PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE HONORABLE ROQUE A. TAMAYO, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT…

The main issue in the instant petition is whether or not being a
co-ordinate and co-equal court, Branch 132 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, has the power to restrain, through the issuance of
a restraining order, the execution of the judgment of Branch 145 of the same
court.

On October 20, 1983, petitioner Paper Industries Corporation of
the Philippines obtained a favorable judgment against private respondent Vicmar Development Corporation in Civil Case No. 3963
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 145
(or the Madayag court) in the sum of Three Million
Four Hundred Sixty-Two Thousand and Four Hundred Seventy Pesos and Seventy-Five
centavos (P3,462,470.75), accrued
interests in  the amount of One Hundred
Fifty-Seven Thousand and Ninety Pesos and Eighty-Two Centavos (P157,091.82) and
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as attorney’s fees.  The private respondent paid the principal
amount but did not pay the interest charges and the attorney’s fees, claiming
there was an agreement that these were waived.

On June 6,
1984, a writ of
execution was issued for the unpaid P257,091.82 since
the Madayag court agreed with the petitioner
that there was no agreement to waive the amount.

On June 13, 1984, the
sheriff levied on the machineries and equipment of the private respondent worth
One Million, Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,600,000.00) and real properties
worth no less than Three Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos (P330,000.00).

On October 14,  1984, the sheriff again levied on the logs of the private respondent worth more than Two Million, Two Hundred Ninety
Five Thousand Pesos (P2,295,000.00), which logs were subsequently bought by the
petitioner at an auction sale and later sold to Union Plywood Corporation.

Thus on December 14,
1984, the private respondent filed Civil Case No. 9301 to nullify the sheriff’s
proceedings with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the
petitioner and the sheriff before Branch 132 (or the Tamayo court) of the same court.  On February 2, 1985, this complaint was amended describing it as
an action for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.

On December
19, 1984, the Tamayo court issued a restraining order
addressed to the sheriff to
cease and desist from further taking possession of and/or disposing of
the logs.

On December
20, 1984, the
petitioner filed a motion before the Madayag court
for the issuance of an alias writ of execution in Civil Case No. 3963 which motion was granted in an order
dated January 2, 1985.

On the other hand, the private respondent obtained another restraining order in Civil Case
No. 9301 before the Tamayo court in an order dated January
7, 1985.

On January
18, 1985, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 9301 before Branch 132 or the Tamayo court on the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.  This motion to dismiss was denied in an order
dated February 20, 1985.

This order of denial was
later affirmed by the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court in a decision dated
May 20, 1985 and in a
resolution dated July 9, 1985.

In affirming the
questioned orders of the Tamayo court, the appellate
court ruled that Civil Case No. 9301 for damages with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction before Branch 132 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Tamayo court) is separate
and different from Civil Case No. 3963 before Branch 145 of the same court (Madayag court) in
that the cause of action in the former
is predicated on the failure of private respondent to ship its quota of
5,000 cubic meters of logs thereby
resulting in petitioner’s losses and 
damages.  This resulted from the enforcement of the June 6, 1984 writ of execution on October
14, 1984 when the
sheriff levied on the logs of the private respondent worth more than P2,295,000.00.  The
court stated that the sheriff’s act was made pursuant to a “dead
writ”, the levy having been effected more than
sixty (60) days after the sheriff received a copy of the June 6,
1984 writ of
execution.

The court further ruled that since the writ of execution was void, the levy made on the property was also void.  Therefore, the Madayag
court (Branch 145) never had custody over the property, subject matter of the
action.  Under this premise, the court
stated that it was the Tamayo court which acquired
custodial possession over the subject matter of the controversy, when it assumed
jurisdiction over the case for damages.

The petitioner objects to
these findings of the appellate court. 
It submits that Civil Case No. 9301, while captioned as one for damages
with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction filed before Branch 132 is
actually for the purpose of nullifying the proceedings conducted by the deputy
sheriff in Civil Case No. 3963 of Branch 145 of the same court, which it
alleges cannot be done, otherwise the former would interfere with the orders or final judgment of the latter, which is a co-ordinate or co-equal court.

