PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JULIA MANIEGO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Application of the established rule in this jurisdiction, that the acquittal
of an accused on reasonable doubt is not generally an impediment to the
imposition, in the same criminal action, of civil liability for damages on said
accused, is what is essentially called into question by the appellant in this
case.

The information which initiated the instant criminal proceedings in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal indicted three (3) persons — Lt. Rizalino
M. Ubay, Mrs. Milagros Pamintuan, and Mrs. Julia T. Maniego — for the crime of
MALVERSATION committed as follows:

    “That on or about the period covering the month of May, 1957 up to and
including the month of August, 1957, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and helping one
another, with intent of gain and without authority of law, did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously malverse, misappropriate and misapply
public funds in the amount of P66,434.50 belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, in the following manner, to wit:  the accused, Lt. RIZALINO M.
Ubay, a duly appointed officer in the Armed Forces of the Philippines in active
duty, who, during the period specified above, was designated as Disbursing
Officer in the Office of the Chief of Finance, GHQ, Camp Murphy, Quezon City,
and as such was entrusted with and had under his custody and control public
funds, conspiring and confederating with his co-accused, MILAGROS T. PAMINTUAN
and JULIA T. MANIEGO, did then and there, unlawfully, willfully and feloniously,
with intent of gain and without authority of law, and in pursuance of their
conspiracy, take, receive, and accept from his said co-accused several personal
checks drawn against the Philippine National Bank and the Bank of the Philippine
Islands, of which the accused, MILAGROS T. PAMINTUAN is the drawer and the
accused, JULIA T. MANIEGO, is the indorser, in the total amount of P66, 434.50,
cashing said checks and using for this purpose the public funds entrusted to and
placed under the custody and control of the said Lt.Rizalino M. Ubay, all the
said accused knowing fully well that the said checks are worthless and are not
covered by funds in the aforementioned banks, for which reason the same were
dishonored and rejected by the said banks when presented for encashment, to the
damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines, in the amount of
P66,434.50, Philippine currency.”^[1]

Only Lt. Ubay and Mrs. Maniego were arraigned, Mrs. Pamintuan having
apparently fled to the United States in August, 1962.^[2] Both Ubay and Maniego entered a plea of
not guilty.^[3]

After trial
judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance^[4], the dispositive part whereof reads:

“There being sufficient evidence beyond reasonable doubt against the accused,
Rizalino M. Ubay, the Court hereby convicts him of the crime of malversation and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal of TWELVE
(12) YEARS, ONE (1) DAY to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS, and a fine of
P57, 434.50 which is the amount malversed, and to suffer perpetual special
disqualification.

“In the absence of evidence against accused Julia
T. Maniego, the Court hereby acquits her, but both she and Rizal T. Ubay are
hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the amount of P57,434.50 to the
government.”^[5]

Maniego sought reconsideration of the judgment, praying that she be absolved
from civil liability or, at the very least, that her liability be reduced to
P46,934.50^[6] The Court declined to
negate her civil liability, but did reduce the amount thereof  to
P46,934.50.^[7] She appealed to the Court
of Appeals^[8] as Ubay had earlier
done.^[9]

Ubay’s appeal was
subsequently dismissed by the Appellate Court because of his failure to file
brief.^[10] On the other hand, Maniego
submitted her brief in due course, and ascribed three (3) errors to the Court
a quo, to wit:   

1)  The Lower Court erred in holding her civilly liable to indemnify the
Government for the value of the checks after she had been found not guilty of
the crime out of which the civil liability arises.

2)  Even assuming
arguendo that she could properly be held civilly liable after her acquittal, it
was error for the lower Court to adjudge her liable as an indorser to indemnify
the government for the amount of the checks.

3)  The Lower Court erred in
declaring her civilly liable jointly and severally with her co-defendant Ubay,
instead of absolving her altogether.^[11]

Because, in the Appellate Court’s view, Maniego’s brief raised only questions
of law, her appeal was later certified to this Court pursuant to Section 17, in
relation to Section 31, of the Judiciary Act, as amended, and Section 3, Rule 50
of the Rules of Court.^[12]

The
verdict must go against the appellant.

