PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, MARIANO R. PADILLA AND ERIBERTO MELLIZA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE CEFERINO DULAY, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRS…

The instant petition challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 437-L entitled
“Rosemary Mayordo-Alferez, joined in and
assisted by her husband, Rey Alferez,
Anita Mayordo and Teresita Mayordo vs. The Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,
Inc., et al.” on the ground that since it involves a labor dispute, it
falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) of the then Ministry of Labor.

Private respondents, Rosemary Alferez
and Teresita Mayordo, were
employed as junior representatives of petitioner Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Co., Inc.  (PLDT).

On October 17, 1979, PLDT filed with the Ministry of Labor,
Region VII Office (Cebu City) an application for
clearance to suspend and subsequently dismiss seven employees including respondents
Rosemary Alferez and Teresita
Mayordo for alleged involvement in fraudulent
transactions of PLDT stock certificates [Petition, p. 4; Rollo,
p. 5.]

On October 20, 1979 Rosemary Alferez
and Teresita Mayordo
together with their mother Anita Mayordo and Rey Alferez (husband of Rosemary)
filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City,
a verified complaint against
petitioner PLDT for damages arising from their employer’s conduct and practices
allegedly violative of the Constitution and the Civil Code provisions on
torts [“Annex B” to the Petition, pp. 9-10; Rollo,
pp. 26-27.]

From the complaint, it appears that Anita Mayordo
is the widow of the late Jose L. Mayordo, an employee
of the PLDT for eighteen (18) years who was killed by lawless elements in Marawi City
way back on June 29, 1974
while in actual performance of his
duties as radio operator.  The surviving
heirs (herein private respondents) were paid only nine thousand pesos
(P9,000.00) and to discourage them from filing suit, PLDT offered to employ the
daughters of the late Jose Mayordo, Rosemary Alferez and Teresita Mayordo, which offer was accepted by private
respondents.  Private respondents alleged
two independent causes of action against PLDT. 
The first pertains to the alleged breach by PLDT of its commitment by
suspending respondents-employees and subjecting them to harassment and
slanderous accusations of involvement in fraudulent transactions of PLDT stock certificates.  The second is a claim for damages for the
death of Jose Mayordo allegedly occasioned by the
negligence of PLDT.  They asked the court
a quo to enjoin defendants (herein
petitioners) from suspending and dismissing plaintiffs-employees from their
employment in PLDT and to award damages [Complaint, pp. 15-16; Rollo, pp. 32-33.]

Respondent judge issued
the ex-parte restraining
order prayed for (“Annex C” to the Petition.) Petitioners then
filed their Answer to the Complaint and sought the lifting of the restraining
order.  Subsequently petitioner PLDT
filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of prescription and lack of
jurisdiction but this was denied by respondent Judge.

On December 26, 1979, the
Ministry of Labor rendered its resolution on the application for clearance to
suspend and/or dismiss respondents-employees and issued an order granting the
preventive suspension requested by PLDT, but leaving the determination of the
involvement of respondents-employees in fraudulent transactions to the grievance
machinery provided for in the collective bargaining agreement [“Annex
D” to the Petition, pp. 1-3; Rollo, pp.
38-40.]  In view of the clearance granted
by the Ministry of Labor, petitioner Eriberto V. Melliza, local manager of Cebu City
branch of PLDT, issued an “inter-office” memo dated December 27,
1979 with copy
furnished to petitioner Mariano Padilla, Senior Manager of PLDT for Visayas and Mindanao, placing
respondent employees under preventive suspension for an indefinite period
effective December 28, 1979.

Upon respondent-employees’ motion, petitioners Padilla and Melliza were cited for indirect contempt for disobeying and
disregarding the Order of the court dated October 20, 1979 and were further
ordered to “desist from transferring, reassigning, suspending, dismissing
and/or in any manner harassing or disturbing the terms and conditions of
employment of plaintiffs-employees with defendant PLDT until further orders of [the] Court.” [CFI Order dated December
29, 1979; Rollo, p. 45.]

