G.R. No. 69651. June 18, 1987
EDUARDO S. SOLANTE, CELEDONIO R. ABELLA, RAYMUNDA V. TUVILLA AND ROSARIO TURIN, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPONDENT.
FERNAN, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner bondsmen
charge the Sandiganbayan with grave abuse of discretion in finding no merit in
their explanation for their failure to produce the body of their principal
when required to do so.
Said principal, Benjamin Maunes, was the postmaster of Cateel,
Davao Oriental, until he was accused of malversation of public funds before the
Sandiganbayan [Criminal Case No. 1444]. As Maunes’ bondsmen, petitioners undertook jointly and severally to
ensure that Maunes would appear in court and answer the charge against him
“in whatever Court it may be tried, and will at all times hold himself amenable to the orders and
processes of the Court, and if
convicted, will appear for judgment
and render himself to the execution thereof”. Should Maunes fail to perform any of those conditions, they
would pay the Republic of the Philippines the amount of P30,000 the payment of
which was guaranteed by a first lien constituted on the respective real
properties of the petitioners.[1]
On July 21, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted Maunes and
sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as minimum, to
18 years, 8 months and 1 day also of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
Immediately after the promulgation of the decision, the Sandiganbayan dictated an order in open court allowing Maunes to
continue enjoying temporary liberty under his original bond. The bondsmen did not object to that order.
Maunes filed in this Court a petition for review on certiorari
seeking a reversal of the Sandiganbayan decision.[2]
On October 25, 1983, this Court denied said
petition. His motion for
reconsideration of the denial resolution was likewise denied. Consequently, the resolution of October 25,
1983 became final and executory on January
30, 1984 and the record of the case was remanded to the Sandiganbayan in a
letter of transmittal dated April 9, 1984.
Two weeks later or on April 23, 1984, the Sandiganbayan required
the petitioners to produce the body of Maunes on May 21, 1984 for the execution
of its judgment. As Maunes failed to
appear in court on said date, the Sandiganbayan ordered his arrest and the
confiscation of the bond. It gave
petitioners, as bondsmen, thirty days within which to produce the body of Maunes and to explain why judgment should not be
rendered against them for the amount of their bond for Maunes’ failure to
appear in court for the execution of the judgment against him.
On July 4, 1984, petitioners submitted their explanation alleging
therein that since Maunes did not appeal the decision [which allegation is
belied by the filing of G.R. No. 65095 in this Court], they thought that they were no longer responsible for his whereabouts.
According to the petitioners, it was only on August 6, 1984 when
one of them went to the office of the clerk of court of the Sandiganbayan that
they learned about Maunes’ having appealed to this Court without the
Sandiganbayan requiring him to post bail on appeal as mandated by Section 13,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. They
also discovered a written order dated July 21, 1983, the date of promulgation
of the Sandiganbayan decision, which states thus:
“In order to give
the accused time within which to determine the course action he desires to take on the decision convicting him, he is hereby directed to appear
before this Court on
August 5, 1983, at 8:30 A.M. However, if prior thereto accused files an
appropriate pleading which prevails
or has the effect for prevailing [sic] the decision from becoming final, his appearance on said date is deemed dispensed with.
“In the meantime, accused is allowed to continue enjoying temporary liberty based on the original bond.
“So ordered.
“Given in open court this 21st day of July, 1983
at Manila, Philippines.”[3]
Petitioners also found in the record of Criminal Case No. 1444 an
affidavit dated April 27, 1981 which allegedly indicated their conformity to the reinstatement of their bond.
