ROBERTO VALLARTA, CESAR VALLARTA, ANTONIO MANANSALA, JR., ARMANDO GARCIA AND ABELARDO LOPEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT; HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, IN H…

This case commenced as a complaint for forcible entry filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga against respondent
Marcelino Marcos and his group who allegedly
entered the disputed fishponds through threat and intimidation on June 22, 1981 and threw the
petitioners out of the premises.

The defendants, now respondents, alleged their prior possession
of the fishponds and claimed that the petitioners were the ones who attempted
to dispossess them from the property. 
Meanwhile, respondent Tranquilino Arroyo, intervened in the ejectment
case alleging that he was the real owner of the fishponds and that the
defendants, now his co-respondents in this petition, were his lessees.

The background facts from the petitioners’ viewpoint are recited
in their memorandum as follows:

“1. Prior to July 22, 1981, the fish­pond in dispute which consists
of four (4) parcels of land with an area of fifty-seven (57) hectares situated
in Sitio Teracan, Barrio
Consuelo, Municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga, as depicted in LC Map-SZ-R-3-6-01 was inalienable
part of the public domain having been classified as mangrove swamp (forestral).  (Exhibits H-3; K, K-1 to K-­4).

“On July 22, 1981, the Minister of Natural Resources, then
Hon. Teodoro Q. Pena, issued BFD Administrative Order
No. 4-1596 (Exhibit H-3) which declared certain portions of the public domain
situated in the Municipality of Masantol, Province of
Pampanga under LC Project 21-A, as alienable and
disposable for fishpond development.  (Exhibit H-3) Among those listed as
claimants/occupants within said Project 21-A, alienable and disposable for
fishpond development at Masantol, Pampanga, Barangay Consuelo and Esteban, is plaintiff Roberto
Vallarta, (Exhibits H-6 and H-7).

“It was actually plaintiff Vallarta who precipitated the
release from the public domain (forestral) of the
area in dispute as alienable and disposable for fishpond development by filing
an application there­for.  (Exhibit 1)

“2.     Plaintiff Vallarta
came upon a swamp area at Teracan, Bo. Consuelo, Municipality of Macabebe, Province of Pampanga, occupied by his co-plaintiffs, who inherited their respective
areas from their grandparents.

“3.     Plaintiff Vallarta, on
his pro­posal, developed the subject area with his co-plaintiffs in 1976 and
little by little, thru the years, improved it into a developed fishpond.  Presently fifty (50) hectares are developed, while seven (7) hectares
remain undeveloped.

“4.     From plaintiff
Vallarta’s verification from the Bureau of Lands, the land in question was
still public land (mangrove) swamp).  He
was referred to the Bureau of Forestry, which informed him that the area was
part of the public domain (forestral) and was
advised, as he was in occupancy thereof, to file an application for lease agreement with
the Bureau of Fisheries, which in turn, told him that the area should first be
classified as alienable and dis­posable. 
A formal request therefor was thus made by
Vallarta (Exh. 1) which he filed with the Bureau of
Forestry.

“5.     The application of
plaintiff Vallarta was referred to the Composite Land Classification Team (CLC
Team), the members of which are representatives of the Bureau of Lands, the
Bureau of Fisheries & Aquatic Resources and the Bureau of Forest Develop­ment.  The CLC Team classifies and zonifies area/s
fitted for fishpond purposes, as alienable and disposable, and effects survey
and prepares the map of the area involved.

“6.     The CLC Team verified
from their own records the nature of the area involved
and certified the same as public land. 
The questioned area is depicted in LC-Map-SZ­-R-36-01 (Exhibit A –
Injunction).

“The CLC Team conducted the necessary field work on the area
applied for as alien­able and disposable for fishpond purposes.  Finding the area in question suited for
fishpond purposes, the CLC Team issued the necessary certification that the
area is alienable and disposable for fishpond development subject to the
approval of the Minister of Natural Resources. 
The Minister of Natural Resources approved the recommendation of the
Director of Forestry and issued BFP ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 4-1596 dated July
22, 1981 which declares as ‘alienable or disposable for fishpond development
that portion of the public domain situated in Masantol,
Pampanga, containing an approximate area of 4,574.8
hectares, more or less, as shown and described in the Bureau of Forest Development Map SZ-68.’ (Exhibit H-3)
The 57.6373 hectare fishpond, developed and occupied
by plaintiff Vallarta is a portion
of the area covered by BFD Adm. Order No. 4-1596.  (Exhibits K, K-1 to K-4, H-6, H-7)

