MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NLRC SHERIFF AND CESAR E. LADISLA, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner assails in this petition for review on certiorari
the Resolution dated July 24, 1986
of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-19301-78-T
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of its
decision dated April 30, 1986
which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Ceferina
J. Diosana and ordered the reinstatement of private
respondent Cesar E. Ladisla to his former position
with full backwages.

Records show that private
respondent Cesar E. Ladisla was employed by petitioner
Mercury Drug Corporation as a Stock Analyst at its Claro
M. Recto Branch.  He had been with the
company for two years and nine months when on August 15, 1977 he was
apprehended by representatives of Mercury Drug while in the act of
pilfering company property consisting of three (3) bottles of Persantin and one (1) bottle of Valoron
at 100 tablets per bottle with a total value of P272.00.  He admitted his guilt to the investigating
representatives of petitioner company and executed a
handwritten admission.  Said admission
was repeated verbally at the police station before the arresting officer as
shown in the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report which was signed and authenticated
by Ladisla.^[1] Thus, on August 19, 1977, petitioner, while simultaneously placing private
respondent on preventive suspension, filed before the Department of Labor an
application for the termination of private respondent’s employment on grounds
of dishonesty and breach of trust.

Private respondent
opposed the aforesaid application for clearance to terminate his services
alleging among others, that his suspension and proposed dismissal were
unfounded and baseless being premised on the machinations and incriminatory
acts of Ms. Leonora Suarez and Edgardo Imperial,
Manager and Retail Supervisor, respectively, of
petitioner’s Claro M. Recto Branch; and that he was
not given the opportunity to be heard nor allowed to explain his side before he
was summarily suspended.

The parties were then required by the Arbitration Branch of the
Department of Labor to file their respective position papers.  While the case was being heard by Labor Arbiter Ceferina
J. Diosana, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for
attempted qualified theft against private respondent before the Fiscal’s Office of Manila but this was dismissed by the
court before the arraignment of the accused. 
However, the case was refiled and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 43096 before Judge Pedro A. Ramirez of the then Court of First Instance,
subsequently the Regional Court of Manila, Branch XXX.

In a decision dated November
8, 1979,^[2]
Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana
sustained the validity of private respondent’s dismissal and granted
petitioner’s application for clearance to terminate the services of the former.  Private respondent appealed his aforesaid
dismissal to the National Labor Relations Commission.  Pending resolution of the appeal, herein
petitioner filed a Manifestation with said Commission notifying the latter of
the ongoing trial in Criminal Case No. 43096 against private respondent.  On September
15, 1983, judgment was rendered in Criminal Case No. 43096, finding
private respondent-accused guilty of the crime of simple theft.^[3]
No appeal was taken from the decision in the subject criminal case, private
respondent having availed himself of the benefits of the Probation Law.  He was eventually discharged from probation
on December 27, 1984,
after complying with the terms and conditions thereof.^[4]

On April
30, 1986, public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission reversed the decision of
the Labor Arbiter because it found no substantial evidence
establishing the charge against private respondent Ladisla
stating thus:

“WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby set aside and
a new one entered ordering respondent to imme­diately reinstate him in (sic)
his former position with full back wages.

SO ORDERED.”^[5]

Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision, which was denied by public
respondent Commission in its resolution dated July 24, 1986.^[6]
Hence, this petition assailing the
latter’s reversal of the labor arbiter’s decision and its order
for the reinstatement with full back wages of private respondent.

Petitioner submits that
it was serious legal error on the part of public respondent to order the
reinstatement of private respondent who was convicted of the crime of simple theft by Judge Pedro Ramirez in
Criminal Case No. 43096 filed by petitioner against said private
respondent-employee involving the same facts obtaining in the present case for
termination.  On the other hand, private
respondent maintains that he was a victim of revenge and incriminatory
machinations as the charge of qualified theft of company property was a
frame-up.

We hold that public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in finding no substantial evidence
to sustain the charge against private respondent.  This conclusion is in complete and utter
disregard of the Regional Trial Court’s conviction of private respondent for
the crime of simple theft which decision was rendered prior to its own assailed
decision.  It must be remembered
that proceedings in criminal cases such as that held in the subject criminal
case require proof beyond reasonable doubt to establish the guilt of the
accused and findings of fact of the trial court on this matter are generally accorded great weight by appellate
courts most especially where no appeal had been filed thereafter, thus
rendering the said findings final.  As mentioned earlier, private respondent did
not appeal from the decision of the lower court but instead availed himself of
the benefits of the probation law which was correspondingly granted by the
Regional Trial Court.

