DR. CARMELITA U. CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. HON. GUILLERMO C. MEDINA, HON. GABRIEL M. GATCHALIAN AND ROOSEVELT COLLEGES, INC., RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner, by way of a special civil action for certiorari,
seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter, dismissing
petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal from employment and for damages.

Petitioner Dr. Carmelita U. Cruz is a 1958 mathematics graduate of the University of the Philippines. She earned a doctoral degree in Mathematics
Education from Centro Escolar University in 1977. She wrote several books in mathematics and statistics and
likewise attended numerous seminars, workshops and conferences, either as a
delegate, resource person or consultant. She rose from the ranks, starting out as a high school teacher in 1958
to college instructor and eventually Dean, until her services were terminated
in 1984 by her employer and herein private respondent, Roosevelt Colleges, Inc.

The whole controversy started when in October 1983,
Agro-Industrial Management and Consultancy, Inc. (AIMCON) submitted a proposal
to Roosevelt Colleges, Inc., to start a Distance-Study Program leading to a
Degree of Master of Arts in Education Teaching Elementary Agriculture
(MAETEA). Roosevelt Colleges, Inc., in
accepting the proposal, designated petitioner, being the Dean of the Institute
of Education and Graduate School, to head the committee to work for the
approval of the program with the Ministry of Education, Culture & Sports
(MECS). The program which is a joint
venture between AIMCON and Roosevelt Colleges, will have its own operational budget and a Board
of Trustees composed of two representatives from Roosevelt Colleges, the
College President and one other person. In view of this, petitioner was offered the post of Deputy Director as
well as the second seat allotted to Roosevelt Colleges in the Program’s Board
of Trustees.

The Ministry of Education however, issued the authority to
operate the Program on the condition that such shall only be an extension of
the Graduate School of Roosevelt
Colleges. The masteral degree was
changed to Master of Arts in Education, Major in Elementary Agriculture
(MAEMEA). Considering that she was
already the Dean of Graduate School, a post higher than the Program’s director,
the offer to make petitioner as Deputy Director did not push through. During that time petitioner was receiving
P4,330.50, including P1,747.50 representing remuneration for six (6) teaching
loads.^[1]

On September 26, 1984, pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Board
of Trustees, the President of Roosevelt Colleges, Romeo P. de la Paz, sent
petitioner a letter informing her, as follows:

” x x x the issue concerning the amount of remuneration or
honorarium to be added to what you are presently receiving in view of the
institution of the Agro-Forestry Program in the Institute of Education was
discussed by the board yesterday. The
final decision is given below:

“1) You will be given monthly honorarium
equivalent to the amount you are now
receiving for teaching 6 loads.

“2) This amount
is chargeable to the Agro-Forestry Program and to be drawn from the Cashier’s
Office in Sumulong.

“3) This shall
take effect as soon as the monthly remuneration you are receiving for teaching 6 loads ends.

“4) Effective
the second semester of SY 84-85 you are not allowed to accept teaching
assignment be it in the undergraduate or graduate programs.

“5) It is
expected that you will devote more time to effective and efficient administration
and supervision of the Institute of Education including the Agro?Forestry
Program. x x x “^[2]

In response to the above letter, petitioner Dr. Cruz sent a
letter dated October 1, 1984, stating that:

” x x x with a few considerations to
reckon with, I think it would be better that I, much to my regret, be no longer
involved in the Agro-Forestry Program. x x x “^[3]

In addition, she expressed her wish to
retain her teaching loads citing professional reasons as well as her desire to
be in constant contact with her students.

On October 8, 1984,
President de la Paz informed Dr. Cruz of the Resolution of the Board, to
wit: (a) that Dr. Cruz be required to appear in its next meeting to be
held on 30 October 1984; (b) that Dr. Cruz is expected to continue functioning as Dean of Education including the new
Agro-Forestry Program under the Institute of Education; and (c) that Dr. Cruz be directed to send to the Board
within twenty-four (24) hours upon receipt of this communication her reply to
these resolutions.^[4]
Dr. Cruz manifested her willingness to
appear before the Board. In the
meanwhile, President de la Paz informed
the Board that he will go on leave until the
issue in connection with Dr. Cruz shall have been resolved.

The Board held several meetings to thresh out this problem. During these meetings, Dr. Cruz reiterated
her desire to retain her teaching loads in lieu of handling the Agro-Forestry
Program. The Board on the other hand,
remained firm on its stand to enforce Resolution No. 5. Several attempts were made to amicably
settle the issue, but to no avail. A
deadlock occurred. On October 19, 1984,
the Board issued Dr. Cruz a letter terminating her services, the text to wit:

“Even before the receipt of your letter of October 16, 1984,
the Board was aware of your intractable stand not to be involved in the
Agroforestry Program unless your teaching loads are retained.