“When the CLC Team headed by Jose O. Banigued,
who testified in the case, conducted in January 1981 an ocular inspection of
the area applied for, they found Roberto Vallarta in occupancy of the subject
area and saw workers and plaintiffs in the fishpond.  They also saw in the area in question
concrete dikes and gates, as well as milkfish, and indeed found it to be ‘fully
developed area.’ The CLC Team prepared their Memorandum to the Chairman,
National LC Committee and Swamp Zonification Report
dated January 17, 1981
recommending approval of the zonification of the area
into alienable and disposable for fishpond development.  (Exhibits K, K-1 to K-4).

“6.     On May 22, 1981, plaintiff Vallarta
filed his Application for Fishpond Lease Agreement (Exhibit J) with the Bureau
of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, covering the 57-hectares fishpond in
question.

“7.     Plaintiff Vallarta and
his co­-plaintiffs had since 1976 continuously and peacefully developed and
operated subject fishpond until disturbance occurred on May to June 1981 and
complete interruption (forcible entry) occurred on June 22, 1981.

“8.     Since May 1981 up to
the time of forcible entry on June 22,
1981, defend­ants had been harassing plaintiffs with the assistance
of the military.”

(Rollo, pp. 157-160).

In their memorandum, the private respondents adopt the facts as
found by the appellate court:

“The 57-hectare fishpond in litis forms part of a 102-hectare property
developed as a fishpond, located in Macabebe, Pampanga. 
Admittedly, a 47-hectare portion thereof is already titled in the name
of private respondent Tranquilino Arroyo under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4244, a derivative of Original Certificate of
Title No. 490 dating back to August 21, 1917.  The
said 4-parcel, 57-hectare fishpond in litis together with other unregistered land in Macabebe, Pampanga, is subject of
the pending Cadastral Case No. N-7, LRC Record No. N-619
filed on behalf of the Director
of Lands, the said four (4) parcels having been designated as Lots Nos. 3305,
3324, 3329 and 3331 in a cadastral survey therefor.

“Evidence of private respondent Arroyo’s title to and
ownership of the entirety of the 102-hectare developed fish­pond, aside from a
certificate of title covering a portion thereof now here in question, includes:  (a) 1921 tax declaration for the 102-hectare
property in the name of Proceso de Guzman; (b)
subsequent tax declarations also in
the name of Proceso
de Guzman for 1922, 1927, 1929 and 1942; (c) a 1965 tax declaration for the
102-hectare property in the name of Nicolasa de
Guzman, daughter of the late Proceso de Guzman; (d)
tax declarations therefor continuing in the name of Nicolasa de Guzman for 1969, 1973 and 1979; (e) official
receipts of real estate tax payments for the property covered by said tax
declarations; (f) contracts of lease over the fishpond to Carpio
Calara dated May 15, 1960; to Cipriano
Soriano and Carpio Calara dated May 15, 1961; to Geronimo Enriquez dated May
17, 1972 also for five (5) years; (g) a September 5, 1978 Order in Special
Proceedings Case No. C-525 re the Testate Estate of the late Nicolas de
Guzman-Arroyo, evidencing private respondent Tranquilino
Arroyo’s accession to ownership of the property in litis; (h) lease to Teofilo Panganiban,
petitioner Vallarta’s father-in-law, from May 20, 1978 to May 20, 1981; and (i) lease to private respondent Marcelino
Marcos thereafter up to May 21, 1983.

“There is unrebutted testimony that
petitioner Vallarta served as Teofilo Panganiban’s overseer in
the operation of the leased fishpond, and that while such an overseer,
Vallarta had occasion to deliver gift produce to private respondent Arroyo, and
having once offered to help Arroyo sell the
fishpond (t.s.n., July 19, 1984, pp. 12-15).” (Rollo, pp. 134-135)

This case was earlier elevated to this Court as G.R. No. 62709, Arroyo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et
al.

