FRANCISCA SALOMON AND ABRAHAM GATDULA, PETITIONERS, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND FROILAN BLANCO AND ARACELI CALIMBAS, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision
of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in AC-G.R. CV No.
70059 reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bataan (now Regional Trial Court) in Civil Case No. 3861
entitled, “Francisca Salomon and Abraham Gatdula
v. Araceli Calimbas and Froilan Blanco.”

The antecedent facts in this case are as follows:

Macario Salomon was the registered
owner of Lot No. 50 of the Pilar Irrigation Cadastre,
containing an area of 638 square meters, and covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 283 of the Registry of Deeds of Bataan.  He is the father of petitioner Francisca
Salomon and Josefa Salomon, who is now deceased.  The latter had two children, namely
petitioner Abraham Gatdula and Rogelio Gatdula.

On July 11, 1941, OCT No. 283 was cancelled by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 5333 in favor of the children of Macario
Salomon, namely:  Francisca Salomon,
married to Florencio Buenaflor,
1/2 share of the lot, and Josefa Salomon, married to
Ramon Gatdula, 1/2 share.  Josefa Salomon and
her husband Ramon Gatdula died in 1950 and 1951,
respectively.

After the war, petitioner Francisca Salomon, acting as the administratrix of said lot, permitted Felisa
Calimbas, mother of respondent Araceli
Calimbas, to construct a house of light materials on
said lot, on the condition that Felisa Calimbas shall pay the taxes thereon, take good care of the
fruit trees on the lot and to vacate the land should the owners decide to use the same or should the latter
dispose or sell it to other persons.

Sometime in 1973, petitioner Salomon learned that the respondent Araceli Calimbas built a house of
strong materials on the lot.  An inquiry
from the Office of the Register of Deeds disclosed that TCT No. 5333 was cancelled and TCT No. 7544
was issued on May 22, 1958 in the names of: 
Francisca Salomon, widow – 1/2 share; Rogelio Gatdula,
married to Teresita Sangalang,
1/4 share; and Abraham Gatdula, single, 1/4
share.  Records also disclosed that on
the same date, TCT No. 7544 was cancelled and TCT No. 7545 was issued in the name of respondent Araceli
Calimbas.  The
basis of the said cancellation was a certain Extra
judicial Partition with Absolute Sale purportedly executed on August 10, 1953 before respondent Froilan Blanco, then Justice of the Peace of Pilar, Bataan,
by petitioners Salomon and Abraham Gatdula and by the
deceased co-owner Rogelio Gatdula.

Petitioner Salomon submitted xerox
copies of the said deed for examination and analysis.  The findings of the PC Crime Laboratory at Camp
Crame
revealed that the petitioners’ signatures, as appearing in the said document
were forgeries.

The case was thereafter brought by petitioner Salomon to the
Special Action Unit of Malacañang and to the Office
of Civil Relations of Camp Crame.  However, respondent Araceli
Calimbas still refused to return the property subject
of this case.  Hence, petitioners filed
the complaint on June 19, 1974
with the trial court to nullify the Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of
Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1953,
to cancel TCT Nos. 7544 and 7545 and to restore the efficacy of TCT No. 5333.

Respondents filed their answers denying the facts in the
complaint and contending that sometime in the first week of August, 1953,
petitioner Francisca Salomon and the respondent Calimbas
agreed to the sale of the aforementioned lot for P450.00, and that the
petitioner Francisca Salomon undertook to have all the necessary documents
prepared.  They further submit that
petitioner Salomon supplied the technical description of the lot covered by TCT
No. 5333, and gave the names of Rogelio and Abraham Gatdula
and her own name to be placed as owners in the document; that respondent Calimbas thereafter requested co-respondent Blanco, then
Justice of the Peace, to prepare the document based on facts given by
petitioner.  Respondents also tried to
show that on August 9, 1953,
Calimbas paid P450.00 as consideration to petitioner
Salomon who signed the receipt of payment in the presence of co-petitioner
Abraham Gatdula and Rogelio Gatdula,
in the house of Salomon at Caloocan
City.  Maximo Inlong and respondent’s brother Miguel Calimbas
acted as witnesses.  Respondents further
claimed that the following day, Salomon, Abraham and Rogelio Gatdula signed and ratified the Extrajudicial Partition and
Deed of Absolute Sale in the presence of respondent Calimbas
before Froilan Blanco as Justice of the Peace.  Blanco and Basilio Ontingco, a mail carrier, both acted as witnesses to the
signing.  In May, 1958, respondent Calimbas allegedly brought the aforestated
signed document and TCT No. 5333 to the Register of Deeds for
registration.  The title on the lot was
finally transferred in the name of respondent Calimbas.