Respondent judge denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
of the Order citing Padilla and Melliza for indirect
contempt and issued an Order dated February
7, 1980 directing petitioners to comply with the previous orders of
the court.  Petitioners then filed this
instant Petition challenging the validity of the orders of respondent judge on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction.  On April 11, 1980 this Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondent judge from enforcing the
challenged Orders.

The resolution of the
issue raised by petitioner PLDT depends largely upon the determination of the
true nature of the action filed by the private respondents in the court
below.  If as claimed by private
respondents it is purely civil in nature then there is no question that the
case falls within the general jurisdiction of the regular courts and not the
NLRC.  Otherwise, if as contended by petitioners the case arose out of an employer?employee relationship, then the regular courts do
not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, jurisdiction having
been lodged with the NLRC.  This
necessarily involves a consideration of the ultimate facts alleged in the
complaint constituting the private respondents’ causes of action, for the
averments of the complaint determine
the nature of the action and, consequently, the jurisdiction of the courts [Calo v. Roldan, et al., 76 PHIL
445 (1946); Serrano v. Munoz Motors Inc., G.R. No. L-255547, November
27, 1967, 21 SCRA
1085; Union Obrera de Tabacco,
Inc. v. Quicho, G.R. No. L-25799, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 589; Vargas v. Akai Philippines, G.R. No. UDK-7927, December 14, 1987, 156 SCRA 531.]

A careful examination of
the complaint shows that while the second cause of action is purely civil in nature and hence within the general jurisdiction of
regular courts, the first cause of action arose from the employer-employee
relationship of petitioner PLDT and the respondents-employees and
therefore outside of the jurisdiction of respondent court.

Private respondents claim
that the two causes of action “while apparently separate are in fact
linked to each other in the sense that what led to the employment of
respondents-employees in the petitioner PLDT was precisely the death of their
father Jose Mayordo” and therefore they should
be tried in the same proceeding before the respondent court [Memorandum for
Respondents, p. 18; Rollo, p. 241.]

This argument is
unmeritorious.

The two causes of action
are independent of each other.  The fact
that respondents in their second cause of action also claim damages for the
untimely death of Jose Mayordo does not affect the
true nature of the first cause of action as one arising from employer-employee
relations.  If at all the two causes of
action are connected, it is but a tenuous connection.  The determination of the merits of one cause
of action does not affect that of the other.

In any case, private
respondents’ second cause of action has already prescribed.  Article 1146 of the Civil Code explicitly
provides that actions upon an injury to the right of the plaintiff and upon a
quasi-delict must be instituted within four years
from the time the cause of action accrued.  Private respondents’ right of action against
PLDT for the death of Jose Mayordo prescribed on June 29, 1978, four (4) years after
his death, while the complaint below was filed only on October 20, 1979.  They cannot now hope to erase the effect of
prescription by merely joining their claim for damages for the death of Jose Mayordo with their claim for damages for the suspension
and/or dismissal of respondents employees.

Moreover, private respondents are estopped
from claiming damages for the death of Jose Mayordo
since, by their own admission, they already received from PLDT the sum of nine
thousand pesos (P9,000.00) as indemnity for the death of Jose Mayordo [Complaint, p. 3; Rollo
p. 20.]

As to the first cause of action, private respondents cannot rely
on the ruling of this Court in Quisaba v.
Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and
Plywood, Inc., et al. [G.R. No. L-38088,
August 30,
1974, 58 SCRA 771] to bolster their claim
that the case falls within the jurisdiction of the regular court and not the
Labor Arbiters of the NLRC.

In the Quisaba case a
distinction was drawn between the right of the employer
to dismiss an employee, which is within the
competence of labor agencies to pass upon and the manner in
which the right was exercised, declared to
be intrinsically civil and cognizable only by the regular courts.  This doctrine has been abandoned by this
Court in a number of cases subsequent to Quisaba
[Atlas Fertilizer Corporation v. Navarro, G.R. No. 72074, April 30, 1987, 149
SCRA 432; Primero v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. 72644, December 14, 1987, 156 SCRA 433; Garcia v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-47629, August 3, 1978, 84 SCRA 577.]