Upon the filing of the forcible entry case, the petitioners were
granted a temporary restraining order.  The
defendants-respondents were prohibited from harvesting the milkfish which were
in the fishponds when they took over possession.  However, after hearing the parties, the
municipal circuit trial court denied the
motions for mandatory and prohibitory injunctions thus enabling the respondents to harvest the
fish.  When the case was elevated on certiorari
and prohibition to the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
the order was reversed and a writ of injunction, both mandatory and preventive,
was issued.  The petitioners were,
therefore, given back their possession of the disputed fishponds.

The private respondents went on certiorari to the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 74573-SP
but their petition was denied.  Upon
elevation of that petition to this Court, we affirmed the findings and the
orders which restored possession to the petitioners.

In the meantime, trial in the forcible entry case proceeded.  Judgment was rendered in favor of intervenor Arroyo on a finding that the disputed fishponds
belonged to him.  The original defendants
bowed out of the picture as the contract of lease allegedly executed between
them and intervenor Arroyo had expired.  Based on the factual findings of the trial
court, the regional trial court and the respondent court affirmed the decision
on appeal.

The petition before us calls for the resolution of the dispute
between the petitioners and intervenor Arroyo, now
the principal private respondent.

The petitioners contend that the respondent court committed the
following errors:

I

“RESPONDENT COURT
ERRED GRAVELY IN ASSUMING WITHOUT SUFFICIENT BASIS THAT THE FOUR (4) PARCELS OF
LAND IN DISPUTE ARE THE SAME LOTS COVERED BY THE LEASE AGREEMENTS AND THE TAX
DECLARATIONS OFFERED BY RESPONDENT TRANQUILINO ARROYO AS BASIS OF HIS CLAIM OVER
SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND OCCUPIED AND DEVELOPED BY PETITIONER VALLARTA AND HIS
CO-PETITIONERS.

II

“RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED, NAY, ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION IN ADOPTING IN TOTO THE SAME FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS SET FORTH IN THE DECISIONS SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED BEFORE IT,
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THESE ARE THE VERY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS CHALLENGED BY
PETITIONERS IN THEIR APPEAL FOR BEING DEVOID OF EVIDENTIAL SUPPORT AND BEING
CONJECTURAL AND, IN FACT, CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE THEORY OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THEMSELVES.

III

“RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING POSSESSION TO
RESPONDENT TRANQUILINO ARROYO (INTERVENOR) AND IN ORDERING PETITIONERS TO
VACATE THE FISHPOND IN DISPUTE (THE POSSESSION OF WHICH WAS RETURNED TO
PETITIONERS IN VIRTUE OF A PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION DULY AFFIRMED BY
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT), NOTWITHSTANDING THE FINDINGS THAT THERE WAS
FORCIBLE ENTRY WHICH IS THE MAIN ISSUE IN THIS CASE, THEREBY LEGALIZING PUBLIC
DISORDERS AND BREACH OF THE PEACE AND TRAVERSING THE BASIC PHILOSOPHY
UNDERLYING THE SUMMARY REMEDY OF FORCIBLE ENTRY UNDER RULE 70 OF THE RULES OF
COURT.

IV

“RESPONDENT COURT
GRAVELY ERRED, NAY, ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN CONCLUDING THAT
PETITIONERS’ RELIANCE ON BFD ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 4-1596 AND HIS
APPLICATION FOR LEASE WITH THE GOVERNMENT ARE INSUFFICIENT, ON THE BASIS OF AN
UNFOUNDED ASSUMPTION THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER REFERS TO LAND IN MASANTOL,
PAMPANGA, AND NOT IN MACAREBE, PAMPANGA, WHERE THE SUBJECT AREA IS LOCATED,
SAID COURT BEING OBVIOUSLY OBLIVIOUS OF THE FACT THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
COVERS THE VERY LAND IN DISPUTE AS TESTIFIED TO BY NO LESS THAN THE CHIEF OF
THE LAND CLASSIFICATION TEAM.

V

“RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADJUDICATING OWNERSHIP IN FAVOR
OF RESPONDENT ARROYO (INTERVENOR) NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE LAND IN
DISPUTE IS PUBLIC LAND (FORESTRAL) WHICH IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP AND NOTWITHSTANDING FURTHER THAT SUCH ADJUDICATION IS A CLEAR­
PREJUDGEMENT OF THE CADASTRAL CLAIM OF SAID RESPONDENT-INTERVENOR WHICH HAS
BEEN VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IN BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT.