On May 5, 1981,
the Court of First Instance of Bataan (now Regional
Trial Court) rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which states:

“RESULTINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered:

“1.     Declaring as null
and void the Extra-judicial Partition and Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1953;

“2.     Cancelling Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7544 and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7545 covering Lot 50 of the Pilar (Bataan) Irrigation
Cadastre;

“3.     Restoring the
efficacy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5333, likewise, covering Lot
50 of the Pilar (Bataan)
Irrigation Cadastre;

“4.     Ordering defendant
Araceli Calimbas to remove
at her presence her house constructed on Lot 50 and directing the said
defendant to pay to plaintiffs the amount of P50.00 as reasonable monthly
rental on Lot 50 since the construction of her house on the said lot;

“5.     Restoring
plaintiffs to the possession of Lot 50;

“6.     Directing
defendants; jointly and severally, to pay attorney’s fees the sum of P3,500.00 and to pay cost of the suit.

“SO ORDERED.” (p. 35, Rollo)

In the meantime, petitioner Salomon filed Administrative Case No.
2505-MJ with the Supreme Court against Froilan
Blanco, Justice of the Peace of Pilar, Bataan.  In a decision dated November 12, 1981, this Court found the
respondent guilty of notarizing the deed of partition and sale
in the absence of one of the supposed deponents, namely petitioner herein.

Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court in the civil case, the respondents Blanco and Calimbas appealed to the respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court.

On January 8, 1985,
the respondent appellate court rendered judgment reversing the decision of the
trial court.  The dispositive
portion of the judgment states:

“WHEREFORE, the
decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and set aside and another judgment is rendered dismissing the complaint
and ordering plaintiffs-appellees to jointly and
severally pay appellant Araceli Calimbas
P10,000.00 and appellant Froilan Blanco P2,500.00 for attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation plus costs.

“SO ORDERED.” (pp. 46-47, Rollo)

Hence, the instant petition was filed, praying for a reversal of the above-mentioned decision
in favor of private respondents, with the petitioner assigning the following
errors:

“a)     RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK, OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS AND RULINGS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT IN ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER NO. 2505-MJ ENTITLED ‘FRANCISCA
SOLOMON V. JUDGE FROILAN BLANCO’;” (p. 10, Rollo)

“b)     RESPONDENT
COURT COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTION BEING FOR
ANNULMENT ON THE GROUND OF FRAUD HAD PRESCRIBED AFTER THE LAPSE OF FOUR
YEARS.” (p. 11, Rollo)

“c)     RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTION IS BARRED BY LACHES.” (p. 12, Rollo)

“d)     THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS TO JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY PAY
PRIVATE RESPONDENT ARACELI CALIMBAS P10,000 AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT
FROILAN BLANCO P2,000 FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND EXPENSES AND LITIGATION PLUS
COSTS.” (p. 13, Rollo)

In its first assigned error, petitioner alleges that the
respondent appellate court did not give credence to the findings of PC Document
Examiners Doctura and Tabo
who found the signatures of petitioners on the questioned document as forged,
even as this Court had already ruled on the
correctness of such findings in Administrative Matter No. 2505-MJ against Judge
Froilan Blanco who notarized the questioned deed of
Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale in the absence of the supposed vendors, petitioners
herein.

On this matter, the appellate court reversed the factual findings
of the trial court and held as follows:

“This Court is convinced that the findings of Doctura and Tabo have only
persuasive effects and not necessarily conclusive upon this Court.  The positive testimonies of the witnesses to
the execution of said document are entitled to some weight as there is no
reason for them to be interested in this case, especially so in the case of Basilio Ontingco.

“x x x.