However, it was only in the case of Primero
v. IAC, supra, where the Court categorically stated its
intention to abandon the Quisaba
doctrine.  The Court held that the
distinction laid down in Quisaba is tenuous
and difficult to observe and that the question of the legality of
the act of dismissal is intimately related to the
issue of the legality of the manner by which that
act of dismisal was
performed.  The fact that the
issue of whether or not moral or other damages were suffered by an employee and
in the affirmative, the amount to be awarded to him is determined by the Civil
Code provisions on torts and damages and not the Labor Code,
was not meant to create a cause
of action independent of that for illegal dismissal.  Whatever tribunal exercises jurisdiction over
the question of illegal dismissal also has jurisdiction over claims for moral
and exemplary damages arising from such dismissal [Primero,
supra at 445.] Furthermore, respondents in this case are not only
challenging the manner by which PLDT exercised its right to dismiss its
employees but also the validity of the suspension and threatened
dismissal of respondents-employees.

Private respondents also
contend that even assuming that the claim for damages arose from the
employer-employee relations of PLDT and respondents-employees, the regular
court still has jurisdiction over the case because pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1367, which was the law prevailing at the time the complaint was
filed, the NLRC had no jurisdiction over claims for moral damages and other
forms of damages which is precisely the nature of the claims in their first
cause of action.  They argue that “matters
arising from the injustice and unfairness committed by an employer against an
employee . . . matters about the manner such an employee is treated and its
effects, and matters about moral damages and other forms of damages are
definitely beyond the cognizance now of the
NLRC” [Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 25-26; Rollo,
pp. 248-249.]

The law governing jurisdiction over cases involving claims for
damages arising from employer-employee relations is Article 217 of the Labor
Code (Pres. Decree 442).  Prior to its
amendment Article 217 provided for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiters and the NLRC over “all money claims of workers” and
“all other cases arising from employer-employee relation unless expressly
excluded by [the] Code” [par. 3 and 5 of Article 217, Pres. Decree 442.]

On May 1, 1978,
Presidential Decree No. 1367 amended Article 217 by removing from the
enumeration of cases falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters
“money claims arising from employer-employee relations.” Furthermore,
it limited the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters over cases arising from
employer-employee relations to those which are “duly indorsed by the
Regional Directors in accordance with the provisions of [the] Code” which
in no case shall include
claims for moral and other forms of
damages.  [Abad
v. Philamgen, G.R. No. 50563, 30 October 1981, 108 SCRA 717.]

On May 1, 1980,
Presidential Decree No. 1691 substantially reenacted Article 217 in its
original form and restored to the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC their
jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in cases arising from
employer-employee relations. 
Presidential Decree No. 1691 was again amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 which took
effect on August 21, 1981.  On June 1, 1982, said Article was amended
anew by Batas Pambansa Blg.
227, vesting on Labor Arbiters jurisdiction over cases that workers may file
involving wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment and
all money claims of workers, except money claims for employees’ compensation,
social security, medicare and maternity benefits
[Sentinel Insurance Co., Inc. v. Bautista, G.R. No. 55774, February 20, 1984,
127 SCRA 623; Atlas Fertilizer Corporation v. Navarro, G.R. No. 72074, April
30, 1987, 149 SCRA 432.]

The complaint in this case was filed on October 20, 1979 when P.D. 1367 was the law applicable.  However, the amendatory provisions of P.D.
1691, which took effect during the pendency of this
case, ousted respondent court from the jurisdiction it initially had under P.D.
1367.  Jurisdiction over all money
claims, including claims for damages arising from or in connection with
employer-employee relations is now vested exclusively on the Labor Arbiters of
the NLRC.