VI

“RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT
JUDGE COMMITTED ERROR IN PASSING JUDGMENT UPON THE RIGHT OF POSSESSION BASED ON
INTERVENOR’S CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP WHICH IS COGNIZABLE BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
IN AN ACCION PUBLICIANA, THE SOLE ISSUE IN THE FORCIBLE ENTRY
CASE BEING ONE OF PHYSICAL POSSESSION WHICH IS EXCLUSIVELY COGNIZABLE BY THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT.

VII

“RESPONDENT COURT ERRED GRAVELY, NAY, ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION IN
ORDERING PETITIONERS TO PAY RENTALS TO RESPONDENT-INTERVENOR NOTWITHSTANDING
THAT – (1) INTERVENOR HAS NO BETTER RIGHT THAN PETITIONERS, AND, IN FACT, NO
RIGHT AT ALL OVER THE DISPUTED FISHPONDS,
(2) THE INTERVENOR NEVER ALLEGED, MUCH LESS, PRAYED FOR SUCH RELIEF, (3)
INTERVENOR RESERVED TO FILE SEPARATE ACTION FOR DAMAGES IN THE PROPER COURT,
AND (4) THE AWARD TO PAY RENTS IS IN THE NATURE OF LOSS OF INCOME FROM RENTS
THAT MAY BE DERIVED FROM MARCOS’ LEASE CONTRACT, BUT THE AMOUNT OF WHICH IS
BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT.”

All of these assigned errors center around the nature and identity of the disputed property and
the validity of the respondent-intervenor’s claim of ownership.

The main defense of the
respondents in this petition asserts that we should respect the factual findings
of the respondent court.

As a rule, we respect the factual findings of the appellate court
and trial courts and accord them a certain measure of finality.  (Monfort v. Aguinaldo, et al. 91 Phil. 913; Collector of Customs of
Manila v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 137 SCRA 3; Espiritu
v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 50; Guita v. Court of
Appeals, 139 SCRA 576; Alto Sales Corporation v. Judge Guardson
R. Lood, et al., 128 SCRA 91; Hidalgo v.
Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 652; People v. Navoa, 131
SCRA 190; Leonardo v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 890; Borlas
v. Court
of Appeals, 114 SCRA 254; Magpantay v. Court of
Appeals, 116 SCRA 236; Regalario v. Northwest Finance
Corporation, et al., 117 SCRA 45; American Home Assurance Co. v. Court of Appeals,
109 SCRA 180 and Director of Lands v. Funtilar, 142
SCRA 57).  However, this rule is subject
to well established exceptions.  We ruled in
Moran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals (133 SCRA 88) that this Court retains the power
to review and rectify the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals when (1) the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd and
impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment
is based on a mis­apprehension of facts; and (5) when the court, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee.  In Manero v.
Court of Appeals (102 SCRA 817) we stated
additional exceptions such as:  (1) the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (2) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (3) the facts set forth in the petition as
well as the peti­tioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (4) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised
on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record.

We have departed from the general rule in this case because there
is a grave misapprehension of facts and the inferences made are manifestly
mistaken.

This case started out and continues to be a
forcible entry litigation. 
Ownership was not in issue except to aid in the determination of the
legality of the prior possession of whoever was forcibly ejected from the
premises.

The fact is established that the petitioners had been in peaceful
possession of the premises when they were thrown out.  The questioned decision of the appellate
court awarded the properties not to the original defendants or deforciants but to the intervenor-respondent,
Tranquilino Arroyo, because of its finding that he is
the owner.  It is clear, however, that
Mr. Arroyo was not in possession and was not even involved when the forcible
entry took place.

The records show that for many years prior to the defendants entry in 1981, the petitioners had been
constructing, enlarging, repairing, and maintaining the physical facilities and
cultivating milkfish in the disputed premises. 
The records sustain the petitioners’ description of the defendants’ take
over, as follows:

xxx      xxx     xxx

“10.   On June 22, 1981, at about 9:00 o’clock of the same morning, a group of armed
men, more than ten (10) in number, carrying armalites,
.45 pistols and carbines, with bullets on their body, arrived.  They kicked the door of the central hut to
force it open.  Some of these armed men
were identified thus:  defendants Vicente
Gonzales, Berting Cunanan, Filemon Sison, Andres Balingit, Ato Gaddi,
Rodolfo Canilao, Nazario Mangahas, Dionisio Catahan and Carling Aquino, Berting Cunanan, Vicente Gonzales,
Nazario Mangahas and Dionisio Catahan entered the
central hut pointing their firearms at the occupants, including Cesar Vallarta,
Marcelino Reyes and the workers who were inside the
hut, and ordered them to get out.  One of
these armed men was heard,
saying:  At last Celing
(referring to Marcelino Marcos) will get
possession of the fishpond.  The
occupants of the main hut, for fear of their lives, obeyed the order and went
out of the hut.  The occupants of the
other huts in the fish­pond in question were already within the premises of the
central hut when the people in the latter hut went out.  All of the men in the questioned fishpond were ordered at gun point
to ride in a banca, after which they went to Hagonoy, Bulacan.  Some of their personal belongings were left
in the hut while some were thrown into the river.

“On June 23, 1981,
the incident on June 19-20, 1981
was complained of or reported by Cesar Vallarta to the police station in Macabebe.  Cesar
Vallarta was given a copy of the report in the nature of complaint sheet dated June 23, 1981 about said incident
(Exhibit E).  The incident of forcible
entry of June 22, 1981 was
the subject of another report (complaint sheet) prepared by the Macabebe Police Station at Macabebe
(Exhibit E-1).

“11.   At the time when
plaintiffs and the workers were forcibly disposed of the fishpond in
controversy, there were 150,000 pieces of bangus of
7-8 inches long worth P.70 to P1.00 each in the “Kaluwangan”
portion of the fishpond and some 700,000 pieces of fingerlings 1-1/2 inches
long valued at .40 each at the
“Binhian” compartment thereof.  The 100,000 released in the “Kaluwangan” was
acquired from Mrs. Milagros Soriano, while 50,000
pieces from Bulacan, Bulacan;
and the fingerlings released in the “Binhian”
were acquired from Alfredo Panganiban.  (Exhibits
C and D-Injunction) All these fish were left in the disputed fishpond on
June 22, 1981 or at the
time of the forcible ejection of plaintiffs.” (Rollo,
pp. 19-20)

The appellate court found the forcible entry taken by Marcelino Marcos and his group censurable.  However, it did not return possession to the
dispossessed petitioners because of its finding that inter­venor,
Arroyo, is the owner and, therefore, entitled to possession.

Are the title and ownership of respondent Arroyo sufficiently
established in this forcible entry case? 
The records show that they are not. 
The evidence upon which the respondent court relied is tenuous and unreliable.

The respondent court accepted the intervenor’s
claim that 47 hectares of the 57 hectares fishpond forms part of a 102 hectares
property which had been titled in his predecessor’s name since August 21, 1917.  The petitioners, however, contend that the
property covered by TCT No. 4244, derived from OCT No. 490 cannot possibly
refer to the disputed fishponds.

The evidence supports the petitioners’ contention.

BFD Administrative Order No. 4-1596 dated July 22, 1981 shows that 4,574.8 hectares of
mangrove swamps earlier classified as forest land was on that date declared
alienable or disposable for fishpond development.  The released forest land
was placed under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources as part of its LC Project No. 21-A. 
(Exh. H-3, Original
Records) The disputed property forms part of that
forest land which became alienable only in 1981.

It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that
forest land cannot be owned by private persons. 
It is not registrable.  The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of
title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence until after forest land has been declared alienable and disposable.  Possession of forest land,
no matter how long cannot convert it into private property.  (Adorable, et al. v. Directory of Forestry, 107
Phil. 401; Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648). 
If somehow forest land happens to have been included in a Torrens Title,
the title is null and
void insofar as that forest land is concerned. 
(Director of Lands v. Reyes,
68 SCRA 177; Li Seng Giap y Cia v. Director of Lands, 55 Phil. 693; Director of
Forestry v. Munoz, 23 SCRA 1183; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 121 Phil. 681).

Bolstering the nature of the disputed properties as recently
released alienable land and, therefore, not yet titled is the fact that
Cadastral Case No. N-7, LRC Registration No. 619 which was filed to settle the
ownership and titles of unregistered lands in the area covered by the case includes the disputed lots.