“The Court may disregard the findings of a handwriting expert14.  Indeed in some
instances, the report of even NBI handwriting experts are rendered of doubtful
integrity as sometimes forgers possess better skills than genuine writers
themselves15, and that, in general, an expert’s testimonies are based on
conjectures16. 
Judges are not bound by the testimony of expert witnesses when the
question is the determination of genuineness of handwriting by comparison.  They may arrive at their own conclusion17.” (pp. 44-45, Rollo)

We find the petitioners’ allegations in its assigned error
meritorious.  Although courts are not
ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place whatever weight they
choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case.  The relative weight and sufficiency of expert
testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide,
considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the
witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has
supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he
testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for
study or observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other
matters which serve to illuminate his statements.  The opinion of the expert may not be
arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all the
facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly fails,
the expert opinion may be given
controlling effect (20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058).  The problem of the credibility of the expert
witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the
trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that
discretion.

The records show that respondents Araceli
Calimbas and Froilan Blanco
presented as witnesses Blanco himself both as judge notary and subscribing
witness to the said deed, and Basilio Ongtingco, as the other subscribing witness, who both
affirmed the genuineness of the said document. 
On the other hand, petitioners presented Manuel Doctura,
Officer-in-Charge of the Questioned Document Section, PC Crime Laboratory, and Crispina Tabo, who had been a
document examiner for 10 years at the PC Crime Laboratory at Camp
Crame.  Doctura testified
that the signatures of petitioners on the deed of extra-judicial partition and
absolute sale did not appear to be the same signatures of the vendors,
petitioners herein, appearing on other documents bearing their undisputed
signatures.  The respondents Calimbas and Blanco admitted the competency and
qualification of witness Doctura as a handwriting
expert although the latter died before he was cross-examined.  Nonetheless, his testimony on the forged signatures was not
stricken out from the records and was in fact corroborated by the other expert witness Tabo.  Tabo was directed by
the court to compare the questioned signatures supposedly made in 1953
with the undisputed standard signatures made by petitioner Salomon in the years
1946, 1951 and 1952 (TSN, Crispina Tabo, December 15, 1976). 
After noting the several differences between the standard signatures and
questioned signatures, document examiner Tabo
likewise testified and concluded that the signatures in the disputed document
were not made by petitioner
Salomon.

In placing greater weight to the testimonies of the handwriting
experts than to the testimonies of the judge notary and subscribing witness Ongtingco, the trial court said inter alia:

“This Court is prone to believe the position taken by
plaintiffs.

“To prove the forgeries, no less than PC document examiners Doctura and Tabo testified and
were in unison in their conclusion that the signatures of both Francisca and
Abraham on the document (Exhibit A; Exhibit 2) were not theirs after comparison
with their sample standard signatures (Exhibits C, M, M-1 to M-7, N, N-1 to
N-17, O, O-1, P, P-1 to P-7, Q, Q-1, to Q-4).

“Defendants parried the claim of forgery by presenting
documents (Exhibit 6, 6-A, 6-B, 7, 7-A) to prove that the signatures of
Francisca and Abraham really belonged to them. 
They tried to prop up their stand by the testimonies of subscribing
witnesses – the judge and the mail carrier-that all the parties did really sign
the document.

“The Court accords greater respect to the testimonies of Doctura and Tabo, experts to the
very line which is the subject of examination, that is
handwritten.  This especially when they
arrived at their unanimous, verdict after comparison of the questioned
signatures of Francisca and Abraham on documents executed close and proximate to August 10, 1953, the date of the
execution of the questioned documents (Reyes v. Vidal, 96 Phil. 130) (sic).

“As against the testimonies of the subscribing witnesses to the
document in question, the judge acting as notary public ex officio,
who in defense of his position would naturally
not dispute the authenticity of the very document he had notarized, and the
mail carrier who was merely picked up by Araceli at
the spur of the moment, this court would give greater and heavier weight and
credence to the expertise of document examiners Doctura
and Tabo testifying on technical matters which beyond
doubt are their domain (Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, L-31494, Jan. 23, 1978, 81
SCRA 153″ (pp. 29-32, Rollo).

Aside from relying on the expert testimonies, the trial judge
also based its conclusion of forgery on the physical appearance and condition
of the questioned document.  As observed
by the trial court:

“The aforementioned defects in the document would show how
inaccurately and hurriedly it was prepared and in the process vital data were
misstated and some necessary details added. 
The characteristic haste in the preparation of the document was best
exemplified in the typographical errors and erasures apparently pictured
thereon muddling the document’s facial authenticity.

