PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. TEODORICO SILFAVAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 23 at Iloilo City,
finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape and sentencing him as
follows:

“WHEREFORE, having been found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of RAPE, the accused TEODORICO SILFAVAN is hereby sentenced to
suffer a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and he is hereby further ordered to
indemnify the victim by way of moral damages in the amount of P12,000.00.

“And as a consequence of the crime (sic) conviction of rape,
he is further ordered to acknowledge the child, Irene Silfavan, and to give
support to the said child pursuant to
Art. 283 of the New Civil Code.” (p. 35, Rollo).

The information filed by
the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of the criminal complaint
subscribed and sworn to by complainant Josephine Tesoro states:

“That on or about the second week of November, 1979 and
succeedingly thereafter on February 3, 1980 and then on February 24, 1980, in
the municipality of Miagao, Province of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused armed with a knife by means
of force and intimidation and while the victim was unconscious, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of Josephine
Tesoro a minor, fifteen years of age, against her will and consent.  That as a result of the rape, the victim is
now pregnant.” (p. 24, Rollo).

The prosecution presented
complainant and principal witness, Josephine Tesoro; the attending physician,
Dr. Irene A. Tillo; Elena Tesoro, mother of the complainant; and Joaquin
Tesoro, uncle of the complainant.

The circumstances
surrounding the rape are narrated by Josephine and Dr. Tillo whose testimonies
are summarized by the trial court as follows:

“On October 17, 1980,
Dr. Irene A. Tillo,
of Guimbal Emergency
Hospital, Guimbal, Iloilo,
testified that she examined the complainant Josephine Tesoro on June 30, 1980.  Her
findings indicated the complainant was pregnant for 23 weeks as per
Medical Certificate marked as Exhibit “B” (p. 21, rec.).  The examination thus conducted further showed
that the complainant suffered ruptured hymen (Ev. for the Prosecution, p. 3,
TSN., October 17, 1980).  In the course
of the said examination, the complainant also revealed to Dr. Irene Tillo that
she was raped by the accused Teodorico Silfavan sometime on February, 1980 (Ev.
for the Prosecution, p. 1, TSN., October 17, 1980).

“The complainant Josephine Tesoro testified that sometime in
the evening of November, 1979, she attended the wake of her late uncle Miguel
Tesoro; that at about 9:00 o’clock that same evening, she went home together
with Teresita Tesoro, Salvacion Tesoro and Alma Nonato; that before reaching
home they parted ways and each of them proceeded to their respective houses;
that upon reaching her house and
finding the front door closed, she proceeded to the backdoor; that when she was
about to enter the backdoor, the accused Teodorico Silfavan, with knife on hand
pointed at her, told her not to shout, otherwise he would kill her; that the
accused held her and brought her to a coconut plantation; that she tried to
release herself from the accused but failed; that with the use of force and
intimidation, the accused raped her; that after the sexual intercourse with
her, the accused told her not to tell anybody or he would kill her (Ev. for the Prosecution, pp. 6, 11, TSN., February 16, 1981).

“The complainant further testified that on February 3, 1980
she had a stomach ache while at the seashore helping pull the fishnet; that she
went home to defecate; that when she was about to leave the toilet, she saw the
accused standing at the door, pushed her back inside, causing her to hit the
wall thereby rendering her unconscious; that she felt pain on her vagina upon
regaining consciousness, that she saw the accused Teodorico Silfavan covering
her mouth and warning her not to tell her family or he would kill her (Ev. for the Prosecution, pp. 12-13, TSN., February 16, 1981).