Contending that said affidavit was fictitious, petitioners mailed to the Sandiganbayan a
“comprehensive explanation” why they should not be compelled to
produce Maunes in court. They stated
therein that when Maunes appeared in court for the promulgation of the judgment
and he signed a copy of the decision, he “was already surrendered to, and
in complete custody of, the court”. They argued that Section 4 of Rule 114 was not observed because instead
of requiring Maunes to apply for approval of a bail bond after his conviction,
he was immediately released. They
further contended that Section 8 of Rule 114 was also overlooked by the court
as no hearing was conducted on an application for bond after conviction. They felt aggrieved because their consent to
the use of the original bond had not been secured thus depriving them of their
chance to hold Maunes and have him committed in jail.[4]
Before said “comprehensive explanation” could be
received by the Sandiganbayan, said court issued a resolution dated August 31,
1984 finding petitioners’ first explanation to be without merit and ordering
judgment against the bond. The court
stated therein that:
“It is obvious that the obligation of the bondsmen continued up/ to the
time when the Court required them
to produce the body of the accused for the execution judgment. Their excuse that they did surrender the accused on July 21, 1983 when he appeared for the promulgation of
judgment, is
without merit. They did not specifically inform the Court that
they were surrendering the body of
the accused and they no longer wanted to accept the obligation as
bondsmen after the promulgation
of the judgment of conviction because had they done so, the Court would have immediately committed the accused to
preventive detention during the pendency of any appeal that he may have taken.“[5]
Thereafter, on September 20, 1984, the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution noting petitioners’ “comprehensive explanation” with the
observation that “the same will not change the previous order of August
30, 1984” considering this Court’s pronouncement in Mabuhay Insurance
Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 32
SCRA 245.[6]
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the two resolutions on
their explanation contending that the Sandiganbayan failed to deal with their
allegation that their signatures in the
affidavit which appeared to have been executed before notary public Pedro T.
Sanico sometime after April 9, 1981 [sic], were forged.[7]
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
was set for hearing on November 29, 1984 but they moved for its postponement
alleging as grounds therefore that: [a]
notary public Pedro T. Sanico, whom they
would like to confront during the hearing, was not notified of said
hearing because of his new address, and [b] except for Celedonio R. Abella, all
the bondsmen were
septuagenarians and their travel to Manila would not only tax their failing
health but it would also drain their
financial resources especially considering the fact that they were saving money
to satisfy the judgment against their bond should their explanation fail to
satisfy the court. They prayed that
their testimonies and that of Pedro T. Sanico concerning the questioned
affidavit, be taken before any qualified officer preferably before the then
Regional Trial Court in Baganga, Davao Oriental in the form of deposition and discovery under Rule 24 of the Rules of Court.
On
December 3, 1984, the Sandiganbayan denied both petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration and motion for
postponement. The court said:
“There is a
puissant reason why We can
not impart legitimacy upon the bondsmen’s contention that their signatures
appearing on the ‘Manifestation of Conformity’ were falsified. After said manifestation was filed in Court, several notices of trial have been received by the bondsmen. And at least in two instances, they have filed their explanations, as directed by
the Court, to why judgment should not be rendered against their bonds failure of the accused to appear at the scheduled trial and promulgation of judgment
[pp. 143-150; 445,
Record]. The bondsmen never
complained about the cancellation of their bail bonds and the forgery of their signatures written on the
‘Manifestation of Conformity’. Those
occasions would have been the most auspicious for them to call the
attention of the Court that
they are no longer responsible for
the failure of the
accused to appear before the Court. If they did so and was found true, no notices of trial
and orders requiring them to explain would have been issued to them. But the bondsmen
mentioned nothing and kept silent about the alleged forgery and continued to receive notices and to respond
to the Court’s orders. They can
not now question the validity of
their signatures on the ‘Manifestation of Conformity’.
“The ‘Manifestation Conformity’ is contained in a
public document, acknowledged by the bondsmen before a notary public. The bondsmen have not introduced that
quantum of proof which will justify Us in disregarding
the contents of a public document. The biased and interested declarations of
two of the parties to such a document who
repudiate their signatures
thereon, can not overcome the evidentiary force of what is recited in the document. Accordingly, We find and hold that the signatures of the bondsmen found on the ‘Manifestation of Conformity’ dated April
27, 1981 are genuine, and
consequently, they are liable
under the terms and conditions thereof.