More specifically, the Solicitor-General in Cad. Case No. N-7, LRC Reg.
No. 619 before the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga
opposed the claim of Tranquilino Arroyo to Lot Nos.
3304, 3305, 3324, 3329, and 3331
on the ground that these lots, which consist of the disputed fishponds may be
disposed of only through lease by the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources.  The Solicitor-General asked
in the cadastral case that the claim of Mr. Arroyo should be dismissed pursuant
to Sec. 24 of PD 704, which provides:

“Sec. 24.  Lease of Fishponds.
– Public lands available for fishpond development including those earmarked for
family-sized fishponds and not yet leased prior to November 9, 1972, shall be
leased only to qualified person, association, cooperatives or corporations xxx.” (Exh. H-1, Original Records)

Far from being a settled matter, the
ownership of the fishponds in question is still to be adjudicated.  (See Claim of the Republic
of the Philippines, Exh. H,
Original Records).  The Government
itself has asked that the claim of respondent Arroyo in the cadastral case be
dismissed.

The records show that petitioner
Vallarta in 1976
started to develop the swampland in Teracan, Barrio
Consuelo, Macabebe, Pampanga by building dikes and constructing
fishponds.  Upon inquiry from the Bureau
of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry, he was told that the mangrove swampland he
was developing formed part of the public
domain.  On February 20, 1980, he, therefore, filed an application
with the Bureau of Forest Development asking for the release of Lots 3305,
3324, 3329, and 3331 with an area of 57.637 hectares and praying for their
classification as alienable and disposable for fishpond development.  (Exh.
I, Original Records)

On January 17, 1981, CLC Team No. 16 composed of a Forestry
Supervisor, two Senior Foresters, an Engineer, and two Cartographers rendered a
report on the applied for property stating that four lots with an area of
57.6373 hectares formed part of a big body of fishpond block already fully
developed into fishponds and recommended favorable action on the
application.  (Exh. K-1, Original Records).

A recommendation was prepared by
Director Edmundo V. Cortes of the Bureau of Forest
Development with a draft BFD Administrative Order for the signature of
Jose J. Leido,
Jr., Minister of Natural Resources to
declare as alienable or disposable for fishpond development the 57.6373
hectares described in BFD Map SZ-R-3-6-01. 
(Exh. K-3, Original
Records)

As earlier stated, Minister Teodoro O. Pena of the Ministry of Natural Resources
released on July 22, 1981
not only the above cited lots but a total area of 4,574.8 hectares of forest land.

The respondent court is plainly in error
when it disregarded the above
administrative proceedings and affirmed the subject property as owned by
respondent Arroyo and his
predecessors-in-interest as early as 1917.  The
survey conducted by a team of experienced foresters, cartographers, and an
engineer pinpointed the area as classified forest land suitable far release as alienable and disposable land.  The
Minister of Natural Resources issued an Administrative
Order.  These acts cannot be lightly disregarded.  The court, therefore, erred in declaring the forest land as private property owned by the intervenor
for the purpose of determining possession
in a forcible entry proceeding.

Respondent Arroyo contends that BFD
Administrative Order No. 4-1596
refers only to land located in Masantol, Pampanga and
does not extend to land in Macabebe, Pampanga.  This
contention is answered by the Solicitor-General who
stated in his memorandum in Cad.  Case No. N-7, LRC
Rec. No. N-619:

“The lots in question form part of a vast tract of land
classified as swamp mangrove or forestral
land actually situated in the
municipality of Macabebe, province Pampanga, albeit mentioned in the zonification
map (SZ-68) as portion of the public domain
situated in the municipality of Masantol.  This is explained in the Memo­randum of the
Director of Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (Exhibits 4, 4-A and 4-B)
as well as in the notation appearing on said zonification
map that Provincial/Municipal boundary lines are not actually located and that
such political boundaries are only for the purposes of determining the
administrative jurisdiction of Forest Districts affected.  It is further explained that the ‘references
used as far as political boundaries of Macabebe and Masantol is concerned are obsolete, since according to your
report the area involved is found in Macabebe not in Masantol as indicated. 
It could further be inferred, that the land classification committee is not authorized to change or alter the
references from which the Municipal boundaries indicated are based.  Such political boundaries according to the
above-quoted notation are for purposes of determining the administrative
jurisdiction of Forest District affected.’ (Exhibit 4-B) Verily, the lots in
dispute are within the municipality of Macabebe as indicated in the zonification
map (SZ-68), Exhibit 3, and thus form part of that declared alienable and
disposable for fishpond development only.