“The complainant continued with her testimony and declared
that at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening of February 24, 1980, the accused
grabbed her while she was pumping water in the process of washing her clothes;
that the accused grabbed and brought her to his house; that he forced her to
lie down and undressed her; that she pleaded for him to stop but it turned to
deaf ears; that she fought back and kicked him but to no avail; that after
having carnal knowledge with her, the accused warned her not to tell anybody or
he would kill her; that the accused even told her to look for a boyfriend and
get married if ever she gets pregnant; that she gave birth to a child on October 12,
1980 (Ev. for the Prosecution, pp. 14-15, TSN., February 16, 1981); that
because of fear for the accused, she never revealed her horrible experiences to
her mother not until the latter discovered her pregnancy; that the accused went
to see Joaquin Tesoro, the uncle of the complainant, and Iloilo City
Superintendent of Schools, seeking help to settle the rape charges filed
against him (Ev. for the Prosecution, p. 17, TSN., February 16, 1981); that she
caused the entry of the name of the accused as the father of the child in the
record of birth of the child; that the accused did not object to the putting of
his name in the record of birth of the child nor attempted to destroy the
baptismal and birth certificates of the child (Ev. for the Prosecution, pp.
21-22, TSN., February 16, 1981).  (Decision of trial court, pp. 1-4).

The accused-appellant claims that the trial court committed the
following errors:

I.     THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE
FACT THAT COMPLAINANT AND HER MOTHER WERE MOTIVATED BY ILL-MOTIVE
AS BORNE OUT BY THE EVIDENCE IN FILING THE
RAPE CHARGE AGAINST THE ACCUSED, PARTICULARLY BY MONETARY CONSIDERATION.

II.    THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE
CORRECTLY THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI BY THE ACCUSED AS SHOWN BY THE EVIDENCE.

III.   THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO
COMPLAINANT’S TESTIMONY BY REASON OF ALLEGED MORAL ASCENDANCY BY THE ACCUSED
OVER THE COMPLAINANT, SUCH MORAL ASCENDANCY IS
INEXISTENT IN THE EVIDENCE.

IV.   THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
ACCUSED WENT TO JOAQUIN TESORO TO ASK FOR THE LATTER’S INTERCESSION FOR THE
SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE, SUCH FACT IS NOT BORNE OUT BY
THE EVIDENCE.

V.   THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
CHILD WAS THE PRODUCT OF THE ALLEGED RAPES.

VI.   THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED AND IN NOT ACQUITTING HIM, HIS GUILT NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.  (pp. 1-2, Appellant’s brief).

The trial court acknowledged the “difficult task of sifting
truth from falsehood and thereafter determin(ing) the version that shall merit
credence and belief” where the only eyewitnesses to the crime are the
complainant and the accused themselves. 
After examining “with greatest care the complainant’s story and
subject(ing) it to a thorough scrutiny to determine its veracity in the light
of human nature, ordinary behaviour, and common experience”, the trial
court stated that the complainant’s story is more deserving of credence.  (See Decision of trial
court, p. 7).

After going over the records of the case, we find that the trial
court did not err as alleged.

The evidence does not sustain the appellant’s contention that the
filing of the rape charge was motivated by ill-will.

The appellant states that “the threat of the accused against
the mother of the complaint (sic) to eject them from his land gave the latter
insecurities that led to the filing of the rape charge.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 16). 
Apart from the testimony of the appellant when he was already being
tried for rape, there is absolutely no evidence to show that he ever threatened
to eject the appellant and her mother from his land.  We fail to see why the mother of a
fourteen-year old child would concoct a story of rape involving her own daughter
and the husband of her sister-in-law (bilas
in Tagalog) in order to forestall a threatened ejectment suit.  The rape charge with its resulting ill-will
would hasten their departure from the brother-in-law’s lot instead of
preventing it.

The other motives behind the filing of a fabricated rape charge
are equally difficult to believe.  The
appellant states that he was accused of rape so he could not get his retirement
pay.  His own testimony shows that he had
already received his lump sum retirement benefits one month before the filing
of the case.  (TSN.,
November 19, 1982, pp. 30-31). 
The appellant claims that the rape charge was intended to force him to
give support to the complainant and was a cover-up for her wild behaviour.  There is no proof to show and no indication
of any reason why he, of all people, should be asked to support the complainant
and her child, if he was not the father of the child.  The cover-up theory was not given credence by
the trial court.  There is no basis for us
to withhold our usual respect for the factual findings of the trial court
insofar as this theory is concerned.