Well known is the principle that
“any person criminally liable for felony is also civilly liable”^[13].  But a person adjudged not criminally
responsible may still be held to be civilly liable.  A person’s acquittal of a
crime on the ground that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt^[14] does not bar a civil action for
damages founded on the same acts involved in the offense.^[15] “Extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise
did not exist.”^[16]

“Rule 111 SEC. 3(b) — Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.  In
other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the
jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be
liable for restitution of the thing and reparation of indemnity for the damage
suffered.” (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).

Hence, contrary to her submission^[17],
Maniego’s acquittal on reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation imputed to
her and her two (2) co-accused did not operate to absolve her from civil
liability for reimbursement of the amount rightfully due to the Government as
owner thereof.  Her liability therefor could properly be adjudged, as it was so
adjudged, by the Trial Court on the basis of the evidence before it, which
adequately establishes that she was an indorser of several checks drawn by her
sister, which were dishonored after they had been exchanged with cash belonging
to the Government, then in the official custody of Lt. Ubay.

Appellant’s
contention that as mere indorser, she may not be made liable on account of the
dishonor of the checks indorsed by her, is likewise untenable.  Under the law,
the holder or last indorsee of a negotiable instrument has the right to “enforce
payment of the instrument for the full amount thereof against all parties liable
thereon.”^[18] Among the “parties liable
thereon” is an indorser of the instrument i.e., “a person placing his
signature upon an instrument otherwise than as maker, drawer, or acceptor **
unless he clearly indicates by appropriate words his intention to be bound in
some other capacity.”^[19] Such an
indorser “who indorses without qualification,” inter alia “engages that
on due presentment,** (the instrument) shall be accepted or paid, or both, as
the case may be, according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored, and the
necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof
to the holder, or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay
it.”^[20] Maniego may also be deemed an
“accomodation party” in the light of the facts, i.e., a person “who has
signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving
value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other
person.”^[21] As such, she is under the
law “liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder
at the time of taking the instrument knew ** (her) to be only an accommodation
party”^[22], although she has the right,
after paying the holder, to obtain reimbursement from the party accommodated,
“since the relation between them is in effect that of principal and surety, the
accommodation party being the surety.”^[23]

One last word.  The Trial Court
acted correctly in adjudging Maniego to be civilly liable in the same criminal
action in which she had been acquitted of the felony of Malversation ascribed to
her, dispensing with the necessity of having a separate civil action
subsequently instituted against her for the purpose.^[24]

WHEREFORE, the
judgment of the Trial Court, being entirely in accord with the facts and the
law, is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against the
appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco,
and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

^[2] CFI
Record, Vol. II, pp. 122-125; 156-157.

^[3] CFI Record, Vol. I, p. 32.

^[4] Bearing date of June 10, 1964, but
promulgated on August 6, 1964.

^[5]
Rollo, pp. 24-44; CFI Record, Vol. II, pp. 163-183; underscoring
supplied.

^[6] CFI Record, Vol. II,
pp. 188-192.

^[7] Id., p.
211.

^[8] Id., p.
212.

^[9] Id., pp.
186-187.

^[10] Rollo, pp.
72, 96.

^[11] Id., p. 54;
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 42-43.

^[12]
Id., pp. 93-95.

^[13] ART.
100, Revised Penal Code.

^[14] Sec.
2, Rule 133, Rules of Court [of 1964].

^[15] ART. 29, Civil Code; Laperal de
Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558, citing Oro v. Pajarillo, 23 Phil.
484; Padilla v. CA, May 31, 1984, 129 SCRA 558 (565-566) citing PNB
v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286, De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558,
People v. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748 and Castro v. Collector of Internal
Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093.

^[16]
Sec. 3 [c], Rule 111, Rules of Court [of 1964].

^[17] Invoking Almeida, et al., v.
Abaroa, 8 Phil. 178; Wise & Co. v. Larion, 45 Phil. 314;
Francisco v. Onrubia, 46 Phil. 327.

^[18] Sec. 57, Act No. 2031.

^[19] Sec. 63, id.

^[20] Sec. 66, id.

^[21] Sec. 29, id.

^[22] Id.

^[23] Philippine National Bank v. Maza and
Mecenas, 48 Phil. 207.

^[24]
Padilla v. CA, supra, citing Sangco, Phil. Law on Torts and Damages,
pp. 288-289.