“It can be seen from BFD Administrative Order No. 4-1596
(Exhibit 1) that prior to its issuance on July 22, 1981, the lots in question were portion of the swamp
mangove or forestral
land of the public domain.  It was only on July 22, 1981 that said forestral
land, including the disputed lots, was released or declared as alienable or
disposable for fishpond development.” (Records of
CA-G.R. No. 07803, pp. 101-102).

The Solicitor-General is correct in stating that the disputed
lots are not private properties and are not registrable.  Our decision in Director of
Lands v. Court
of Appeals, (133 SCRA 701) is cited.  This decision states:

“Forestal land is not registerable.  Its
inclusion in a title, whether the title be issued
during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens system,
nullifies the title.  (Director of Lands
vs. Reyes, L-27594 and Alinsunurin v. Director of
Lands, L- 28144, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177, 194-5; Li Seng
Giap v. Director of Lands, 55 Phil. 693; Director of
Forestry v. Munoz, L-24796, June 28,
1968, 23 SCRA 1183; Dizon v. Rodriguez, and Republic
v. Court of Appeals, 121 Phil. 681; Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil.
401).

“Section 48(b) cannot apply to forestal
land before it is declassified to form part of disposable public agricultural
land (Heirs of Jose Amunategui
v. Director of Forestry, L-27873, November 29, 1983, 125 SCRA 69, 75).  A patent issued for forestal
land is void.  The State may sue for its
reversion to the public domain (Republic v. Animas, L-37682, March 29, 1974, 56
SCRA 499).  Possession of forestal lands cannot ripen into private ownership
(Director of Forestry v. Munoz, supra).”

The error of the respondent court is further shown by the surveys
forming part of the records.

Exhibit 3 of the original records in the trial court is a Plan of
Lots 3304, 3324, 3329, 3331, and 3305 drawn up by Geodetic Engineer Ernesto Montemayor on October
21-23, 1976 for Mr. Tranquilino Arroyo.

“Exh. “A”,
Injunction, of the same original records is a land classification map, Map
SZ-R-3-6-01, bearing the names of Director Felix G. Gonzales of the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, Director Edmundo
Cortes of the Bureau of Forest
Development, Director Juanito C. Fernandez of the Bureau of Mines,
and Director Ramon N. Casanova of the Bureau of Lands.  This map plots the same Lot Nos. 3305, 3329,
3331, and 3324 (excluding Lot 3304) found in Exh. 3 of Mr. Arroyo.

The Government’s land classification map states that the four
lots it covers, with an area of 57.6373, is a correct map of the areas
demarcated as Alienable or Disposable. 
It states that the areas were originally surveyed under Cad 378-D of the
Macabebe Cadastre on March 1, 1966 to May 31, 1966 and approved by the Director
of Lands on August 27, 1969.

As between the map prepared by a private surveyor for the intervenor and the map prepared for no less than four
different bureaus of the Ministry of Natural Resources as part of its land
classification program, this Court gives credit to the latter.  The lots in question are
not private property as described by the respondent court but lands
still belonging to the public domain although now released to he developed as
fish­ponds by authorized lessees.

In declaring respondent intervenor
Arroyo as owner, the respondent court relied heavily on tax declarations.  Going over these tax declarations, we find
them inadequate to sustain the court’s findings.  The petitioners’ contention appears to be
meritorious that the supposed 1921 declaration with superficially described
boundaries underwent meta­morphosis and extreme changes in areas and boundary
descriptions when it suddenly evolved in 1980 as three tax declarations
conveniently referring to cadastral Lots 3331, 3329, and 3305.  However, we see no need to discuss the
evolution of these tax declarations in detail in the light of the Government
declaration that these properties were released for alienation and disposition
only in 1981.

The petitioners do not claim to own the disputed fishponds.  They admit that when they entered on the
land, improved and developed it, and planted fish therein, it was still forest
land.  This explains why they filed
applications with the proper authorities for permits or licenses to develop
fishponds in the area.

The claim for damages due to respondents’ seizure of the
fishponds for eight months is not fully established in these ejectment proceedings. 
This case is without prejudice to the petitioners’ taking separate legal
action to assert their claims for damages and rentals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.  The questioned decision of the respondent
court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The petitioners’
right of possession is recognized.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.