LOPE O. DAEZ, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the
reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (now Regional Trial Court) convicting petitioner of
the crime of libel.  The petitioner was
charged in an
information which reads as follows:

“That in and during the month of October, 1972, in the Municipality of Meycauayan,
Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Lope O. Daez, with intent to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt
to the complaining witness Celso R. Legaspi, and without justifiable motive did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, publicly and maliciously impute in
writing the following vice or defect to the
complaining witness Celso R. Legaspi,
and furnish copies thereof to the
Municipal Court, Municipal Council and
Chief of Police
of Meycauayan, Bulacan,
portion of which is quoted hereunder, to
wit:

‘Sala-ula at bulok
ang iyong pangasiwaan, ang iyong polisia ay tinuruan mong maging
colector mo ng tong, ang daan-libong-pisong buwis ay ayaw mong
ipacolecta sa
Ingat-Yaman-Bayan, ang tanong ng bayan, kangino napupunta
ang daan-libong-buwis na ito?  At mabuti na lamang kung hindi mahalungkat sa fael ng
army ang Salaysay laban sa iyo
nuonq ikaw ay hulihin ng 7th  BCT. 
Kaya mag-ingat ka Alkalde sapagkat hindi mabilang
anq iyong atraso.  Ang bahay mo ay nakatayo sa buhangin, mabuay
at sa bahagyang ihip ng hangin
ay babagsak.’

thus causing to
the complaining witness Celso R. Legaspi
dishonor, discredit and contempt to his damage and prejudice.” (pp. 1-2, Records)

Upon being arraigned, the petitioner pleaded not guilty.

The facts of the case are stated by the Court of Appeals as
follows:

“Appellant Lope Daez was the chairman of
the Liberal Party in Meycauayan, Bulacan,
and in that
capacity helped the complainant Celso Legaspi campaign for the position of Mayor of that town.  (tsn., Oct. 18, 1973, pp. 8-10) When Legaspi was already serving as
Mayor of Meycauayan, he often received
recommendations from appellant regarding the employment of certain persons in
the police or other departments of the municipality.  (tsn., August 8, 1973,
pp. 7-12; Exhibits G and H).  In 1972,
appellant recommended a certain Villareal for the
position of policeman and a certain Rubio for that of performance officer.  However, Legaspi
failed to appoint these persons.  (id.,
12-13).  This omission of Legaspi as well as the prejudice which his subsequent
renovation of the public market caused appellant’s relatives resulted in
appellant’s resentment of him.  (id., 8
and 49)

“On April 19, 1972,
while Legaspi was on leave as mayor, appellant wrote
the then acting mayor, Vicente Barazon, as follows:

“ ‘Hulo, Meycauayan

   Abril 19,1972

“Mr. Vicente Barazon

Pansamantalang
Gatpuno

“Mahal na Vice Alkalde:

“Hindi ko na kayang tiisin
ang sakit ng mga pangungusap
na inu-ukol ng taong Bayan
sa Pangasiwaan ninyo ni Alkalde,
kung kaya ipagpaumanhin ninyo na paabutin
ko sa inyo
ang mga bagay
na ito.

“Ang nakatulad ng ating
PANGASIWAAN sa unang-isang-daang-araw ay ang Pangasiwaan ni Marcos na hanggang ngayon
ay patuloy sa masamang pamamalakad.  Hanggang ma-aga ay minarapat kong tawagin
ko ang inyong
pansin upang mabigyan natin ng lunas ang
lumalaganap na di paggalang at paglayo ng Bayan
sa ating Pangasiwaan.

“Ang dahilan ay ang sumusunod:  Una, kabaligtaran ang nangyayari ngayon sa
PANGAKO natin sa Bayan; Pangalawa, iyong mga taong
naghirap sa ating ang lalaboy-laboy
samantala iyong hindi naghirap ang kasalo ninyo
sa ligaya; Pangatlo, ang masagwang
pag-aayos ninyo sa Palengke; at ang Pangapat, ang kahinahinalang
ginawi natin sa Pandayan.