Dismissal of a dishonest
employee is to the best interest not only of management but also of
labor.  As a measure of self-protection
against acts inimical to its interest, a company has the right to dismiss its
erring employees.  An employer cannot be
compelled to continue in employment an employee guilty of acts inimical to its interest, justifying loss of confidence in
him.  The law does not impose unjust
situations on either labor or management.^[7] We therefore find justification in the
termination private respondent Cesar E. Ladisla’s
employment by petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation.

Under Article 282(c) of
the Labor Code, an employer may terminate an employment for “fraud or
willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or his duly authorized representative.” Loss of confidence is established as
a valid ground for the dismissal of an employee.  The law does not require proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the employee’s misconduct to invoke such a justification.  It is sufficient that there is some basis for
the loss of trust or that the employer has reasonable grounds to believe that
the employee is responsible for the misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of
the trust and confidence demanded of his position.^[8]

Private respondent’s
admission of his guilt as earlier
stated, his subsequent conviction in Criminal Case No. 43096 and his acceptance
of the same as implied in the
absence of an appeal therefrom and his
subsequent application for probation established
beyond reasonable doubt his guilt for
the crime of simple theft.  It was this
same act which gave rise to his conviction by the trial court that was the
basis for the termination of his employment by petitioner.

We have held that the
eventual conviction of the employee who is prosecuted for his misconduct is not
indispensable to warrant his dismissal by his employer.^[9] More specifically, an employee who has been
exonerated from a criminal charge of theft of gasoline on the basis of
technicality may still be dismissed from employment if the employer has ample
reason to mistrust him.^[10] If acquittal from the criminal charge does
not negate the existence of a ground for loss of trust and confidence,
with more reason should conviction for such criminal charge fortify said mistrust.

Anent private respondent’s claim of summary suspension without being given the
opportunity to be heard, the Court takes note that, in addition to the fact
that his suspension was merely preventive pending approval by the Department of
Labor of its application for clearance to terminate the services of private
respondent, the latter was given the chance to defend himself in several
instances:  at the Police Precinct No.
III, Western Police District, Metro Manila where he was brought for investigation
or questioning immediately after the occurrence of the alleged pilferage of
medicines and where he was given the opportunity to state his defenses, and
thereafter, before the arbitration branch of the Department of Labor where he
was required and did submit his position paper.

The law in protecting the
rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression
nor self-destruction of the employer.^[11]
While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the
protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor
dispute will be automatically
decided in favor of labor.  Management
also has its own rights, which, as such, are entitled to respect and
enforcement in the interest of simple fair play.  Out of its concern for those with less privileges in life, the Supreme Court has inclined more
often than not toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the
employer.  Such favoritism, however, has
not blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the
deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and applicable
law and doctrine.^[12]

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of the National
Labor Relations Commission is reversed and set aside and the Labor Arbiter’s
decision of November 8, 1979 dismissing Cesar E. Ladisla as petitioner’s stock analyst is hereby reinstated.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.

^[1]
Rollo, pp.
4-6.

^[2]
Rollo, pp. 32-37.

^[3]
Rollo, pp. 104-110.

^[4]
Rollo, p. 146.

^[5]
Rollo, p. 45.

^[6]
Rollo, p. 64.

^[7]
Piedad v. Lanao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc., 153 SCRA 509 [1987]; International Hardwood & Veneer Co. of the Phils.
v. Leogardo, Jr., 117
SCRA 967 [1982].

^[8]
Piedad v. Lanao del Norte Electric Cooperative,
Inc., 153 SCRA 508 [1987]; Dole Phil., Inc. v. NLRC, 123 SCRA 673
[1983].

^[9]
San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC, 128 SCRA 181 [1984].

^[10]
Philippine Geothermal, Inc. v. NLRC, 117 SCRA 692-693
[1982].

^[11]
Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Zulueta, 69
Phil. 485 [1939] cited in Allied Banking Corporation v. Castro, 156 SCRA
789, 800 [1987].

^[12]
Sosito v. Aguinaldo Development Corporation, 156 SCRA 392, 396
[1987].