“The Board has been too
patient with you aside from the fact that Dr. Isidro was unofficially
designated to talk to you and
clarify things to avoid misunderstanding. You are aware that the course of
Master of Arts in Education in Teaching Elementary Agriculture is a part of the
Graduate School of Education including the Institute of Education wherein you
are the Dean. Your refusal to accept involvement
in the said program, unavoidable as it is,
is a defiant disregard of the Board’s action, and leaves us no other
recourse except to terminate your relationship with the school effective
immediately.”^[5]

On November 16, 1984, Dr. Cruz filed a complaint for illegal dismissal in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), National
Capital Region. This case was assigned
to Labor Arbiter Apolinar L. Sevilla. The parties were required to submit their respective position papers, supplemental
pleadings and supporting documents, after which the case was deemed submitted
for decision. On March 19, 1985, Labor
Arbiter Sevilla rendered a decision^[6] finding petitioner guilty of insubordination
and thus dismissed petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of
merit. Dr. Cruz appealed to the
National Labor Relations Commission which on June 26, 1985 promulgated a Resolution^[7] dismissing petitioner’s appeal and affirming
the Labor Arbiter’s decision in toto. Not satisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration^[8] on September 30, 1985 which was likewise
denied on October 3, 1985.^[9] Petitioner then filed a special civil action
for certiorari^[10] before Us on December 13, 1985. This was dismissed for lack of merit by the
First Division in a Court resolution^[11] dated July 7, 1986.

Still not satisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration^[12] on August 8, 1986. On October 27, 1986, the Second Division to which the case was
raffled on August 29, 1986 granted the motion for reconsideration and gave due
course to the petition.^[13] Said Second Division eventually became the
present Third Division.

Petitioner raises the following issues:

“1) Whether or
not the June 26, 1985 Resolution of the NLRC is replete with factual findings unsupported
by substantial and credible evidence; and, therefore, not binding on and subject to review by the Honorable
Supreme Court;

“2) Whether or
not the 26 years of petitioner’s continuous, efficient and devoted service to
the private respondent should be taken into account in deciding the case;

“3) Whether or
not the alleged loss of trust and confidence on the petitioner was validly
justified so as to warrant her dismissal vis-a-vis her recent promotion and
manifestation to handle the Program even without pay;

“4) Whether or
not the petitioner could be dismissed from her position as Professor III, an
ordinary employee when the basis of her dismissal was loss of trust and
confidence on her as a Dean or managerial employee;

“5) Whether or
not the petitioner was guilty of insubordination;

“6) Whether or
not the petitioner is entitled to a writ of certiorari, annulling the
NLRC Resolutions, and

“7) Whether or
not the petitioner is entitled to damages and for how much.”^[14]

The primordial issue in
this case is whether or not petitioner is guilty of insubordination resulting
in loss of confidence sufficient to warrant a dismissal.

Before attempting to
resolve this issue, the
employment status of petitioner must first be looked into. Petitioner contends that she was divested of
her Deanship of the Graduate School and retained as Dean in the Institute of
Education. This is of no moment. The fact remains that she was a Dean, a position which
is on the managerial level. In the case
of Metro Drug Corporation v. NLRC,^[15] this Court held that managerial
personnel and other employees occupying positions of trust and confidence are entitled to security of
tenure, fair standards of employment and the protection of labor laws. While it is true that the decision to dismiss
or lay-off an employee is management’s
prerogative, it must be made without abuse of discretion, for what is at stake
is not only the employee’s
position but also his means of livelihood.^[16]

However, the rules on termination of employment, penalties for
infractions and resort to concerted actions in so far as managerial employees
are concerned are not necessarily the same as those for ordinary employees.^[17]
Employers, generally, are allowed a wider latitude of discretion in terminating
the employment of managerial personnel or those of similar rank performing
functions which by their nature require the employer’s trust and confidence,
than in the case of ordinary
rank and file employees.^[18]