“As regards
the bondsmen’s motion for postponement, of the hearing of the motion for
reconsideration, We find that the same
is a mere dilatory expedient to delay execution of judgment on the bail
bonds, considering that the sole
ground invoked in the motion for reconsideration is frivolous.”[8]
Hence, the bondsmen filed the instant petition for certiorari
alleging that the Sandiganbayan exceeded its jurisdiction and abused its discretion
in: [a] issuing the order of July 21,
1983 without serving them notice, and [b] denying their motions for
reconsideration and for the postponement of the hearing of November 29, 1984.
We find that this petition for certiorari was filed for no
other purpose than to delay the forfeiture of the bail bond. Considering that one of the petitioners, Eduardo S. Solante is a
lawyer who himself prepared and filed the instant petition, it is not illogical
to presume that they know the extent of their liability under the bond and the
procedure under which they could obtain a discharge therefrom. Nonetheless, if only to enlighten them, We
shall discuss the merits of this case notwithstanding our conviction that it
should have been dismissed outright.
Petitioners contend that “their consent was never asked for
using their original bond”.[9]
They bewail the fact that they were not notified of the order of July 21, 1983 which allowed temporary liberty to Maunes after his conviction on the basis of his original bond. Yet, they fail to dispute the fact that said
order was merely a written reiteration of an oral order given in open court to
which they did not register any
objection.
Petitioners should be reminded that it is not the duty of the court to ask bondsmen whether they desire to continue their liability under
the bond after the principal has been convicted. This is clearly enunciated in Section 16, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court which reads:
“SEC. 16. Discharge
of sureties. – Upon application
filed with the court and after due notice to the fiscal,
the bail bond shall be cancelled and the sureties discharged from liability [a]
where the sureties so
request upon surrender of the defendant
to the court; [b] where the defendant is re-arrested or
ordered into custody on the same charge or for the same offense; [c] where
the defendant is discharged by the court at any stage of the
proceedings, or acquitted, or is convicted
and surrendered to serve the sentence;
and [d] where the defendant dies during the pendency of the action.” [Underscoring
supplied].
It is therefore not enough that bondsmen produce the
person of the accused at the time of the promulgation of the decision.[10]
It is also incumbent upon them to petition
the court for their discharge as sureties.[11]
Until after the accused has been surrendered and the court has ordered the
cancellation of the bond, the bondsmen’s liability continues.[12]
Petitioners should not put the blame on the Sandiganbayan for
their own failure to observe the procedure for their discharge as
bondsmen. The Sandiganbayan could not
have required the filing of a bail on appeal simply because of petitioners’ own
neglect in filing an application or petition for the cancellation of their bond. Bondsmen are not supposed to be passive in discharging their responsibilities
as such. They owe it to themselves to
exercise a modicum of initiative
especially with regard to their liabilities under the bond.
Petitioners’ effort to delay the forfeiture of the bond is
manifest in their motion for postponement of the hearing on their motion for
reconsideration. They cited as a
reason therein the fact that they were saving money in the event that the court
would not be satisfied with their explanation. Unwittingly, that allegation betrayed a knowledge on their part
that theirs was a losing proposition and their bond would eventually be
forfeited.
We are satisfied with the Sandiganbayan’s explanation why
petitioners’ assertion on the fictitious character of their affidavit of April
27, 1981 should not be given merit. We
see no plausible reason to deal further on said matter.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby
dismissed. Costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez,
Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, and Cortes, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, p. 83
[2]
G.R. No. 65095, Maunes vs.
Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines.
[3]
Rollo, p. 4
[4]
Rollo, p. 18
[5]
Rollo, pp. 14-15
[6]
Rollo, p. 20
[7]
Rollo, p. 21
[8]
Rollo, p. 27
[9]
Memorandum, p. 1; Rollo, p. 97
[10]
People vs. Celeste, L-25806,
April 29, 1977, 76 SCRA 601, 605
[11]
Mabuhay Insurance & Guaranty, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, L-28700, March 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 245, 251-252
[12]
People vs. Valle, L-18044, April
30, 1963, 7 SCRA 1025, 1027