As stated earlier, the
main issue is whether or not, being a co-ordinate and co-equal court, the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132 or the Tamayo court has
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 9301 with the power to issue a
restraining order to stop the execution of
the judgment of Branch 145 or the Madayag court.

While it is true that the
amended complaint in Civil Case No. 9301 is styled as for “Damages with
Prayer for Writs of Preliminary Injunctions“,
the nature of the action is not necessarily one of damage.

The well-entrenched
principle is that the facts alleged in the complaint are determinative of the
nature of the, action filed in court.  (De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis’
Society, Inc., 112 SCRA 243; Alger Electric, Inc., v. Court of Appeals, 135
SCRA 37).

An examination of the facts alleged in the amended complaint
for damages with prayer for writs of preliminary injunctions filed before
Branch 132 and docketed therein as
Civil Case No. 9301 discloses that the nature of the action involves the
writ of execution issued by Branch 145 of the same court on June 6, 1984 in
connection with Civil Case No.
3963.  The complaint questions the validity of the enforcement of the
June 6, 1984
writ of execution on October
14, 1984 by Ruben S. Nequinto, deputy sheriff of Branch 145.  It alleges that the deputy sheriff had no
more authority to enforce the writ on October 14, 1984 because the lifetime of the writ was
only sixty (60) days or up to August
12, 1984.  Pursuant to section 11, Rule 39, Rules of
Court it had become a dead writ. 
The private respondent therefore, prayed
that the court declare the nullity of the proceedings of Sheriff Ruben
S. Nequinto. 
The damages sought by the private respondent are merely the result
of the wrongful implementation of the writ of execution by the deputy
sheriff of Branch 145.  The private
respondent alleged:

xxx                               xxx                               xxx

“12.   That as a result
of the unlawful and illegal enforcement the said Writ of Execution on October
14, 1984, the plaintiff suffered damages amounting to no less than P12,000.000.00 by reason
of its failure to ship its quota of 5,000 cubic meters of logs approved by
President Marcos and negotiated for shipment to the Sheng
Kee Enterprises Co., Ltd., in Hongkong.  The 1,700 cubic meters of logs levied by the
defendants are part of the 5,000 cubic meters of logs contracted to be shipped
in full to the Sheng Kee
Enterprises Co., Ltd., in
December 1984.”‘(pp. 67-68, Rollo)

All these incidents should be threshed out in Civil Case No.
3963.  At the time the Tamayo court assumed jurisdiction of Civil Case No. 9301,
the Madayag court was still the process of executing
the judgment in Civil Case No.
3963.  The record reveals that the amount
of P257,091.82 representing the accrued interests and
attorney’s fees, which formed part of the judgment, remained unpaid by the
private respondent.  The claim of the private respondent that per verbal agreement, the petitioner waived
the payment of accrued interests and attorney’s fees is part of the
execution proceedings in Civil Case No. 3963. 
As we ruled in the case
of Seavan Carrier, Inc., v.
GTI Sportswear Corporation (137 SCRA 580):

“The general rule is ‘A case in which an execution has been
issued is regarded as still
pending so that proceedings on the
execution are proceedings in the suit. 
There is no question that the court
which rendered the general supervisory control
over its process of execution, and this power carries with it
the right to determine every
question of fact and law which may be involved in
the execution.’ (Vda. de Paman v. Seneris, 115 SCRA 709).  Moreover, it has been
stated that it is ‘when the judgment has been satisfied that the same passes
beyond review, for satisfaction thereof is the last act and end of the
proceedings.  Payment produces permanent
and irrevocable discharge.’ (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1979 ed., Vol. II, p. 405). 
(at pp. 586-587) (Emphasis supplied).