“Kung tayo’y may pag-galang pa sa ating sarile ang
lunas ay nasa atin.  Samakatwid, ang matinding pagalipusta sa ating Pangasiwaan
ng maraming (ma)mamayan sa
ngayon ay mailalagay natin sa wasto
at ma-ayos na kalagayan, kung ating babaguhin ang paraan
natin sa ngayon, sa paraang
makatarungan at makatao.  Ang Lunas ay na sa
atin, sapagka’t ang Kapangyarihan na ibinigay ng
Bayan sa atin ay kasangkapan dapat nating gamitin
para maging ma-ayos ang takbo
ng (ma)mamayan.  Pagka hindi natin
ginamit ang nasabing kapangyarihan alinsunod sa batas
at ng ating concencia, alipusta at di-paggalang sa maykapangyarihan ang maghahari sa sangbayanan.  Ang nais ng bawat
taong humaharap sa bayan
ay maglingkod ng tapat
at pantay-pantay. 
Pagnakalimutan na ang mga
bagay na ito, poot, galit,
di-paggalang at alipusta ang ganting-dulot ng Bayan sa
maykapangyarihan. 
Ito ngayon ang siya kong
nadadama, huwag nating magpatuloy ito, sa lalong
madaling panahon ay bigyan natin ng
lunas upang manauli hanggang ma-aga ang pag-galang
at pag-mamahal sa atin ng bayan.

“Malaking bahagi ng tumutulong
sa atin,
malamig at hapo na, maraming kapanalig
ang nagdaramdam … ang nangyayari bang ito pababayaan nating magpatuloy?  Ang magandang kasagutan
nito ay na sa inyong dalawa ni Alkalde.

“Gumagalang

(Sgd.)
Lope O. Daez’

“On Legaspi’s
return from his leave, Barazon referred to him appellant’s letter.  (id., 44; Exhibit B) Legaspi
read the letter but did not do anything about it.  On October
3, 1972, appellant wrote Legaspi the
letter which is the subject of the present action (Exhibit A).  It read as follows:

“Meycauayan,
Bulacan

Octubre
3, 1972

‘Alkalde
Celso R. Legaspi

Meycauayan,
Bulacan

‘Ibinalita sa akin ni Engrasio
Bollas na kahapon a-2 ng Oktubre 1972, na kinausap siya (Asiong) ng iyong
ama, at sinabi sa kanya (Asiong)
ng iyong ama, (Delfin Legaspi)
na iyong sulat ko kay
Vice Alkalde Vicente Barazon
na may pecha-19 ng Abril, 1972, ay iyong (Celso R. Legaspi) ipina-serox upang gamitin mong katibayan
laban sa akin kung hindi ako magtitigil
sa paglaban sa iyong marungis, masama at napakasa-ulang pangasiwaan.

‘Marahil kaya mo na
isip bagay naa yaon ay sapagkat
ngayon ay na sa ilalim tayo ng Marcial
Law.  Ang Marcial Law ang pinakamabuting paraan naisip ng kasalukuyang
Pangasiwaan upang masugpo ang kaguluhan, upang malikom sa lalong
madaling panahon ang armas na
nakalat, upang mailigpit ang masama, bulok (Corrupt) na oficiales ng
pamahalaan at bilanggo
yaong oficiales na masiba, matakaw
sa pagtanggap ng suhol o regalo.

‘Kung ang nais mo Alkalde Celso R. Legaspi na kung kaya mo ipinaa-serox ang nasabi kong sulat
kay Vice Alkalde Vicente Barazon upang gawin
mong panakot sa akin, ikinalulungkot kong sabihin sa
iyo, Ginoong Alkalde, na, ikaw
ay nagkakamali, sapagkat walang makapipigil sa akin sa pagIaban
sa iyong marungis at sala-ulang pangasiwaan.

‘Ginoong Alkalde, ang payo
ko sa iyo,
at mag-ingat
ka, sapagkat ang ayos ng Bagong Lipunan ay sa iyo
nakatuon, sapagkat marami kang armas (baril), sala-ula at bulok ang iyong pangasiwaan, ang iyong
polisia ay tinuruan
mong maging colector mo ng tong, ang daan-libong pisong buwis ay ayaw mong ipacolecta
sa Ingat-Yaman-Bayan,
ang tanong
ng bayan,
kangino napupunta
ang daan-libong-buwis
na ito?  At mabuti
na lamang kung hindi
nahalungkat sa
fael ng army
ang Salaysay laban sa iyo nuong ikaw ay hulihin
ng 7th BCT.  Kaya mag-ingat ka Alkalde
sapagkat hindi
mabilang ang iyong atraso.  Ang bahay mo ay nakatayo
sa buhangin, mabuay
at sa bahagyang
ihip ng hangin ay babagsak.

‘Kaya dahan-dahan ka ng iyong pagsasalita,
pakilinis mo muna ang iyong conciencia
para mapanuto ang iyong pagsasalita.