“Even the identity of the one who prepared the document was
quandary by itself.  For in her Answer
(par. 5(c)) the document while in her testimony (tsn,
pp. 6, 7, 8, October 17, 1977)
she claimed she was the one responsible for its preparation.  Even the judge chipped in the confusion when
he assuredly stated that he prepared the document upon instructions of Araceli who supplied him some of the data (tsn, p. 3, 4, 5, May
3, 1979).  From the very
appearance of the document it could be gauged that Araceli
threw into the lap of the judge the job of completing the contents thereof
through various additions and in the absence of plaintiffs.” (pp. 32-33, Rollo).

We accord respect to the conclusions of the lower court.  The condition and physical appearance of a
questioned document may help in determining whether it is genuine or forged. 
Subscribing witnesses may forget or exaggerate what they really know,
saw, heard or did; they may be biased and therefore, tell only half truths to
mislead the court or favor one party to the prejudice of the other.  This cannot be said of the condition and
physical appearance of the questioned document itself (Junquera
v. Borromeo, et al., No. L-18498, March 30, 1967).  Moreover, factual findings show, and these
were not overturned by the appellate court, that petitioner Salomon was not
present during the time that the questioned document was allegedly signed and
ratified before judge–notary
Blanco.  The totality of evidence on
record and the existence of several factors and circumstances surrounding the
disputed deed of partition and sale, which We shall
enumerate herein, leave no alternative to this Court but to accept the
conclusion that the said deed was forged. 
These are:  1) the expert
testimonies of two handwriting experts both declaring that the signatures of
petitioners in the deed were forged; 2) the inconsistent allegations of the
respondents in their answer and in their testimonies as to who took charge of
the preparation of the questioned document; 3) the physical appearance of the
document showing several typographical errors and insertions on its face; 4)
the discrepancies and mistakes in the facts and contents of the said document;
5) the visible difference between the signatures of petitioner Abraham Gatdula in the first and second pages of the document as correctly examined by the trial
court; 6) the absence of petitioner Salomon during the time of the alleged
signing and notarization of the document before Justice of the Peace Froilan Blanco.

Thus, it is error for the respondent appellate court to disregard
the findings of the trial court. 
Although the rule is settled that the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are final and non-reviewable on appeal, this
case, however, falls within the exceptions to this rule, wherein the factual
findings of the respondent appellate court are contrary to those of the trial
court and are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence.  In this case, We
find that a reversal of the findings of the appellate court becomes
proper.  It is generally recognized that
the conclusions and findings of facts by the trial court are entitled to great
weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless for strong and cogent reasons
because the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence as
well as to observe the demeanor of witnesses while testifying on the case (Macua v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. 70810, October
26, 1987, 155 SCRA 29).  No compelling
reasons or clear specific contrary evidence are cited by the respondent
appellate court to justify the reversal of the lower court’s findings.  Between the factual findings of the appellate
court and the trial court, the trial court’s conclusion must prevail over the
appellate court (Teodoro v. Court of Appeals, 55 SCRA
547).

Anent their second assigned error, petitioners allege that the
issuance of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7545 to respondent Araceli Calimbas was by means of
forgery of the questioned document and is therefore, null and void; that since
an action to declare the nullity of a contract does not prescribe under the
law, the respondent appellate court erred in ruling that petitioner’s action
was brought beyond the prescribed period of four years in cases of annulment of
contracts.