With these principles in mind, we find no grave abuse of
discretion commited by public respondents in ruling petitioner’s dismissal
legal. Considering the fact that she
was holding a managerial position, her refusal to abide by the lawful orders of
her employers would lead to the erosion of the trust and confidence reposed on
her. Loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an
employee and proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. All that is needed is for the employer to
establish a sufficient basis for the dismissal of an employee. The grant of teaching loads was only a
privilege since as Dean, her first and primary function was to administer the
particular college under her care and authority. Hence, the decision of Roosevelt Colleges to take away her six
(6) teaching loads so that she can handle the Agro-Forestry Program, with the
same pay is found to be reasonable and lawful. In the case of Philippine Japan Active Carbon Corporation and Tokuichi
Satofuka v. NLRC & Olga Quinanola,^[19] We
held that:

“It is the employer’s prerogative, based on its assessment and
perception of its employees’ qualifications, aptitudes, and competence, to move
them around in the various areas of its business operations in order to
ascertain where they will function with maximum benefit to the company. An employee’s right to security of tenure does not give him such
a vested right in his position as would deprive the company of its prerogative
to change his assignment or transfer him where he will be most useful. When his transfer is not unreasonable, nor
inconvenient, or prejudicial to him, and it does not involve a demotion in rank
or a diminution of his salaries, benefits, and other privileges, the employee
may not complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal.”

While the Constitution is
committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working
class, it should not be supposed that every dispute will be automatically
decided in favor of labor. Management
also has rights, which, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the
interest of simple fair play. Although
the Supreme Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and has
upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer, such favoritism has not
blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving,
to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law
and doctrine.^[20]

But considering that
petitioner Cruz had spent the best years of her professional life in the
service of the employer and that her work as a Dean and teacher was, as
manifested by the “Faculty Evaluation Results By Students”,^[21] beyond reproach, the ends of social and
compassionate justice would be served if she will be given some equitable relief.

The grant of equitable relief in the form of separation pay finds
support in a number of decisions promulgated by this Court. In the case of Eduardo V. Reyes v. Minister
of Labor and PACWOOD, Inc.,^[22] this
Court adopted the ruling in Baby Bus, Inc. vs. Minister of Labor,^[23]
to wit:

“x
x x it does not necessarily follow that if there is no illegal
dismissal, then no award of separation pay may be made.”

and in the case of San Miguel Corporation
v. Deputy Minister of Labor and Employment,^[24]
where this Court held that:

“x x x the trust and confidence in the
private respondent having been lost, the respondent Regional Director acted
correctly in allowing termination of employment but with retirement or
separation benefits.”

Furthermore, in the case of Soco v. Mercantile Corporation of
Davao,^[25]
We held that:

“Where an employee who had been
dismissed for violation of company rules had been employed for 18 years, he may
be afforded some equitable relief due to the past services rendered by him by
granting him separation pay equivalent to one month salary for his every year
of service to the company.”

WHEREFORE, the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) is hereby affirmed with the modification that petitioner, Dr. Carmelita U. Cruz is hereby
adjudged entitled to separation pay equivalent to one (1) month latest
salary for every year of service. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and
Cortes, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 34.

^[2]
Rollo, p. 39.

^[3]
Rollo, p. 40.

^[4]
Rollo, p. 43.

^[5]
Rollo, p. 48.

^[6]
Rollo, pp. 87-96, NLRC/NCR Case No. 11-4026-84.

^[7]
Rollo, pp. 120-137, by the Third Division composed of Guillermo C. Medina,
Presiding Commissioner, Gabriel M. Gatchalian and Miguel B. Varela (abroad on
official travel), Commissioners.

^[8]
Rollo, pp. 138-144.

^[9]
Rollo, p. 145.

^[10]
Rollo, pp. 2-19.

^[11]
Rollo, p. 226.

^[12]
Rollo, pp. 231-235.

^[13]
Rollo, p. 236.

^[14]
Rollo, pp. 258-259.

^[15]
G.R. No. 72248, July 22, 1986, 143 SCRA 132.

^[16]
International Harvester Macleod, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. 73287, May 18, 1987, 149
SCRA 641.

^[17]
Ibid., Metro Drug v.
NLRC.

^[18]
Manila Midtown Commercial Corporation v. NUWHRAIN (Ramada Chapter), G.R. No.
57268, March 25, 1988, 159 SCRA 212.

^[19]
G.R. No. 83239, promulgated on March 8, 1989.

^[20]
Sosito vs. Aguinaldo Development Corporation, G.R. No. 48926, December
14, 1987, 156 SCRA 392.

^[21]
Rollo, pp. 59-60.

^[22]
G.R. No. L-48705, February 9, 1989.

^[23]
158 SCRA 221 (1988).

^[24]
126 SCRA 489 (1983).

^[25]
G.R. Nos. 53364-65, March 16, 1987.