The appellant states that the trial court erred in not
appreciating his defense of alibi.

Alibi is a weak defense (People v. Casundo, 134 SCRA 197; People v.
Manalo, 135 SCRA 84; People v. Deus, 136 SCRA 660; People v. Sinaw-ay, 138 SCRA
221; People v. Plandez, 132 SCRA 69; People v. Aballe, 132 SCRA 641; People v.
Roallos, 113 SCRA 584; and People v. Yutila, 102 SCRA 264).  In the face of the complainant’s positive
testimony that the accused-appellant was the person who raped her on three
occasions, the trial court refused to give credence to the allegations that he
was elsewhere on those occasions.

The appellant has failed to show why we should reverse the trial
court’s rejection of his alibi.

The contention that
during the last two weeks of November, 1979, when the first rape took place,
the appellant was always with his wife and could not have committed the crime
is too unnatural to be a basis for acquittal.  It
is inherently improbable that a 61 year old retired school teacher would be
under the watchful gaze of his wife every minute, even during the nighttime
wakes for a deceased
first cousin of the wife.

The appellant states that the coconut grove where the rape
allegedly took place is within shouting distance of the house where the
deceased relative was lying in state and yet Josephine did not shout for
help.  The complainant, however,
testified that when she entered their house through the kitchen door as their
front door was locked, her uncle held her hand, pointed a knife at her, and
told her she would be killed if she shouted. 
She was then dragged and pushed to the coconut grove where the rape took
place.  Josephine Tesoro could not shout
because there was the threat to kill her. 
In fact, after the act was consummated, the uncle told her not to tell
anybody or he will kill her.

The appellant states that the second rape allegedly committed
while the complainant was unconscious was impossible because the toilet where
it took place was only “1/2 square meter in width and length.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 19). 
The Solicitor General correctly points out that one would not be able to
squat and defecate in a toilet only 1/2 square meter in floor area.  The testimony of the complainant shows that
the toilet was three meters by three meters in dimensions (TSN., March 2, 1981,
p. 14).

The third assignment of error questions the trial court’s finding
of the appellant’s moral ascendancy over the victim.  Josephine Tesoro is the daughter of the
brother of Mrs. Restituta Tesoro-Silfavan, appellant’s wife.  She is a niece of the appellant’s wife.  She is, therefore,
a first cousin of the appellant’s own children.  The complainant and her widowed mother live
in a small house which the appellant permitted to be built on his
lot, not far from his own house.  The
appellant testified that he treated Josephine as if she were his own daughter, that he feels they are part of his own family, and
that he used to tutor her in her studies (TSN., November 19, 1982, pp. 12 &
37).  The complainant was not yet
fourteen years old when the first rape was committed.  The appellant was a sixty one year old
retired school teacher with a certain degree of prominence in their community.  The complainant’s family has been receiving
favors from the appellant.  A clear case
of moral ascendancy is established by the records (See People v. Alcid, 135
SCRA 280; People v. Erardo, 127 SCRA 250; and People v. Alvis, Jr., 117 SCRA
362).

The fourth assignment of
error refers to an issue involving credibility. 
The appellant alleges that it was Joaquin Tesoro, related to him
and to the complainant, who offered his services to intercede in the
affair.  On the other hand, Joaquin
Tesoro, who was the Division Superintendent of City Schools and former boss of
the appellant, testified that it was Mr. Silfavan who went to his house asking
for his help in the settlement of the case. 
The trial court did not err in giving credence to the testimony of Mr.
Tesoro.  Appellant Silfavan was in need of assistance.  He was the one charged with a serious
crime.  As a former school teacher, it
was natural for him to seek the help of
the Division Superintendent of Schools. 
It would have been unnatural for the latter to take the initiative
of interceding to effect a settlement.

