NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO AND EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, PETITIONERS, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (FIRST CIVIL CASES DIVISION) AND MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., RESPONDE…

The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus is whether a corporation, which has built
through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its
land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held
civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad
Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga
(Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that
of private respondent, Missionaries
of Our Lady of La Salette,
Inc., a religious corporation.

Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths
and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which
allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners’ land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners’ crops and
plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy
seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.

In  July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal
action, docketed as Criminal Case No.
TG-907-82, before the Regional
Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City),
against Efren Musngi,
Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of
herein respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under
Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.

Subsequently, on February
22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent
corporation, this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction before the same court.^[1]

On March 11, 1983,
respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.  Hearings were
conducted including ocular inspections on the land.  However, on April 26, 1984, the trial
court, acting on respondent corporation’s motion to dismiss or suspend the
civil action, issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case
No. TG-748 until after judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.

Resolving respondent corporation’s motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court issued
on August 27, 1984 the
disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of
jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case
was still unresolved.  Said order was
anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court
which provides that “criminal and civil actions arising from the same
offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been
commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action.”^[2]

Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate
Appellate Court.^[3]

On February 17, 1986,
respondent Appellate Court, First Civil
Cases Division, promulgated a decision,^[4]
affirming the questioned order of the trial court.^[5]
A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the Appellate
Court in its resolution dated May 19,
1986.^[6]

Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance
with Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.  Petitioners contend that the trial court and
the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on a quasi-delict.  Petitioners have raised a valid point.

It is axiomatic
that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged
in the complaint as constituting the
cause of action.^[7] The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern
it, including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by
the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but
rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.^[8] The nature of an action is not necessarily
determined or controlled by its title or heading but by the body of the
pleading or complaint itself.  To avoid possible denial of substantial
justice due to legal technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws should be liberally
construed so that the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their
respective claims.^[9]

Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners’
complaint in Civil Case No. TG-748:

4) That within defendant’s land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite, adjacent on the
right side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion thereof
leading to a big hole or opening, also constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of its concrete
hollow- blocks fence situated on the right side of its cemented gate fronting
the provincial highway, and connected by defendant to a man-height
inter-connected cement culverts which were also con­structed and lain by
defendant cross-wise beneath the tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of
the said inter-connected culverts again connected by defendant to a big hole or
opening thru the lower portion of the
same concrete hollow-blocks fence
on the left side of the said
cemented gate, which hole or opening is likewise connected by defendant to the
cemented mouth of a big canal, also constructed by defendant, which
runs northward towards a big hole or opening which was also built by defendant
thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence which separates the
land of plaintiffs from that of defendant (and which serves as the exit-point
of the floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at the same time, the
entrance-point of the same
floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year, during rainy or stormy
seasons.

“5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just
beside the land of plaintiffs, defendant also
constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is soil, which
utilizes the water being channeled thereto from its water system thru
inter-connected galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain water
during rainy or stormy seasons, so much so that the water below it seeps into, and the excess water above it
inundates, portions of the adjoining land
of plaintiffs.

“6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by
defendant’s aforementioned water conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a
young man was drowned to death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and will
continue to suffer, as follows:

“a)  Portions of the
land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to deep, wide and long canals,
such that the same can no longer be planted to any crop or plant.

“b)  Costly fences constructed by
plaintiffs were, on several occasions,
washed away.

“c)  During rainy and
stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their laborers are always in danger.

“d)  Plants and other
improvements on other portions of the land of plaintiffs are exposed to
destruction.  x x
x.”^[10]

A careful examination of the aforequoted
complaint shows that the civil action is
one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.  All the
elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:  (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or
some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.^[11]

Clearly, from petitioners’ complaint, the waterpaths
and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated
the land of petitioners.  There is therefore, an asser­tion of a causal connection between the acts of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners.  Such action if proven constitutes fault or
negligence which may be the basis for
the recovery of damages.

In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio,^[12] the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and
held that “any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike,
stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river,
thereby causing loss and damages
to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to
the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an
indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.”

While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the
public domain and the property subject of the instant case is privately owned,
the fact remains that petitioners’ complaint sufficiently alleges that
petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation.  Indeed, the recitals of the
complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission
of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the
causal connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing
contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not without
limitations.  Article 431 of the Civil
Code provides that “the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a
manner as to injure the rights of a third person.” SIC UTERE TUO UT
ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.  Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require
that each must use his own land
in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of
others.  Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must
be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot
be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected
forces of nature.  If the structures
cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter
can claim indemnification for the injury
or damage suffered.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a
person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or
negligence, thus:

“Article 2176.  Whoever
by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. 
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.”

Article 2176, whenever it refers to “fault or
negligence”, covers not only acts “not punishable by law” but
also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent.  Consequently, a separate
civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually
charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary.^[13]

The distinctness of quasi-delicts is
shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:

“Article 2177. 
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.  But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant.”

According to the Report of the
Code Commission “the foregoing
provision though at first sight startling,
is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider
the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence.  The former is a violation of the
criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a “culpa aquiliana”
or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had
its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence.  Such
distinction between criminal
negligence and “culpa extra-contractual” or “cuasi-delito”
has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain xxx.”^[14]

In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals,^[15]
this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the
Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely
apart and independent from a delict or crime — a distinction exists between the civil liability
arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual.  The same negligence
causing damages may produce civil liability arising from crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil
Code.  Therefore, the acquittal or
conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case,
unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has
declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it
the extinction of the civil liability.

In Azucena vs. Potenciano,^[16] the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, “(t)he civil action is entirely independent
of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code.  There can be no logical conclusion than this,
for to subordinate the civil action contemplated
in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution —
whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render
meaningless the independent character
of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article
31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.“

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The trial
court is ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled “Natividad V. Andamo and
Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of La
Salette, Inc.” and to proceed with the hearing
of the case with dispatch.  This decision
is immediately executory.  Costs
against respondent corporation.

So ordered.

Gutierrez, Jr., and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 27-30.

^[2]
Rollo, p. 33.

^[3]
AC-G.R. CV No. 04340.

^[4]
through Associate Justice Ma. Rosario Quetulio-Losa, ponente, with
Presiding Justice Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., and
Associate Justices Eduardo P. Caguioa and Leonor Ines-Luciano, concurring.

^[5]
Rollo, pp. 16-24.

^[6]
Rollo, p. 26.

^[7]
Republic v. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-35512, February 29, 1988, 158 SCRA 282;
Alger Electric, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-34298, February
28, 1985, 135 SCRA 3; Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. 71375, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 161.

^[8]
De Tavera vs. Philippine Tuberculosis Society,
Inc., G.R. No. L-48928, February 25, 1982, 112 SCRA 243.

^[9]
Dominguez vs. Lee, G.R. No. 74960-61, November 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 703.

^[10]
Rollo, pp. 27-28.

^[11]
Taylor vs. Manila Electric Company, 16 Phil. 8; Vergara
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77679, September 30, 1987, 154
SCRA 564.

^[12]
11 Phil. 538 (1908).

^[13]
Virata vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. L-46179, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 472.

^[14]
Report of the Code Commission on the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines,
January 26, 1948, p. 162.

^[15]
G.R. No. 48541, August 21, 1989,
176 SCRA 591.

^[16]
No. L-14028, June 30, 1962, .5 SCRA 468, 470-471.