Gumagalang,

(Sgd.) Lope O. Daez’

Isang sipi

Municipal Court

Municipal Council

Hepe ng Polisia’

“The under (scored) portion constitutes the basis of the libel
charge.  The record bears no translation
of this part of the letter but, substantially,
appellant charges Legaspi of having a dirty (salaula) and corrupt (bulok)
administration, of teaching (tinuturuan) his police to
become collectors of bribe money (tong) and of refusing (ayaw)
to have the Municipal Treasurer (Ingat-Yaman-Bayan)
collect (ipacolecta) hundre(d)s
of thousands of taxes (daan-libong pisong buwis).  The letter adds that the people (bayan) ask:  To whom
(kangino) do these hundre(d)s of thousands of
taxes (daan-libong buwis)
go (napupunta)? 
The letter states further that it is just as well (mabuti
na lamang)
if (kung) the statements against Legaspi (salaysay laban sa iyo) when he was arrested (nuong ikaw ay hulihin)
by the 7th BCT are not dug up (hindi nahalungkat) in the files of the army.  Appellant then warns Legaspi
to be careful (mag-iingat ka) because (sapagkat) his delinquency (ang iyong atraso) are limitless in
number (hindi mabilang).  The
letter concludes that Legaspi’s house (ang bahay mo) stood on sand (ay nakatayo sa
buhangin), unstable (mabuay),
and would tip over (babagsak) at the slight (bahagyang)
blow (ihip) of wind (hangin).

“As the letter itself stated, copies of if (sic) were furnished the
municipal court of Meycauayan, the municipal council
and the chief of police.  Aida Barazon who worked as interpreter in the municipal court
read the letter along with some of her co-employees (tsn., May 23, 1973, pp. 10 and 15) Julio Ramos, the
chief of police of the town, got his copy. 
(id., 27). 
After he had read it, he went to see appellant and asked him for the
names of the policemen referred to in the
letter.  However, appellant could
not give any.  (id., 29
and 32).  Serafin
Valenzuela, the municipal secretary, received the copy of the letter pertaining
to the municipal council and referred the same to that body.  (tsn., June 28, 1973,
pp. 5-6, 8).  Mariano Agapito,
an employee of the local waterworks, got a mimeographed copy of the letter from
a certain Councilor Francisco Ramos (tsn., May 23, 1973;
pp. 45-47; Exh. D).  Other copies were distributed around
town by a tricycle boy (tsn., August 8, 1973, pp. 18-19).

“In a meeting subsequently held at the residence of one Atty. Manalo Cruz at Hulo, Meycauayan, appellant read his October 3, 1972 letter before local party leaders,
visitors and sundry residents of the neighborhood.  (id., pp. 17-18).  Legaspi was present in that meeting and he denied the truth
of any of the accusations against him. 
(id., 23-24) At the trial of this case, complainant Legaspi
repeated his denial of the charges made against him in the letter.  He also
narrated the anxiety and embarrassment that the letter had caused him and his
family.  (Id.,
25-26).” (pp. 9-14, Rollo)

On August 25, 1975,
the trial court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.  The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, the Court declares Lope O. Daez
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of libel penalized under Articles 353 and 355 of the Revised
Penal Code by ‘prision correccional
in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos or
both, in addition to the civil action
which may be brought by the offended party.’ 
There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance proven, the
Court sentences said accused Lope O. Daez to pay a
fine of P3,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency but which in no case shall exceed Six (6)
months of arresto mayor; to indemnify the offended
party in the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos, by way of moral
damages, pursuant to Articles 100, 104 and 385 of the Revised Penal Code and
Article 2217 of the New Civil
Code and to pay the costs.” (pp. 26-27, Rollo)

Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the decision of the trial court on March 7, 1978 with
modification, by reducing the
award of moral damages to P15,000.00 (pp. 26-37, Rollo).

Hence, the accused filed the instant petition with the following
assignment of errors:

“1)     THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN INTERPRETING PETITIONER’S LETTER (EXHIBIT A) TO BE DEFAMATORY AND
FALLING WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF ARTICLE 353
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

“2)     THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING PETITIONER’S LETTER (EXHIBIT A) AS PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATION.

“3)     THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN ARRIVING AT A CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONER WAS MOTIVATED BY MALICE IN WRITING HIS LETTER
(EXHIBIT A).

“4)     THE COURT OF APPEALS
FINALLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONER OF THE CRIME CHARGED.” (p. 7, Brief
of the Petitioner)

We affirm.