Moreover, Deputy Sheriff Nequinto who was restrained by the Tamayo
court for his acts in levying on the logs belonging to the private respondent
under the alleged dead writ of execution was a ministerial officer of the
Madayag court in relation to Civil Case No.
3963.  As such an officer, the deputy
sheriff is under the control and supervision of the Madayag court to
the exclusion of the other
courts.  The Tamayo
court never acquired
jurisdiction over him.  The alleged
irregularities in the execution of the judgment brought about by the
enforcement of a dead writ of execution must be litigated in the
Madayag court which issued the
controversial writ of execution.  Thus,
in the case of De Leon v. Salvador (36 SCRA 567), we
said:

“The decisive issue at bar is a simple one of jurisdiction; which court, Branch XII presided by Judge Cruz or Branch XIV presided by Judge Salvador
has exclusive jurisdiction to set aside for alleged irregularities the execution
sale held on February 14, 1967 by virtue of the writ for the execution of the
final judgment in the first case (No. C-189) issued by Judge
Cruz’ court and to order a new auction sale — which was the relief
sought by the judgment debtor in the second case (No. C-1217)
in Judge Salvador’s court.

“It is patent that such exclusive jurisdiction was vested in
Judge Cruz’ court.  Having
acquired jurisdiction over Case No.
C-189 and rendered judgment that had become final and executory, it retained jurisdiction over its judgment,
to the exclusion of all
other co-ordinate courts for its execution
and all incidents thereof, and to control,
in furtherance of
justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers
in connection therewith. 
Execution of its judgment having been carried out by the sheriff with
the levy and sale of the judgment debtor’s properties, Eusebio
Bernabe as judgment debtor could not in the guise of
a new and separate second action (Case No. 1217) ask another court of co-ordinate
jurisdiction, Judge Salvador’s court, to interfere by injunction with the execution proceedings, to set them aside and to
order the holding of a new execution sale — instead of seeking such relief by
proper motion and application from Judge Cruz’ court which had exclusive
jurisdiction over the execution proceedings and the properties sold at the
execution sale.  (Emphasis supplied).

xxx                               xxx                               xxx

“The court similarly ruled in Hubahib
v. Insular Drug Co., Inc., (64
Phil., 119 [1937] emphasis supplied.), with reference to Branch II of the Cebu
court of first instance having taken cognizance of an independent action for
the annulment of a writ of execution issued by Branch III of the same court
which has rendered the judgment, that ‘the institution of said action was not
only improper but also absolutely unjustified, on the ground that the appellant
had the remedy of applying to the same Branch III of the lower court, which
issued the orders in question, for reconsideration thereof x x x or of appealing from said
orders of from that denying his motion in case such order has been issued.  The various branches of
a Court of First Instance of a province or
city, having as they have the same
or equal authority and exercising as they
do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not,
cannot and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases,
much less with their orders or
judgments, by means of injunction.'” (at pp. 572-573) (Emphasis supplied).

Therefore, Branch 132 of
the Makati Regional Trial Court clearly interfered
with the execution proceedings of Civil Case No. 3963 of Branch 145 of the same
court.  The Tamayo
court abused its discretion in assuming jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 9301
to annul proceedings of deputy sheriff Nequinto by
issuing restraining orders to stop the deputy sheriff and the petitioner from
enforcing the June 6, 1984 writ of execution issued by the Madayag court in Civil Case No. 3963.  It is the Madayag court which should look into the questioned
irregularities in the sheriff’s proceedings. 
Considering that the first levy on properties allegedly worth
P1,930,000.00 was more than sufficient to answer for the unpaid interests and
attorney’s fees, why should a subsequent levy on logs still be
effected, especially whew such levy was made pursuant to a dead writ?

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.  The questioned decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.  Branch 132 of the Makati Regional Trial Court declared without jurisdiction
over Civil Case No. 9301, except to DISMISS the same.  The temporary restraining order issued on July 29, 1985 is made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.