The arguments of the appellant in his fifth assignment of error are
misleading.  He alleges that the period
from February 3, 1980, the
date of the alleged second act of rape, to October 12, 1980, when the complainant’s child was born,
is only seven months and twenty-one days, which means that the child was born as a premature
baby.  There is nothing in the record, according to him, to show that the child was
prematurely born.

From February 3 to October 12, is eight months and nine
days.  A child born 8 months and 9 days
from conception will look like a full term nine months old baby.  He or she does not have to be given the
special care of a premature baby.  And
even assuming the correctness of the appellant’s computations, the neglect in
presenting evidence of a premature birth does not necessarily mean that there was no
such birth.  The bone of contention in
this case is the forcible act of rape, not the state of the 8 months and 9 days
old baby when born.

To show that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt,
the appellant alleges in his last assigned error that – (1) the complainant is
impure and unchaste; (2) the complainant did not resist and “short of
enjoying the act, she allowed the accused to penetrate at will and ease”;
(3) the venue of the November, 1979 rape is unlikely; (4) the complainant’s
sexual encounter with the accused in November, 1979 was voluntary; (5) there
was unreasonable delay in revealing the alleged rape; (6) the complainant
appeared to enjoy narrating her experience; and (7) the fact that the accused
did not flee shows he is innocent.

The above arguments to show reversible error on the part of the
trial court are either self-serving or easily refuted.

The supposed impure and wild behaviour of the 14 year old
“probinsiyana” can easily be concocted by the accused.  Not one of the supposed “barkadas”
or boyfriends was presented as a witness.  The “wild”
behaviour was not corroborated by a witness more disinterested than the
accused-appellant.  It is understandable
why the trial court did not accept the story about the 14-year old victim
having an affair with her own brother-in-law as a ground for acquittal. 
Apart from being self-serving testimony, the story is rather improbable.

The allegations that the victim allowed the complainant to
penetrate at will and with ease and that the first sexual encounter was
voluntary are not supported by the records. 
The allegations are also contradictory to the appellant’s defense that
he never touched the girl.  The victim
was a minor; the appellant
exercised moral ascendancy over her; and the threat to kill the complainant was
backed by a knife pointed at her.  Resistance to rape can be in varying degrees,
dependent on the circumstances of the case and of the victim vis-a-vis the
assailant.

The delay in prosecuting
the rapes is not an indication
of fabricated charges.  If the
complainant did not become pregnant, she probably would never have revealed
that she was raped by her uncle.  Many victims of rape never complain or file
criminal charges against the rapists. 
They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain rather than reveal their shame
to the world or risk the rapists’
making good their threats to kill or hurt their victims.

The fact that the
complainant did not ask for the
exclusion of the people in the courtroom while she was testifying does not
signify that she “enjoyed” narrating the rape incident.  Josephine Tesoro was asked if she was willing
to tell her story with everybody there hearing it.  She answered that it was “okay” with her.  (TSN., February 16, 1981,
pp. 11-12).  This does not
necessarily mean that Josephine enjoyed having an audience
listen to her narration.  Not
being a lawyer, she was not familiar with the procedure of excluding the court audience during offensive, degrading,
or titillating testimony.  She
could have felt that a different answer might be interpreted to mean that her
testimony was untrue if it could not be told with other people around.

In some cases of murder, robbery, or even rape where a person is a prime suspect, his not fleeing may be a badge of innocence.  In the present case, however, the
crime was committed with impunity on three occasions by one who thought the
victim would not complain.  Under the
circumstances of this case, the appellant would most likely not have been
discovered if Josephine did not become pregnant.  The appellant did not have to flee.

The assignments of errors have no merit.  The trial court did not err as alleged.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the court a quo
is hereby AFFIRMED except for the INDEMNITY which is INCREASED to TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.