residents of F. Ramos St., Cebu City;”
Claimants Paulin, et al., then pray
that the court issue an order
approving Psd-17733 and its technical description as
recommended by the Land Registration Commission and directing the latter to issue the corresponding
decree of registration for Lot No. 6017 pursuant to the decision of 16
September 1916 as supplemented by the Order of 1 March 1932.
Subsequently, on 30 July 1979, Eugenia Llaban
y Catalan, one of the heirs of the adjudicatees,
filed through Atty. Bienvenido P. Jaban[7]
a petition for the issuance of a decree of registration for Lot No. 6017 on the basis of the 13 September 1916 decision as “affirmed and further
enforced by this Honorable Court in its order of March 3, 1925.”[8]
The petition enumerates the legal heirs of the adjudicatees
of the lot who have not sold, relinquished or transferred their rights,
interests and participation therein to the
parties. Attached thereto is the
technical description of the lot. This
petition was granted by the court, per Judge Jose Ramolete,
in its Order of 7 August 1979; the Commissioner of Land Registration was then
directed to issue a decree of registration on the basis of the Order of 3 March
1925 and the decision of 13 September 1916 in favor of the adjudicatees
and/or their legal heirs.[9]
On 5 May 1980, Jose G. Paulin filed
another petition (supplementing his previous petition) wherein he attached a
certified micro-film copy of Plan Psd-17733; the technical descriptions of the
subdivision lots nos. 6017-A to 6017-H, inclusive and a certified true copy of
a deed of absolute sale executed in Paulin’s favor by
the spouses Marcos Nacua and Benita Seno over Lot No.
6017-C. For and in behalf of his
clients, Atty. Jaban filed an opposition to the
petition[10]
alleging therein that the Order of the court of 7 August 1979 directing the
issuance of a decree based on the 16 September 1916 decision and the 3 March
1925 Order had already become final and that the Paulin,
et al., claims can be ventilated only upon the partition of the lot by the
heirs of the adjudicatees and the issuance of the
certificate of title since Paulin, et al., are not
themselves adjudicatees or heirs of the latter.
In his reply to the opposition, Paulin
et al., contend that the decision of 13
September 1916 was amended by the 1 March 1932 order, and hence prays that the Order of 7 August 1979 should be set
aside. Atty. Jaban,
in a rejoinder, insists that since the 13
September 1916 decision, as reinstated by the order of 3 March 1925, had long become final,
the court has no jurisdiction to set it aside.
No hearing was had on the aforesaid Paulin
petitions and the opposition thereto.
In its Order of 16
February 1981, the court, through Judge Jose Ramolete,
finding the opposition of Atty. Jaban to be devoid of
merit, ruled:
“x x
x The order of March 1, 1932 which is (sic)
never questioned up to the present, superseded and/or amended the decision of
September 13, 1916 as reinstated in the order of March 3, 1925.
It is a rule that so long as a decree of registration has not been
issued registration proceedings
is (sic) still pending for the purposes of pre-Commonwealth Act 3110, and, when
lost or destroyed, must be reconstituted in conformity with said Act (Villegas
vs. Fernando; Sampedro vs. Director of Lands, 27 SCRA 1119).
There being transfers of ownership by way of sales by the adjudicatees or their
heirs of their participations in Lot No. 6017 awarded to them in the decision
dated September 13, 1916 as reinstated in the order of March 3, 1925, the Court
acted well within its jurisdiction as a Cadastral Court to issue (sic) the order of March 1, 1932 to reflect
the changes of ownership in the participations of the adjudicatees
in favor of the vendee-spouses pending the issuance of the decree of
registration. The petition of the
claimants at bar who acquired their respective interest in or portions of Lot
No. 6017 subsequent to the order of March 1, 1932 while the issuance of the decree still
depends must necessarily be also in order.”
and then granted the Paulin
petitions by approving the subdivision plan Psd-17733 and the technical
descriptions of Lots Nos. 6017-A to 6017-H, inclusive, ordering that the
subdivided lots be respectively awarded to the parties enumerated in the 14 May
1979 petition and directing the Land Registration Commissioner to issue, upon
the finality of the Order, a decree of registration of the subdivision lots in
favor of each of the claimants enumerated in said petition.[11]
Their motion for the reconsideration of the above order, based on
the ground that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing
a second decree of registration in favor of parties who are not the adjudicatees mentioned in the 13 September 1916 decision or
the 3 March 1925 Order having been denied in the Order of 4 August 1981, oppositors filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari alleging lack of jurisdiction and/or
grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Ramolete
to issue the orders of 16 February 1981 and 4 August 1981.