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that where a court has
already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction
to proceed to the final determination of the case is not affected by new
legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal [Iburan v. Labes, 87 Phil. 234
(1950); Insurance Company of North America v. United States Lines Company, et
al., G.R. No. L-21021, May 27, 1966,
17 SCRA 301; Tinitigan v. Tinitigan,
Sr., G.R. No. L-45574, October 30, 1980, 100 SCRA 619; Ramos v. Our Lady of Peace
School, G.R. No. 55950, December 26,1984,133 SCRA 741.]  This rule, however is not without exception.  It is not applicable when the change in
jurisdiction is curative in character [Garcia v. Martinez,
G.R. No. L-47629, May 28, 1979, 20 SCRA 335; Calderon v. CA, G.R. No. 52235, 28
October 1980, 100 SCRA 459; Atlas Fertilizer Corporation v. Navarro, G.R. No.
72074, April 30, 1987, 149 SCRA 432; Abad v. RTC of
Manila, G.R. No. 65505, October 12, 1987, 154 SCRA 664.]

In at least four (4) cases the Court has declared that P.D. No.
1691 is a curative statute with retrospective application to pending
proceedings.  In the cases of Getz
Corporation Philippines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals [G.R. No. 59823, August 21, 1982, 116 SCRA 86]; Sentinel Insurance
Company, Inc. v. Bautista [G.R. No. 55774, February
20, 1984, 127 SCRA 623]; and Atlas Fertilizer  Corporation v. Navarro, supra,
the Court applied P.D. No. 1691 to cases filed during the effectivity
of P.D. No. 1367.

In the more recent case of Abad v.
Regional Trial 
Court of Manila [G.R. No. 65505, October 12, 1987, 154 SCRA 664] the
Court upheld the decision of the lower court giving retroactive application to
P.D. No. 1691.  The Court said:

However, whereas before jurisdiction over money claims of laborers
and employees appertained to Courts of First Instance, the same are now to be
taken cognizance of by proper authorities in the Department of Labor and
Employment.

The rule of adherence of jurisdiction
until a cause is finally resolved or
adjudicated does not apply when the change
in jurisdiction is curative in character.  Thus in the instant case, there is nothing
wrong in holding that Courts of First Instance/Regional Trial Courts no longer
have jurisdiction over aforesaid monetary claims of labor [at p. 671;
Underscoring supplied.]

There is therefore no reason why P.D. 1691 should not be given
retroactive application to this pending case. 
P.D. 1691 merely restored the jurisdiction earlier vested in Labor
Arbiters before the enactment of P.D. 1367. 
It was intended to correct a situation where two tribunals would have
jurisdiction over separate issues arising from the same labor conflict [Ebon v.
De Guzman, supra; Aguda v. Vallejos, supra; Sentinel
Insurance Company, Inc., v. Bautista, supra; Atlas Fertilizer v.
Navarro, supra.]

In any case, private respondents can still file an action before
the administrative machineries in the Department of Labor and Employment [Getz,
Corp. Phils., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra;
Atlas Fertilizer Corp., v. Navarro, supra; Abad
v. RTC of Manila, supra.]
While it is true that the respondents-employees’ cause of action has already
prescribed, since Article 291 of the Labor Code provide for a three-year
prescriptive period for all money claims arising from employer-employee
relations, equity dictates that petitioners be allowed to file the proper
action before the appropriate labor tribunal. 
At the time the petitioners filed their complaint with the then Court of
First Instance, the regular courts were the proper forum for all claims for
damages arising from employer-employee relations.  Under these circumstances, the retroactive
application of Pres. Decree 1691 should not unduly deprive petitioners of the
right to pursue their claim in the proper tribunal if they choose to do so.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED
and the assailed Orders of the respondent court are SET ASIDE.  Civil Case No. 437-L is DISMISSED without prejudice to the right of private respondents
to file appropriate action before the proper administrative body in the
Department of Labor and Employment.  The
Restraining Order previously issued by this Court is hereby made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.