PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROBERTO RANOLA Y MAGDARAO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Finding the accused guilty of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic
Act 6425 as charged in the information, to wit:

“That on or about the 4th day of July, 1983, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and
deliver to Pat. Eduardo Puchero, who posed as buyer,
dried marijuana leaves in a small plastic bag, a prohibited drug, knowing the
same to be such and without any lawful authority.

“CONTRARY TO LAW.” (p.
17, Rollo)

the Regional
Trial Court of
Kalookan City,
Branch 123, in its questioned decision dated July 17, 1985, ordered thus:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered the court finds the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 4, Article
II of RA 6425 and imposes on him the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of TWENTY THOUSAND
(P20,000.00) PESOS.  The packet of
marijuana leaves are ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
Government and the Social
Worker of this Court is hereby directed to turn over said packet of marijuana
leaves after proper receipt therefor to the Dangerous
Drug Board for proper disposal of the same.

“SO ORDERED.” (p. 21, Rollo)

Hence, the accused interposed this
present appeal.  And as expected of cases
of this nature, the parties hold on to their own version of the facts.  As found by the trial court, the
prosecution’s account in brief states:

“The evidence for the prosecution showed that at about 4:25 p.m. on July 4, 1983
Pat. Eduardo Puchero and Pfc. Albino Pedria
went to Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City together with a confidential informer
after they were instructed by their chief to cause the arrest of a certain alias ‘John Lennon’ reported to
be a drug pusher.  Pat. Puchero knew who ‘John Lennon’ was even prior to July 4, 1983 and that his real name was Roberto Ranola.  He learned
all this from his informer.  After
conducting a surveillance at the place, they finally saw ‘John
Lennon’ at about 8:20 p.m.
along G. de Jesus Street,
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City.  Pat.
Puchero acted as posseur?buyer
while Pfc. Pedria stood about 5 to 8 meters away from them during the transaction.  The informer had left,

“Pat. Puchero made Contact with
‘John Lennon’, the accused herein and told him he wanted to buy marijuana.  After
a brief negotiation, the accused gave him a small plastic bag containing
the marijuana he was buying.  He gave
accused a marked ten (P10.00) peso
bill and then arrested him (TSN October 3, 1984).  Pfc. Pedria joined
him and took the marked P10.00 bill from the pocket of the accused after they had arrested him (TSN
April 26, 1984).  They brought him to Camp
Sikatuna,
Pat. Ricardo Param conducted the investigation and
referred the specimen confiscated from the accused to the PC Crime Laboratory
for the necessary examination.  The  Chemisty
Report (Exh ‘B’) showed that the
specimen was positive for marijuana.” (p. 19, Rollo)

Likewise, the court a quo summarized the evidence for the defense in this manner:

“On the other
hand, the lone witness for the
defense, who was the accused himself, testified that on July 4, 1983 at about 7:00 p.m. was going home from work
when he stopped at the corner of G. de Jesus
St., Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan
City to converse with two tricycle drivers
whom he knew.  Two persons approached them, together
with a boy who pointed to
him and said ‘Yan ho, yan
ho.’ He was immediately handcuffed and was told he
was John Lennon, a drug pusher.  He
denied this and said he
did not know any John Lennon.  The two who handcuffed him introduced themselves
as peace Officers and forced him to go with them.  They showed a plastic container to his
companions, the tricycle drivers.  The
police officers brought him to police HQ at Sikatuna, Quezon City,
where he was mauled.  They told him to make a statement but he did not
give any.  They continued mauling him and
brought him to the Fiscal, but he did
not tell the Fiscal
about the mauling because the police threatened him.” (TSN January 23, 1985) (p. 19, Rollo)

Basically, appellant submits that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.  He assails the credibility of the
two arresting officers as witnesses for the prosecution, pointing to inconsistencies and alleged
improbabilities in their respective testimonies. It is claimed that while Patrolman
Pedria testified that there were only two (2) of them involved in the buy-bust
operation (TSN, April 26, 1984, p. 4), Patrolman Puchero
states that there were three of them, including his informer (TSN, October 31,
1984, p. 6).  Appellant also insists that
since the arresting officers do not know alias JOHN LENNON as the person to be
arrested, they could not be honestly believed in their declarations.  He finally submits that, in reality, no such
buying and selling of marijuana ever occurred and that he was a victim of the
two arresting officers eagerness to please their
commanding officers in arresting anybody who may be pointed to them as alias
JOHN LENNON.

After having gone
through the records, We find no reason to alter the
trial court’s ruling.  As correctly noted
by the Solicitor General in his
Brief, the issue involved here is one of credibility of witnesses.  And like the trial court, We
believe the prosecution’s version and uphold the credibility of its witnesses.

It is a settled principle of evidence in this jurisdiction that findings of fact and
credibility of witnesses by the trial court
are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal (People v. Millarpe, 134 SCRA 555; Municipality of Victorias
v. CA, 149 SCRA 32; People v. Taduyo, 154 SCRA 350; People v. Francia,
154 SCRA 495).  Finding no indiscretion
on the part of the trial court, We apply the above
legal tenet to the case at bar.  But even
if such principle were not
invoked the fact is that the appellant
failed to controvert the more credible evidence of the prosecution pointing to
the fact that the former actually sold to Pat.
Puchero marijuana leaves for ten pesos (P10.00) in
violation of RA 6425, Sec. 4.  While
there may be some contradictions in the testimonies of the arresting officers
as to incidents in carrying out the buy-bust operation, such are minor and do
not affect their credibility (People v. Manalo, 135
SCRA 84; People v. Dava, 149 SCRA 582).  And contrary to the appellant’s claim, the
evidence shows that Pat. Puchero, who posed as buyer, came to know the person of
alias JOHN LENNON through his confidential informer while he was conducting
surveillance activities prior to the actual buy–bust operation (see TSN, October
31, 1984, pp. 6,
8).  The best evidence the appellant
could have presented, aside from his self-serving declarations, are the
testimonies of his tricycle driver friends who allegedly witnessed his arrest. 
As the trial court fittingly observed:

“He could have supported this
allegation by presenting his two friends, the tricycle drivers Boy and Kiko, who, according to his testimony were present when he was apprehended
by the two policemen, since they were conversing at that time.

‘An accused persons runs the risk of an
inference against him because of his failure to produce evidence.  Unless the failure to produce evidence is
explained away, the inference is that the tenor of the specific unproduced evidence would not support his case.’ (People v.
Santos, 91 Phil, 320)

Rule 131, Sec. 5 includes among the
disputable presumptions the following: ‘that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.’”
(RTC Decision, p. 20, Rollo)

Having failed in this respect, the above
presumption made by law operates against appellant.  All these taken together create a moral
certainty as to appellant’s guilt, compelling us to affirm the trial court’s
ruling.

In a last ditch effort to avoid liability, appellant attacks the arresting officers
motive in apprehending him. However, appellant’s allegations remain
unfounded.  As such, the legal
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed (Rule 131, Sec.
5(6)) stands.  Furthermore, as pointed
out by the Solicitor General ‘there is no showing that prosecution witnesses…
had any ill-motive against and falsely accused appellant, considering the
gravity of the offense charged… As such, their testimonies cannot be
discredited where no motive is shown why they would frame up the accused.  (People v. Lim, 71 SCRA 249 [1976]).” (Rollo,
p. 40-K).

Accordingly, We
AFFIRM the trial court’s decision.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman),
Padilla, Sarmiento, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.