In its decision promulgated on 29 September 1982, the Court of Appeals denied the
petition on the ground that:
“x x x the
issues raised herein could not be resolved without passing upon the merits of
the case. Inasmuch as the function of certiorari
is to determine only whether or not the lower court abused its discretion or
acted in excess of its jurisdiction in its judgment without consideration of
the actual merits of the case, We are therefore, denying this petition without prejudice to the filing of
the proper remedy with the courts, if still possible.”[12]
Unable to accept said decision, petitioners filed with this Court
on 15 February 1983 the
instant petition raising the following issues:
a) lack of jurisdiction of the lower
court, sitting as a cadastral court, to rule and decide on the controversy, or
to pass upon the validity of the claim, sale or transfer in favor of the
private respondents, alleging that such matters could only be ventilated in an
ordinary civil action;
b) grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Judge Ramolete in
adjudicating and issuing an order
declaring private respondents as the
new owners of Lot No. 6017 over
the opposition of petitioners without
trial, without the presentation of evidence and without giving the contending
parties the opportunity to prove their claims, but solely on the basis of the
allegations in the motion of private respondents and the annexes attached
thereto; and
c) the ruling of the
Court of Appeals as above quoted is confusing, erroneous, strange, ridiculous
and absurd.
They likewise allege that the Order of 1 March 1932 was issued
without any notice to them; they were never
given a chance to be heard and that they did not receive a copy of said order; they came to know about
it only in the middle part of 1980;
and granting that it was in fact issued, such was done in excess of and/or
without jurisdiction.[13]
In their Comment filed on 21 June 1983 in compliance with the
Resolution of 16 May 1983, private respondents claim that the
predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners had sold the lot in question to the
spouses Filemon Sotto and Carmen Rallos,
now both deceased; petitioners have nothing then to inherit; and that they
cannot now re-open the cadastral proceeding because the Order of 1 March 1932
constitutes res judicata.[14]
We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit simultaneous memoranda which petitioners complied with on 10 September 1983 and the private
respondents on 26 August 1983.
It plainly appears to this Court that while respondent Court of
Appeals evaded the fundamental issues raised before it by petitioners under the
pretext that “the function of certiorari is to determine only whether or not the lower court abused its
discretion or acted in excess of its jurisdiction in its judgment without
consideration of the actual merits of the case,” it says in the same breath
that “the issues raised herein could not be resolved without passing upon the
merits of the case.”[15]
There is thus vagueness and patent self-contradiction. In any case, the resolution of the issues
raised does not require a determination of the “merits of the case in the sense
of the legal rights of the parties in the case.
A careful scrutiny of the factual and procedural moorings of this
case leads Us to agree with the main thesis of petitioners that the lower
court, sitting as a cadastral court, had no jurisdiction to amend or modify the
13 September 1916 decision and that Judge Ramolete
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
Order of 16 February 1981. We are,
however, unable to agree with their postulation that said Judge likewise
committed grave abuse of discretion in practically setting aside the Order of 7 August 1979 by promulgating the 16 February 1981 order.
The 13 September 1916 decision, as amended by the Auto of 1 March
1932, had long become final as there is no showing at all that any affected
party appealed therefrom within the reglementary period of thirty (30) days prescribed by the
then governing law on procedure, Act No. 190.[16]
Section 11 of the Cadastral Act expressly provides that trials in cadastral
cases shall be conducted in the same manner as ordinary trial, and proceedings
in the Court of First Instance shall be governed by the same rules and that all
provisions of the Land Registration Act,[17]
as amended, except as otherwise provided in the former, shall be applicable to
proceedings in cadastral cases. Sections
38 and 41 of the Land Registration Act tell us when decisions become final.[18] Even if they are erroneous, but such errors
are not jurisdictional, correction could only be done by a regular appeal
within the reglementary period, the failure of which
could lead to the decisions becoming final.
As this Court stated in Daquis vs. Bustos,
et al.:[19]
“x x
x Decisions, erroneous or not, become final
after the period fixed by law; litigations would be endless; no questions would
be finally settled; and titles to property
would become precarious if the losing party were allowed to reopen them at any
time in the future.”
The failure to issue a final decree does not, as seems to be the
suggestion of the lower court and the theory presented by the private
respondents, prevent the decision from attaining finality. Precisely, final decree can only issue after
the decision shall have become final.
The final decree must state the name of the party adjudged in the
decision to be owner of a cadastral lot.[20]
It follows that in the instant case, in view of the finality of
the decision of 13 September 1916,
as amended by the Auto of 1
March 1932, the final decree which can be validly issued is one
which must be in full conformity with said decision, as amended.