This contention is impressed with merit.  Article 1391 of the Civil Code provides that
an action to annul a contract on the ground of vitiated consent must be filed
within four years from the discovery of the vice of consent.  The case at bar however, involves not a voidable contract tainted with fraud, mistake, undue
influence or intimidation as grounds for its nullification but a contract that
is totally null and void.  Petitioners
declared in their complaint that they had not signed nor acknowledged the
questioned deed of extra-judicial partition with absolute sale of the
land.  This We
found to have been sufficiently proven as found by the trial court.  This means that they had not given their
consent to the sale of the lot in favor of respondent Calimbas.  Hence, the absence of such consent made the
said document null and void ab initio and is subject to attack at any time
(Baranda v. Baranda, No.
73275, May 20, 1987, 150 SCRA 59). 
Moreover, it is recognized in our jurisprudence that a forded deed is a
nullity and conveys no title (Director of Lands v. Seymour Addison, et al., 49
Phil. 19).  In view thereof, Article 1410
of the Civil Code clearly provides that an action to declare the inexistence of
void contracts does not prescribe (Teja Marketing v. IAC, 148 SCRA 347).  Likewise, We have
consistently ruled that when there is a showing of such illegality, the
property registered is deemed to be simply held in trust for the real owner by
the person in whose name it is registered, and the former then has the right to
sue for the reconveyance of the property.  The action for the purpose is also imprescriptible.  As
long as the land wrongfully registered under the Torrens
system is still in the name of the person who caused such registration, an
action in personam will lie to compel him to reconvey the property to the real owner (Baranda v. Baranda, No. 73275,
May 20, 1987, 150 SCRA 59).

In their third assignment of error, petitioners submit that they
have not incurred laches in seeking the return of the
property; that after their discovery of the issuance of TCT No. 7545 in the
name of respondent Calimbas in 1973, they took
immediate steps to vindicate their rights on the said lot.

Concerning this matter, the respondent appellate court said
otherwise.  It found from the records
that petitioner Salomon went home every year to Pilar
Bataan since 1953 and visited Felisa
Calimbas in the latter’s house on the lot.  It likewise held that in the case of
petitioner Abraham Gatdula, the latter admitted that
from time to time he went to the municipal building which is near Calimbas house.  From
these facts, the appellate court concluded that it is improbable that
petitioners could not have noticed the house of strong materials built on the
questioned lot during the period of time from 1953 up to 1976 when petitioners
filed their action.

We disagree.  The facts
cited above do not sufficiently prove laches on the
part of petitioners.  Laches,
in a general sense, means the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that, which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have done earlier.  It is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or
declined to assert it (Chung Ka Bio, et al. v. IAC, G.R. 71837, July 26, 1988).

What the records clearly show is that petitioner Francisca
Salomon admitted that she went to the municipality
of Pilar
once or twice from 1953 and 1972 to attend fiestas (TSN, Francisca Salomon, May
28, 1975).  This, however, does not
establish in any manner, that she had in fact, actually seen the construction
of the house by respondent Calimbas during the said
period.  Likewise, although co-petitioner
Abraham Gatdula often went to the municipal building
in Pilar, he could not see the house of respondent Calimbas because it was partly hidden from view, and that
he could not establish the exact year when he first noticed the new house
during the period between 1952 and 1972 (TSN, Abraham Gatdula,
July 2, 1975).  Records show that when
petitioners discovered in 1972 the cancellation of title in their names, they
immediately took steps to protect their rights to the land, by:  1) the filing of an adverse claim with the
Register of Deeds of Bataan on June 21, 1973; 2) submission of copies of the deed of
extrajudicial partition and sale to the PC Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame for examination and analysis of the signatures
appearing thereon; 3) the filing of an administrative case with the Supreme
Court against respondent Judge Froilan Blanco wherein
We found the latter guilty as charged; and 4) the filing of Civil Case No. 3861
against respondents for nullification of title issued in the name of respondent
Calimbas.  The
diligence of petitioners as shown above in pursuing their interests cannot be
gainsaid.  Further, the length of time
which had elapsed from the date of transfer of title in 1958 up to the time the
complaint was filed in 1974, which amounted to sixteen (16) years, is not too
unreasonable to permit the assertion and enforcement of petitioners’ rights to
their land, taking into account the imprescriptibility
of the action herein and the distance of the disputed lot in Bataan from the places of residence of petitioners
especially that of Salomon.

Finally, in view of the foregoing discussion, We
find that the award of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation by the
respondent appellate court in favor of respondents as against petitioners is
unjustified and has no legal basis. 
Clearly, the case filed by the petitioners is not an unfounded civil action but on the contrary, a
legal course of action to vindicate their rights to the land.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED.  The decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court (now Court of Appeals) dated January 8, 1985 is hereby reversed, and the
decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) dated March
5, 1981 in Civil Case No. 3861 is reinstated.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, and Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., on leave.