Since the assigned errors herein are correlated with each other,
it would be well to discuss them jointly.

The elements of libel are: 
1) The imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; 2)
publication of the imputation; 3) identity of the person defamed; and 4)
existence of malice.

There is no doubt as to the presence of the first three elements in
the instant case.  A simple perusal of
the letter will show the injurious nature of the imputations made to the
complainant mayor.  The charges in the
disputed letter against the mayor that the latter was guilty of misconduct in
public office, bribery, malversation of public funds,
graft and corruption, if true, would
constitute actual crimes punishable under the Penal Code or special laws.  The gravity of the imputations are sufficient to impeach the complainant’s honesty, virtue, integrity and reputation as a
public official.

The matter of publication was also proven on the basis of
evidence on record as found both by the appellate court and the trial court (p.
32, Rollo). 
As indicated in the letter, copies
thereof were distributed in the municipal court and municipal council of
Meycauayan, Bulacan and
chief of police in that place.  Several
witnesses testified as to having read the libelous letter.  Further, evidence shows that petitioner even
read the questioned letter before a gathering
at a local party meeting wherein the complainant was present.

Anent the last element of malice, the law presumes that every
defamatory imputation is malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention
and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in cases concerning
privileged communications (Article 354, Revised Penal Code).  Hence, the burden of
proving justifiable motive is upon the author of the libel.

Petitioner contends that he was actuated by good intention and
social duty to bring about reforms in the administration of the municipal government of Meycauayan,
Bulacan.  Such
motive however, that led the
accused to publish the letter in question cannot be considered as constituting
a motive sufficient or justifiable for
the publication thereof.  The goodness of the intention is not always sufficient by itself to justify the publication of an injurious fact; thus the goodness
of the end is not a sufficient
motive to warrant the employment of illicit means to obtain
it.  The existence of justifiable motives
is a question which has to be
decided by taking into consideration not only
the intention of the author of the publication but all the other
circumstances of each particular
case (US v. Prautch, 10 Phil. 562).  The Court finds
that the records amply support the
findings of the appellate court
and trial court that complainant had rejected persons recommended by petitioner for employment in the municipal government and had ousted
petitioner’s relatives from the public market.  Petitioner had expressed
his resentment over complainant’s actuations in a letter earlier addressed to
the vice-mayor of Meycauyan, Bulacan (p. 35, Rollo).  There
is not even the least evidence here that the offended party performed the acts
which the petitioner attributed to him in the letter.  Neither had the petitioner shown that someone
had informed him that these misdeeds were committed by the mayor.  Thus, We cannot but rule that the prima facie
presumption malice in the case at bar has
not been overthrown.

Petitioner’s submission that the defamatory letter falls within the ambit of
privileged communications has no
basis.  The concept of privileged
communications has been explained by this Court as follows:  “A communication
made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating
has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made
to a person having a corresponding
interest or duty, although it contained criminatory
matter which without this privilege would
be slanderous and actionable.” (Harrison v. Bush 5E.
& B, 344; 1 Jur. [N.S.],
846; 25 L.J.W.Q.B., 25, cited in
Mercado v. Court of First Instance, G.R. No. L-38753, August 25, 1982, 116 SCRA 93). 
However, a written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is
published and circulated among the public (Laesa v. IAC,
G.R. No. 74907, May 23, 1988, 161 SCRA 427).

As a rule, it is the right and duty of a citizen to make a
complaint of any misconduct on the part of public officials, which comes to his
notice, to those charged with supervision over them.  Such a communication is qualifiedly
privileged and the author is not guilty of libel.  The rule on privilege, however, imposes an
additional requirement.  Such complaints
should be addressed solely to some official having jurisdiction to inquire into
the charges, or power to redress
the grievance or has some duty to
perform or interest in connection therewith (US v. Galeza,
31 Phil. 365).  In the instant case, none of the persons
to whom the letter was sent, was vested with the power of supervision over the mayor or the authority to
investigate the charges made against the
latter.

In view of the foregoing, We find that the appellate court
correctly affirmed the judgment convicting petitioner of the crime of libel
under Articles 353 and 355 of the Revised Penal Code punishable by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine
ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended
party.  In the instant case, the penalty
imposed by the trial court upon the accused, which is a fine of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency but which in no case shall exceed six (6) months of arresto mayor, and the indemnity awarded by the appellate
court in the amount of Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) pesos as moral damages to
the offended party is just and proper.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision
of the respondent appellate court dated March
7, 1978 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Gancayco, and Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., see dissent.