From the Paulin petition of 14 May 1979, it is quite clear that,
except for the spouses Filemon Sotto and Carmen Rallos, the alleged claimants in whose favor the subdivided
lots are to be adjudicated are not the adjudicatees in the 13 September 1916
decision, as amended by the 1 March
1932 Auto.
And, except in the case of Paulin himself, who
claims to be a vendee, there is no indication whatsoever of the relationships
of the claimants with the original adjudicatees that could serve as basis for their
claims. In reality then, the petition is
not just for the issuance of a final decree, but for the amendment or
modification of the final decision. In
light of the above disquisition, the lower court has no jurisdiction to grant
such relief and Judge Ramolete clearly acted without
any jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the
petition by approving the Subdivision
Plan Psd-17733, the technical descriptions of Lots Nos. 6017-A to 6017-H, inclusive, and directing
the Land Registration Commissioner to issue the final decree of registration of
the subdivision lots in favor of each of the claimants named in the 14 May 1979
(Paulin) petition.
Aggravating such action is his obvious disregard for due process. There was no formal hearing on the Paulin petition. Paulin and his co-claimants presented no witness, marked no
exhibit and offered no evidence. It is
true that certain documents were attached as Annexes to the petition; but Paulin, et al., went no further. Until identified, formally offered in evidence
and admitted by the court, the annexes were but mere scraps of paper. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is
quite explicit: “The court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.” The offer is
necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and
his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties and the
trial.[21]
That such a hearing and offer of evidence are necessary is evident from the
fact that substitution of adjudicatees, approval of
subdivision plan and technical descriptions of subdivision lots were asked
for. In view of the opposition of
petitioners, the matter became controverted and
issues were thus joined necessitating a trial for its resolution. But this is not to suggest that the lower
court should have conducted a hearing on the petition, for as already indicated
above, the court had no jurisdiction to amend the decision.
This Court notices from the allegations in the questioned Paulin petition that Subdivision Plan Psd-17733 was
executed by a private land surveyor pursuant to the Auto of 1 March 1932,
in relation to the 13 September 1916
Order, and that the same was approved by the Director of Lands. These suggest that there was an attempt to
partition Lot No. 6017. Such partition
was allowed under the Cadastral Law, provided
that there was compliance with Sections 6 and 19 to 24 thereof.[22]
Unfortunately, Paulin, et al., failed to explore and
raise this matter.
The lower court, however, correctly set aside the Order of 7 August 1979. The contention of petitioners that the same
had become final and therefore cannot be set aside is untenable. There is nothing on record to support it. Indisputably, Atty. Jaban
knew, or ought to have known, at the time he filed on 30 July 1979 a petition
for issuance of final decree, that other parties have existing claims on Lot
No. 6017; insofar as the records Cadastral Case No. 12 are concerned, two (2)
prior petitions for the issuance of decree had been filed — that of 7 March 1974 and that of 14 May
1979. In a manner of speaking, the
property has become a contested
lot. Petitioners failed to show that
private respondents were furnished with copies of his petition and of the 7 August 1979 Order. In the absence of proof that they received a
copy of the Order, no conclusion may be drawn that it has become final as
against them. Besides, the order has no
valid basis. It failed to consider the Auto of 1 March 1932 which amended the original decision
of 13 September 1916. Hence, no valid decree can be issued
exclusively on the basis of the
latter.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 13091-SP, promulgated on 29 September
1982 and the Orders of the lower
court of 16 February 1981 and 4 August 1981 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Feliciano, and Romero, JJ., concur.
Bidin, J., in the result.
[1]
Annex “1” of Respondent’s Memorandum; Rollo,
106-110.
[2]
Annex “B” of Petition; Id.,
30-31.
[3] Annex “2” of Private
Respondents’ Memorandum; Rollo, 111- 113.
[4]
Annex “G” of Petition; Id.,
55.
[5]
Annex “J” of Petition; Id.,
p. 67-68.
[6]
Annex “F” of Petition, Id.,
49.
[7]
Counsel for petitioners.
[8]
Annex “C” of Petition; Rollo, 32.
[9]
Annex
“D” of Petition; Id., 45.
[10]
Annex “E” of Petition; Rollo, 46.
[11]
Annex “G” of Petition; Rollo, 55, et seq.
[12]
Annex “H” of Petition; Rollo, 61.
[13]
Rollo, 123, 133-134.
[14]
Id., 78.
[15]
Rollo, 64.
[16]
Director of Lands vs. Sanz, et
al., 45 Phil. 117.
[17] Act No. 496.
[18]
Likewise, Section 38 in relation to
Section 30 of P.D. No. 1529 (The Property Registration Decree), which took
effect on 11 June 1978, provides that the decision in cadastral cases becomes
final upon expiration of thirty (30) days from notice and appeal may be taken therefrom as
in ordinary civil cases.
[19]
94 Phil. 913.
[20]
See Sections 40 and 41, Act No. 496 and Section 31, P.D. No. 1529.
[21]
MORAN, Comments on the
Rules of Court, vol. 6, 1980 ed., 123, citing U.S. vs.
Solano, 33 Phil. 582; Dayrit vs. Gonzalez, 7 Phil. 182.
[22]
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Gabutan,
et al., 68 Phil. 254.