FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. CARLOS LARIOSA AND NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Firestone Tire and
Rubber Company of the Philippibne [Firestone for brevity] assails the decision
of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission which ordered the
reinstatement without backwages of Carlos Lariosa, a dismissed tire builder of
petitioner, as having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.

The facts are as follows:

Carlos Lariosa started working with Firestone on January 3, 1972, as a
factory worker. At the time of his dismissal, he was a tire builder.

At around 2:00 o’ clock in the afternoon of July 27, 1983, as he was about to
leave the company premises, Lariosa submitted himself to a routine check by the
security guards at the west gate. He was frisked by Security Guard Ambrosio Liso
[Lizo} while his personal bag was inspected by Security Guard Virgilio Olvez. In
the course of the inspection, sixteen [16] wool flannel swabs, all belonging to
the company, were found inside his bag, tucked underneath his soiled
clothes.

As a result of the incident, Firestone terminated Lariosa’s services on
August 2, 1983, citing as grounds therefor: “steeling company property and loss
of trust.”^[1] Firestone also filed a
criminal complaint against him with the Rizal province fiscal for attempted
theft [I.S. No. 83-436-M].^[2]

Lariosa, on the other hand, sued Firestone before the Ministry of Labor and
Employment for illegal dismissal, violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and its
related rules and regulations, and damages. The Labor Arbiter, in his decision
dated May 8, 1984, found Lariosa’s dismissal justified.^[3] However, on appeal, the National Labor
Relations Commission on December 28, 1984 reversed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter [with one commissioner voting the affirmance] and held that the
dismissal of Lariosa was too severe a penalty. It therefore ordered Lariosa’s
reinstatement but without backwages, the period when he was out of work to be
considered a suspension.^[4]

Petitioner Firestone, in this special civil action certiorari,
contends that the NLRC erred in not dismissinf Lariosa’s appeal for being late,
in finding that Lariosa was not accorded due process and in reversing the Labor
Arbiter.

We shall deal first with the timeless on the appeal. It is admmitted that
Lariosa filed his appeal on June 7, 1984 or after the lapse of fourteen days
from notice of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Article 223 of the Labor Code
clearly provides for a reglementary period of ten days within which the appeal a
decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. The ten-day period has been
interpreted by this Court in the case of Vir-jen shipping and Marine
Services, Inc. vs, NLRC, G.R. Nos. 58011-12, July 12, 1982, 115 SCRA, 347,
361, to mean ten “calendar” days and not ten “working” days. However, the
“Notice of Decision” which Lariosa’s lawyer received together with a copy of the
arbiter’s decision advised them that an appeal could be taken to the NLRC within
ten “working” days from receipt of the said decision.^[5]

Mindful of the fact that Lariosa’s counsel must heve been misled by the
implementing rules of the labor commission and considering that the shortened
period for appeal is principally intended more for the employees’s benefit,
rather that that of the employer, We are inclined to overlook this particular
precedural lapse and to proceed with the resolution of the instant case.

A review of the record shows that Lariosa was indubitably involved in the
attempted theft of the flannel swabs. Durinf the investigation called by the
company’s industrial relations manager Ms. Villavicencio on July 28, 1983, or
one day after the incident, Security Guards Liso and Olvez contradicted
Lariosa’s bare claim that he had simply overlooked that he had earlier placed
them inside his bag after they were given to him by his shift supervisor while
he was busy at work. Guard Olivez stated that they were for “home use”. And when
he requested Lariosa to stay behind while he reported the matter to the
authorities, Lariosa refused and hurridely left the premisses and boarded a
passing jeepney.^[6]

From the records, it is likewise clear that Firestone did not act arbitarily
in terminating Lariosa’s services. On the contrary, there are transcripts to
prove that an investigation of the incident was promptly conducted in the
presence of the employee concerned, the union president and the security guards
who witnessed the attempted asportation. Records also belie the allegation that
Lariosa was shown his walking papers on the very day of the incident. The latter
Ms. Villavicencio to Lariosa dated August 1, 19833 informing the latter of his
dismissal effective August 2, 1983 conclusively shows that he was discharged
only August 2, 1983, after an investigation was held to ventilate the
truth about the July 27 incident.^[7]
Thus, we cannot agree with the NLRC’s conclusion that even if Firestone had
found substantial proof of Lariosa’s misconduct, it did not observe the
statutory requirements of due process.

There is no gainsaying that theft committed by an employee consititutes a
valid reason for his dismissal by the employer. Although as a rule this Court
leans over backwards to help workers and employees continue with their
employment or to mitigate the penalties imposed on them, acts or dishonesty in
the handling of company property are a differrent matter.^[8]

Thus, under Article 283 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate an
employment for “serious misconduct” or for “fraud or willful breach by the
employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or representative.”

If there is sufficient evidence that an employee has been guilty of a breach
of trust or that his employer has ample reasons to dustrust him, the labor
tribunal cannot justify deny to the employer the authority to dismiss such an
employee.^[9]

As a tire builder, Lariosa was entrusted with certain materials for use in
his job. On the day in question, he was given two bundles of wool flannel swabs
[ten pieces per bundle} for cleaning disks. He use four swabs from one pack and
kept the rest [sixteen pieces] in his “blue travelling bag.”^[10] Why he placed the swabs in his personnal
bag, which is not the usual receptacle for company property, has not been
satisfactorily explained.

If Lariosa, by his won wrongdoing, could no longer be trusted, it would be an
act of oppression to compel the company to retain him, fully aware that such an
employee could, in the long run, endanger its very viability.

The employer’s obligation to give his workers just compensation and treatment
carries with it the corollary right to exopect from the workers adequate work,
diligence and good conduct.^[1]

In view of the foregoing, We rule that Firestone had vaild grounds to
dispense with the services of Lariosa and that the NLRC acted with grave abuse
of dicretion in ordering his reinstatement. However, considering that Lariosa
had worked with the company for eleven years with no known previous bad record,
the ends of social and compassionate justice would be served if he pai full
separation pay not reistatement without baskwages as decreed by the NLRC.^[12]

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission dated December 28, 1984 is reversed and set
aside. Petitioner Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines is
directed to pay its dismissed worker Carlos Lariosa the separation pay to which
he may be entitled under the law, or any collective bargaining agreement or
company rules or practice, whichever is higher.

SO ORDERED.

Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Padilla, and Bidin, JJ. ,
concur.

Cortes, J., no part, was not yet in the Supreme Court when this case
was deliberate upon.

^[1] Rollo, p. 43.

^[2] Rollo, p. 82.

^[3] Rollo, p. 27.

^[4] Rollo, p. 20-21.

^[5] Rollo, p. 88.

^[6] Rollo, p. 43.

^[7] Rollo, p. 42-43.

^[8] Metro Drug Corporation
vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 72248, July 22, 1986, 143 SCRA 132, citing Dole
Philippines, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 55413, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 673.

^[9] Philippine Geothermal,
Inc. vs. NLRC, G. R. Nos. 55249-50, October No. 19,1982, 117 SCRA 692, 695;
Reynolds Philippine Corp. vs. Eslova, G.R. No. L-48814, June 27, 1985,
17 SCRA 259.

^[10] Rollo,
p. 93.

^[11] Jacinto vs.
Standard-Vaccum Oil Co., 70 Phil. 501; San Miguel Corporation vs.
NLRC, G.R. No. 56554, July 20, 1982, 115 SCRA 329.

^[12] Engineering Equipment Inc. vs.
NLRC, G.R. No. 59221, December 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 752; National Service
Corporation vs. Leogardo, Jr., G.R. No. 64296, July 20, 1984, 130 SCRA 502.